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Offshore facility decommissioning is a frequent target of Federal auditors given the complex financial and regulatory challenges. Unfortunately, the reviews have done little to better protect the public interest. As have previous inquiries, the new GAO report (attached for your convenience) calls for improved regulations and enforcement practices. That, of course, has been the objective for decades, but the problems have only worsened.

While the GAO recommendations are unsurprising, the body of the report is informative. Most notably, GAO (p. 29) raises a significant inconsistency on a key provision in the proposed decommissioning financial assurance regulations published last year:

One of the five criteria BOEM would no longer use under the proposed rule is demonstrated reliability, as shown by record of compliance with laws, regulations, and lease terms, among other factors. BOEM’s June 2023 regulatory analysis concluded this criterion is not a good predictive indicator of default on decommissioning obligations. However, BOEM and BSEE officials we spoke with told us that poor compliance records—such as safety and maintenance issues or delayed decommissioning obligations—can be an indicator of potential decommissioning noncompliance or financial stress.

Why was there such a disconnect between the opinions of BOEM and BSEE officials (who are directly involved with decommissioning) and BOEM’s decision not to include a company’s compliance record among the factors to be considered in determining the need for supplemental financial assurance? As pointed out here and here, safety performance is arguably the most important predictor of financial failure and decommissioning noncompliance.

The GAO report correctly acknowledges the difficulties in disqualifying operating companies. However, the regulations at 30 CFR § 250.135 specifically provide for disqualification for poor performance. While the regulations could be tighter, enforcing disqualifications regulations is dependent on persistence and strong support from management and DOI attorneys. Given the political risks associated with disqualifying operators, that support is often lacking.

Disqualification difficulties make it imperative that BOEM carefully consider past performance before approving lease assignments or determining financial assurance amounts. Provisions in 30 CFR §585.408 and §585.107 could have been used to disapprove assignments to Signal Hill, Fieldwood, Cox, and other problem operators. The failure to do so has significantly delayed decommissioning and increased public exposure to financial risks.

In some cases, lease assignments to unqualified companies have not only been approved but they have been facilitated by BOEM/MMS. The case of Platforms Hogan and Houchin, in the Santa Barbara Channel, is a particularly good example. (Did GAO inquire about the Inspector General report on this matter or ask why that report has still not been released?)

Most operating companies are responsible about planning for and fulfilling their decommissioning obligations. The problem is the exceptions, and they are not difficult to identify if you look at compliance data and obtain input from BSEE inspection personnel.

Other important decommissioning questions that need to be considered:

Additional comments on the GAO report from decommissioning specialist John Smith will be posted tomorrow.

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This Santa Barbara Independent article discusses the Record of Decision (ROD) for the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement on Pacific OCS Decommissioning. A quote from the article regarding BSEE’s support for complete removal of all infrastructure follows:

“It’s great that the federal government finally has a loose game plan for getting oil companies to clean up their rusty messes,” said Miyoko Sakashita, oceans program director at the Center for Biological Diversity. 

Apparently the Center for Biological Diversity supports complete removal, the decommissioning alternative that would destroy “the most productive marine habitats per unit area in the world.” How’s that for irony?

Complete removal may be the most politically expedient alternative in California, but it is by far the most environmentally damaging and poses the greatest safety risks. Old disputes about offshore oil and gas production should not be driving decommissioning policy.

beneath Platform Gilda, Santa Barbara Channel

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link: Investigation of May 15, 2021, Fatality, Eugene Island Area Block 158 #14 Platform

Firstly, taking 2.5 years to publish an investigation report is unacceptable for an organization with BSEE’s talent, resources, and safety mandate. Unfortunately, such delays now seem to be the rule as the summary table (below) for the last 4 panel reports demonstrates. The most recent report implies that the actual investigation was completed in 2-3 months. Why were another 2+ years needed to publish the report? (Note that the lengthy and complex National Commission, BOEMRE, Chief Counsel, and NAE reports on the Macondo blowout were published 6 to to 17 months after the well was shut-in.)

incident datereport dateelapsed time (months)incident type
5/15/202110/31/202329.5fatality
1/24/20217/24/202330fatality
8/23/20202/15/202330fatality
7/25/20202/15/202331spill
Four most recent BSEE panel reports

The subject (May 2021) fatality occurred during a casing integrity pressure test, and some of the risk factors were familiar:

  • The operator, Fieldwood Energy, was facing bankruptcy, and had a poor performance record.
  • The platform was installed 52 years prior to the incident, and had been shut-in for more than a year.
  • The well of concern (#27) was drilled in 1970, sidetracked in 1995, and last produced in February 2013.
  • Diagnostic tests clearly demonstrated communication between the tubing, production casing, and surface casing.

In light of the known well integrity issues and the absence of production for more than 8 years, the prudent action would have been to plug and abandon the well in a timely manner. However, under 30 CFR 250.526 as interpreted at the time, Fieldwood had another option – submit a casing pressure request to BSEE to confirm the integrity of the outermost 16″ casing and (per p. 10 of the report) “continue to operate the well in its existing condition.” Given that the well had not produced for 8 years and that the platform had been shut-in for more than a year, the option to continue operating the well should not have been applicable.

The only issue for Fieldwood to resolve with the regulator should have been the timing of the plugging operation. Additional well diagnostics would only serve to create new risks and further delay the well’s abandonment.

The resulting pressure test of the outermost (16″) casing was solely for the purpose of confirming a second well bore barrier. Per the report (p.10), there is a “known frequency of outermost casings in the GOM experiencing a loss of integrity as a result of corrosion.” Whether or not the 16″ casing passed the test, the inactive well had clear integrity issues and should have been plugged.

Fieldwood proceeded with the pressure test rather than correcting the problem. The regulations, as interpreted, thus facilitated the unsafe actions that followed. These factors heightened the operational risks:

  • Extensive scaffolding and a standby boat were needed for the test.
  • Process gas via temporary test equipment was used to conduct the test.
  • The Field-Person In Charge (PIC) heard about the test for the first time on the morning of the incident.
  • The PIC and victim had no procedures to follow, and had to figure out how to conduct the test on the fly.
  • A high pressure hose was connected without a pressure regulator or pressure safety valve.
  • The digital pressure gauge had two measurement modes, one to display pressure in psi and the other in bars. (One bar is equivalent to 14.5 psi. Assuming that the readings were in psi rather than bars would thus result in serious overpressure of the casing.)

Seconds after the victim told the field-PIC the pressure was 175 psi (presumably 175 bar and 2538 psi), the casing ruptured. The force of the explosion propelled the victim into the handrail approximately 4 feet away, which bent from the impact. The victim’s hardhat was projected 60 to 80 feet upwards, lodging into the piping.

The investigation report fails to address the wisdom of conducting the pressure test and the regulatory weaknesses that enabled Fieldwood to defer safety critical well plugging operations. The pressure test option in 30 CFR § 250.526, was not intended for long out-of-service wells with demonstrated well integrity issues. The only acceptable option was corrective action (plugging the well) without further delay. The pressure test option added risks without addressing the fundamental problem and helped enable the operator to further delay decommissioning obligations.

The report also fails to address the lease administration practices that enabled a problem operator to expand their lease holdings. Indeed, BOEM’s inexplicable proposal to eliminate a company’s performance record in determining the need for supplemental bonding would exacerbate the risk of more such incidents. (See these comments on the BOEM proposal).

Postscript: According to BOEM data, the lease where the fatal incident occurred expired on 7/31/2021. Per the BSEE Borehole and structures files, neither the platform (#14) nor any of the other 4 structures remaining on the lease have been removed, and the well (#27) has yet to be plugged.

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An excellent compliance and incident update by Jason Mathews is attached. BSEE’s focus on risk assessment, compliance and incident trends, high potential near-misses, medivac capabilities, hot work safety, lifting operations, and gas releases is encouraging. Good work by the folks in BSEE’s Gulf of Mexico Region.

Observations:

  • Zero 2023 occupational fatalities through Q3. Hoping this holds through the end of the year and beyond.
  • INCs/component are down but INCs/inspection are slightly higher. This may imply a relative increase in the inspection of high component deepwater facilities.
  • No. of hours worked is increasing; good sign for the offshore program.
  • Hand and finger injuries are driving up the injury count.
  • Well control incidents are stable at a low level.
  • Improved fire data help facilitate risk assessments
  • No YTD explosions
  • No. of collisions is down
  • 10 YTD spills> 1 barrel (total volume not specified)
  • Some evidence of decline in lifting incidents in Q2 and Q3
  • Gas releases are up (aging facilities, decommissioning related?)

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BSEE shouldn’t have to issue guidance about helicopter loading precautions that every worker and visitor should be taught before going offshore, but apparently they do. See the safety alert that is attached below.

In this alarming near-miss event, a helicopter was stationed on the facility’s helideck and a crew member approached the aircraft from the rear, entering the rotor arc area before the rotor blades had come to a complete stop. This unsafe action posed a significant threat to the safety of all personnel involved. An offshore helideck assistant repeated the unsafe behavior by approaching the helicopter from the rear, entering the vicinity of the tail rotor, and positioning themselves within the main rotor’s danger zone immediately after the helicopter had landed on the facility’s helideck.

Meanwhile, we are still awaiting the final report on the tragic crash at the West Delta 109 A platform last December. Why is this taking so long?

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Consistent with the findings of their inspections and data gathering (as discussed further here), BSEE has published a safety alert (attached) that identifies significant shortcomings in medical evacuation planning and performance.

The findings suggest that a renewed focus on medevac preparedness should be an immediate industry priority. Note the evacuation time, supply, training, and other planning issues summarized in the BSEE alert. Also note the helideck safety issues that were identified. These issues are particularly troubling in light of last December’s fatal crash.

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The plan looks good. It appears to be consistent with previous contingency plans. Offshore operations should not be impacted.

During the shutdown BSEE will continue critical permitting, oversight, preparedness verification, and related activities that are necessary to protect workers and the environment from operations associated with conventional and renewable energy development on the Outer Continental Shelf. Approximately 40% of the 851 BSEE employees will be retained to accomplish these activities and will be designated as exempt, as their salaries will be funded from non-lapsing prior year carryover. Should an extended shutdown occur, exhausting current funding sources, all the exempt personnel would be designated as excepted as they are essential for life and safety.”

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Federal funding lapses, real or threatened, are rather common. They range from false alarms to the extended shutdown of 35 days that occurred in 2018-19. In no case have offshore oil and gas operations been significantly affected. BSEE and its predecessors developed and implemented contingency plans that identified “essential employees” needed to monitor operations and review necessary permits.

Most Federal agencies have posted updated Federal contingency plans on the OMB page established for the purpose. Noticeably absent is the plan for the Department of the Interior (DOI), which includes the bureaus responsible for overseeing energy operations on Federal onshore and offshore lands. Presumably this is just a bureaucratic delay, and DOI has plans for the safe continuation of operations. However, the Petroleum Association of Wyoming was sufficiently concerned that they wrote a letter to Secretary Haaland and the Director of the Bureau of Land Management, which is responsible for oil and gas operations on Federal onshore lands. That letter is attached below.

Hopefully, DOI will provide clarity on these matters today, since a Federal government shutdown could begin at midnight tomorrow. Needless to say, any disruption in ongoing oil and gas production operations would have significant safety and economic implications.

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The civil penalties provision in the 1978 OCS Lands Act (OCSLA) Amendments was flawed in that it stipulated that operators must be given time to take corrective action before a civil penalty could be assessed. The “time to take corrective action” requirement was confirmed by a 1983 Federal Court decision in Louisiana:

The Court agrees with Chevron’s construction of Section 24(b) and holds that civil penalties may only be imposed under Section 24(b) for violations which continue after the violator has been notified of the breach and has failed to correct it within a reasonable period allowed. This conclusion is based primarily upon a careful review of the pertinent statute. The first sentence sets forth the conditions of liability:

If any person fails to comply with any [provision of the Act] after notice of such failure and expiration of any reasonable period allowed for corrective action, such person shall be liable for a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each day of the continuance of such failure.

The court decision gutted the Minerals Management Service (MMS) civil penalties program. Civil penalties could no longer be assessed until the operators had been given time to correct their violations, even those that endangered workers and the environment.

Ironically, Congressman George Miller (D-CA), an ardent opponent of the offshore oil and gas program, proved to be an important MMS ally by adding language to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 that amended the OCSLA civil penalties provision. The first draft of that language expanded the civil penalties authority to include violations that may constitute a threat of serious, irreparable, or immediate harm or damage to life, property, or the environment.

We were able to revise that draft by adding the words “or constituted” after “constitute” to cover situations where the threat was no longer present. For example, if an inspector found that a well had been drilled without required elements of the well control system in place, the threat may no longer be present at the time the violation was detected but it certainly was when the well was drilled.

The revived MMS civil penalties program was fair and effective, and BSEE seems to be administering the program in a similar manner. Civil penalties data for the past 4 years will be posted next week.

Congressman George Miller (CA)

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For those interested in safety and compliance data, a good BSEE update for the Gulf of Mexico is attached.

Interestingly, (slide pasted below), there were 20% fewer Incidents of Noncompliance (INCs) per component inspected but 37% more INCs/inspection. This would seem to imply high INC rates at less complex (typically older) facilities with relatively fewer components.

Posted 2023 inspection data indicate high INC/inspection rates for Cox and affiliates Energy XXI GOM and EPL that have filed for bankruptcy. Through August, these companies have accounted for 44% (635/1457) of all INCs issued in 2023. This may explain, at least in part, the divergence in the 2 compliance measures.

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