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Posts Tagged ‘oil spill’

Rules of thumb for offshore spills:

  • The initial spill estimates are low; often by a lot
  • The estimates of oil recovered are high and unverified

Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP) spill:

  • product spilled: Venezuelan crude
  • first observed:  2/26 at approximately 0400
  • initial spill volume estimate: <100 barrels (bbls)
  • 3/3: spill volume update: 300 bbls
  • 3/5: final spill volume update: 750 bbls; volume reaffirmed on 3/17 and 2/26
  • reported cause: material failure in a section of the cargo transfer hose during a crude oil transfer between the offshore facility tanker
  • estimate of oil recovered: 655–664 bbls (>87%!)

Comments:

  • According to a Unified Command interview, the spill volume estimate was based on visual observations and estimates of the volume of oil recovered. Neither are reliable indicators of the volume actually spilled.
  • Was the volume transferred being metered at the vessel and LOOP, such that meter differentials could indicate the actual spill volume?
  • The spill was first observed at night. What procedures were in place for monitoring the transfer operation for potential leaks?
  • LOOP first reported a spill estimate of <100 bbls, subsequently increased to 300 bbls, and then 750 bbls.
  • The oil recovery estimate of 655-664 bbls is highly suspect unless the spill was much larger than reported. Recoveries >50% are unlikely for open water spills. (Typically <20% is recovered.)
  • How were the oil recovery estimates determined? Is data available on the total fluid recovered and water content?
  • NOAA reports that the spill response and repair were postponed due to hazardous offshore conditions. This makes the spill and recovery numbers even more suspect.
  • Ed Tennyson, a leading authority on oil spill response capabilities and a former colleague, was skeptical of oil recovery claims. When on-scene, he would ask to see the recovered oil and data on how the volumes were determined.
  • Hopefully, the investigation report will be timely and comprehensive.

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Per the latest update from the Unified Command, a total of only 75 barrels of oil have been recovered (up from 29 bbls reported on Sunday). The 75 bbls no doubt includes some water. It’s unclear as to why so little oil has been recovered (unfavorable offshore conditions? response focused on the shoreline?). Perhaps the volume of oil spilled was less than the 3000 barrel estimate. A few hundred barrels of oil can generate a very large slick.

As BOE and others have suggested, the most likely cause of the spill was a ship’s anchor. SkyTruth’s review of satellite data points to that possibility.

SkyTruth image

The Orange County District attorney seems unhappy with the possibility that (1) the pipeline was struck by an anchor and (2) the leak was in Federal waters:

The Orange County district attorney, Todd Spitzer, said he has investigators looking into whether he can bring state charges for the spill. Spitzer said his jurisdiction ends 3 miles offshore.

Spitzer also said Amplify’s divers should not be allowed near the pipeline without an independent authority alongside them.

AP article

The DA’s insistence that independent divers accompany the company’s divers may be a first in the history of the US offshore program. Isn’t video documentation sufficient? Diving is not risk free.

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No photo description available.
Platforms Ellen and Elly
  • Pipeline carries oil from Platform Elly in Federal (OCS) waters to onshore processing facility in Long Beach
  • Operator: Beta Operating Co.
  • Platform complex is 8.6 miles from shore
  • Estimated spill volume: 3,000 bbls
  • Slick first evident on Saturday (10/2) about 3 miles from shore
  • Oil has reached shoreline at Huntington Beach
  • Production has been shut-in; unclear as to whether the leak has been sealed
  • No information on the cause of the leak

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oil-eating bacteria

Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute scientists have published important new findings on the rapid bacterial degradation of the Macondo spill.

They found that bacterial microbes inside the slick degraded the oil at a rate five times faster than microbes outside the slick—accounting in large part for the disappearance of the slick some three weeks after Deepwater Horizon’s Macondo well was shut off.

 

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Dauphin Island tarballs, May 2011

Cheryl’s update after reviewing the latest reports:

  • There is a USCG unified command specific to BP spill residue after storms.
  • The tarballs are not considered toxic, just an unattractive nuisance.
  • Tarball cleanup on Dauphin Island was halted on May 1 to protect nesting birds.
  • BP estimates a total Macondo spill volume of about 4 million bbl as opposed to the government estimate of 4.9 million bbl.
  • BP estimates that 850,000 barrels were captured, burned or skimmed off the water.
  • 1,260 people remain employed in spill cleanup as of [July 14, 2011], down from a peak of 48,200 a year ago

Articles of interest:

Alabama.com

WALA New Orleans

Bloomberg Business Week 

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Very interesting findings for those interested in the fate of spilled oil:

The deep sea entrainment of water-soluble hydrocarbons has far-reaching implications for deep water oil spills. Our results demonstrate that most of the C1-C3 hydrocarbons and a significant fraction of water-soluble aromatic compounds were retained in the deep water column, whereas relatively insoluble petroleum components were predominantly transported to the sea surface or deposited on the seafloor, although the relative proportions are not known.

The resulting apportionments of hydrocarbon transfers to the water column and atmosphere are therefore very different for a deep water oil spill versus a sea-surface oil spill. During seasurface oil spills, highly water-soluble components such as BTEX, C3-benzenes, and naphthalene quickly volatilize and are rapidly lost to the atmosphere within hours to days, thereby limiting the extent of aqueous dissolution into the water column. In the case of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, however, gas and oil experienced a significant residence time in the water column with no opportunity for the release of volatile species to the atmosphere. Hence, water-soluble petroleum compounds dissolved into the water column to a much greater extent than is typically observed for surface spills.

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from Platts Oilgram News:

Representatives Ed Markey of Massachusetts and Rush Holt of New Jersey introduced the so-called No Free Inspections for Oil Companies Act (H.R. 2566) July 15, in reaction to House Republicans’ proposal for funding the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement. About $35 million short of the Obama administration’s request, the GOP’s $154 million budget rejected new and more expensive fees on offshore operators. The administration wanted to ratchet up industry fees to $65 million a year, from $10 million, to pay for a tougher inspections regime.

The annual inspection fees debate, a budget season ritual for 20+ years, has picked up intensity and financial significance in the post-Macondo spotlight. However, discussions about regulatory philosophy and the fundamental program decisions that dictate inspection strategy are still absent. Safety and pollution prevention are the goals, not inspections. While inspections are an essential part of any safety regime, they are just one component of a comprehensive regulatory program. More inspections would not have prevented Macondo. Better standards, training, technology, and attention to prior incidents (most notably Montara) may have.

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The oil is most likely from natural seeps, but the Coast Guard is investigating.  Link provided by Cheryl Anderson:

An MH-65 helicopter flew over the area Wednesday evening just before sunset but did not spot any spill or sheen, or any other oiled birds. Coast Guard officials tell KEY News they have contacted the owners of the oil platforms in the channel but none of them have reported a spill or had transferred any fuel or oil in the past day.

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Links

Animation of Transocean’s BOP analysis

Transocean’s BOP Defense:

Forensic evidence from independent post-incident testing by Det Norske Veritas (DNV) and evaluation by the Transocean investigation team confirm that the Deepwater Horizon BOP was properly maintained and did operate as designed. However, it was overcome by conditions created by the extreme dynamic flow, the force of which pushed the drill pipe upward, washed or eroded the drill pipe and other rubber and metal elements, and forced the drill pipe to bow within the BOP. This prevented the BOP from completely shearing the drill pipe and sealing the well.

In other words, Transocean contends that properly maintained BOPE was not up to the task of shutting-in and securing a high-rate well. If true, this finding has significant implications for the offshore industry.  I’m looking forward to reading the government’s findings on the BOP failure when the Joint Investigation Team report is issued next month.

 

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Hundreds of witnesses expected.

The trial won’t proceed quickly, if the parties call all the witnesses on their lists.

Transocean’s roster of 304 included 82 of its own employees, 87 from oil company BP, and 18 from cement contractor Halliburton.

BP listed 71 witnesses from Halliburton, 110 others, plus anyone else who has been or will be deposed.

The United States listed 56 from BP, 32 from Halliburton, and 76 others.

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