…and should be an integral part of Job Safety Analyses!
According to BSEE, there is a recurring trend of equipment misuse contributing to fire and explosion hazards during offshore oil and gas operations in the Gulf of America.
Workers have used tools not rated for electrical work on live circuits (Figure 1) and mismatched hydraulic or pneumatic tools for high-pressure systems (Figure 2). In several cases, non-intrinsically safe hand tools were used in explosive atmospheres, including mudrooms and drilling floors.
The latest Baker Hughes Rig Count Report shows only 10 rigs actively drilling in the Gulf. All are at deepwater locations – 7 in the Mississippi Canyon area, 2 in Green Canyon, and 1 in Alaminos Canyon. Per the BSEE borehole file, Shell accounts for most of the current MS Canyon wells and the Alaminous Canyon well. Beacon is also drilling in the MS Canyon, and the Green Canyon well appears to be a Chevron operation.
Only Anadarko/Oxy, Beacon/BOE, BP, Chevron/Hess, Shell, and Talos have spudded deepwater exploratory wells in 2025 YTD. Arena and Cantium are the only shelf drillers – all development wells.
Technological advances and extensions of past discoveries have sustained Gulf production, but declines are certain over the longer term if drilling activity doesn’t increase. Oil price uncertainty is an issue, but that’s always the case. Semiannual lease sales are now legislatively required and the terms will be attractive, so those issues are off the table. Let’s see what the bidding looks like at the upcoming sale.
The decline in deepwater discoveries (BOEM data below) is particularly discouraging. Per BOEM, the last deepwater field discovery was in March 2023.
The “One Big Beautiful Bill Act of 2025” (OBBB), Public Law 119-21, which was signed into law on July 4, 2025, includes a significant offshore production directive (section 50102) that has received little public attention:
“The Secretary of the Interior shall approve a request of an operator to commingle oil or gas production from multiple reservoirs within a single wellbore completed on the outer Continental Shelf in the Gulf of America Region unless the Secretary of the Interior determines that conclusive evidence establishes that the commingling—(1) could not be conducted by the operator in a safe manner; or (2) would result in an ultimate recovery from the applicable reservoirs to be reduced in comparison to the expected recovery of those reservoirs if they had not been commingled.”
This is, to the best of my knowledge, the first time in the history of the OCS oil and gas program that Congress has directed the safety regulator to approve well completion practices that could increase safety, environmental, and resource conservation risks.
Rather than calling for the operator to demonstrate that a downhole commingling plan is safe and optimizes resource recovery, the plan must be approved unless BSEE proves conclusively that the operation could not be conducted safely or that resource recovery would be reduced. This is the antithesis of the operator responsibility doctrine, a fundamental principle of the OCS regulatory program, and safety management principles that call for the operator to demonstrate that safety, environmental, and resource conservation risks have been effectively addressed.
Only 40 days after the OBBB was signed, BSEE published a direct final rule implementing the downhole commingling directive. This is warp speed for promulgating a Federal regulation! In keeping with the rush to finalize the rule, the preamble asserts that “notice and comment are unnecessary because this rule is noncontroversial; of a minor, technical nature; and is unlikely to receive any significant adverse comments.”
I intend to submit comments prior to the Sept. 12 deadline. These comments will assert that the rule does not qualify for an exemption from the Administrative Procedures Act’s public review and comment requirement. I will also recommend that BSEE consider hosting a public forum during the comment period to present their research on downhole commingling and discuss the risk mitigations.
Below are some of the issues/questions that should be considered during the public comment period:
BSEE’s own fact sheet acknowledges the well-known pressure differential, crossflow, and fluid compatibility risks associated with downhole commingling. The public should have the opportunity to provide input on the extent to which “intelligent completions” and other production technology are effective in mitigating these risks.
The industry-funded Univ. of Texas (UT) study, which led to a relaxation of downhole commingling restrictions, was specific to the “unique Paleogene Gulf of Mexico fields.” Does BSEE have evidence that supports the applicability of the study to other fields?
The authors of the UT study acknowledged that their findings were based on a “simple but reasonable geological base case model.” They also acknowledged the need for “a more comprehensive study using advanced geological models to explore additional geological features.” What are BSEE’s plans for additional research?
Should an independent assessment of Gulf of America downhole commingling safety and resource recovery risks be conducted before finalizing a rule that essentially mandates approval of all applications?
BSEE’s April 2025 policy change raised the allowable pressure differential for commingling production in Paleogene (Wilcox) reservoirs from 200 psi to 1500 psi. Unlike the policy update, the new rule includes no boundaries whatsoever.
What criteria will BSEE use in determining that there is “conclusive evidence” that a commingling request would be unsafe or would reduce ultimate resource recovery? Will BSEE disapprove any requests outside the parameters in the current policy guidance or subsequent updates?
There are many more issues that remain to be discussed, which is why the downhole commingling rule should be published in draft form, with a comment period of at least 90 days.
We preferred the House version, but the Senate Parliamentarian killed the provisions that reduced the risk of litigation and processing delays.
Whether justified or not, the royalty rate is now capped at 1/6 and a 10-year deepwater lease term is locked in.
The favorable terms and assurance of regular GOA lease sales put the ball squarely in industry’s court. We are looking for a good showing at Sale 262, including some new bidders and the return of some prominent companies.
As the chart indicates, the % of flared or vented Gulf of America gas production increased over the past 10 years. This trend is presumably due, at least in part, to the sharp increase in the % of gas production from oil wells (associated gas), which have a higher flaring rate. In 2024, 87% of Gulf gas production was from oil wells.
Flaring/venting summary tables and comments, updated through 2024, will be posted later in the week.
The Safety Alert is attached. Per BSEE, the fires resulted from an accumulation of gas caused by improperly installed or disconnected exhaust vent piping on gas starters.
Incident 1: Two workers sustained burns to the hands, arms, and face. BSEE investigators discovered that the engine’s air intake hose was disconnected, which may have allowed gas-enriched air to be drawn into the carburetor causing the backfire.
Incident 2: While attempting to start the gas engine of a pipeline pump, the lead mechanic sprayed ether into the engine’s carburetor. The exhaust vent piping for the starter had not been installed. The combination of the gas-rich atmosphere and ether caused the engine to backfire and ignited the accumulated gas. The lead mechanic, sustained burns to his face, arms, and hands.
The Alert includes important recommendations for proper venting, mechanical integrity awareness training, maintenance, and the use of gas detectors and a temporary fire watch during engine startup.
This week Total announced the acquisition of a 25% working interest in 40 Chevron leases in the Gulf of America. Total already owned interest in Chevron’s producing Ballymore (40%), Anchor (37.14%), Jack (25%), and Tahiti (17%) fields. Ironically, Federal regulations prohibited Total from jointly bidding with Chevron for any of those leases at the time of the sales. How does that make sense?
Total did not submit a single bid in any of the past 4 Gulf of America lease sales. Perhaps they prefer to acquire interest in blocks previously leased to companies like Chevron. That is a reasonable acquisition strategy. However, farm-in acquisitions yield no bonus dollars to the Federal government. Wouldn’t it have been in the government’s best interest if some of those acquisition dollars were spent at lease sales where the bonus bids go to the US Treasury?It’s long past time to remove the joint bidding restrictions!
As explained in the attached Safety Alert, BSEE’s risk-based inspection program has identified deficiencies in safety device bypass practices including:
inadequate documentation
inoperative data history software
bypassing more devices than is necessary
bypassing devices for longer than necessary
missing audit documentation
mistakenly bypassing the entire safety system during production
The regulations restricting the bypassing of safety devices are core elements of OCS regulatory and operator management programs. Because they are critical to process safety, these requirements are widely supported and strictly enforced.
March Gulf of America oil production was nearly identical to the 2024/2025 average, and the trend line (red) is remarkably flat. However, production remains below the volumes forecasted by EIA and well below those forecasted by BOEM.
It appears that new deepwater production is replacing Gulf-wide production declines, but is not yet sufficient to increase total production. We will see if that changes as the year progresses.
March 2025 Gulf of America production: 1.793 million bopd
2024/2025 average production: 1.77 million bopd
2024/2025 average omitting Sept. 2024 (tropical storms): 1.784 million bopd
EIA forecast for 2025 (published 9/16/2024): 1.9 million bopd
BOEM forecast for 2025 (published in 2022, table below): 2.052 million bopd
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 