Tiå går og di seie tiå lege adle sår Men ein mista bror e sår som aldri gror Kanskje vil dårr gå vinter og vår Sei oss klart kor dokker står Håpte på at han sko komma At han sko komma hjem igjen
Time is gone, they said; time would heal all wounds But to lose a brother is a wound that will never heal It could take as long as the never-ending winter and spring [i.e., never] I hope that he should come That he should come home again
The International Regulators’ Forum (IRF) does a good job of compiling safety performance data for offshore oil and gas operations in member countries. Because these data are collected by the respective regulators and compiled in accordance with established guidelines, we consider the IRF compilations to be the most credible international incident summary data for the offshore industry.
BOE looked at the numbers for the IRF countries with the highest level of activity in terms of hours worked – Brazil, Norway, UK, and US. These countries accounted for 90% of the total hours worked in 2020, the last year for which data are available. The 2020 hours worked (millions) were also relatively similar for the 4 countries: Norway – 41.2, UK – 42.4, US – 50.4, Brazil – 50.7. The differences in hours worked were somewhat greater in the prior years, but not dramatically so.
We charted the fatality and lost-time (>3 days) data (below). Our intent at this point is to draw attention to the IRF data sets, not to assess and compare performance. We do think the overall safety performance in these and other IRF countries, while far from perfect, is quite good given the hundreds of millions of hours worked, complexity of operations, logistical challenges, and difficult operating environments. We recommend that the IRF prioritize the timely posting of these data, and begin providing causation information so that companies and other interested parties can better identify performance issues and safety trends.
Six weeks after the Trinity Spirit fire, there is still no public accounting of the number of fatalities and injuries. The initial reports were incomplete and inconsistent, even with regard to the number of people on the vessel at the time of the incident.
Linked below is an excellent compliance and incident data update by Jason Mathews. COVID-19 statistics are included. Kudos to BSEE’s Gulf of Mexico Region for their timely and comprehensive reviews and safety alerts.The collection, analysis, and timely publication of incident data are critical to safety achievement and continuous improvement.
This useful SafeOCS report summarizes and itemizes well control equipment failures associated with well operations on the Gulf of Mexico OCS in 2020. Of particular note was the absence of any loss of containment (leak of wellbore fluids) events in 2020 or the prior two years.
Unfortunately, there appear to be significant reporting gaps despite the fact that reporting of these data is required by regulation (30 CFR 250.730(c)). The reporting issues are particularly serious for surface systems (surface BOP and associated equipment). Per SafeOCS, surface rig reports were received from less than 50% of active operators and rigs. Reporting for subsea systems (subsea BOP and associated equipment) was much better with 85% of the active rigs represented.
Of further concern with regard to the reporting of surface equipment events, the data indicate only 5.3 events per 1000 hours for surface systems vs. 71.5 for subsea systems. While subsea systems are more complex, the cost of pulling and repairing subsea equipment dictates newer, better maintained equipment. As a result, surface BOPs have historically had higher failure rates than subsea BOPs. The data below are from a presentation to MMS approximately 15 years ago. Both the Sintef and OOC data show higher failure rates for surface BOPs.
The SafeOCS team did a very good job of analyzing the reports and presenting the data. However, the reporting issues need to be investigated and resolved to get maximum value from this very important work.
A federal investigation into the October oil spill that paved the Orange County coast has been stalled for several months as authorities await approval to cut, remove and analyze part of the ruptured pipeline.
Coast Guard and National Transportation Safety Board investigators currently have to rely on video captured during underwater pipeline inspections. Without a more detailed forensic examination of the damage in a lab, investigators won’t know whether to continue with their original investigation or move the investigation in a new direction.
It’s not good when bureaucratic processes stall an important investigation. Hopefully the responsible agencies will be sufficiently embarrassed to get the investigation moving.
Kristen Nordlund, a spokeswoman for the C.D.C., said the agency has been slow to release the different streams of data “because basically, at the end of the day, it’s not yet ready for prime time.” She said the agency’s “priority when gathering any data is to ensure that it’s accurate and actionable.”
Another reason is fear that the information might be misinterpreted, Ms. Nordlund said.
“The C.D.C. is a political organization as much as it is a public health organization,” said Samuel Scarpino, managing director of pathogen surveillance at the Rockefeller Foundation’s Pandemic Prevention Institute. “The steps that it takes to get something like this released are often well outside of the control of many of the scientists that work at the C.D.C.”
Two weeks after the Trinity Spirit FPSO fire offshore Nigeria we still don’t know the fate of the crew. Neither the operator nor the regulator websites include any mention of the fire. The last operator statement (more than a week ago) advised that 3 workers were confirmed dead and others were still missing. There has been no subsequent update and the media have moved on, as is usually the case when there is no ongoing oil spill.
We need an international standard that identifies incident information to be publicly disclosed and specifies the timeframes and methods for releasing this information. An API or ISO committee would seem to be the best means of developing such a standard. If these organizations are unwilling to take the lead, perhaps the International Regulators’ Forum can do so. The credibility of the offshore industry is at stake.
This is an excellent tribute written by two brothers who lost their father in the Ocean Ranger tragedy. I highly recommend that you listen and reflect.
Condensed below is important background information from my notes and from an outstanding presentation by Howard Pike in St. John’s Newfoundland in 2017.
84 men aboard; no survivors
Largest semisubmersible drilling rig of its day
US registered MODU
The “unsinkable” rig had weathered more than 50 significant storms
Unlike most semisubmersibles, the ballast control room was located in one of the legs (starboard column No.3). At drilling draft, it was just 28 feet above mean sea level.
Water depth was 240′, rig was moored with 12 anchors
Ballast control operators had minimal training
Incident with the ballast control system just a week before the disaster.
On February 14th, the Ocean Ranger was battered by a severe storm; wave heights up to 21m; rogue wave damaged deck items on nearby Sedco 706
Crew stopped drilling when the heave exceeded 15′, forced to shear the drill pipe during the disconnect process
Crew did not deballast to the storm draft from the 80′ drilling draft
Waves broke portlight in the ballast control room
Salt water soaked the ballast control console
Short circuits or inadvertent operator commands caused ballast tank valves in the bow to open.
Water flooded the forward ballast tanks, and the rig began to list toward the bow.
Crew inadvertently opened more pontoon valves
Forward list passed the point of recovery
The Ranger’s standby vessel, the Seaforth Highlander, was contacted but was delayed by sea conditions
At approximately 1:10 a.m. on February 15 th , the Ocean Ranger began sending mayday signals.
Zapata Ugland and Sedco 706, working in the area, sent their standby vessels
At 1:30 a.m. the Ocean Ranger’s radio man sent his final transmission. The crew was boarding the lifeboats.
Investigators later determined that as the lifeboats descended, violent winds threw them against the side of the rig, damaging some lifeboat hulls before they ever touched the water.
Crew did not have survival suits
Seaforth Highlander attempted unsuccessfully to rescue survivors from a damaged lifeboat
At the time of the Ocean Ranger tragedy, 3 rigs – the Alaskan Star, Rowan Midland, and Zapata Saratoga were working on Georges Bank in the US North Atlantic. The nor’easter had passed over Georges Bank before strengthening as it moved toward the Grand Banks. Among the small Georges Bank drilling community there was a kinship with those working in the even harsher environment on the Grand Banks. 40 years later, we are still greatly saddened by what transpired. Many lessons were learned and applied, but the ocean is unforgiving and we must continue to assess storm preparedness. Reflection on past tragedies is an important part of the process.
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 