Pictured: Transocean’s Deepwater Proteus. T/O should name one of their drillships Deepwater Diligence 😉
Seven of the deepwater exploratory wells drilled in the Gulf of Mexico in 2023 (YTD) were spudded within 4.5 years of the effective date of their leases. Three of these wells were spudded within 3 years of their lease effective dates (see table below).
These are impressive achievements when you consider the time required for consultation with partners (if any) and contractors, site surveys, exploration plan development and approval, well planning, and drilling permit preparation and approval.
The subject wells accounted for 28% of thedeepwater exploratory well starts in 2023 (25 net YTD wells after subtracting restarts at the same location).
date lease effective
spud date
elapsed time (months)
water depth (ft)
operator
3/1/2021
8/27/2023
30
6498
Shell
8/1/2020
5/21/2023
34
2211
Talos
8/1/2020
3/15/2023
31
3338
Talos
12/1/2019
6/5/2023
42
4228
Chevron
11/1/2019
6/1/2023
43
4603
Hess
7/1/2019
7/11/2023
48
7486
Kosmos
12/1/2018
6/6/2023
54
4127
bp
Below are the exploration plan (EP) and permit (APD) approval timeframes for these 7 wells. With the exception of the Kosmos EP which required a number of modifications, the regulator actions appear to have been timely. For the bp, Shell, and Chevron wells, only 4-6 months elapsed between EP submittal and APD approval.
operator
block
date EP received
date EP approved
APD received
APD approved
Shell
WR 365
3/1/2023
5/17/2023
5/11/2023
8/8/2023
Talos
GC 78
1/19/2021
4/16/2021
3/8/2023
5/26/2023
Talos
MC 162
4/1/2022
7/13/2022
8/2/2022
3/2/2023
Chevron
MC 937
12/7/2022
5/19/2023
4/21/2023
5/21/2023
Hess
MC 727
8/30/2022
11/3/2022
12/21/2022
4/24/2023
Kosmos
KC 964
1/3/2020
10/12/2022
4/18/2023
7/3/2023
bp
GC 436
1/18/2023
4/14/2023
3/29/2023
6/5/2023
Notes: EP=Exploration Plan, APD=Application for Permit to Drill, WR=Walker Ridge, GC=Green Canyon, MC=Mississippi Canyon, KC=Keathley Canyon
According to the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority, this would result in an average 54% price hike across their portfolio. The strike prices would rise from $118.38 to $159.64/MWh for Empire Wind 1, from $107.50 to $177.84/MWh for Empire Wind 2, and from $118.00 to $190.82/MWh for Beacon Wind.
Keathley Canyon (KC) Block 96, the tract receiving the highest bid in the entire sale ($15,911,947 by Chevron), had a BOEM MROV of only $576,000. Clearly, Chevron and the government have a very different view of the value of this tract. BP was the second bidder for KC 96, and their bid ($4,003,103) was also considerably higher than BOEM’s MROV. This one will very interesting to follow.
The only bid that was rejected in Sale 257 was the BP/Talos bid of $1.8 million for Green Canyon Block 777. BOEM’s MROV in the Sale 257 evaluations was $4.4 million. BP again bid on GC 777 in Sale 259, but their bid was only $583,000 (even though BOEM’s Sale 257 evaluation was public information). BOEM’s MROV was reduced only slightly to $4.2 million, and they again rejected BP’s bid. We’ll see what happens in the next sale.
51 of the 230 accepted bids were >$1 million, all for deepwater tracts. All of the rejected bids were for deepwater tracts, and a higher percentage (4/14) were >$1 million. This makes sense given that the higher potential prospects are in deepwater.
These results demonstrate again that resource evaluation is far from an exact science. BOEM is not selling barrels of oil and cubic feet of gas. BOEM is evaluating prospects, and companies are bidding on the opportunity to explore these prospects.
Bidding strategies differ; the more companies participating, the better the long-term prospects for the OCS program.
There are a number of recent articles related to the Guyana Supreme Court ruling on Exxon’s financial assurance obligations. An Oil Now piece (quoted below) is the most informative. It seems that the Supreme Court decision is based on a provision of Exxon’s EPA permit and that EPA is siding with Exxon in this dispute.
The Guyana government and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) are set to appeal a recent Guyana Supreme Court ruling that determined that the EPA and ExxonMobil affiliate, Esso Exploration and Production Guyana Limited (EEPGL), breached the terms of the Liza 1 environmental permit. The permit was revised and granted to EEPGL last year for operations in the Stabroek Block, offshore Guyana.
Justice Sandil Kissoon granted several declarations, including that the EPA failed to enforce compliance by EEPGL of its Financial Assurance obligations to provide an unlimited Parent Company Guarantee Agreement and/or Affiliate Company Guarantee Agreement to indemnify and keep indemnified the EPA and the Government of Guyana against all environmental obligations of the Permit Holder (EEPGL) and Co-Venturers (Hess and CNOOC) within the Stabroek Block.
While acknowledging the court’s ruling, the Government of Guyana, as a major stakeholder, maintained in a statement that the Environmental Permit imposes no obligation on the Permit Holder to provide an unlimited Parent Company Guarantee Agreement and/or Affiliate Company Guarantee Agreement. The government believes that Justice Kissoon erred in his findings and that the ruling could have significant economic and other impacts on the public interest and national development.
Unlimited liability is a rather daunting and open-ended obligation that would trouble permittees in any industry.
In the US, the liability for oil spill cleanup costs is unlimited for offshore facilities, but there is a liability cap for the resulting damages. That cap is currently $167.8 million after a recent inflation adjustment. BP, of course, paid far more than that for damages associated with the Macondo blowout. BP’s costs, which amounted to an astounding $61.6Â billion, were both voluntary and compulsory as a result of agreements and settlements. Keep in mind that the damage liability limit was only $75 million at the time. One can imagine what would have happened if a company with less financial strength or more inclination to fight had been responsible for the spill.
Based on drilling contractor rig activity reports, the table below lists 19 deepwater MODUs under or soon to begin contracts in the GoM. (Further details are pasted at the end of this post.) Per the Valeris report, platform rigs are operating on bp’s Thunder Horse and Mad Dog platforms. Per the BSEE borehole file, Arena and Cantium continue to drill development wells on the GoM shelf.
Prior to the installation of these platforms, the last deepwater platform addition was Shell’s Appomattox in 2018. That gap in deepwater platform installations was the longest since Bullwinkle was installed in 1988.
The 5 new structures will increase the deepwater platform count by 9% from 56 to 61, and in the next few years should account for approximately 1/4 of GoM oil production.
This picture was posted by MaritmePhoto. The”Blue Marlin” heavy lift vessel is arriving in Texas (2005) with the massive semisubmersible production platform “Thunder Horse” on board.
Above (from BOE archives): Pre-commissioning inspection of Thunder Horse
Thunder Horse has a most interesting history. The project was initially named Crazy Horse, but the name was changed out of respect for concerns raised by the Lakota nation. The massive structure is 136 m in length and 113 m in width, and is located in 6300′ of water in the Mississippi Canyon area of the Gulf of Mexico.
Many of you no doubt remember the near disaster during Hurricane Dennis (2005) when the platform was being commissioned. In light of the extensive pre-production hype for the “world’s largest production platform,” this was a costly and embarrassing incident for BP and the OCS program.
Findings indicate that failures associated with the hydraulic control system and its isolation on evacuation led to the partial opening of multiple hydraulically actuated valves in the ballast and bilge systems of the vessel. This allowed ballast water migration to take place, causing the initial listing (to approximately 16 degrees) of the vessel shortly after the hydraulic system was isolated.
The findings also indicate that ballast water migrated into manned spaces in the lower hull, via faulty and improperly installed check valves in the integrated ballast/bilge piping system. As the degree of list increased beyond the 16 degree mark, downflooding of seawater occurred, initially through overboard discharge lines and/or vents, and possibly later through the deck box as it entered the water. Since the PDQ was already listing at a 16 degree angle prior to the passage of Hurricane Dennis, wave action associated with the passage of the hurricane may also have contributed to the downflooding of seawater.
Although not an initiating event, failed Multiple Cable Transits (MCTs) and two unintended openings in the bulkheads allowed water transfer between watertight compartments, which led to extensive flooding and water damage in the lower hull.
Fortunately, there were no injuries. Repairs were made and production was finally initiated in June 2008.