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Archive for the ‘Offshore Energy – General’ Category

How much of the decline in shelf bids is attributable to higher royalty and rental rates?

Posted in CCS, decommissioning, energy policy, Gulf of Mexico, Offshore Energy - General, Regulation, tagged , , , , , , , , , , on March 19, 2024| Leave a Comment »

A post from last March discussed the high and seemingly unfair royalty and rental rates for new leases in the shallow waters of the Gulf of Mexico shelf. A 50% increase in the shelf royalty rate for lease sales 259 and 261 combined with rather punitive rental rates have likely contributed to the sharp decline in bidding for shelf lease blocks (see table below).

This decline in shelf bidding is unfortunate because the smaller companies that operate in the shallow waters of the Gulf are critical to sustaining the production infrastructure. These companies are also significant producers of environmentally favorable nonassociated (gas-well) natural gas.

lease saleshelf blocks with bids
(excluding CCS bids)		sum of high shelf bids
($million, excluding CCS bids)
25746$8.1
25929$4.1
26113$1.7
The royalty rate for shelf production jumped 50% from sale 257 to sales 259 and 261

BOEM has completed their evaluation of the Sale 261 shelf bids (see below). Each of these blocks received only a single bid, and every bid was accepted. Ironically, the invalid CCS bids for blocks that have no oil and gas value, were the first to be accepted. This was also the case for Sales 257 and 259.

CompanyBlockhigh bid ($)
per acre ($)		date accepted
ByronSM 60128,750
25.75		2/2
ByronSM 70182,235
33.32		2/20
CantiumGI 35125,000
25.00		2/20
CantiumGI 36125,000
25.00		2/20
CantiumMP 314125,000
25.00		3/12
CantiumSP 63125,000
25.00		3/12
ArenaEI 231135,000
27.18		2/20
ArenaEI 277135,000
27.18		2/20
ArenaEI 281135,000
27.18		2/20
ArenaEI 340135,000
27.18		2/20
ArenaEI 343135,000
27.18		2/20
ArenaWD 119135,000
26.75		3/12
FocusV 152121,152
25.16		2/20
Repsol36 CCS bids187,200 (1)
32.50		1/23
(1) All of the Repsol bids were $32.50/ac. Total bids varied by block size, but were $187,200 for the 5760 acre blocks.

Suggestions:

  • Seek a legislative fix to the Inflation Reduction Act😉 provision that established a 1/6 royalty rate floor for all OCS leases (formerly the royalty rate was 1/8 for leases on the shelf).
  • In the interim, administratively lower the royalty for shelf leases to 1/6 (from 18 3/4%).
  • Reconsider the rental rate scheme for shelf leases.
  • For future oil and gas lease sales, accept all high bids that exceed the specified minimum bid (currently $25/ac for the shelf). The Gulf of Mexico shelf has been extensively explored and developed for 70 years. While prospects remain, they are generally marginal as evidenced by the recent lease sale results. Fair market value is what any company is willing to bid (above the specified minimum).
  • Focus on assuring that lease purchasers are technically qualified to minimize safety risks, and that financial assurance for decommissioning (for new and existing leases owned by the high bidder) has been fully addressed.

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Rincon Island Phase 2: first major California decommissioning project since 1996

Posted in California, decommissioning, Offshore Energy - General, tagged , , , , on March 18, 2024| Leave a Comment »

Rincon Island, “the 9th Channel Island“

Per John Smith, Rincon Island (Phase 2) will be the first major production facility decommissioning project in California state waters since the Chevron 4-H platform removals in 1996.

Rincon Island and the onshore facility were constructed in 1959 and used for oil and gas production. In December 2017, Rincon Island Limited Partnership, the most recent lessee, transferred its lease interests to the State after becoming financially insolvent. Phase 1 of decommissioning included the plugging and abandonment of all oil and gas wells and removal of service equipment at Rincon Island.

The proposed Phase 2 project, analyzed within the Environmental Impact Report (executive summary attached), would prudently retain Rincon Island and the Rincon Island Causeway in their current configuration. Phase 3 will prepare Rincon Island and the Onshore Facility to be leased for yet-to-be determined new uses.

rincon_deir-esDownload

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CNOOC holding onto Gulf of Mexico leases

Posted in energy policy, Gulf of Mexico, Guyana, Offshore Energy - General, tagged , , , , , , on March 15, 2024| Leave a Comment »

Appomattox FPU
Stampede TLP

In light of the TikTok drama in Washington, I thought I’d take another look at Chinese ownership of Gulf of Mexico oil and gas leases.

A year ago, it was reported that State owned China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) was considering an exit from its operations in the US, Canada, and the UK because of sanctions concerns. That may still be the case for other properties, but CNOOC has retained its Gulf of Mexico lease interests.

Per BOEM lease data, CNOOC continues to own 25% and 21% interest respectively in the important Stampede (Green Canyon 468, 511, and 512) and Appomattox (Mississippi Canyon 391, 392, and 393) deepwater projects. CNOOC reports are positive on those operations, noting that the production wells have performed better than expected.

CNOOC also owns interest in five other GoM leases. No CNOOC lease interest has been assigned to other companies in the past two years.

As is the case with CNOOC’s position in Guyana’s Stabroek block, their GoM lease holdings were acquired as part of CNOOC’s takeover of Nexen in 2013.

I welcome foreign investment in our offshore program, and see little downside in Chinese entities owning minority shares of OCS leases. GoM lease ownership does advance CNOOC’s understanding of deepwater exploration and development technology, but that knowledge can also be acquired elsewhere, sometimes in partnership with US companies (as is the case in Guyana).

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A US offshore wind lease may NOT be issued after 12/20/2024 unless an oil and gas lease sale is held prior to that date.

Posted in energy policy, Offshore Energy - General, Offshore Wind, Regulation, tagged , , , on March 12, 2024| 2 Comments »

(2) the Secretary may not issue a lease for offshore wind development under section 8(p)(1)(C) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C.1337(p)(1)(C)) unless—
(A) an offshore lease sale has been held during the 1-year period ending on the date of the issuance of the lease for offshore wind development; and (B) the sum total of acres offered for lease in offshore lease sales during the 1-year period ending on the date of the issuance of the lease for offshore wind development is not less than 60,000,000 acres.

‘‘Inflation Reduction Act of 2022,” p. 646

Lease Sale 261 was held on 12/20/23. Absent legislative action, no wind leases may be issued after 12/20/24 unless another oil and gas lease sale is held prior to that date. Given that the minimalist 5 year oil and gas leasing plan, which is being challenged, does not propose a sale until 2025, wind lease issuance will likely be suspended at the end of the year. (Note: I wonder if the legislative restriction also applies to lease assignments from existing owners to new owners? Probably not, but that would be very significant given the current state of the offshore wind industry.)

The legislative restriction may be a partial explanation for the apparent rush to issue wind leases. 16 new wind leases were issued in 2022 and 2023, bringing the total number of active leases to 36. The philosophy seems to be this: issue as many leases as you can, as fast as you can, wherever you can (ala James Watt’s failed strategy for the oil and gas program.) Coastal residents are not entirely thrilled.

Perhaps the wind program should be required to develop 5 year leasing plans, as is the case for the oil and gas program. This might facilitate a more holistic approach to wind energy development and ease concerns about cumulative impacts.

Morro Bay protest

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Huntington Beach sheen caused by natural source not platform spill

Posted in California, Offshore Energy - General, oil spill response, tagged , , on March 11, 2024| Leave a Comment »

Test results came back from the Office of Spill Prevention and Response – part of the Department of Fish and Wildlife – indicating the natural oil source, said Richard Uranga, US Coast Guard public affairs specialist.

“From the first initial stages, they were tracking that from the samples,” he said. “The oil rig samples were not the same as the oil that was gathered from the oil sheen.”

LA Daily News

So why did the LA Times report shortly after the sheen was detected that it was not from natural causes, and attribute that finding to the Coast Guard? It was too soon for the lab results to be back. Was a platform spill the desired narrative?

Keep in mind that up to several hundred barrels of oil per day seep naturally into Southern California waters.

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Stabroek dispute: the Venezuela and China factors

Posted in Guyana, Offshore Energy - General, tagged , , , , , on March 11, 2024| Leave a Comment »

Exxon has filed for arbitration at the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the next step in the company’s attempt to derail or delay Chevron’s acquisition of Hess. Adding to the intrigue are the ambitions of neighboring Venezuela, which has claimed 2/3 of Guyana and the adjacent offshore territory.

Chevron continues to operate in Venezuela and is a beneficiary of the easing of US sanctions that facilitated the resumption of oil exports. Is the government of Guyana okay with Stabroek partners helping to support the regime that claims much of their offshore oil?

On the other hand, what about Exxon’s Stabroek partner, state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corp.? CNOOC has a 25% share of the Stabroek block (vs. 45% for Exxon and 30% for Hess) as a result of their takeover of (Canadian) Nexen in 2013. The CNOOC acquisition of Nexen was similar to Chevron’s acquisition of Hess. Was Exxon okay with that change in ownership?

CNOOC hasn’t released any public statements on the Stabroek dispute, but appears to be aligned with Exxon. Presumably, CNOOC also wants a larger share of the Stabroek pie. Is the Government of Guyana okay with an ally of Venezuela increasing their influence and having access to geologic, reservoir, and operational data for the Stabroek block? CNOOC is also partnered with Exxon on the block they acquired at the most recent licensing round.

Given the national security implications, is the Government of Guyana okay with leaving the resolution of this dispute to an ICC tribunal in Paris?

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US offshore carbon disposal: And so it has begun…

Posted in CCS, climate, decommissioning, energy policy, Gulf of Mexico, Offshore Energy - General, Regulation, tagged , , , , , , , on March 7, 2024| Leave a Comment »

Bayou Bend CCS LLC commenced drilling an offshore (Texas State waters) and an onshore stratigraphic well for carbon sequestration in the first quarter 2024.

Talos

Is offshore carbon disposal ocean dumping? One of the provisions that was slipped into the “2021 Infrastructure Bill” exempted carbon sequestration from the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (Ocean Dumping Act). This exemption revises the OCS Lands Act and thus does not apply to State offshore lands. The Texas offshore wells must therefore be permitted by EPA as “Class VI wells,” as is the case for onshore disposal wells. However, Texas and Louisiana have asked the EPA for “primacy,” which would allow state agencies to approve and oversee these operations.

Meanwhile, the regulations for carbon disposal on the OCS, which the Infrastructure Bill mandated by November 2022, have yet to be published for comment. The latest Federal regulatory agenda indicates a publication date of 12/00/2023 for these regulations. Presumably the staff work has been completed and the rule is stalled in the review process.

Despite the absence of a regulatory framework, BOEM has accepted sequestration bids at the last three oil and gas lease sales. These bids were evaluated as if the leases were being acquired for oil and gas exploration and production, even though the bidders’ intentions were widely known. Why was BOEM a willing participant in this charade, not just at one sale, but at three sales in succession?

Given that the perceived carbon disposal bonanza is dependent on mandates and subsidies, one has to wonder about the massive revenue projections for this industry and raise concerns about the associated public and private financial risks. What is the long term business plan for this industry? Who will be monitoring the offshore wells (in perpetuity)? How will the public be protected from financial assurance and leakage risks? We will see how the myriad of carbon sequestration issues are addressed in the proposed regulations.

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2022 BSEE incident statistics are finally posted and include a major error

Posted in accidents, Gulf of Mexico, Offshore Energy - General, Regulation, tagged , , , , , , , , on March 5, 2024| Leave a Comment »

As we enter the third month of 2024, BSEE has finally updated the incident tables to include 2022 data.

The OCS program managers I was privileged to work for would never have accepted such delays in posting fundamental safety data. Carolita Kallaur (RIP) wouldn’t tolerate a delay of 14 days in publishing quarterly incident statistics, let alone a delay of 14 months for annual data with no quarterly updates. Transparency and timeliness in informing the public about offshore safety performance was her highest priority. Cynthia Quarterman, Tom Readinger, and other OCS program leaders were similarly insistent on timeliness and transparency in the reporting of incident data.

The belated 2022 BSEE tables also include a glaring error. The most important figure, the number of fatalities, is incorrect. Five workers died from US OCS incidents in 2022, not one. The fatal helicopter crash at the West Delta 106 A helideck on 12/29/2022 that killed four workers (photos below) is inexplicably not included. 

Is the failure to include this fatal incident a regulatory fragmentation issue? OCS safety data should be reported holistically and should not be parsed based on perceived regulatory jurisdiction? In any event, the tragic accident at the West Delta 106 A platform occurred at the helideck, which per the MOA with the Coast Guard is under BSEE jurisdiction.

It’s unfortunate that 2023 data are not available, even in summary form. At a minimum, BSEE should be proudly reporting that 2023 was the first zero fatality year on the US OCS since at least 1963! While acknowledging that this outstanding achievement will be difficult to repeat, it most certainly deserves public attention.

Lastly, what about incident data for the offshore wind program? When will these data be posted?

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GoM oil production remained slightly depressed in Dec. after Main Pass pipeline shut-ins

Posted in Gulf of Mexico, Offshore Energy - General, oil spill response, pipelines, tagged , , , , on March 1, 2024| Leave a Comment »

from EIA data

Reports in Nov. indicated that ~60,000 bopd were shut-in as a result of the presumed Main Pass Oil Gathering system pipeline leak. The Coast Guard subsequently reported that other pipelines in the area were shut-in as the search for a leak continued. The bulk of the Nov./Dec. production decline of ~80,000 bopd (from Oct. levels) was probably attributable to those pipeline system shut-ins.

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Stabroek Supermajor Squabble

Posted in CCS, Guyana, Offshore Energy - General, tagged , , , , , , , on February 29, 2024| Leave a Comment »

Note that the Stabroek block is equivalent in size to 1,150 Gulf of Mexico lease blocks and contains multiple outstanding prospects.

Are Exxon and Chinese partner (CNOOC) attempting to use Chevron’s acquisition of Hess to improve their already lucrative position in Guyana’s prolific Stabroek block?

From OilNow Guyana:

  • The Stabroek operating agreement outlines terms for Hess, Exxon, and CNOOC to explore and develop the block.
  • This Stabroek agreement includes a right of first refusal (ROFR) provision which allows the parties to buy out the stake of one of them in the event of a ‘change of control’ transaction.
  • Chevron and Hess argue that the merger’s structure does not trigger the ROFR clause.
  • Exxon and CNOOC argue that the clause applies. This could force Hess to offer its stake in the Stabroek block to its partners first. 

The Exxon/CNOOC position seems to be a stretch. Chevron did not buy the Stabroek share; they bought the company that holds that share. Hess is to be part of Chevron and there would be no change of control from the standpoint of the partnership.

As an offshore operator, Exxon has been highly responsible from a safety standpoint. However, the company has a shown tendency to stretch the envelope when it comes to contract rights. The most recent example was their acquisition of 163 GoM oil and gas leases for carbon disposal purposes, contrary to the terms of the sale notice and lease contracts.

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