Comments on BSEE’s proposed revisions to the Well Control Rule are due in 27 days (by Nov. 14). Given the fundamental importance of well control to offshore safety and pollution prevention, all interested parties are encouraged to comment. Although some of the proposed revisions are rather nuanced, the document is neither long nor complex.
My completely independent comments are being drafted and will be posted here after they have been submitted to Regulations.gov.
My comments will explain why the proposal may reduce the rigor of the BOP system performance standard and will address a related shear ram issue. The comments will also discuss the management of BOP equipment failure and other safety data, the use of independent third parties and standards development organizations, dual shear rams on surface BOP stacks, ROV intervention capabilities, and BOP test data reporting and management.
Hopefully, the attached response is indicative of the quality of comments BSEE will receive on their proposed WCR revisions.
The comments, which were submitted by a retired engineer (always the best commenters 😉), express the opinion that BSEE should not remove the option for submitting failure data to BTS. While my comments will express a somewhat different opinion, I thought he made good arguments in support of his position.
Contrary to some post-Macondo commentary, well control has always been the highest priority of the US offshore regulatory program. This was the case regardless of the administration, party in power, responsible bureau, or politics of the day. The first specific well control requirements were in OCS Order No. 2 (Drilling) which dates back to 1958.
Continuous improvement must always be the objective; hence the many revisions to these regulations over the years.
BSEE’s recently proposed Well Control Rule includes updates that should be reviewed by all who are interested in drilling safety and well control regulations. I will be submitting comments to the docket and will post some of those comments on this blog. I hope others take the time to review the relatively brief BSEE proposal and submit comments
Industry comments are typically consolidated which limits the technical discussion and diversity of input. Consensus industry recommendations tend to be less rigorous from a safety perspective than some companies might submit independently. There are also far fewer operating companies than there were in the past. Most of you surely remember Texaco, Gulf, Getty, Amoco, Arco, Mobil, Unocal, and other important offshore operators that have merged into even larger corporations. This further limits the diversity of input.
Of course, the operating company is fully accountable for any safety incident at an OCS facility, including well control disasters like the 1969 Santa Barbara and 2020 Macondo blowouts. This should be ample incentive for comprehensive safety management programs. Unfortunately, risk management, culture, and human/organizational factors are complex, and good intentions don’t always lead to good results.
Although the operating company is legally accountable, the regulator and industry as a whole also bear some responsibility for safety performance. What is the purpose of the regulator if not to prevent safety and environmental incidents? Also, the industry can do better in terms of assessing data, updating standards, and publicly calling out poor performance.
On a more positive note, the offshore industry has collectively had some spectacular well control successes. Perhaps most impressive is this: Prior to 2010, 25,000 wells had been drilled in US Federal waters over the previous 25 years without a single well control fatality, an offshore safety record that was unprecedented in the U.S. and internationally. That number of offshore wells over a 25 year period is by itself a feat that will never again be achieved in any offshore region worldwide. The well control safety record makes that achievement extraordinary.
More positively, the court chose not to vacate the sales or the EIS:
Moreover, vacatur would be highly disruptive for the lessees. They have paid millions of dollars to obtain their leases and have acted for some four years in reliance on them—including by investing substantial additional sums and by executing contracts with third parties. Moreover, any redo of the lease sales “would be tainted by prior publication of [the] lessees’ proprietary valuation of the leases” following the original sales.
Comments:
How many GAO reports on BSEE or MMS have not been critical of some processes or procedures? None that I can recall.
It’s unreasonable to expect BOEM to consider every GAO or other external criticism of the regulatory program in their EIS’s.
All of the GAO recommendations in the subject report were process related and were closed (implemented) several years ago.
The court exercised good judgement in declining to vacate the sale. Per the decision, the case will be remanded to BOEM for further consideration of the GAO report.
In addition to the penalty and reimbursement elements of the plea agreement, there are two Amplify commitments that may be of particular interest to BOE readers:
New leak detection system for the pipeline: More information on the leak detection improvements for this low pressure oil pipeline would be helpful.
Notification to regulators of all leak detection alarms:
Which regulators? DOT? BSEE? State? All?
Real time reporting or periodic compilations? With real time reporting for every alarm, the distinction between the pipeline operator and regulator(s) would be blurred and new organizational and competence risks would be added. The probability of communications errors and delayed decisions would increase, and the operator would no longer be accountable for bad decisions.
Also, given that the investigating agencies have still not issued their report on the October 2021 spill and no action has yet been taken against the shipping companies that caused the pipeline rupture, the congratulatory Coast Guard, EPA, FBI, and DOT quotes in the announcement seem rather premature and self-serving.
The offshore world lost an important figure over the weekend with the passing of John Gregory Fitzgerald. As Chairman and CEO of the Canada Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board in the late 1990’s, John presided over the first production from the massive Hibernia field. He also approved the pioneering Terra Nova project, the first FPSO development in a harsh, iceberg laden environment.
John worked closely with his international counterparts and hosted an important offshore safety meeting in St. John’s in 1996. It was an honor to be associated with such an outstanding individual and dedicated safety leader.
RIP John, your contributions will not be forgotten.
The energy sections begin on page 232 and continue until the end (page 725!). Some highlights from an offshore energy perspective (more important items in bold):
p. 429 – Tax credit eligibility for offshore wind energy components including blades, nacelles, foundations, and towers.
p. 447 – Credits for CCS equipment
p. 460 – For offshore wind facilities, this section specifies the % of the total costs that must be expended in the US for the facility to qualify as being manufactured in the US. That % rises gradually to 55% after 12/31/2027.
p. 518 – Eligibility of CCS for credits
p. 615 – $100 million for offshore wind electricity transmission planning, modelling, and analysis. (Seems like a lot for planning and analysis.)
p. 621 – $10 million for oversight by DOE Inspector General. (Those folks will have their hands full!)
p. 628 – Authorizes wind leasing in the EGOM and South Atlantic areas withdrawn from all leasing at the end of the Trump administration.
p. 631 – Authorizes offshore wind leasing adjacent to US territories. (Should be interesting!)
p. 632 – Codifies increase in offshore royalty rates: range of 16 2/3% – 18 3/4% for 10 years; not less than 16 2/3 % thereafter
p. 640 – The provision requiring that royalty be paid on flared/vented gas could be problematic. The exceptions are not consistent with those currently in the regulations, and would be difficult for BSEE/ONRR to manage. The proposed legislation (exception 1) exempts “gas vented or flared for not longer than 48 hours in an emergency situation that poses a danger to human health, safety, or the environment.” However, current BSEE regulations allow limited (48 hours cumulative) flaring for certain operations (e.g. during the unloading or cleaning of a well, drill-stem testing, production testing, and other well-evaluation testing). This flaring is essential but not normally an emergency situation. Requiring royalty payments for such essential, but not emergency, flaring would be unreasonable and inconsistent with the intent of this provision (minimize unnecessary flaring and venting).
p. 641 – Per our previous post, this section reinstates Lease Sale 257 (GoM) and requires that the scheduled 2022 lease sales 258 (GoM) and 259 (Cook Inlet) be held by 12/31/2022. Lease Sale 261 (GoM) must be held by 9/30/2023. Saddle up!
The only current Alaskan OCS production is from Northstar, a joint State-Federal Unit in the Beaufort Sea. The production island is in State waters, but 7 of the wells produce from the Federal sector. The field was originally developed by bp, but Hilcorp is the current operator. To date, BSEE has conducted 5 inspections of the facility in 2022, and no incidents of noncompliance (INCs) were identified.
Per BOEM records, 4 companies operate Pacific (California) OCS facilities that are currently producing. Three of those operators have superior 2022 inspection records. No INCs were issued to either Exxon (11 Santa Ynez Unit inspections) or Freeport-McMoRan (24 Platform Irene inspections). Only 2 warning INCs were issued during 12 inspections of Beta Operating Co. platforms Ellen, Elly, and Eureka in the Beta Unit offshore Long Beach.
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 
Comments on BSEE’s proposed Well Control Rule are due by Nov. 14
Posted in drilling, Offshore Energy - General, Regulation, well control incidents, tagged BOP, BSEE, comments, Well Control Rule on October 18, 2022| Leave a Comment »
Comments on BSEE’s proposed revisions to the Well Control Rule are due in 27 days (by Nov. 14). Given the fundamental importance of well control to offshore safety and pollution prevention, all interested parties are encouraged to comment. Although some of the proposed revisions are rather nuanced, the document is neither long nor complex.
My completely independent comments are being drafted and will be posted here after they have been submitted to Regulations.gov.
My comments will explain why the proposal may reduce the rigor of the BOP system performance standard and will address a related shear ram issue. The comments will also discuss the management of BOP equipment failure and other safety data, the use of independent third parties and standards development organizations, dual shear rams on surface BOP stacks, ROV intervention capabilities, and BOP test data reporting and management.
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