At Oil and Gas Lease Sale 261, Repsol was the sole bidder for 36 nearshore Texas tracts in the Mustang Island and Matagorda Island areas (red blocks at the western end of the map above). Exxon acquired 163 nearshore Texas tracts (blue in map above) at Sales 257 and 259. All 36 of the Repsol bids have now been accepted.
As previously posted here and here, carbon disposal bidding at the last 3 oil and gas lease sales has made a mockery of the leasing process and the regulations that guide it.
Hopefully, the carbon sequestration regulations that are under development will preclude conversion of leases acquired at Sales 257, 259, and 261. At a minimum, these regulations should require a competitive process for converting any oil and gas leases.
A friend owns land in the Texas Permian. His family gets a nice royalty check every month that has helped them get through some difficult times. Texas Permian production is almost entirely from private land, which is a big part of the success story. Payments to private land owners by responsible producers engender public support, access to resources, and growth in production. Add to that the continuous improvements in horizontal drilling, well stimulation and completion practices, and you have the success story that is the Texas Permian.
Similarly, private and state land plus technology launched the natural gas boom in my native state of Pennsylvania. When I was a student, we looked back at the Titusville/Colonel Drake glory days, and no one dreamed that the state would become a major natural gas exporter. Today, pipeline constraints, particularly in NJ and NY (which has managed to prevent access to the state’s substantial Marcellus and Utica shale resources) are preventing PA from further increasing gas sales.
The offshore lands on the US Outer Continental Shelf are a different story. Unfriendly, bordering on hostile, leasing policy (and not just during the current administration) has been partially overcome by advances in deepwater well and facility design that have lowered costs and increased productivity. However, OCS oil production is a fraction of what it could be.
OCS gas production has fallen dramatically since the turn of the century. Ultradeep (subsurface) gas production was not economically viable and production was fading even before onshore shale gas began to dominate US gas markets. Most of the current OCS gas production is associated with deepwater oil production.
Less attention has been given to natural gas’s other important air quality advantages – low NOx. SO2, and particulate emissions. These emissions have greater local significance from a human health standpoint. Those who have ridden a bike behind a natural gas powered bus have no doubt experienced the natural gas advantage firsthand.
Roughly 237 NARWs have died since the population peaked at 481 in 2011, exceeding the potential biological removal (PBR) level on average by more than 40 times for the past 5 years (Pace III et al. 2021).
Human-caused mortality is so high that no adult NARW has been confirmed to have died from natural causes in several decades (Hayes et al. 2023).
Most NARWs have a low probability of surviving past 40 years even though the NARW can live up to a century.
There were no first-time mothers in 2022.
About 42% of the population is known to be in reduced health (Hamilton et al. 2021)
A NASEM study confirmed that offshore wind has the potential to alter local and regional hydrodynamics
“Effects to NARWs could result from stressors generated from a single project; there is potential for these effects to be compounded by exposure to multiple projects.” (p. 14)
BOEM/NOAA strategy:
No new mitigation is recommended pending further study.
“BOEM and NOAA Fisheries will work together alongside our partners (including the OSW industry) to further develop the information and science the agencies will use to inform their decisions to responsibly develop OSW while protecting and recovering NARWs.” (Comment: While regulator-industry collaboration is essential for effective offshore development, be it wind or oil and gas, regulators and operating companies have distinctly different missions and responsibilities and should not be viewed as partners.)
(p. 15): “As the OSW industry continues to grow and as projects begin construction, BOEM and NOAA Fisheries will continue to work with our partners to evaluate existing strategies and to further collect and apply newly available information to inform future decisions. This Strategy is an integral step to organize BOEM, NOAA Fisheries, and their partners around a shared vision and clear path to effectively study and manage this issue moving forward.” (???)
(p.17): BOEM will “attempt to avoid issuing new leases in areas that may impact potential high-value habitat and/or high use areas for important life history functions such as NARW foraging, migrating, mating, or calving. For areas that are leased, permitting activities should minimize any known or potential threat to NARWs and their habitats, and developers and BOEM should support research and monitoring.”
Questions:
How are the NARW threats identified in the NASEM study being mitigated?
Why are the Rice’s whale litigants okay with the more compelling threat to the NARW?
What happens if the hydrodynamic threats identified by the NASEM panel are confirmed?
Why isn’t this collaborative approach being pursued in assessing and mitigating risks to the Rice’s whale?
Can we expect the Federal government’s leading offshore wind promoter to impose restrictions that further weaken the economics of offshore wind development?
Pictured below: density of NARWs near wind leases and hydrodynamic effects of turbines
Recent disclosures indicate that BOEM, which very publicly promotes the offshore wind projects that it regulates, has waived a fundamental financial assurance requirement at the request of Vineyard Wind (approval letter attached). Given its broad applicability, this precedential waiver could have the effect of revising a significant provision of the offshore wind decommissioning regulations without public review and comment.
The issue is the “pay as you build” financial assurance requirement at 30 CFR § 585.516, which was waived by BOEM. This requirement, which is intended to project the public from decommissioning liability, is fair and reasonable given that wind developers must only provide financial assurance “in accordance with the number of facilities installed or being installed.” Companies that don’t have sufficient financial strength to comply with this requirement should not be installing and operating offshore wind turbines.
Vineyard Wind was either unable or unwilling to comply with the requirement. They instead requested to defer providing the full amount of the required financial assurance until year 15 of actual operations. The waiver changes “provide assurance when you install” to provide assurance 15 years after installation if everything goes as planned (hoped?).
After their waiver request was denied in 2017, Vineyard Wind resubmitted the request in 2021 seeking a favorable decision from an administration concerned that project cancellation or delay might tarnish the program that they were enthusiastically promoting.
BOEM (as directed from above?) granted the waiver, citing the general departure authority at 30 CFR § 585.103. However, that authority is intended for special situations, not for broadly applicable waivers that have the effect of revising the regulations without the public review required by the Administrative Procedures Act and Executive Orders 12866 and 13563.
There are no criteria in the Vineyard Wind waiver approval that could not apply to other wind developers. Vineyard Wind has simply committed to the same “risk-reduction factors” that apply to all offshore wind projects: damage insurance, the “use of proven turbine technology,” and long-term power purchase agreements. How could BOEM deny the same request from other companies?
It’s noteworthy that the regulations specific to financial assurance at 30 CFR § 585.516 provide no criteria for waiving the assurance requirements; nor do the regulations provide for the 15-year payment plan approved by BOEM. Given the precedential nature of the BOEM action and its enormous financial implications, a revision to the decommissioning regulations that provides criteria for such payment schemes should be promulgating before any similar departures are approved.
In light of the waiver, the public will likely incur substantial costs if Vineyard Wind fails, walks away, doesn’t fully fund their decommissioning account in a timely manner, or seeks new concessions after some or all of the 62 turbines have been installed.
Given the decommissioning obligations, what company would want to step in and assume responsibility for a failing project 10-15 years from now? What happens if Vineyard Wind’s project revenues don’t meet expectations and contributions to their decommissioning account are insufficient or used improperly? More concessions? We’ve seen this dance before.
Whether the project is for oil, gas, or wind energy, protecting the public from decommissioning liabilities should always be prioritized over facilitating development.
11/21/2023: Nauru Ocean Resources Inc. (NORI) shares data from their 2022 test mining on the impacts of seafloor sediment plumes. See the informative video embedded below.
12/7/2023: 31 members of congress send letter to Secretary Austin (attached) regarding the importance of deep-sea polymetallic nodules from a national security standpoint.
1/3/2024: National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is signed into law, and includes provisions directing the Department of Defense to submit a report to the House Armed Services Committee assessing the domestic processing of seafloor polymetallic nodules by March 1, 2024. See text pasted below.
1/11/2024: The Wall Street Journal reports on growing US political support for deep sea mining.
“the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy shall, by March 1, 2024, submit a report to the House Armed Services Committee assessing the processing of seabed resources of polymetallic nodules domestically. The report shall include, at a minimum, the following: (1) a review of current resources and controlling parties in securing seabed resources of polymetallic nodules; (2) an assessment of current domestic deep-sea mining and material processing capabilities; and (3) a roadmap recommending how the United States can have the ability to source and/or process critical minerals in innovative arenas, such as deep-sea mining, to decrease reliance on sources from foreign adversaries and bolster domestic competencies.
Keathley Canyon and Walker Ridge bids at Sale 259: blue=1 bid, red=2 bids, green=3 bids
Based solely on a comparison of the bids (Sale 261 vs. Sale 259), the Sale 259 rejections were, on balance, to the benefit of the public (table below). On the plus side:
Assuming all of the high Sale 261 bids are accepted, the net gain to the US Treasury is $8,749,365
Of the 14 tracts with rejected high bids at Sale 259, 8 received bids at Sale 261
Seven of those 8 bids were higher than the Sale 259 high bids, and 5 of those 7 were more than $1 million higher.
The Sale 259 bid rejections in the Keathley Canyon and Walker Ridge areas proved to be 100% beneficial. All 6 of those tracts received much higher bids at Sale 261.
The best BOEM decisions were the rejections of the Sale 259 bids for AT 5 and WR 795 and 796. The Sale 261 high bids on these 3 tracts were $10.8 million higher than the Sale 259 bids.
WR 795 and 796 were single bid tracts at Sale 259.
AT 5 received 3 bids at Sale 259. BOEM rejected the high bid despite the competitive bidding. That proved to be the right call given that the Sale 261 high bid was $3.5 million higher.
On the other hand:
None of the 5 Green Canyon rejections received any bids at Sale 261.
The high bid for GC 777 was rejected twice (Sales 257 and 259) at a cost of $1.8 million, the BP/Talos high bid at Sale 257. At sale 259, BP was the sole bidder for GC 777, and their bid was only $583,000, less than 1/3 of their Sale 257 bid. GC 777 received no bids at Sale 261.
The worst BOEM Sale 259 decisions were the rejections of the DC 622, GC 547, and GC 591 bids at a cost of $4.6 million ($5.2 if the Sale 261 bid for DC 622 is rejected).
This is not to say that the tracts with rejected bids will not ultimately be leased. However, the uncertainty regarding future sales changes the historic GoM leasing dynamic. The next opportunity for purchasing unleased tracts is a troubling unknown. Absent leasing and exploration, their resource and revenue potential will never be known.
area and block
Sale 259 high bid – company
Sale 261 high bid
govt gain (loss)
DC 622
2,101,836 – Shell
615,628* – Shell
(1,486,208)
GC 173
307,107 – Woodside
no bid
(307,107)
GC 547
1,783,498 – Chevron
no bid
(1,783,498)
GC 591
1,291,993 – Chevron
no bid
(1,291,993)
GC 642
605,505 – Anadarko
no bid
(605,505)
GC 777
583,103 – bp
no bid
(583,103)
AT 5
1,551,130 – Anadarko
5,215,628* – Shell
3,664,498
AT 133
607,107 – Woodside
no bid
(607,107)
KC 745
707,777 – Beacon
2,422,222 – Beacon
1,714,445
KC 789
707,777 – Beacon
2,143,299 – Beacon
1,435,522
WR 794
724,744 – Beacon
1,487,624 – Beacon
762,880
WR 795
774,242 – Beacon
5,301,107 – Woodside
4,526,865
WR 796
774,242 – Beacon
3,310,107 – Woodside
2,535,865
WR 750
724,744 – Beacon
1,498,555 – Beacon
773,811
*The BOEM sale 261 bid summary misidentifies the DC 622 and AT 5 bids as being for MC 622 and GC 5 respectively. The corrected identification above is based on the “Blocks Receiving Bids” file correlated with the block number and company code.
I couldn’t believe the release of the final Five Year Program as just a necessity to hold offshore wind sales. Back in 1969, Carolita Kallaur, Joan Davenport and I worked on a 5-year schedule based on the supply and demand needs of the nation. That approach, which developed into the elaborate process in the OCS Lands Act and the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act, is a thing of the past. Over.those 50 plus years, politics from both sides of the aisle always drove the changes
The announcement boasts about “the fewest oil and gas lease sales in history” while seemingly apologizing for holding any sales at all.
Consistent with the requirements of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) concerning offshore conventional and renewable energy leasing, the Department of the Interior today published the final 2024–2029 National Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program (Program) with the fewest oil and gas lease sales in history.
These three lease sales are the minimum number that will enable the Interior Department’s offshore wind energy program to continue issuing leases in a way that will ensure continued progress towards the Administration’s goal of 30 gigawatts of offshore wind by 2030.