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Posts Tagged ‘decommissioning’

Excerpts from a stunning Sable update issued by Hunterbrook Media LLC (“Hunterbrook“) on November 14, 2025:

  • SEC filing reveals Sable entered October about a month from potential bankruptcy. The company had $41.6 million as of September 30, with $39.7 million in average monthly burn in 3Q25.  
  • When Sable announced its $250 million financing on November 10 at $5.50 per share, the company likely had single digit millions in the bank based on its reported burn, against over $163 million in accounts payable and accrued liabilities. Sable does not generate any revenue.
  • Sable needs to raise significantly more money: According to leaked audio of Sable’s CEO briefing for select investors, the company will require $2.3 billion to achieve commercial production of oil and gas from its three platforms off the coast of Santa Barbara.
  • That includes at least $900 million to buy out Exxon, to which Sable must pay 15% interest on debt due by March 31, 2027. By then, the loan would be about $1.1 billion, accruing $200 million in added debt.
  • One of Sable’s only known assets other than the oil and gas project is a private plane the company purchased from its CEO, Jim Flores. The plane recently flew round-trip from Houston, where Flores lives, to Louisiana, in time for a football game at the CEO’s alma mater.

Comments from Santa Barbara County Supervisor Steve Lavagnino, an oil industry supporter, that explain his opposition to the transfer of Exxon’s pipeline permit to Sable:

“The final straw for me was a Hunterbrook article, which was as disturbing as anything I’ve read. I have many friends in the oil industry and I will continue to support efforts to access our natural resources, but it has to be done responsibly by operators who put safety above profits.”

Sable’s limited response to the Hunterbrook report includes information on decommissioning financial assurance:

  • Sable’s original SYU Purchase and Sales Agreement (PSA) with Exxon required Sable to post a $350 million decommissioning bond “150 days following the resumption of production from the wells.”
  • According to Sable, production resumed on May 15, 2025. The bond would have thus been required in October. (SYU production was halted by court order on June 6, so that “resumption date” may be irrelevant. Regardless, the Oct. financial assurance deadline is immaterial given the recent update to the PSA.)
  • The PSA update extended the date for posting the decommissioning bond to three business days following the new Exxon Loan Maturity Date of March 31, 2027 or 90 days after first sales of hydrocarbons, whichever comes first. (Note the change in language from “resumption of production” to “first sales.” Brief well test production does not trigger posting of the decommissioning bond.)
  • Under certain circumstances after the bonding is in place Exxon may seek an increase in the bonding amount to $500 million.

The decommissioning obligations are moot if Sable runs out of funds or is unable to resume SYU production prior to the 3/31/2027 PSA deadline. Exxon would remain fully responsible for SYU decommissioning.

Is it time for a public statement from Exxon on the SYU and Sable?

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The Dept. of the Interior is currently reconsidering approval of the Construction and Operations Plan for the Maryland Offshore Wind Project (US Wind).

Attached is a court filing challenging Delaware’s approval of the Coastal Construction Plan for that project. Some interesting points from the filing:

  • Maryland local governments declined to allow the transmission lines from the Maryland Offshore Wind Project to come ashore in their jurisdictions.
  • The Governor of Delaware agreed to allow the transmission lines to make landfall at the Delaware Seashore State Park.
  • The transmission pipelines would then traverse the adjacent Delaware Bays, to an inland substation, from which the power would be sent to Maryland.
  • US Wind applied for a number of permits from the Delaware Department of Natural Resources (DNREC) specific to horizontal directional drilling, laying cable pipelines, and other coastal construction activity.
  • The approval process, including provisions for public input, was not consistent with State regulations.
  • The Secretary’s decision to issue the beach construction permit is supported virtually exclusively by documents which were submitted by US Wind after the close of public comment.
  • Decommissioning and financial assurance information, a favorite BOE topic for both wind and oil/gas, was submitted after the close of the public record.

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JL Daeschler informs that UK offshore wind energy is 82% foreign-owned. Foreign companies are thus the primary beneficiaries of the UK’s generous renewable energy subsidies (chart below).

David Turner comments as follows in his informative piece on UK wind energy:

We have been warning for some time that it is crazy for a developed economy to try and run its electricity generation system using technologies that are dependent on the weather. Even though there has been only a relatively modest decline in wind output this year, the operators and owners of wind farms are learning the hard way that it is very difficult to run a business that is at the mercy of the vagaries of the weather. Many of these companies are up to their eyeballs in debt. They better hope the wind blows hard this Autumn and Winter so they can collect higher subsidies, or they will be in real trouble.

We have consistently raised concerns about decommissioning financial assurance for offshore wind facilities. Turner echoes those concerns noting that the wind industry’s perilous finances are an even bigger reason to insist that proper funds are set aside to fund decommissioning or the long-suffering taxpayer will be on the hook for another hidden cost of renewables.

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Attached is the Dept. of the Interior’s Semiannual Regulatory Agenda (9/22/2025). BSEE and BOEM decommissioning rules are excerpted below.

Of particular concern is the revised BOEM regulation (107) that “would reduce the amount of supplemental financial assurance required from oil gas, and sulfur lessees operating on the OCS.” See our previous post on this regulatory action. Note that a proposed rule is expected to be published by year end.

  1. REVISIONS TO DECOMMISSIONING REQUIREMENTS ON THE OCS [1014–AA53]
    Legal Authority: Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 1331 to 1356a
    Abstract: This proposed rule would address issues relating to (1) idle iron by adding a definition of this term to clarify that it applies to idle wells and structures on active leases; (2) abandonment in place of subsea infrastructure by adding regulations addressing when BSEE may approve decommissioning-in-place instead of removal of certain subsea equipment; and (3) other operational considerations.
    Timetable:
    NPRM ……………… 07/00/26
    NPRM Comment Period End: 10/00/26
  1. RISK MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL ASSURANCE FOR OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LEASE AND
    GRANT OBLIGATIONS [1010–AE26]
    Legal Authority: 43 U.S.C. 1331, OCS Lands Act; E.O. 14154, Unleashing American Energy
    Abstract: This proposed rule would rescind BOEM’s final rule ‘‘Risk Management and Financial Assurance for OCS Lease and Grant Obligations.’’ The proposed rule would revise the criteria for determining whether oil, gas, and sulfur lessees, right-of-use and easement grant holders, and pipeline right-of-way grant holders are required to provide financial assurance above the current minimum bonding levels to ensure compliance with their Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Lands Act obligations. This rule, if finalized, would reduce the amount of supplemental financial assurance required from oil gas, and sulfur lessees operating on the OCS and would support the goals of E.O. 14154; Timetable: NPRM ……………… 01/00/26

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A long-time colleague is very familiar with Judge Lamberth, a Reagan appointee, and thinks highly of him. Orsted has a lease contract, and no matter where you stand on offshore wind, you have to have a compelling case to halt a project that is in the advanced stages of development. Judge Lamberth ruled that the govt doesn’t have such a case. Per the judge:

  • The govt presented insufficient evidence to support alleged permit noncompliance and national security concerns.
  • The govt acted in an “arbitrary and capricious” manner.
  • “If Revolution Wind cannot meet benchmark deadlines, the entire project could collapse.”
  • “There is no doubt in my mind of irreparable harm to the plaintiffs.”

Projects under development will be difficult to pause or stop. The Administration should focus on requiring sufficient decommissioning financial assurance, monitoring and mitigating project impacts, making incident data publicly available, issuing the report on the Vineyard Wind blade failure (finally!), and improving the availability of dispatchable power (i.e. natural gas and nuclear).

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Massive swell at Platform Esther, 12/24/2024 – Christmas gift for surfers

Eloquent eulogy by DCOR (platform operator) CEO Alan Templeton: Last Sunday, August 10, I joined a small group of DCOR personnel on Platform Esther to witness her final moments of operation. At exactly 3:00 p.m., we pressed the ESD on the production deck, and one by one, the sounds of compressors and pumps faded until the platform fell silent — a profound and bittersweet moment in California’s energy history.

For over half a century, Esther stood off the coast of Orange County, first installed in the early 1960s as one of California’s iconic man-made oil islands. She blended into the horizon while quietly producing oil and gas, surviving storms, and later being rebuilt in 1985 into the platform we know today. More than just steel and pilings, Esther was a proving ground for innovation, a dependable asset, and a source of pride for the men and women who worked safely on her decks.

While she has now been permanently shut in, her legacy remains — a testament to the ingenuity, resilience, and dedication that have defined California’s offshore industry for generations.

Litigation prematurely ended production at Esther, which would have had an estimated 15 more years of operative life. The attached settlement agreement, shared by John Smith, ends a dispute between the State Lands Commission and DCOR over repurposing a pipeline to transport oil from state Platform Eva to Federal Platform Edith (diagram above).

In exchange for relinquishing its mineral rights and decommissioning Platform Esther, the settlement grants DCOR a $10 million royalty credit on future oil produced from Platform Eva. This credit is significantly less than the value of remaining production from Esther.

Platform Esther, is one of three remaining oil production platforms in California state waters.

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Ørsted’s stock price plummeted on Monday following the announcement of a $9.4 billion rights issue to fund the Sunrise Wind project. The share price has remained depressed (chart below).

Also, although Ørsted attributes its financial woes to the change in US policies, it’s apparent in the second chart (5 year trend) that the decline in Ørsted’s valuation has been ongoing since 2021.

In March, Fitch downgraded Ørsted’s rating to BBB from BBB+, and its subordinated rating to BB+ from BBB-. Further downgrades would seem to be a distinct possibility.

Meanwhile, decommissioning financing for the 3 Ørsted projects under construction in the US Atlantic is far from assured:

  • Revolution Wind: As they did for Vineyard Wind, BOEM approved Ørsted’s request to defer full decommissioning financial assurance until 15 years after the beginning of construction (see attached letter). This approval was prior to the Renewable Energy Modernization Rule (effective June 29, 2024), which eliminated the need for such waivers.
  • Sunrise Wind: Ørsted is now solely responsible for funding and constructing this project given the company’s failure to find investment partners. Presumably, decommissioning financial assurance was not required given BOEM’s latitude under the so-called “Modernization Rule.”
  • South Fork Wind: As is the case with Sunrise Wind, BOEM presumably allowed Ørsted to defer financial assurance for decommissioning as permitted by the “Modernization Rule.”

According to Ørsted, almost 70% of the turbines are installed at Revolution Wind and the first foundations have been installed at Sunrise Wind. South Fork Wind, 12 turbines and an offshore substation, is complete.

Given Ørsted’s strained finances, will BOEM now opt to require decommissioning assurance as provided for in 30 CFR § 585.517?

Ørsted’s situation is atypical in that the Danish government owns a majority (50.1%) stake in the company and Equinor, which is 2/3 Norwegian govt owned, holds a 9.8% stake. How will government ownership factor into BOEM decisions regarding decommissioning assurance? Note that Norwegian govt lobbying may have been one of the factors influencing the decision to allow the resumption of construction on Equinor’s Empire Wind project.

Meanwhile, two Danish opposition parties are calling for the state to relinquish its ownership stake in Ørsted.

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The Dept. of the Interior is reviewing offshore wind regulations including “the Renewable Energy Modernization Rule, as well as financial assurance requirements and decommissioning cost estimates for offshore wind projects…”

Concerns about offshore wind financial assurance were first raised on this blog in response to a precedent setting waiver of the “pay as you build” requirement. Vineyard Wind was authorized to defer providing the full amount of required decommissioning financial assurance until year 15 of actual operations.  The waiver request, which had been denied in 2017, was resubmitted in 2021 and approved. This questionable decision was consistent with the administration’s enthusiastic promotion of accelerated offshore wind development.

BOEM’s streamlining rule codified the deferred financial assurance option. The rule authorizes the transfer of decommissioning risks from developers to taxpayers and consumers by (1) not requiring any additional supplemental financial assurance at the Construction and Operations Plan (COP) approval stage, (2) not requiring supplemental assurance at the installation stage, and (3) providing for incremental supplemental assurance post-installation (e.g. for Vineyard Wind, the full amount is not due until 15 years after installation). See the rule’s previous and current language in the table below (emphasis added).

30 CFR 585.516 – What are the financial assurance requirements for each stage of my commercial lease?

financial assurance required before BOEM will: language prior to 4/24/2024 “modernization” rulecurrent language
Approve your COPA supplemental bond or other financial assurance, in an amount determined by BOEM based on the complexity, number, and location of all facilities involved in your planned activities and commercial operation. The supplemental financial assurance requirement is in addition to your lease-specific bond and, if applicable, the previous supplement associated with SAP approval.There is no supplemental bond requirement at the COP approval stage.
Allow you to install facilities approved in your COPA decommissioning bond or other financial assurance, in an amount determined by BOEM based on anticipated decommissioning costs. BOEM will allow you to provide your financial assurance for decommissioning in accordance with the number of facilities installed or being installed. BOEM must approve the schedule for providing the appropriate financial assurance coverage.A supplemental bond or other authorized financial assurance in an amount determined by BOEM based on anticipated decommissioning costs of the proposed facilities. If you propose to incrementally fund your financial assurance instrument, BOEM must approve the schedule for providing the appropriate financial assurance.

The current financial assurance language is fuzzy enough that BOEM could deny deferred funding requests and require full financial assurance at the time facilities are installed. However, revising the language to clearly require that assurance be fully demonstrated prior to installation would provide clarity and eliminate the deferral option going forward.

The more difficult challenge may be adjusting financial assurance requirements for the projects already under construction. It’s also important to ensure that parent corporations are not shielded from decommissioning and other liability risks.

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MV Times -blade replacement continues

MV Times: “The recent site visit raised questions on the production of the wind farm. The Times has been able to neither verify the report independently nor confirm disparities between visuals on the ground and the Iberdrola report.”

  • Avangrid, an Iberdrola subsidiary and one of Vineyard Wind’s developers, reported that 17 out of 62 turbines were currently sending power to the Massachusetts grid.
  • The MV Times counted between five and nine turbines spinning at different points, and for different intervals, in their two hour visit.
  • BOE comment: Although there are many possible reasons for this discrepancy, it’s reasonable to question the absence of turbine output data. Developers assert that generator specific data are sensitive and could have market implications. However, these turbines are operating on public lands and were in part publicly funded. Output data and other performance metrics clearly have policy implications.
  • Note that Iberdrola “expect[s] no impact from new federal budget legislation, as it doesn’t impact 1,000 megawatts under construction.”

An MV Times photo of a Vineyard Wind substation is pasted below. These substations are large structures. Per the Construction and Operations Plan (COP) for Vineyard Wind, the topsides for a conventional electrical service platform (ESP) (also known as an offshore substation or OSS) are 45 x 70 x 38 m, which is larger in surface area than a typical 6-pile oil and gas platform (~30 x 30 m), and is comparable in size to a large jackup drilling rig.

Decommissioning financial assurance requirements were relaxed to reduce development costs, thus increasing taxpayer liability risks. This policy decision should be reviewed.

Vineyard Wind substation

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Background: On February 12, 2024, the bankruptcy court approved the sale of certain Cox Operating assets to Natural Resources Worldwide LLC (NRW), a company that “does not mine, drill, or produce minerals, has no operations, and conducts business solely in an office environment.”

NRW contracted with Array Petroleum to operate the former Cox Assets. Array subsequently sued NRW, asserting that NRW received $78,000,000 in revenue, but disbursed only about $48,000,000 to pay Array’s invoices and those of the subcontractor.

The court filing claimed that NRW failed to pay Array $2.5 million, the subcontractors $10.7 million, and the United States $12 million. A large share of the subcontractor costs were probably for well operations given that 21 Array workover applications were approved in 2024 and 2025. The $12 million due to the Federal government is reportedly for royalty payments. Were any revenues set aside for decommissioning liabilities?

Array’s lawsuit was dismissed by the court on January 3, 2025, after a joint motion to dismiss was filed by the defendants. Information on the reasons for the dismissal is not publicly available.

Old platforms: According to BOEM records, Array operates 154 platforms previously owned by Cox. These platforms are in the Ship Shoal, South Marsh Island, and West Delta areas of the Gulf of America. Most are >30 years old and four are more than 70 years old (see chart below). 41 are classified as major structures including 15 of the 26 platforms installed in the 1950s and 1960s. 44 are manned on a 24 hour basis. 79 have helidecks. Massive decommissioning liabilities loom.

Violations: NRW/Array ranks 37th out of 42 companies in GoA oil production (2025 YTD) and 36th out of 42 companies in gas production, but leads the pack in Incidents of Noncompliance (INCs):

  • Array accounted for nearly half of all GoA INCs issued in the first half of 2025 (chart below).
  • Array was issued 9 times more warning INCs (311) than any other operator. Apache was second with 34.
  • Array had more component shut-in INCS (46) than any other operator. W&T, another operator of Cox legacy platforms, was second with 32.
  • Array had more facility shut-in INCs (6) than any other operator. W&T was again second with 5.
  • Array averaged 2.0 INCs/facility inspection vs. a combined average of 0.3 INCs/facility inspection for all other operators.
violation typewarningscomponent shut-insfacility shut-ins
Array311466
all others21116449

Lessons that should have been learned from the Cox, Fieldwood, Black Elk, Signal Hill, and other bankruptcies dating back to the Alliance Operating Corp. failure in 1989:

  • There are many small and mid-sized companies that are responsible operators. Their participation in the OCS program should be encouraged. However, others have demonstrated, by their inattention to financial and safety requirements, that they are not fit to operate OCS facilities.
  • The growth of Fieldwood, Cox, Signal Hill, and Black Elk was in part facilitated by lax lease assignment and financial assurance policies. 
  • Operating companies should have to demonstrate that they can operate safety and comply with the regulations before they are approved to acquire more properties.
  • Despite ample evidence of the importance of compliance and safety performance in determining the need for supplemental financial assurance, BOEM’s 2024 rule dropped all consideration of these factors.,
  • Expect the ultimate public cost of the Cox bankruptcy, in terms of decommissioning liabilities and the need for increased oversight, to be large.
  • The Federal govt (Justice/Interior) should strongly oppose bankruptcy court asset sales that increase public financial, safety, and environmental risks.

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