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Posts Tagged ‘BSEE’

BSEE shouldn’t have to issue guidance about helicopter loading precautions that every worker and visitor should be taught before going offshore, but apparently they do. See the safety alert that is attached below.

In this alarming near-miss event, a helicopter was stationed on the facility’s helideck and a crew member approached the aircraft from the rear, entering the rotor arc area before the rotor blades had come to a complete stop. This unsafe action posed a significant threat to the safety of all personnel involved. An offshore helideck assistant repeated the unsafe behavior by approaching the helicopter from the rear, entering the vicinity of the tail rotor, and positioning themselves within the main rotor’s danger zone immediately after the helicopter had landed on the facility’s helideck.

Meanwhile, we are still awaiting the final report on the tragic crash at the West Delta 109 A platform last December. Why is this taking so long?

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Consistent with the findings of their inspections and data gathering (as discussed further here), BSEE has published a safety alert (attached) that identifies significant shortcomings in medical evacuation planning and performance.

The findings suggest that a renewed focus on medevac preparedness should be an immediate industry priority. Note the evacuation time, supply, training, and other planning issues summarized in the BSEE alert. Also note the helideck safety issues that were identified. These issues are particularly troubling in light of last December’s fatal crash.

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The plan looks good. It appears to be consistent with previous contingency plans. Offshore operations should not be impacted.

During the shutdown BSEE will continue critical permitting, oversight, preparedness verification, and related activities that are necessary to protect workers and the environment from operations associated with conventional and renewable energy development on the Outer Continental Shelf. Approximately 40% of the 851 BSEE employees will be retained to accomplish these activities and will be designated as exempt, as their salaries will be funded from non-lapsing prior year carryover. Should an extended shutdown occur, exhausting current funding sources, all the exempt personnel would be designated as excepted as they are essential for life and safety.”

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Federal funding lapses, real or threatened, are rather common. They range from false alarms to the extended shutdown of 35 days that occurred in 2018-19. In no case have offshore oil and gas operations been significantly affected. BSEE and its predecessors developed and implemented contingency plans that identified “essential employees” needed to monitor operations and review necessary permits.

Most Federal agencies have posted updated Federal contingency plans on the OMB page established for the purpose. Noticeably absent is the plan for the Department of the Interior (DOI), which includes the bureaus responsible for overseeing energy operations on Federal onshore and offshore lands. Presumably this is just a bureaucratic delay, and DOI has plans for the safe continuation of operations. However, the Petroleum Association of Wyoming was sufficiently concerned that they wrote a letter to Secretary Haaland and the Director of the Bureau of Land Management, which is responsible for oil and gas operations on Federal onshore lands. That letter is attached below.

Hopefully, DOI will provide clarity on these matters today, since a Federal government shutdown could begin at midnight tomorrow. Needless to say, any disruption in ongoing oil and gas production operations would have significant safety and economic implications.

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The civil penalties provision in the 1978 OCS Lands Act (OCSLA) Amendments was flawed in that it stipulated that operators must be given time to take corrective action before a civil penalty could be assessed. The “time to take corrective action” requirement was confirmed by a 1983 Federal Court decision in Louisiana:

The Court agrees with Chevron’s construction of Section 24(b) and holds that civil penalties may only be imposed under Section 24(b) for violations which continue after the violator has been notified of the breach and has failed to correct it within a reasonable period allowed. This conclusion is based primarily upon a careful review of the pertinent statute. The first sentence sets forth the conditions of liability:

If any person fails to comply with any [provision of the Act] after notice of such failure and expiration of any reasonable period allowed for corrective action, such person shall be liable for a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each day of the continuance of such failure.

The court decision gutted the Minerals Management Service (MMS) civil penalties program. Civil penalties could no longer be assessed until the operators had been given time to correct their violations, even those that endangered workers and the environment.

Ironically, Congressman George Miller (D-CA), an ardent opponent of the offshore oil and gas program, proved to be an important MMS ally by adding language to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 that amended the OCSLA civil penalties provision. The first draft of that language expanded the civil penalties authority to include violations that may constitute a threat of serious, irreparable, or immediate harm or damage to life, property, or the environment.

We were able to revise that draft by adding the words “or constituted” after “constitute” to cover situations where the threat was no longer present. For example, if an inspector found that a well had been drilled without required elements of the well control system in place, the threat may no longer be present at the time the violation was detected but it certainly was when the well was drilled.

The revived MMS civil penalties program was fair and effective, and BSEE seems to be administering the program in a similar manner. Civil penalties data for the past 4 years will be posted next week.

Congressman George Miller (CA)

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For those interested in safety and compliance data, a good BSEE update for the Gulf of Mexico is attached.

Interestingly, (slide pasted below), there were 20% fewer Incidents of Noncompliance (INCs) per component inspected but 37% more INCs/inspection. This would seem to imply high INC rates at less complex (typically older) facilities with relatively fewer components.

Posted 2023 inspection data indicate high INC/inspection rates for Cox and affiliates Energy XXI GOM and EPL that have filed for bankruptcy. Through August, these companies have accounted for 44% (635/1457) of all INCs issued in 2023. This may explain, at least in part, the divergence in the 2 compliance measures.

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Per the BSEE presentation attached below:

Slide 13: “In 2022, the rate of occupational fatalities, reported for activities on facilities where BSEE has primary investigation authority, decreased to being near the historical national average of approximately 0.9 fatalities per 25,000 full time equivalent workers per year. However, considering all offshore risk factors, including helicopter transportation, diving, marine transfer, and COVID-19 exposures, the occupational fatality rate for all OCS activities has remained high since 2019.

Slide 15: “In 2022, the TRIR for both production and construction operations increased to the highest levels recorded since 2010 and remained high even after discounting the impact of COVID-19 illnesses. The TRIR for drilling and well operations, however, remained near their historical lows.

Comments:

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Published today.

Comments on the proposed rule.

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For the first time in the history of the US OCS program, Federal ontracts have been awarded for the decommissioning of facilities in the Matagorda Island area of the Gulf of Mexico. The use of taxpayer funds for this purpose should be an embarrassment for the offshore industry and its regulators, past and present.

Rather than touting these contracts, the regulators should be explaining how this happened and how it will be prevented in the future. Fortunately, BOEM’s proposed decommissioning financial assurance rule is open for comment until the end of this month, so we have an opportunity to provide input.

Matagorda Island Gas, the company whose wells the public will be plugging, had a poor compliance record, and is another example of why compliance should be a primary factor in determining supplemental financial assurance requirements.

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Per the DOI regulatory agenda published on 7/27/2023 (excerpt below), the final BSEE well control rule was published in June. Of course, that did not happen, but the update tells us that the final rule should be published soon. The delay is probably in the internal review process which moves at the pace of continental drift 😉.

BOE comments on the proposed rule are attached here.

12. Oil and Gas and Sulfur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf-Blowout Preventer Systems and Well Control Revisions [1014–AA52]

Abstract: This rulemaking revises the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) regulations published in the 2019 final rule entitled “Oil and Gas and Sulfur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf-Blowout Preventer Systems and Well Control Revisions,” 84 FR 21908 (May 15, 2019), for drilling, workover, completion and decommissioning operations. In accordance with Executive Order (E.O.) 13990 (Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis) and the E.O.’s accompanying “President’s Fact Sheet: List of Agency Actions for Review,” BSEE reviewed the 2019 final rule and is updating to subpart G of 30 CFR part 250 to ensure operations are conducted safely and in an environmentally responsible manner.

Timetable:

ActionDateFR Cite
NPRM09/14/2287 FR 56354
NPRM Comment Period End11/14/22
Final Action06/00/23
Final Action Effective07/00/23

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