International Bird Rescue photo: seabirds coated in oil off the Santa Barbara coast
Noozhawk: “A natural oil seep off the Santa Barbara coast has coated more than 100 seabirds in oil, leaving them in a life-threatening state, according to the nonprofit International Bird Rescue.”
For more about natural seeps, see “Slick Talk About Seeps.” The attached Oil Spill Fact Sheet (2002) by Cheryl Anderson, the world’s foremost authority on oil spill occurrence rates, and a 2012 update, may also be of interest.
Attached is John Smith’s comprehensive summary of lawsuits related to Sable Offshore’s attempts to restart Santa Ynez Unit production.
If you are keeping score, there are 10 separate cases including a class action lawsuit filed by investors. New legal battles are sure to follow given Sable’s OS&T strategy. Per John:
“The combined legal challenges, injunctions, and restraining orders have significantly delayed Sable’s restart plans and prompted the company to pursue an Offshore Storage and Treatment Vessel (OS&T) strategy, which was utilized to process SYU production in federal waters from 1981 – 1994, and transport oil to markets using tankers.“
Tyler Priest, the leading historian on US offshore oil and gas operations, has published another gem. His book, Offshore Oildom, is a fascinating account of the history of the technologically innovative and economically important, yet highly controversial, OCS Oil and Gas program. His bookis highly recommended.
Consider this recommendation by Daniel Yergin:
“Tyler Priest, a preeminent historian of energy and the environment, explores how a single well drilled off a pier near Santa Barbara in 1898 gave rise to a major American industry—offshore oil and gas. In spirited prose, Priest demonstrates how this U.S. industry was created not only by innovation, creative engineering, and complex execution; it was also the result of fierce political battles.” ~Daniel Yergin, Pulitzer Prize–winning author of The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power and The New Map: Energy, Climate, and the Clash of Nations
A leaked Dept. of the Interior (DOI) document will likely have little in common with the Draft Proposed Program (DPP, step 2 above). The DPP decisions will be made by the President, not by DOI staffers or managers.
According to media reports, the leaked document includes lease sales offshore New England, the Carolina’s and California. Unless the President revokes his own 2020 withdrawals, the Carolina’s are off-limits until 2032. Ditto for the Eastern Gulf within 125 miles from Florida. (See the map below.)
Including North Atlantic and offshore California in the DPP would unleash a firestorm of opposition. In the case of the North Atlantic, the acreage may not be sufficiently prospective to justify the fight.
To the extent that marine sanctuary determinations do not preclude California offshore leasing, the litigation and legislative battles probably would. In the unlikely event that a sale could be held, who would bid? Who wants to be the next Sable?
The Beaufort Sea is the most likely frontier area to be included in the DPP given plans to open ANWR, operational history, resource potential, and State support.
Assuming the South Atlantic withdrawal could be partially lifted, a small, targeted lease sale would be of great interest to petroleum geologists and could have significant economic and national security implications. The late Paul Post, the foremost expert on the petroleum geology of the US Atlantic, saw great potential in the paleo deep- and ultra-deepwater areas. He advocated exploration concepts proven successful in analogous West African and South American settings where massive discoveries have been made. Samuel Epstein, another prominent petroleum geologist, also believes the deepwater Atlantic has great resource potential.
Finally, the extent of the Florida buffer needs to be considered given the high resource potential of the Eastern Gulf. Be it 75, 100, or 125 miles, leasing beyond that buffer should be a priority.
John notes that Exxon’s March 26 contractual deadline for Sable to have the SYU up and running is fast approaching. What will Exxon do in the likely event that Sable fails to meet that deadline? Does Exxon want to re-enter the SYU legal and regulatory quagmire?
The SYU’s 500+ million barrels of oil, 3 deepwater platforms, and onshore processing facilities are an enormous prize, but is that prize attainable?
Meanwhile, the latest skirmish between Sable and the Office of the State Fire Marshal (OFSM) pertains to metal loss anomalies and inspection tool tolerances. The dispute is summarized in the linked filing.
Sable contends that the Fire Marshal’s letter contradicts guidance from OSFM staff and provides examples. Sable goes a step further at the end of their response by calling for the FIre Marshal to coordinate better with the experts on his staff:
“We respectfully request that, given this background, you coordinate further with the expert team at OSFM and revisit the statements in your October 22nd letter.”
It’s not looking good for a quick resolution of these issues.
In essence, the 3 Supervisors from South County (Districts 1-3) voted to euthanize an industry that is largely in North County (Districts 4 and 5). Those 3 supervisors, not the marketplace, are terminating a historically important industry. See the maps below.
District BoundariesOil Wells
Supervisors Laura Capps of the Second District, Joan Hartmann of the Third District and Roy Lee of the First District voted for the ordinance.
Ah, but it’s the industry’s fault according to Supervisor Hartmann. She asserted that companies have known since the 1950s about the dangers of climate change, and could have led the way to be part of the solution. How dare they respond to market forces instead of climate ideologues!
Of course, this is the same three vote coalition that is aligned with the Coastal Commission in opposition to the restart of the Santa Ynez Unit, which would benefit the County significantly.
Finally, note that the three supervisors voting for the ordinance represent the districts with the highest income levels and lowest poverty rates. Those opposing the ordinance represent the districts that will be most affected, and have the lowest income levels and highest poverty rates. (See the table below; Information courtesy of Grok AI.)
District
Approx. Median Household Income (2022)
Key Areas Included
Notes
1
$120,000–$140,000
Carpinteria, Summerland, Montecito, parts of Santa Barbara
Affluent coastal communities; high home values (~$1.5M+ median)
2
$95,000–$115,000
Santa Barbara city, Goleta, Isla Vista
Mix of urban professionals, students, and tech; university influence lowers median slightly.
3
$80,000-$95,000
Santa Ynez Valley, Buellton, Solvang, Lompoc
Rural/agricultural with tourism; moderate incomes from wine industry and military base
4
$70,000–$85,000
Lompoc, Vandenberg area, parts of Santa Maria
industrial and defense-related; higher poverty rates (~15–20%).
5
$60,000–$75,000
Santa Maria, Guadalupe
Agricultural North County; majority Latino population; lowest incomes due to farm labor.
Poverty rates: ~8–10% in Districts 1–2 vs. 18–25% in Districts 4–5
“Only in California! Newsom is blocking oil production off California’s coast from reaching their own refineries, driving gasoline prices even higher for Californians! Now, this oil production will have to be shipped elsewhere, lowering gas prices for other areas— just not for California! This is the opposite of common sense!”
BOE was a fan of Chris Wright long before he became Energy Secretary, and I agree that the resumption of Santa Ynez Unit production is economically desirable for California and the nation. However, his comment implies that OS&T processing and tanker transport is a realistic option, and I do not believe that is the case.
John Smith and I have discussed Sable’s OS&T announcement on a number of occasions, and we don’t see a reasonable path forward for this option. In addition to the significantly higher capital and operational costs and the need to acquire and retrofit a suitable floating production, storage, and offloading vessel (FPSO), the legal and permitting challenges could be even more complex than for the pipeline option (as daunting as that may sound).
The OS&T option would require a revised development and production plan, and the associated environmental review (almost certainly an EIS). An EIS would not favor this option, and the California Coastal Commission would surely rule that the OS&T/tanker alternative was inconsistent with their CZM plan. (Keep in mind that the SYU/OS&T production in the early 1980’s was approved prior to the passage of the Coastal Zone Management Act.) The Secretary of Commerce could overrule the Commission’s consistency determination, but legal objections to the override would likely delay the project for years and have a good chance of success.
Onshore processing and pipeline transportation using existing facilities is clearly the environmentally and economically preferable option. The only reasonable path forward for Sable or Exxon is to continue to pursue the onshore pipeline approvals. Federal attention should focus on jurisdiction over that pipeline, which is inherently an interstate line because it transports OCS production, and State actions that are blocking interstate commerce.
Finally, keep in mind that the SYU would still be producing today were it not for the entirely preventable pipeline rupture and the resulting Refugio oil spill. Plains Pipeline, the party responsible for this ugly incident, is no longer the owner, but that doesn’t comfort coastal residents; nor does it absolve the companies that transported their oil through the line from all responsibility.
The Refugio spill will be discussed further in an upcoming post.
As the above discussion demonstrates, the issue before the Court is not whether the specific work conducted by Sable was or is ultimately necessary or appropriate for pipeline safety. The issue before the Court is whether the Commission abused its discretion in issuing the April 10 Orders under the standards for review by petition for administrative writ of mandate.
Based on the foregoing analysis and a review of all of the arguments of the parties and the AR, the Court finds the Commission’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and that Sable has not met its burden to show an abuse of discretion by the Commission in issuing the April 10 Orders.
Accordingly, the petition for administrative mandate as set forth in the first cause of action of Sable’s FAP will be denied.
The road ahead for Sable continues to get rockier, and their share price took a major hit today.
As a result, on Sept. 29 Sable Offshore filed a declaratory judgement action against the State of California in Kern County. Sable is asking the court to confirm that the objectionable permitting provisions of SB 237 do not apply to their Las Flores Pipeline System.
Also, on Oct. 6 Sable filed a motion increasing the monetary damages in its ongoing case against the California Coastal Commission to $347 million. Sable asserts that their pipeline repair program was authorized by existing permits issued by the County of Santa Barbara under its Local Coastal Program and delegated Coastal Act authority.
These seem like good tactical moves on the part of Sable.
Phil also believes SYU production would reduce natural seepage: “UCSB and State Lands Commission studies (Quigley, Luyendyk, Hornafius, Peltonen, and others) have shown that when oil production is active, reservoir pressure is reduced and natural seepage declines by up to 50%. That means: •Cleaner beaches (less tar and oil) •Cleaner ocean surface (fewer sheens) •Healthier marine life with reduced chronic stress“
Note that those studies are specific to Platform Holly and the Coal Oil Point area. To the best of my knowledge, no studies have associated SYU production with a reduction in natural seepage.
While Platform Holly may be a negative spillage facility (i.e. Holly’s seep reduction may significantly exceed the platform’s production spillage), this type of seepage reduction has not been demonstrated at other platforms. Decisions on offshore exploration and development should be driven by the economic, energy security, and environmental benefits. To the extent that production reduces natural seepage, all the better. However, seepage reduction is not a primary reason for producing offshore oil and gas.
Option 1 (use of existing onshore infrastructure) is preferable from cost, air emissions, spill risk, State and local revenue, and regional energy supply standpoints. This is the only option that makes sense despite the enormous permitting challenges.
Option 2 (floating processing facility and tankers) would literally be an “in your face” act of defiance given the coastal visibility of the offshore facilities. Supporters of this option should be aware that there was no Coastal Zone Management Act when Exxon produced from Platform Hondo (the only SYU platform at the time) to the Offshore Storage and Treatment (OS&T) vessel in the 1980s. An EIS would not favor this option, and the California Coastal Commission would surely rule that this option was inconsistent with their CZM plan. The Secretary of Commerce could overrule the Commission’s decision, but legal objections to the override would seem to have a good chance of success.
The only reasonable path forward is to do the right thing and continue to pursue the State pipeline/onshore approvals. Although these approvals are substantively warranted, more litigation is probably inevitable. It will be far better to defend a good project (option 1) than a contrived workaround (option 2).