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Archive for the ‘accidents’ Category

Per PHMSA:

  • At approximately 02:30 PDT (05:30 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT)) on October 2, 2021, Beta Offshore’s control room personnel received a low-pressure alarm on the San Pedro Bay Pipeline, indicating a possible failure.
  • Beta Offshore reported the San Pedro Bay Pipeline was shut down at approximately 06:01 PDT (09:01 EDT) on October 2, 2021—over three hours later.

Comment: Very interesting finding. Good to learn that the pipeline pressures were being monitored. Need to see the pressure history for the pipeline and hear from the crew before reaching any conclusions regarding the conduct of the operator.

Also note that PHMSA is estimating that the spill volume was 700 barrels, far less than the 3000+ bbl maximum estimate. Further, a footnote in the PHMSA letter reports an updated company estimate of 588 barrels. I’m assuming that the refined estimate was based on meter differentials. These lower estimates are more in line with the oil recover data that have been provided and the visual images of the slick.

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The evidence to date indicates that the leak was detected by visual observation of the oil slick. There are some reports that the slick and associated smell were evident on Friday night (10/1). The pipeline operator Amplify issued a statement advising that they first observed an oil sheen on Saturday morning (10/2), which is when the response was initiated. Nothing in Amplify’s statement suggests that a drop in pipeline pressure or a reduction in the flow rate at the onshore terminal was observed.

So, what do the regulations require with regard to leak detection? It depends whether the pipeline is regulated by the Department of Transportation (DOT) or the Department of the Interior (DOI/BSEE). This is how DOI authority is delineated:

DOI pipelines include:
(1) Producer-operated pipelines extending upstream (generally seaward) from each point on the OCS at which operating responsibility transfers from a producing operator to a transporting operator;
(2) Producer-operated pipelines extending upstream (generally seaward) of the last valve (including associated safety equipment) on the last production facility on the OCS that do not connect to a transporter-operated pipeline on the OCS before crossing into State waters;
(3) Producer-operated pipelines connecting production facilities on the OCS;
(4) Transporter-operated pipelines that DOI and DOT have agreed are to be regulated as DOI pipelines; and
(5) All OCS pipelines not subject to regulation under 49 CFR parts 192 and 195.

Unless provision (4) applies, the Elly to shore pipeline is either a producer or transporter-operated pipeline (depending on how the Amplify’s San Pedro Bay Pipeline Co. is classified) that falls under DOT jurisdiction. DOT leak detection requirements (49 CFR 195.134) are new as of 10/1/2019 and do not take effect until 10/1/2024. Unless DOI or similar leak detection requirements are being applied (by agreement, condition of approval, or some other administrative means), there are no such requirements for this pipeline.

Assuming the protection specified below for DOI pipelines is being required, why wasn’t the leak detected and production shut-in. This will be determined during the investigation, but the most probable explanation is that the pressure sensor was set too low, perhaps because the pipeline’s operating range is broad. With regard to a volumetric comparison system (250.1004 (5)), I don’t get the sense that such a capability was in place. If it was, the operator should be able to provide a good estimate of the amount of oil that was spilled (i.e. Elly output – onshore input – any oil recovered from the line after the leak was detected).

§ 250.1004 Safety equipment requirements for DOI pipelines.

(3) Departing pipelines receiving production from production facilities shall be protected by high- and low-pressure sensors (PSHL) to directly or indirectly shut in all production facilities. The PSHL shall be set not to exceed 15 percent above and below the normal operating pressure range. However, high pilots shall not be set above the pipeline’s MAOP.

(5) The Regional Supervisor may require that oil pipelines be equipped with a metering system to provide a continuous volumetric comparison between the input to the line at the structure(s) and the deliveries onshore. The system shall include an alarm system and shall be of adequate sensitivity to detect variations between input and discharge volumes. In lieu of the foregoing, a system capable of detecting leaks in the pipeline may be substituted with the approval of the Regional Supervisor.

One would hope that this major spill will lead to an independent review of the regulatory regime for offshore pipelines. Consideration should be given to designating a single regulator that is responsible and accountable for offshore pipeline safety (a joint authority approach might also merit consideration) and developing a single set of clear and consistent regulations.

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Per the latest update from the Unified Command, a total of only 75 barrels of oil have been recovered (up from 29 bbls reported on Sunday). The 75 bbls no doubt includes some water. It’s unclear as to why so little oil has been recovered (unfavorable offshore conditions? response focused on the shoreline?). Perhaps the volume of oil spilled was less than the 3000 barrel estimate. A few hundred barrels of oil can generate a very large slick.

As BOE and others have suggested, the most likely cause of the spill was a ship’s anchor. SkyTruth’s review of satellite data points to that possibility.

SkyTruth image

The Orange County District attorney seems unhappy with the possibility that (1) the pipeline was struck by an anchor and (2) the leak was in Federal waters:

The Orange County district attorney, Todd Spitzer, said he has investigators looking into whether he can bring state charges for the spill. Spitzer said his jurisdiction ends 3 miles offshore.

Spitzer also said Amplify’s divers should not be allowed near the pipeline without an independent authority alongside them.

AP article

The DA’s insistence that independent divers accompany the company’s divers may be a first in the history of the US offshore program. Isn’t video documentation sufficient? Diving is not risk free.

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Cleanup contractors unload collected oil in plastic bags trying to stop further oil crude incursion into the Wetlands Talbert Marsh in Huntington Beach, Calif., Sunday, Oct. 3, 2021. One of the largest oil spills in recent Southern California history fouled popular beaches and killed wildlife while crews scrambled Sunday to contain the crude before it spread further into protected wetlands. (AP Photo/Ringo H.W. Chiu)
AP Photo/Ringo H.W. Chiu
  • Large, sudden pipeline spills are usually caused by external impacts (e.g. anchor dragging). If that was not the case, the spill was presumably caused by significant, undetected corrosion.
  • The internal (smart pig) and external inspection history of the pipeline will be an important part of the investigation.
  • Another important consideration is the extent to which pressure and volumetric monitoring systems were in place and functioning. Early reports imply that the leak was not discovered until the slick was observed on the water surface.
  • An excellent 2008 case study details the challenges that were experienced in internally inspecting this pipeline. This presentation provides good background information on the pipeline and the initial internal inspection efforts.
  • Why isn’t BSEE, the Federal bureau that inspects the Beta Unit facilities and approves the spill response plan, part of the Unified Command? BSEE is also a leader in spill response research.
  • Per the Unified Command, 1218 gallons of oil-water mix were recovered as of Sunday. This is pretty minimal – only 29 barrels (including water) and <1% of the estimated spill volume, but is not atypical for mechanical spill response operations. It may also be that the 3000 bbl spill estimate was overly conservative (i.e. high).
  • Also per the Unified Command: “One oiled Ruddy duck has been collected and is receiving veterinary care. Other reports of oiled wildlife are being investigated.” If this was the extent of wildlife impacts as of Sunday, some of the reporting on this spill has been hyperbolic.
  • A comprehensive review of the balkanized regulatory regime for offshore pipelines is long overdue, as is an update to Federal pipeline regulations.
  • This spill, Hurricane Ida, and offshore COVID issues have further demonstrated the importance of BSEE. Why has the Administration still not appointed a BSEE Director? Keep in mind that this appointment does not require Senate confirmation.

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No photo description available.
Platforms Ellen and Elly
  • Pipeline carries oil from Platform Elly in Federal (OCS) waters to onshore processing facility in Long Beach
  • Operator: Beta Operating Co.
  • Platform complex is 8.6 miles from shore
  • Estimated spill volume: 3,000 bbls
  • Slick first evident on Saturday (10/2) about 3 miles from shore
  • Oil has reached shoreline at Huntington Beach
  • Production has been shut-in; unclear as to whether the leak has been sealed
  • No information on the cause of the leak

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This comment by the late John Borne, an outstanding USGS and MMS engineer/philosopher, reflects on the persistent vessel allision incidents over the years. The reporting of these incidents was spotty, but some could not be denied. Pictured below is the State Command arriving in Morgan City (~1973?) topped by a platform deck. Fortunately, the platform was unmanned and there were no injuries to vessel personnel. You could say this was the first floating production platform 😃

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While the official BOEMRE-USCG and National Commission/Chief Counsel investigation reports were quite good and there are countless court documents and ad hoc reviews of the blowout, some important Macondo issues have not been fully addressed. BOE will touch on these issues periodically starting with the decision to terminate the top kill operation on 5/28/2010.

The top kill operation (see diagram above) was intended to overcome and halt the flow of oil by pumping heavy mud into the well bore.  The operation was not successful because the pumping rate and mud weight did not generate sufficient pressure.  Per an excellent paper by Dr. Mayank Tyagi and colleagues at LSU  (Analysis of Well Containment and Control Attempts in the Aftermath of the Deepwater Blowout in MC252):

It is very likely that if the top kill had been designed to deliver more than 109 bpm of 16.4 ppg drilling fluid below the BOP stack for a sustained period, the Macondo blowout could have been stopped between May 26-28, 2010. Given that the well was successfully shut-in with the capping stack in July, and that the subsequent bullhead (static) kill was successful, certainly a higher rate top kill would have been successful at that time.

The American Thinker, citing the New York Times, reports that Energy Secretary Chu stopped the top kill operation over the objections of some BP engineers. While it was reasonable to be concerned about possible casing leaks and the fracturing of subsurface formations, the subsequent (7/15/2010) closure of the capping stack demonstrated that the well had sufficient integrity to support the top kill operation. Questions regarding why a higher rate top kill effort was not attempted and how that decision was made are therefore important and merit discussion. Did the Macondo well flow unnecessarily into the Gulf for an additional 48 days (5/28-7/15)? Did the National Incident Command facilitate or delay source control?

Keep in mind that the NIC almost made a similar mistake in July. Even after the capping stack successfully shut-in the well on 7/15, Incident Commander Thad Allen (USCG) continued to call the closure of the capping stack a temporary test and threatened to require BP to resume flow from the well. Fortunately, informed input from experienced engineers prevailed. The well remained shut-in and the static well-kill operation was successful.

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For illustration only - One of Shell's platforms in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico / Image by Stuart Conway - Photographic Services, Shell International Limited.

Attached is an outstanding presentation by Jason Mathews that reviews the latest Gulf of Mexico incident data and trends. The collection and analysis of incident data are critical to safety achievement and continuous improvement, and are among an offshore energy regulator’s most important functions. Kudos to BSEE’s Gulf of Mexico Region for their timely and comprehensive reviews and alerts.

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Noble’s Aug. 29 statementNoble’s Sept. 2 statement
Each rig successfully secured its respective well in progress and took evasive actions to avoid the storm’s path.” (No mention of the delay in relocating the Globetrotter II or the rig, riser, and LMRP damage already reported on social media.)“several riser joints and the lower marine riser package separated from the rig during the storm and sank to the seabed.” (Confirms social media reports.)
“All personnel are safe and accounted for.” (No mention of the injuries alluded to in social media reports.)A small number of crew members were treated for minor injuries.” (The actual number was 9, i.e. not a small number, 4 of whom had to be transported to shore for further evaluation.)
“One of the ship’s cofferdams in the moonpool area sustained damage.” (Update: The storm broke part of the hull, which allowed water into some compartments. Per the ship’s master, the vessel was not in distress and not actively taking on water.)

In a proper safety culture, you don’t downplay serious incidents and you never declare victory. Spin control is for politicians, not safety leaders. The Globetrotter II, with 140 workers aboard, was slammed by a major hurricane, perhaps unnecessarily. After the frightening social media reports, Noble released an “all is well” statement that minimized the significance and potential consequences of the delayed rig relocation. Noble continued to downplay the incident when they update their statement 5 days later.

The Coast Guard and BSEE will be investigating the Globetrotter II relocation, and their findings will be of great interest. Noble has historically been a very good drilling contractor with a strong commitment to safe operations. Hopefully, they and others will learn and apply lessons from this and similar events that have occurred in the Gulf and elsewhere. Companies may also want to assess the compatibility of their messaging practices with their commitment to a robust safety culture and continuous improvement.

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