An excellent compliance and incident update by Jason Mathews is attached. BSEE’s focus on risk assessment, compliance and incident trends, high potential near-misses, medivac capabilities, hot work safety, lifting operations, and gas releases is encouraging. Good work by the folks in BSEE’s Gulf of Mexico Region.
Observations:
Zero 2023 occupational fatalities through Q3. Hoping this holds through the end of the year and beyond.
INCs/component are down but INCs/inspection are slightly higher. This may imply a relative increase in the inspection of high component deepwater facilities.
No. of hours worked is increasing; good sign for the offshore program.
Hand and finger injuries are driving up the injury count.
Well control incidents are stable at a low level.
Improved fire data help facilitate risk assessments
No YTD explosions
No. of collisions is down
10 YTD spills> 1 barrel (total volume not specified)
Some evidence of decline in lifting incidents in Q2 and Q3
Gas releases are up (aging facilities, decommissioning related?)
BSEE shouldn’t have to issue guidance about helicopter loading precautions that every worker and visitor should be taught before going offshore, but apparently they do. See the safety alert that is attached below.
In this alarming near-miss event, a helicopter was stationed on the facility’s helideck and a crew member approached the aircraft from the rear, entering the rotor arc area before the rotor blades had come to a complete stop. This unsafe action posed a significant threat to the safety of all personnel involved. An offshore helideck assistant repeated the unsafe behavior by approaching the helicopter from the rear, entering the vicinity of the tail rotor, and positioning themselves within the main rotor’s danger zone immediately after the helicopter had landed on the facility’s helideck.
Consistent with the findings of their inspections and data gathering (as discussed further here), BSEE has published a safety alert (attached) that identifies significant shortcomings in medical evacuation planning and performance.
The findings suggest that a renewed focus on medevac preparedness should be an immediate industry priority. Note the evacuation time, supply, training, and other planning issues summarized in the BSEE alert. Also note the helideck safety issues that were identified. These issues are particularly troubling in light of last December’s fatal crash.
The plan looks good. It appears to be consistent with previous contingency plans. Offshore operations should not be impacted.
“During the shutdown BSEE will continue critical permitting, oversight, preparedness verification, and related activities that are necessary to protect workers and the environment from operations associated with conventional and renewable energy development on the Outer Continental Shelf. Approximately 40% of the 851 BSEE employees will be retained to accomplish these activities and will be designated as exempt, as their salaries will be funded from non-lapsing prior year carryover. Should an extended shutdown occur, exhausting current funding sources, all the exempt personnel would be designated as excepted as they are essential for life and safety.”
Federal funding lapses, real or threatened, are rather common. They range from false alarms to the extended shutdown of 35 days that occurred in 2018-19. In no case have offshore oil and gas operations been significantly affected. BSEE and its predecessors developed and implemented contingency plans that identified “essential employees” needed to monitor operations and review necessary permits.
Hopefully, DOI will provide clarity on these matters today, since a Federal government shutdown could begin at midnight tomorrow. Needless to say, any disruption in ongoing oil and gas production operations would have significant safety and economic implications.
The civil penalties provision in the 1978 OCS Lands Act (OCSLA) Amendments was flawed in that it stipulated that operators must be given time to take corrective action before a civil penalty could be assessed. The “time to take corrective action” requirement was confirmed by a 1983 Federal Court decision in Louisiana:
The Court agrees with Chevron’s construction of Section 24(b) and holds that civil penalties may only be imposed under Section 24(b) for violations which continue after the violator has been notified of the breach and has failed to correct it within a reasonable period allowed. This conclusion is based primarily upon a careful review of the pertinent statute. The first sentence sets forth the conditions of liability:
If any person fails to comply with any [provision of the Act] after notice of such failure and expiration of any reasonable period allowed for corrective action, such person shall be liable for a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each day of the continuance of such failure.
The court decision gutted the Minerals Management Service (MMS) civil penalties program. Civil penalties could no longer be assessed until the operators had been given time to correct their violations, even those that endangered workers and the environment.
Ironically, Congressman George Miller (D-CA), an ardent opponent of the offshore oil and gas program, proved to be an important MMS ally by adding language to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 that amended the OCSLA civil penalties provision. The first draft of that language expanded the civil penalties authority to include violations that may constitute a threat of serious, irreparable, or immediate harm or damage to life, property, or the environment.
We were able to revise that draft by adding the words “or constituted” after “constitute” to cover situations where the threat was no longer present. For example, if an inspector found that a well had been drilled without required elements of the well control system in place, the threat may no longer be present at the time the violation was detected but it certainly was when the well was drilled.
The revived MMS civil penalties program was fair and effective, and BSEE seems to be administering the program in a similar manner. Civil penalties data for the past 4 years will be posted next week.
For those interested in safety and compliance data, a good BSEE update for the Gulf of Mexico is attached.
Interestingly, (slide pasted below), there were 20% fewer Incidents of Noncompliance (INCs) per component inspected but 37% more INCs/inspection. This would seem to imply high INC rates at less complex (typically older) facilities with relatively fewer components.
Slide 13: “In 2022, the rate of occupational fatalities, reported for activities on facilities where BSEE has primary investigation authority, decreased to being near the historical national average of approximately 0.9 fatalities per 25,000 full time equivalent workers per year. However, considering all offshore risk factors, including helicopter transportation, diving, marine transfer, and COVID-19 exposures, the occupational fatality rate for all OCS activities has remained high since 2019.“
Slide 15: “In 2022, the TRIR for both production and construction operations increased to the highest levels recorded since 2010 and remained high even after discounting the impact of COVID-19 illnesses. The TRIR for drilling and well operations, however, remained near their historical lows.“
Comments:
These charts and tables are helpful for assessing trends.
The data raise concerns that merit further analysis. Absent the specific incident summaries, which have yet to be updated for 2022, it’s difficult to assess the nature and extent of the issues.
The parsing of fatality data according to regulatory jurisdiction adds to previously expressed concerns about regulatory fragmentation and its implications for offshore safety.
The latest International Regulators’ Forum country performance data are for 2020. The absence of regular, timely updates makes international comparisons difficult and limits the value of what is arguably the most important IRF workstream.
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 