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Posts Tagged ‘BSEE’

PNAS: “among the most productive marine fish habitats globally”

Secretarial Order No. 3418 identified energy policies and regulations requiring immediate Interior Dept. review. A policy decision that should be added to the list is BSEE’s Record of Decision (ROD) for the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement on Pacific OCS Decommissioning.

Inexplicably, BSEE’s ROD designates the most environmentally harmful, unsafe, and costly alternative as the “preferred alternative.” The decision is contrary to the opinions expressed by the leading experts on the ecology of California offshore platforms, most notably Dr. Milton Love of the University of California at Santa Barbara.

Why did BSEE select alternative 1 (complete removal) when their $1.6 million EIS acknowledges that alternative 2 (partial removal) is environmentally preferable? Was their decision influenced by activists who support the alternative that is most punitive to the industry they despise?

The Interior Dept. needs to immediately review this decision so that stalled decommissioning projects can move forward in a manner that is most efficient and best protects “the most productive marine habitats per unit area in the world.”

beneath Platform Gilda, Santa Barbara Channel

On December 7, 2023, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) issued a Record of Decision (ROD) recommending the full removal of California’s 23 offshore oil platforms in federal waters, following a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) conducted to assess decommissioning options for platforms, pipelines, and other related infrastructure. However, upon close review, the PEIS and ROD appear to have reached misguided and detrimental conclusions due to critical oversights in their analyses.” Asher Radziner, Montecito Journal

More posts on California decommissioning

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The suspension order for the Vineyard Wind project was lifted on the last business day before the change in Administration and before the completion of the Federal investigation into the blade failure.

New Bedford Light report

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Addressing regulatory fragmentation will improve efficiency and lower costs for industry and government while reducing safety and environmental risks.

Unfortunately, the regulatory regime for US offshore oil and gas operations is noteworthy for redundancy, uncertainty, and complexity that divert industry and governmental attention from safety and environmental protection objectives to administrative processes, interpretations, and jurisdictional boundaries.

“Poster Child” for regulatory fragmentation?

The 12 Federal entities that have some OCS regulatory responsibilities are identified in the above chart. The organizations with core regulatory roles are included in the overlapping circles. The responsibilities of BOEM and BSEE are so inextricably intertwined that those bureaus occupy the same circle.

Coastal states also have OCS regulatory roles through authority granted in the Coastal Zone Management Act.

When multiple agencies have jurisdiction over a facility, system, or procedure, the redundancy inevitably results in inconsistency, ambiguity, and gaps in oversight. The focus of operating companies and contractors is diverted from safety and risk management to understanding and satisfying the regulators. The inevitable result is a compliance mentality that weakens the safety culture.

Interagency agreements in the form of MOUs and MOAs, which are ostensibly for the purpose of managing redundancy, are often unclear or inconclusive. They tend to be more for the benefit of the agencies than the regulated industry. The interests of the regulators and protecting turf are paramount.

Regulatory fragmentation was a contributing factor to the two most fatal US OCS incidents in the past 35 years, the 2010 Macondo blowout and the South Pass 60 “B” fire and explosion in 1989.

Solutions:

  • Where legislation is not required (e.g. BOEM and BSEE), use executive orders to combine and streamline the regulatory functions.
  • Where agencies have separate legislative authority, establish a lead regulator by executive order pending corrective legislation. Under the EO, the agencies would function as a joint authority under the direction of the lead regulator.
  • A combined BOEM/BSEE would be the logical choice for leading the joint authority given that OCS energy is their sole focus and they are accountable for the success of OCS programs.
  • Use a management system regulatory approach that holistically considers all of the legislatively enacted regulatory objectives.
  • Increase the attention given to regulator and operator performance in terms of both outcomes and efficiency.
  • Reduce and simplify permitting requirements for operating companies that have demonstrated outstanding safety and environmental performance over a sustained period.
  • See the findings and recommendations from the 2010 Vancouver IRF Conference.

 

 

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W&T (lease and facility map above) claims that insurers have colluded to damage the company by jointly demanding additional collateral and premiums.

Comments on excerpts from the W&T press release follow:

At the heart of the dispute are rules from the federal Bureau of Ocean Energy Management – BOEM – which require energy producers in the Outer Continental Shelf to provide a bond to pay for well, platform, pipeline and facilities cleanup if the operating company fails to do so.”

Comment: Despite disagreeing with aspects of the BOEM financial assurance rule, this blog has defended the rule against unfair criticism. Better solutions are achievable, but that will require industry leaders from all factions to come to the table with a commitment to reach a balanced agreement that protects the public interest.

“These insurance companies and their unreasonable demands for increased collateral pose an existential threat to independent operators like W&T.”

Comment: If insuring offshore decommissioning is so risk-free and lucrative, why aren’t other companies entering the market?

Several states, including Texas, are challenging the BOEM rule and in one case they specifically cite W&T as an example of how the rule could be misused to irreparably harm energy producers.

Comment: As previously posted, the concerned States should propose alternative solutions that would promote production while also protecting taxpayer interests. Arguing that decommissioning financial risks are not a problem is neither accurate nor a solution.

“In over 70 years of producer operations in the Gulf of Mexico, the federal government has never been forced to pay for any abandonment cleanup operations associated with well, platform facility, or pipeline operations.”

Comment: Shamefully, from the standpoints of both the offshore industry and the Federal government, that statement is no longer true. The taxpayer has now funded decommissioning operations in the Matagorda Island Area offshore Texas (BSEE photo below) and more significant decommissioning liabilities loom.

Other thoughts:

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The attached BSEE document provides guidance for determining pollution inspection frequencies for unmanned facilities. Thoughts:

  • Reasonable risk-based approach
  • A minimum of bi-weekly visual and physical inspections for low risk platforms producing dry gas
  • Any platform with significant oil production and storage, and no real time monitoring system, will have to be visually inspected at least every 3 days (daily if other risk factors apply) and boarded weekly
  • Any platform that had spillage totaling > 1 bbl in the past 2 years will have to be visually inspected every other day and boarded weekly.
  • Provides for the application of technology (cameras, drones, innovative monitoring systems) to reduce inspection frequencies.

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On Sept. 16, 2024, a routine helicopter approach at an offshore facility nearly resulted in a serious accident due to a failure to follow proper helideck procedures. Before landing, the helicopter pilot visually confirmed that a nearby crane was securely stowed and stationary (Figure 1). However, as the helicopter neared the helideck, the crane operator unexpectedly raised the crane boom, bringing it alarmingly close to the landing area as the helicopter was 10 feet from touchdown. The pilots swiftly executed a go-around maneuver, successfully avoiding a collision and ensuring the safety of the crew and passengers onboard.”

Good work by BSEE in continuing to identify and address helideck safety issues. This is the 4th helideck safety alert issued in 2024.

Meanwhile, why are we still waiting for the final NTSB report on the tragic helideck crash that occurred 2 years ago?

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Damaged Vineyard Wind turbine; Kit Noble photo
BSEE statement to the Nantucket Current

Comparing the above BSEE statement with recent GE Venova (GE) statements:

  • GE: We were “granted approval to return to installing new blades on turbines at the project once stringent safety and operational conditions are met.” (Positive spin of the BSEE statement implying that approval is assured.)
  • GE: “We have finalized root cause analysis and confirm the blade at issue at Vineyard Wind was caused by a manufacturing deviation from our factory in Canada.” (Then why doesn’t BSEE have the analysis? Is the Canadian plant being scapegoated?)

Finally, as expected, we can now conclude that the blades being shipped from New Bedford to France were defective.

Rolldock Sun arriving in Cherbourg with defective blades

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The attached letter was obtained by the Nantucket Current through a FOIA request. Key points:

  • Vineyard Wind power generation and blade installation suspension order remains in effect.
  • Vineyard Wind directed to conduct a site-specific study that evaluates the environmental harm and other potential damage from the blade failure, and to identify potential mitigation measures.
  • Vineyard Wind was required to submit a plan for the study by Oct. 11. It’s not clear whether the plan was submitted.
  • The study must include a mass balance of unrecovered debris material based on the weight of debris recovered and the weight of the subsea debris retrieved.

Comments:

  • The study requirement is appropriate given the significance of the blade incident and the implications for offshore wind development.
  • Why was a FOIA request needed to learn about the study requirement?
  • What about the 6 turbine blades being returned to France? Were they defective?

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David Scarborough, Island Operating Co., was one of the 4 workers who died in the 2022 crash at a West Delta 106 platform.

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New Bedford Light: The Rolldock Sun leaves New Bedford on Friday with two blades visible. Credit: Courtesy of West Island Weather

Per the New Bedford Light, the turbine blade delivery vessel Rolldock Sun was seen on Friday carrying at least two blades out of New Bedford. It was not headed for the Vineyard Wind site. According to vessel tracking websites, the Rolldock Sun was en route to the Port of Cherbourg, where GE Vernova has a blade manufacturing facility. 

The most likely explanation for returning the blades to Cherbourg is that defects were detected or suspected. The blade that failed, reportedly as a result of a manufacturing issue, is probably not the only one that was defective.

The New Bedford Light asked GE Vernova, Vineyard Wind, and the Federal regulator BSEE why the blades were being transported to Cherbourg. They received the following responses (my comments in parentheses):

GE Vernova: “No comment on this matter.” (This is the worst possible response. In the absence of information, people are left to speculate. If there was no problem with the blades, why wouldn’t GE simply provide an explanation? Their non-response simply reinforces suspicions that the blades were defective. If that is the case, why not take credit for procedures that identified the suspect defects, albeit belatedly?

Vineyard Wind: “The weekend has gotten in the way of the information flow,” and they would share information should they hear anything. Another request for information was not answered as of noon Monday. (Not exactly confidence inspiring from the company whose blade failure littered beaches and the offshore environment. They are deservedly being watched, and need to be more transparent and responsive.)

BSEE: A BSEE spokesperson did not answer questions and said by email that the agency has no new information. (Disappointing, but not surprising.)

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