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Posts Tagged ‘BSEE’

The civil penalties provision in the 1978 OCS Lands Act (OCSLA) Amendments was flawed in that it stipulated that operators must be given time to take corrective action before a civil penalty could be assessed. The “time to take corrective action” requirement was confirmed by a 1983 Federal Court decision in Louisiana:

The Court agrees with Chevron’s construction of Section 24(b) and holds that civil penalties may only be imposed under Section 24(b) for violations which continue after the violator has been notified of the breach and has failed to correct it within a reasonable period allowed. This conclusion is based primarily upon a careful review of the pertinent statute. The first sentence sets forth the conditions of liability:

If any person fails to comply with any [provision of the Act] after notice of such failure and expiration of any reasonable period allowed for corrective action, such person shall be liable for a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each day of the continuance of such failure.

The court decision gutted the Minerals Management Service (MMS) civil penalties program. Civil penalties could no longer be assessed until the operators had been given time to correct their violations, even those that endangered workers and the environment.

Ironically, Congressman George Miller (D-CA), an ardent opponent of the offshore oil and gas program, proved to be an important MMS ally by adding language to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 that amended the OCSLA civil penalties provision. The first draft of that language expanded the civil penalties authority to include violations that may constitute a threat of serious, irreparable, or immediate harm or damage to life, property, or the environment.

We were able to revise that draft by adding the words “or constituted” after “constitute” to cover situations where the threat was no longer present. For example, if an inspector found that a well had been drilled without required elements of the well control system in place, the threat may no longer be present at the time the violation was detected but it certainly was when the well was drilled.

The revived MMS civil penalties program was fair and effective, and BSEE seems to be administering the program in a similar manner. Civil penalties data for the past 4 years will be posted next week.

Congressman George Miller (CA)

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For those interested in safety and compliance data, a good BSEE update for the Gulf of Mexico is attached.

Interestingly, (slide pasted below), there were 20% fewer Incidents of Noncompliance (INCs) per component inspected but 37% more INCs/inspection. This would seem to imply high INC rates at less complex (typically older) facilities with relatively fewer components.

Posted 2023 inspection data indicate high INC/inspection rates for Cox and affiliates Energy XXI GOM and EPL that have filed for bankruptcy. Through August, these companies have accounted for 44% (635/1457) of all INCs issued in 2023. This may explain, at least in part, the divergence in the 2 compliance measures.

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Per the BSEE presentation attached below:

Slide 13: “In 2022, the rate of occupational fatalities, reported for activities on facilities where BSEE has primary investigation authority, decreased to being near the historical national average of approximately 0.9 fatalities per 25,000 full time equivalent workers per year. However, considering all offshore risk factors, including helicopter transportation, diving, marine transfer, and COVID-19 exposures, the occupational fatality rate for all OCS activities has remained high since 2019.

Slide 15: “In 2022, the TRIR for both production and construction operations increased to the highest levels recorded since 2010 and remained high even after discounting the impact of COVID-19 illnesses. The TRIR for drilling and well operations, however, remained near their historical lows.

Comments:

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Published today.

Comments on the proposed rule.

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For the first time in the history of the US OCS program, Federal ontracts have been awarded for the decommissioning of facilities in the Matagorda Island area of the Gulf of Mexico. The use of taxpayer funds for this purpose should be an embarrassment for the offshore industry and its regulators, past and present.

Rather than touting these contracts, the regulators should be explaining how this happened and how it will be prevented in the future. Fortunately, BOEM’s proposed decommissioning financial assurance rule is open for comment until the end of this month, so we have an opportunity to provide input.

Matagorda Island Gas, the company whose wells the public will be plugging, had a poor compliance record, and is another example of why compliance should be a primary factor in determining supplemental financial assurance requirements.

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Per the DOI regulatory agenda published on 7/27/2023 (excerpt below), the final BSEE well control rule was published in June. Of course, that did not happen, but the update tells us that the final rule should be published soon. The delay is probably in the internal review process which moves at the pace of continental drift 😉.

BOE comments on the proposed rule are attached here.

12. Oil and Gas and Sulfur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf-Blowout Preventer Systems and Well Control Revisions [1014–AA52]

Abstract: This rulemaking revises the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) regulations published in the 2019 final rule entitled “Oil and Gas and Sulfur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf-Blowout Preventer Systems and Well Control Revisions,” 84 FR 21908 (May 15, 2019), for drilling, workover, completion and decommissioning operations. In accordance with Executive Order (E.O.) 13990 (Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis) and the E.O.’s accompanying “President’s Fact Sheet: List of Agency Actions for Review,” BSEE reviewed the 2019 final rule and is updating to subpart G of 30 CFR part 250 to ensure operations are conducted safely and in an environmentally responsible manner.

Timetable:

ActionDateFR Cite
NPRM09/14/2287 FR 56354
NPRM Comment Period End11/14/22
Final Action06/00/23
Final Action Effective07/00/23

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For the first time in the history of the US offshore oil and gas program, taxpayers will be funding the plugging of OCS wells. This should be viewed as a collective failure by government and industry. Nearly 34 years have passed since the Alliance bankruptcy, the first of many wake-up calls, and we still haven’t figured this out.

Per BSEE’s recent announcement, Federal funds will be used to plug wells in the Matagorda Island (MI) area of the Gulf of Mexico (see map below). Based on a BSEE presentation and BSEE borehole data, these wells were drilled by Matagorda Island Gas Operations LLC, a company that filed for bankruptcy in 2014.

Prior to the bankruptcy filing, Matagorda Island Gas was cited for 112 violations on 108 inspections. This INC/inspection rate is approximately double the Gulf of Mexico (all operators) rate in a typical year (0.52 in 2022), and is 4 to 25 times higher than the rate for the 2022 Honor Roll companies.

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David Scarborough, Island Operating Co. employee who died in the crash.

The preliminary NTSB report was posted on 1/18/2023, but the final report has still not been published. Status update:

Will the investigators consider longstanding regulatory fragmentation issues? The most recent Coast Guard – BSEE MOA for fixed platforms added to helideck regulatory uncertainty by assigning decks and fuel handling to BSEE and railings and perimeter netting to the Coast Guard.  This is the antithesis of holistic, systems-based regulation.

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Along with Cox Operating, six affiliates also filed: MLCJR , M21K, EPL Oil & Gas, Cox Oil Offshore, Energy XXI Gulf Coast, and Energy XXI GOM.

The BOEM platform data base lists only Cox Operating (276 platforms), EPL (10 platforms), and Energy XXI GOM (26 platforms) as current operators of OCS platforms. However, according to the Cox Operating website, the company operates 600 producing wells on 500 structures. Presumably, ~200 of those structures are in State waters.

According to testimony at the bankruptcy hearing:

  • In 2020, the OPEC price war drove oil prices down, while stay-at-home orders and well shut-ins associated with the COVID-19 global pandemic sharply reduced production.
  • The debtors’ assets suffered significant damage from five named storms and hurricanes during 2020 and 2021, leading to further reductions in production. Comment: According to BSEE, 7 tropical systems affected GoM operations in 2021, so the number of storms is not in dispute. The extent to which maintenance or preparedness issues contributed to the damage is unknown.
  • In 2020, a foreign-flagged vessel struck a platform owned by one of the debtors resulting in major damage and substantial losses of production. Comment: Apparently, this is the incident being cited. According to the BSEE report, the operator (Cox) was not at fault. Per BSEE: (1) The navigational lights and foghorn on the platform were maintained and in operational order, (2) the allision was not due to any platform related error, and (3) the platform’s operator and safety system responded in accordance with the regulations.
  • At this time, the debtors’ production volume is half what it was in 2019. Comment: Comparing the 2019 and 2022 production data, OCS oil and gas production are down by about 30% and 40% respectively. However, the 50% reduction figure seems reasonable given the likelihood of further reductions in State water production and in 2023.

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NOPSEMA’s June 8 safety alert implies that the June 2nd fatality at the North Rankin complex, offshore Western Australia, was the result of a crane/lifting incident. Per NOPSEMA:

A recent fatal incident involving a person working on an offshore oil and gas facility has provided a tragic reminder of the risks of work involving the rigging, manipulation and movement of loads, including people and equipment.

Despite the international focus on lifting operations over the past 30 years, Norwegian and US data do not suggest improved performance. PSA Norway’s “Trends in risk level on the Norwegian Continental Shelf” report shows an increase in lifting incident rates for both fixed and mobile facilities over the past 10 years (first chart below).

Similarly, recent lifting data from BSEE’s incident tables (summary below) and Jason Mathew’s June 2022 presentation (pages 48-63) suggest that lifting risks are not being effectively mitigated. Why are industy/regulator messages regarding hazard identification and controls not achieving the desired results? Perhaps a fresh look and renewed dialogue are needed.

Crane or personnel/material handling incident (as used in 30 CFR 250.188(a)(8)) refers to an incident involving damage to, or a failure of, the crane itself (e.g., the boom, cables, winches, ballring), other lifting apparatuses (e.g., air tuggers, chain pulls), the rigging hardware (e.g., slings, shackles, turnbuckles), or the load (e.g., striking personnel, dropping the load, damaging the load, damaging the facility) at any time during exploration, development, or production operations on the OCS. This includes all incidents of shock loading that, upon inspection, reveals damage to any part of the crane, lifting apparatus, rigging hardware, or load. Personnel handling incidents include events involving swing ropes, personnel baskets, and any other means to move personnel. Material handling incidents include any activities involving the loading and unloading of material and moving it on, off, or around an OCS facility.

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