…and should be an integral part of Job Safety Analyses!
According to BSEE, there is a recurring trend of equipment misuse contributing to fire and explosion hazards during offshore oil and gas operations in the Gulf of America.
Workers have used tools not rated for electrical work on live circuits (Figure 1) and mismatched hydraulic or pneumatic tools for high-pressure systems (Figure 2). In several cases, non-intrinsically safe hand tools were used in explosive atmospheres, including mudrooms and drilling floors.
The attached comments were submitted to Regulations.gov on 9/8/2025.
Legislatively dictating downhole commingling approvals, as per Section 50102 of the One Big Beautiful Bill, is a reckless precedent from both technical and regulatory policy standpoints.
This type of legislative maneuver compromises the integrity of the OCS oil and gas program and the companies that participate in it. Shaving the maximum royalty rate was one thing; mandating well completion approvals is quite something else. Disappointing. ☹
See below. BOEM is reconsidering its approval of the Construction and Operations Plan (COP) for New England Wind 1 and 2. The operator, Avangrid (Spain), is also a partner in the troubled Vineyard Wind project.
If you are keeping score, the approval of these COPs is being reconsidered:
Other projects: Work has been stopped on the Revolution Wind project. Work was previously halted on the Vineyard Wind and Empire Wind projects, but has been allowed to resume. BSEE has still not published its report on the Vineyard Wind turbine blade failure that occurred on 7/13/2024. Other projects have been suspended by the owners at their own initiative (e.g. Atlantic Shores South, Gulf of Maine, Starboard Wind, Vineyard Wind 2, Beacon Wind). Meanwhile, litigation abounds!
The “One Big Beautiful Bill Act of 2025” (OBBB), Public Law 119-21, which was signed into law on July 4, 2025, includes a significant offshore production directive (section 50102) that has received little public attention:
“The Secretary of the Interior shall approve a request of an operator to commingle oil or gas production from multiple reservoirs within a single wellbore completed on the outer Continental Shelf in the Gulf of America Region unless the Secretary of the Interior determines that conclusive evidence establishes that the commingling—(1) could not be conducted by the operator in a safe manner; or (2) would result in an ultimate recovery from the applicable reservoirs to be reduced in comparison to the expected recovery of those reservoirs if they had not been commingled.”
This is, to the best of my knowledge, the first time in the history of the OCS oil and gas program that Congress has directed the safety regulator to approve well completion practices that could increase safety, environmental, and resource conservation risks.
Rather than calling for the operator to demonstrate that a downhole commingling plan is safe and optimizes resource recovery, the plan must be approved unless BSEE proves conclusively that the operation could not be conducted safely or that resource recovery would be reduced. This is the antithesis of the operator responsibility doctrine, a fundamental principle of the OCS regulatory program, and safety management principles that call for the operator to demonstrate that safety, environmental, and resource conservation risks have been effectively addressed.
Only 40 days after the OBBB was signed, BSEE published a direct final rule implementing the downhole commingling directive. This is warp speed for promulgating a Federal regulation! In keeping with the rush to finalize the rule, the preamble asserts that “notice and comment are unnecessary because this rule is noncontroversial; of a minor, technical nature; and is unlikely to receive any significant adverse comments.”
I intend to submit comments prior to the Sept. 12 deadline. These comments will assert that the rule does not qualify for an exemption from the Administrative Procedures Act’s public review and comment requirement. I will also recommend that BSEE consider hosting a public forum during the comment period to present their research on downhole commingling and discuss the risk mitigations.
Below are some of the issues/questions that should be considered during the public comment period:
BSEE’s own fact sheet acknowledges the well-known pressure differential, crossflow, and fluid compatibility risks associated with downhole commingling. The public should have the opportunity to provide input on the extent to which “intelligent completions” and other production technology are effective in mitigating these risks.
The industry-funded Univ. of Texas (UT) study, which led to a relaxation of downhole commingling restrictions, was specific to the “unique Paleogene Gulf of Mexico fields.” Does BSEE have evidence that supports the applicability of the study to other fields?
The authors of the UT study acknowledged that their findings were based on a “simple but reasonable geological base case model.” They also acknowledged the need for “a more comprehensive study using advanced geological models to explore additional geological features.” What are BSEE’s plans for additional research?
Should an independent assessment of Gulf of America downhole commingling safety and resource recovery risks be conducted before finalizing a rule that essentially mandates approval of all applications?
BSEE’s April 2025 policy change raised the allowable pressure differential for commingling production in Paleogene (Wilcox) reservoirs from 200 psi to 1500 psi. Unlike the policy update, the new rule includes no boundaries whatsoever.
What criteria will BSEE use in determining that there is “conclusive evidence” that a commingling request would be unsafe or would reduce ultimate resource recovery? Will BSEE disapprove any requests outside the parameters in the current policy guidance or subsequent updates?
There are many more issues that remain to be discussed, which is why the downhole commingling rule should be published in draft form, with a comment period of at least 90 days.
JL Daeschler shared a London Sunday Times piece about the Piper Alpha fire that killed 167 workers, the worst tragedy in the history of the offshore industry. We were troubled by the headline, because it seems inconceivable that any UK offshore worker could call July 6, 1988, the best day of their life. However, Punchard helped a number of workers escape the fire, so his mixed message is somewhat understandable.
Lord Cullen’s comprehensive inquiry into the Piper Alphatragedy challenged traditional thinking about regulation and how safety objectives could best be achieved, and was perhaps the most important report in the history of offshore oil and gas operations. That report and the US regulatory response to the tragedy are discussed in this post.
BSEE’s new downhole commingling rule, which responds to a Congressional mandate, is contrary to Cullen’s Safety Case principles in that it puts the burden of proof on the regulator to conclusively demonstrate that a potentially hazardous operation is unsafe.This is exactly the opposite of the approach recommended by Cullen. It’s also the first time in the history of the OCS program that Congress has dictated approval of complex downhole operations. More on this in a later post.
In addition to the Johnson filing, at least 7 other law firms (links below) have announced class action litigation alleging that Sable Offshore made false or misleading statements regarding the restart of Santa Ynez Unit production.
“This is a significant achievement for the Interior Department and aligns with the Administration’s Energy Dominance initiative, as it successfully resumed production in just five months.“
Will the Dept. of Justice intervene on behalf of Sable?
Meanwhile, Sable’s share price rebounded in mid-July and is holding up surprisingly well (see below). Perhaps investors don’t see the class action suits as a significant incremental threat given the risks associated with decisions by 8 California agencies, Santa Barbara County, and various judges, and the persistent challenges by well-organized opponents of offshore production.
BOEM tweet (12/8/2023):Offshore wind is a once-in-a-generation opportunity to build a new clean energy industry, tackle the climate crisis, and create good-paying jobs, while ensuring economic opportunities for all communities.BOEM tweet (7/31/2025): America’s offshore energy resources are powering the nation. In FY2024 that looks like 668M barrels of oil, 700B cubic feet of natural gasBSEE 2023 logoBSEE 2025 logo
BTW, the new BSEE logo appears to have been influenced by the masterpiece Rig at Sunset 👍 😉
On July 25, 2025, more than 2 months after Sable’s brief production restart and 7 weeks after a court decision halted further production, BSEE surprisingly announced the resumption of Santa Ynez Unit (SYU) production boasting:
“This is a significant achievement for the Interior Department and aligns with the Administration’s Energy Dominance initiative, as it successfully resumed production in just five months.“
Were the authors of the press release unaware that the SYU production, which was largely from well tests, was halted by court order shortly after it began? More philosophically, is such cheerleading appropriate for the principal safety regulator, particularly given that BSEE is engaged in litigation over its practices in facilitating SYU production?
Ironically, just 3 days after BSEE hailed the resumption of production, the attached lawsuit was filed on behalf of investors who purchased Sable Offshore securities between May 19, 2025 and June 3, 2025. BOE contributor John Smith shared the filing.
The plaintiffs allege misleading statements regarding the resumption of production. Some of the key points cited in the filing:
On May 19, 2025, before the market opened, the Company issued a press release entitled “Sable Offshore Corp. Reports Restart of Oil Production at the Santa Ynez Unit and Anticipated Oil Sales from the Las Flores Pipeline System in June 2025.”
The release informed that Sable expected to fill the ~540,000 barrels of crude oil storage capacity at LFC (Los Flores Canyon onshore processing facility) by the middle of June 2025 and subsequently recommence oil sales in July 2025.
Following the May 19 Press Release, Sable Offshore stock climbed from a closing price of $28.86 per share on May 16, 2025 to $33.02 per share on May 19, 2025, a 14.4% climb in share price.
Contrary to Defendants’ representations, Sable Offshore had not resumed commercial production off the coast of California.
Defendants then used the share price appreciation following the May 19 Press Release to conduct a secondary public offering (or “SPO”) at a higher offering price per share than would have otherwise been possible.
State Lands Commission staff informed the Lt. Gov./Commission Chair that the limited oil flows were the result of well-testing procedures required by BSEE prior to restart. These activities did not constitute a resumption of commercial production or a full restart of the SYU.
Characterizing testing activities as a restart of operations is not only misleading but also highly inappropriate –particularly given that Sable has not obtained the necessary regulatory approvals to fully resume operations at SYU.
Any attempt to restart commercial operations at the SYU without final regulatory approvals may place the company in violation of its lease terms and jeopardize the status of Sable’s holdover State lease.
Santa Barbara County Judge Thomas Anderle granted a preliminary injunction requested by the California Coastal Commission against Sable Offshore for alleged violations of The California Coastal Act.
Given the investigation’s significance, not only for Vineyard Wind, but for other offshore wind projects planned or under construction, how is the delay in issuing the report acceptable?
Keep in mind that the lengthy and complex National Commission, BOEMRE, Chief Counsel, and NAE reports on the Macondo blowout were published 6 to to 17 months after the well was shut-in.
The Safety Alert is attached. Per BSEE, the fires resulted from an accumulation of gas caused by improperly installed or disconnected exhaust vent piping on gas starters.
Incident 1: Two workers sustained burns to the hands, arms, and face. BSEE investigators discovered that the engine’s air intake hose was disconnected, which may have allowed gas-enriched air to be drawn into the carburetor causing the backfire.
Incident 2: While attempting to start the gas engine of a pipeline pump, the lead mechanic sprayed ether into the engine’s carburetor. The exhaust vent piping for the starter had not been installed. The combination of the gas-rich atmosphere and ether caused the engine to backfire and ignited the accumulated gas. The lead mechanic, sustained burns to his face, arms, and hands.
The Alert includes important recommendations for proper venting, mechanical integrity awareness training, maintenance, and the use of gas detectors and a temporary fire watch during engine startup.
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 