Feeds:
Posts
Comments

Posts Tagged ‘decommissioning’

For 40 years, challenges associated with bankruptcies (or the threat thereof), a divided offshore industry, political pressure, hurricane damage, and unresolved legal issues have hindered initiatives to better protect the public from decommissioning liabilities. Nonetheless, regulators and industry were able to prevent taxpayers from incurring any decommissioning costs. Unfortunately that is no longer the case.

For the first time in history, the govt has funded decommissioning on the OCS (and bragged about it – photo below).

Federally funded decommissioning operation in the Matagorda Area of the Gulf.

BOEM’s proposed revisions to the decommissioning regulations (attached) would facilitate the transfer of aging structures to companies with limited assets, and in some cases, poor or undemonstrated safety records.

The proposal would reduce or eliminate the supplemental financial assurance requirement if a predecessor lessee has a strong credit rating. For that strategy to work, related decommissioning issues must be addressed. and clarifications and boundaries provided to ensure taxpayers are protected from decommissioning liabilities.

Predecessor liability, which is important because it helps prevent companies from assigning leases for the purpose of avoiding decommissioning obligations, was not established in the regulations until much of the OCS infrastructure was already installed. In a final rule that was effective on 8/20/1997, my office (thanks to the perseverance of Gerry Rhodes, John Mirabella, and Dennis Daugherty) codified the joint and several liability principle in 30 CFR 250.110 as follows:

(b) Lessees must plug and abandon all well bores, remove all platforms or other facilities, and clear the ocean of all obstructions to other users. This obligation:
(1) Accrues to the lessee when the well is drilled, the platform or other facility is installed, or the obstruction is created; and
(2) Is the joint and several responsibility of all lessees and owners of operating rights under the lease at the time the obligation accrues, and of each future lessee or owner of operating rights, until
the obligation is satisfied under the requirements of this part.

Prior to the that rule, the official policy of the Dept. of the Interior, as expressed in a 1988 letter from the Director of the Minerals Management Service (see excerpt pasted below), was that lease assignors would NOT be held accountable should their successors fail to fulfill their decommissioning responsibilities.

A major unanswered question regarding decommissioning obligations is thus the extent to which predecessor liability applies to leases assigned prior to the 1997 regulation. According to BOEM data, 771 remaining platforms were installed at least 10 years before the rule change, and 504 were installed at least 20 years prior. For assets transferred prior to the rule change, do the predecessors retain liability? BOEM should explain its position on this issue.

Other predecessor liability questions that need to be answered:

  • Now that the reverse chronological guidance has been scrapped, what will be the process for determining which predecessors will be held responsible?
  • If the govt doesn’t ensure that the new lessees fulfill their performance obligations (e.g. funding escrow accounts, well plugging, insurance, etc.), are predecessors still liable?
  • What if the structures were poorly maintained by the new lessees, complicating decommissioning and increasing the costs
  • Should a predecessor several transfers removed from operating the facilities still be held responsible?

Two examples of what can happen (and has happened):

Example 1: Big AAA Oil assigns a lease to Proud Production, a reputable independent. After years of operations, Proud can no longer profitably produce from the lease. Proud assigns the lease to CCC Oil & Gas, a small and highly efficient operator. After the lease is no longer profitable, even for a company with a low cost structure, CCC assigns the lease to Elmer’s E&P, a sketchy, barely solvent operating company with a poor compliance record. Elmer rather predictably neglects maintenance and declares bankruptcy after a decline in oil prices. Should Big AAA Oil, which had no say in the last 2 transfers in the assignment chain, be financially responsible for decommissioning the facilities?

Example 2: Big AAA Oil assigns a lease to DDD Development Company. Per the terms of the assignment, DDD establishes an Abandonment Escrow Account, as provided for in 30 CFR 556.904. BOEM allows DDD to withdraw funds from the account for purposes not authorized in the regulations. Should Big AAA Oil be liable for decommissioning costs after DDD is no longer solvent? (See “The troubling case of Platforms Hogan and Houchin.”)

For predecessor liability to be fairly and effectively implemented, and survive legal challenges, BOEM should:

  • Before approving lease assignments, verify that the assignors and assignees have contractually specified, to BOEM’s satisfaction, how the decommissioning of assigned assets will be funded.
  • Not approve subsequent lease assignments until the predecessor that is being held financially responsible has approved a funding agreement with the new lessees.

Another important concern is that BOEM’s proposal does not correct two prior changes that further expose the public to decommissioning liabilities:

Read Full Post »

Important and long overdue:

Read Full Post »

Platform Holly in the Santa Barbara Channel

John Smith informs us that the California State Lands Commission (CSLC) is moving forward with the environmental review for decommissioning Platform Holly. This would be the first platform decommissioning project offshore California since the 1996 Chevron 4-H project which involved the removal of Platforms Hope, Heidi, Hilda and Hazel in state waters.

John comments that the project description, which calls for removing the jacket, seep tents and pipelines, and partially removing the upper 5 feet of the 23-foot-high shell mounds, does not make much sense given the abundant fish and invertebrates that reside on or around the platform jacket. Cutting the jacket off 85 feet below the water line and converting the remaining structure to an artificial reef would make more sense and should have been designated the proposed project. 

The plan is to send the materials to the Ports of Long Beach, Los Angeles or Hueneme or possibly Ensenada, Mexico. The project involves complex logistics and is going to be a very long (3 years), ambitious and expensive project that will likely set a precedent for future platform decommissioning projects.

It’s noteworthy that Platform Holly’s oil and gas production effectively reduced natural seepage and methane emissions from shallow formations beneath the Channel. Holly was thus a “net negative” hydrocarbon polluter.

According to their agreement with the CSLC, Exxon is responsible for the decommissioning costs.

Scientific American: The steel “jackets” that support California’s offshore oil platforms are covered in millions of organisms and provide habitat for thousands of fishes. Joe Platko

Read Full Post »

Excerpts from a stunning Sable update issued by Hunterbrook Media LLC (“Hunterbrook“) on November 14, 2025:

  • SEC filing reveals Sable entered October about a month from potential bankruptcy. The company had $41.6 million as of September 30, with $39.7 million in average monthly burn in 3Q25.  
  • When Sable announced its $250 million financing on November 10 at $5.50 per share, the company likely had single digit millions in the bank based on its reported burn, against over $163 million in accounts payable and accrued liabilities. Sable does not generate any revenue.
  • Sable needs to raise significantly more money: According to leaked audio of Sable’s CEO briefing for select investors, the company will require $2.3 billion to achieve commercial production of oil and gas from its three platforms off the coast of Santa Barbara.
  • That includes at least $900 million to buy out Exxon, to which Sable must pay 15% interest on debt due by March 31, 2027. By then, the loan would be about $1.1 billion, accruing $200 million in added debt.
  • One of Sable’s only known assets other than the oil and gas project is a private plane the company purchased from its CEO, Jim Flores. The plane recently flew round-trip from Houston, where Flores lives, to Louisiana, in time for a football game at the CEO’s alma mater.

Comments from Santa Barbara County Supervisor Steve Lavagnino, an oil industry supporter, that explain his opposition to the transfer of Exxon’s pipeline permit to Sable:

“The final straw for me was a Hunterbrook article, which was as disturbing as anything I’ve read. I have many friends in the oil industry and I will continue to support efforts to access our natural resources, but it has to be done responsibly by operators who put safety above profits.”

Sable’s limited response to the Hunterbrook report includes information on decommissioning financial assurance:

  • Sable’s original SYU Purchase and Sales Agreement (PSA) with Exxon required Sable to post a $350 million decommissioning bond “150 days following the resumption of production from the wells.”
  • According to Sable, production resumed on May 15, 2025. The bond would have thus been required in October. (SYU production was halted by court order on June 6, so that “resumption date” may be irrelevant. Regardless, the Oct. financial assurance deadline is immaterial given the recent update to the PSA.)
  • The PSA update extended the date for posting the decommissioning bond to three business days following the new Exxon Loan Maturity Date of March 31, 2027 or 90 days after first sales of hydrocarbons, whichever comes first. (Note the change in language from “resumption of production” to “first sales.” Brief well test production does not trigger posting of the decommissioning bond.)
  • Under certain circumstances after the bonding is in place Exxon may seek an increase in the bonding amount to $500 million.

The decommissioning obligations are moot if Sable runs out of funds or is unable to resume SYU production prior to the 3/31/2027 PSA deadline. Exxon would remain fully responsible for SYU decommissioning.

Is it time for a public statement from Exxon on the SYU and Sable?

Read Full Post »

The Dept. of the Interior is currently reconsidering approval of the Construction and Operations Plan for the Maryland Offshore Wind Project (US Wind).

Attached is a court filing challenging Delaware’s approval of the Coastal Construction Plan for that project. Some interesting points from the filing:

  • Maryland local governments declined to allow the transmission lines from the Maryland Offshore Wind Project to come ashore in their jurisdictions.
  • The Governor of Delaware agreed to allow the transmission lines to make landfall at the Delaware Seashore State Park.
  • The transmission pipelines would then traverse the adjacent Delaware Bays, to an inland substation, from which the power would be sent to Maryland.
  • US Wind applied for a number of permits from the Delaware Department of Natural Resources (DNREC) specific to horizontal directional drilling, laying cable pipelines, and other coastal construction activity.
  • The approval process, including provisions for public input, was not consistent with State regulations.
  • The Secretary’s decision to issue the beach construction permit is supported virtually exclusively by documents which were submitted by US Wind after the close of public comment.
  • Decommissioning and financial assurance information, a favorite BOE topic for both wind and oil/gas, was submitted after the close of the public record.

Read Full Post »

JL Daeschler informs that UK offshore wind energy is 82% foreign-owned. Foreign companies are thus the primary beneficiaries of the UK’s generous renewable energy subsidies (chart below).

David Turner comments as follows in his informative piece on UK wind energy:

We have been warning for some time that it is crazy for a developed economy to try and run its electricity generation system using technologies that are dependent on the weather. Even though there has been only a relatively modest decline in wind output this year, the operators and owners of wind farms are learning the hard way that it is very difficult to run a business that is at the mercy of the vagaries of the weather. Many of these companies are up to their eyeballs in debt. They better hope the wind blows hard this Autumn and Winter so they can collect higher subsidies, or they will be in real trouble.

We have consistently raised concerns about decommissioning financial assurance for offshore wind facilities. Turner echoes those concerns noting that the wind industry’s perilous finances are an even bigger reason to insist that proper funds are set aside to fund decommissioning or the long-suffering taxpayer will be on the hook for another hidden cost of renewables.

Read Full Post »

Attached is the Dept. of the Interior’s Semiannual Regulatory Agenda (9/22/2025). BSEE and BOEM decommissioning rules are excerpted below.

Of particular concern is the revised BOEM regulation (107) that “would reduce the amount of supplemental financial assurance required from oil gas, and sulfur lessees operating on the OCS.” See our previous post on this regulatory action. Note that a proposed rule is expected to be published by year end.

  1. REVISIONS TO DECOMMISSIONING REQUIREMENTS ON THE OCS [1014–AA53]
    Legal Authority: Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 1331 to 1356a
    Abstract: This proposed rule would address issues relating to (1) idle iron by adding a definition of this term to clarify that it applies to idle wells and structures on active leases; (2) abandonment in place of subsea infrastructure by adding regulations addressing when BSEE may approve decommissioning-in-place instead of removal of certain subsea equipment; and (3) other operational considerations.
    Timetable:
    NPRM ……………… 07/00/26
    NPRM Comment Period End: 10/00/26
  1. RISK MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL ASSURANCE FOR OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LEASE AND
    GRANT OBLIGATIONS [1010–AE26]
    Legal Authority: 43 U.S.C. 1331, OCS Lands Act; E.O. 14154, Unleashing American Energy
    Abstract: This proposed rule would rescind BOEM’s final rule ‘‘Risk Management and Financial Assurance for OCS Lease and Grant Obligations.’’ The proposed rule would revise the criteria for determining whether oil, gas, and sulfur lessees, right-of-use and easement grant holders, and pipeline right-of-way grant holders are required to provide financial assurance above the current minimum bonding levels to ensure compliance with their Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Lands Act obligations. This rule, if finalized, would reduce the amount of supplemental financial assurance required from oil gas, and sulfur lessees operating on the OCS and would support the goals of E.O. 14154; Timetable: NPRM ……………… 01/00/26

Read Full Post »

A long-time colleague is very familiar with Judge Lamberth, a Reagan appointee, and thinks highly of him. Orsted has a lease contract, and no matter where you stand on offshore wind, you have to have a compelling case to halt a project that is in the advanced stages of development. Judge Lamberth ruled that the govt doesn’t have such a case. Per the judge:

  • The govt presented insufficient evidence to support alleged permit noncompliance and national security concerns.
  • The govt acted in an “arbitrary and capricious” manner.
  • “If Revolution Wind cannot meet benchmark deadlines, the entire project could collapse.”
  • “There is no doubt in my mind of irreparable harm to the plaintiffs.”

Projects under development will be difficult to pause or stop. The Administration should focus on requiring sufficient decommissioning financial assurance, monitoring and mitigating project impacts, making incident data publicly available, issuing the report on the Vineyard Wind blade failure (finally!), and improving the availability of dispatchable power (i.e. natural gas and nuclear).

Read Full Post »

Massive swell at Platform Esther, 12/24/2024 – Christmas gift for surfers

Eloquent eulogy by DCOR (platform operator) CEO Alan Templeton: Last Sunday, August 10, I joined a small group of DCOR personnel on Platform Esther to witness her final moments of operation. At exactly 3:00 p.m., we pressed the ESD on the production deck, and one by one, the sounds of compressors and pumps faded until the platform fell silent — a profound and bittersweet moment in California’s energy history.

For over half a century, Esther stood off the coast of Orange County, first installed in the early 1960s as one of California’s iconic man-made oil islands. She blended into the horizon while quietly producing oil and gas, surviving storms, and later being rebuilt in 1985 into the platform we know today. More than just steel and pilings, Esther was a proving ground for innovation, a dependable asset, and a source of pride for the men and women who worked safely on her decks.

While she has now been permanently shut in, her legacy remains — a testament to the ingenuity, resilience, and dedication that have defined California’s offshore industry for generations.

Litigation prematurely ended production at Esther, which would have had an estimated 15 more years of operative life. The attached settlement agreement, shared by John Smith, ends a dispute between the State Lands Commission and DCOR over repurposing a pipeline to transport oil from state Platform Eva to Federal Platform Edith (diagram above).

In exchange for relinquishing its mineral rights and decommissioning Platform Esther, the settlement grants DCOR a $10 million royalty credit on future oil produced from Platform Eva. This credit is significantly less than the value of remaining production from Esther.

Platform Esther, is one of three remaining oil production platforms in California state waters.

Read Full Post »

Ørsted’s stock price plummeted on Monday following the announcement of a $9.4 billion rights issue to fund the Sunrise Wind project. The share price has remained depressed (chart below).

Also, although Ørsted attributes its financial woes to the change in US policies, it’s apparent in the second chart (5 year trend) that the decline in Ørsted’s valuation has been ongoing since 2021.

In March, Fitch downgraded Ørsted’s rating to BBB from BBB+, and its subordinated rating to BB+ from BBB-. Further downgrades would seem to be a distinct possibility.

Meanwhile, decommissioning financing for the 3 Ørsted projects under construction in the US Atlantic is far from assured:

  • Revolution Wind: As they did for Vineyard Wind, BOEM approved Ørsted’s request to defer full decommissioning financial assurance until 15 years after the beginning of construction (see attached letter). This approval was prior to the Renewable Energy Modernization Rule (effective June 29, 2024), which eliminated the need for such waivers.
  • Sunrise Wind: Ørsted is now solely responsible for funding and constructing this project given the company’s failure to find investment partners. Presumably, decommissioning financial assurance was not required given BOEM’s latitude under the so-called “Modernization Rule.”
  • South Fork Wind: As is the case with Sunrise Wind, BOEM presumably allowed Ørsted to defer financial assurance for decommissioning as permitted by the “Modernization Rule.”

According to Ørsted, almost 70% of the turbines are installed at Revolution Wind and the first foundations have been installed at Sunrise Wind. South Fork Wind, 12 turbines and an offshore substation, is complete.

Given Ørsted’s strained finances, will BOEM now opt to require decommissioning assurance as provided for in 30 CFR § 585.517?

Ørsted’s situation is atypical in that the Danish government owns a majority (50.1%) stake in the company and Equinor, which is 2/3 Norwegian govt owned, holds a 9.8% stake. How will government ownership factor into BOEM decisions regarding decommissioning assurance? Note that Norwegian govt lobbying may have been one of the factors influencing the decision to allow the resumption of construction on Equinor’s Empire Wind project.

Meanwhile, two Danish opposition parties are calling for the state to relinquish its ownership stake in Ørsted.

Read Full Post »

Older Posts »