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Archive for the ‘Regulation’ Category

Background:

  • Last summer, Trident Energy exercised multiple options for the use of the Island Innovator semi-submersible (pictured above), extending the duration of the Equatorial Guinea contract to approximately 230 days.
  • The rig arrived in Equatorial Guinea in Nov. 2023.
  • On 7 Feb, a Trident team briefed Equatorial Guinea Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons Antonio Oburu Ondo about problems with the Innovator’s BOP system. Apparently, Island Drilling, the rig owner, was not present at that meeting.
  • Mr. Ondo subsequently reported that the BOP had serious problems and failed to respond to control system commands.
  • Trident terminated the rig contract on safety grounds.
  • Island has publicly responded that (1) the Trident statements are inaccurate, (2) there have been no critical safety incidents, (3) the BOP has been checked and tested by the OEM representative on the rig and declared safe and ready for operations, and (4) they will challenge the contract termination.

Questions & comments:

  • Since the rig had just arrived on location, the BOP issues were presumably identified during onboard stump testing. Were corrective measures discussed? Why was contract termination deemed necessary?
  • Island’s statement indicates that the rig was tested with the OEM representative present. Presumably those tests were in accordance with API S53 or the ISO equivalent.
  • Had inspections and maintenance also been conducted in accordance with the standard? Did Trident inspect the rig and review maintenance and testing records before signing the contract?
  • Have other companies had similar issues with the Innovator? None have been identified in my web search.
  • Was a bridging document in place to address differences in Trident/Island management systems? If so, what does that document say about BOP inspection and oversight.
  • Why was the drilling contractor not present at the meeting with the Equatorial Guinea authorities? Was Island advised that the contract was being terminated prior to that meeting? Did the authorities speak with Island to hear their side of the story?
  • Does the contract provide for mandatory arbitration in the event of such disagreements?
  • Could other factors have influenced the cancellation decision? I was involved with an arbitration case involving an operator that used safety issues as the reason for terminating an expensive long-term rig contract. The arbitration panel ruled in favor of the drilling contractor resulting in a very large payment to the rig owner. Ironically, serious safety violations by the operating company (but not the drilling contractor) were identified during the arbitration process.
  • Island Drilling is a Norwegian Company with an experienced management team. The Innovator has conducted operations in the Norwegian and UK offshore sectors. These factors typically imply a strong commitment to safe operations.

Hopefully, we’ll be able to learn more about the specifics of this dispute in the near future.

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Less than a month ago  BSEE issued an alert that addressed chronic and persistent helideck safety issues. This week BSEE again issued an alert (attached) following yet another near-miss. Per BSEE:

After receiving clearance for landing at an offshore helideck, the aircrew noticed upon landing that a section of the helideck’s safety skirting was not properly secured to the support structure and was blowing upward and downward due to the helicopter’s rotor downwash. This created an imminent hazard to safe helicopter operations with potentially catastrophic results.

Of course, we are still waiting for the NTSB report on the tragic helideck incident at the end of 2022 that killed 4 workers.

The latest near-miss is yet another reminder that the muddled regulatory regime for helideck safety needs to be addressed. The most recent Coast Guard – BSEE MOA for fixed platforms only added to helideck regulatory uncertainty by assigning decks and fuel handling to BSEE and railings and perimeter netting to the Coast Guard. What about safety skirting? As is the case with all safety regulations, a holistic, systems based approach to helideck safety oversight is needed.

To their credit, BSEE has been addressing these helideck issues with safety alerts. Since they are bearing the responsibility for these incidents, they should have the unambiguous authority needed to take enforcement actions regardless of which helideck elements are involved.

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Still waiting for:

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The 2023 Safety Honor Roll list will be posted tomorrow.

As background information, below is a summary of compliance data for 2022 and 2023.

The performance of Fieldwood and Cox skewed the 2022 and 2023 data. In 2022, Fieldwood was issued 448 INCs, 26% of the Gulf of Mexico total. In 2023, Cox was by far the leading violator with 718 INCs, 39% of the GoM total (780/43% when Cox affiliates are included). These data point to the importance of considering safety and compliance in approving lease assignments and making supplemental bonding determinations.

20222023
facility inspections33093100
inspection types1085610341
W INCs8091050
CSI INCs530600
FSI INCs376180
total INCs17151830
INCs/facility inspection0.520.59
INCs/inspection type0.160.18
Pacific facility inspections280300
Pacific inspection types802744
Pacific W INCs2211
Pacific CSI INCs1314
Pacific FSI10
Pacific total INCs3625
Pacific INCs/facility inspection0.130.08
Pacific INCS/inspection type0.040.03
Alaska facility inspections85
Alaska inspection types3722
Alaska W INCs01
Alaska CSI INCs01
Alaska FSI INCs00
Alaska INCs total02
Alaska INCs/facility inspection00.4
Alaska INCS/inspection type00.09
INC=incident of noncompliance, W=warning, CSI=component shut-in, FSI=facility shut-in.
No Alaska facilities are located on the Federal OCS. One Alaska facility, Hilcorp’s Northstar island, has wells that are completed on the OCS; hence the limited BSEE inspections.

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  • Must average <0.3 incidents of noncompliance (INCs) per facility-inspection.
  • Must average <0.1 INCs per inspection-type. (Note that each facility-inspection may include multiple types of inspections (e.g. production, pipeline, pollution, Coast Guard, site security, etc). On average, each facility-inspection included 3.3 types of inspections in 2023. Here is a list of the types of inspections that may be performed.
  • Must operate at least 3 production platforms and have drilled at least one well (i.e. you need operational activity to demonstrate compliance and safety achievement).
  • May not have a disqualifying event (e.g. fatal or life-threatening incident, significant fire, major oil spill). Due to the extreme lag in updates to BSEE’s incident tables, district investigations and media reports are used to make this determination.

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At Oil and Gas Lease Sale 261, Repsol was the sole bidder for 36 nearshore Texas tracts in the Mustang Island and Matagorda Island areas (red blocks at the western end of the map above). Exxon acquired 163 nearshore Texas tracts (blue in map above) at Sales 257 and 259. All 36 of the Repsol bids have now been accepted.

As previously posted here and here, carbon disposal bidding at the last 3 oil and gas lease sales has made a mockery of the leasing process and the regulations that guide it.

Hopefully, the carbon sequestration regulations that are under development will preclude conversion of leases acquired at Sales 257, 259, and 261. At a minimum, these regulations should require a competitive process for converting any oil and gas leases.

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15,531 of the 15,537 comments on the bid adequacy rule were from a single organization, Friends of the Earth. I have no problem with the Friends of the Earth campaign given that their comment letter is pertinent to the topic. Their main point is that the bid adequacy process fails “to factor in the climate and social costs of continued Outer Continental Shelf oil and gas lease sales into the bid process.” Although that may be a reasonable position, those issues are addressed in the programmatic and sale specific environmental reviews which factor into when and where sales are held, tract exclusions, special lease stipulations, and the comprehensive operating regulations. Once bids are submitted, the issue (and the sole purpose of the bid adequacy rule) is whether those bids represent fair market value for the oil and gas resource potential of the leases being offered.

Given that 96.3% of the US OCS is off-limits to oil and gas leasing, only 0.7% is currently open to exploration, and the new 5 year plan includes the fewest lease sales in OCS program history, it’s rather a stretch to argue that environmental concerns are not being prioritized.

The State of Alaska submitted very good comments (attached) that point to the historical differences in Gulf of Mexico and Alaska leasing. The State argues that a simpler approach to determining fair market value would encourage exploration and development on offshore lands that have seen little of either in recent years. Knowing BOEM’s expectations prior to the sale, perhaps through higher minimum bid requirements, would ensure that companies do not underbid and that tracts are successfully leased.

The Gulf of Mexico leasing program of today is looking more like the frontier area leasing of the past. As previously noted, the uncertainty regarding future sales changes the historic GoM leasing dynamic. The next opportunity for purchasing unleased GoM tracts is now a troubling unknown. This would seem to make it less prudent to reject bids based on uncertain prospect evaluations. Absent leasing and exploration, the true resource and revenue potential will never be known.

It was good to see the strong comments submitted by my former Minerals Management Service colleagues Dr. Marshall Rose and Ted Tupper. Marshall, who was our Chief Economist, commented that the proposed rule did not identify the problem and explain how the rule addressed that problem. Ted, a senior statistician, points to past failures of the bid adequacy process and proposes specific changes. It’s great to see the passion that our retired employees have for the program they were so instrumental in developing and managing.

The rule was finalized without any substantive changes.

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The attached BSEE Safety Alert addresses chronic and persistent helideck issues that pose significant risks to offshore workers. Meanwhile, we are still waiting for the final NTSB report on the tragic 12/29/2022 helideck incident that killed the helicopter pilot and 3 passengers.

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Cox proposes to sell its Gulf of Mexico assets to W&T Offshore for $88.5 million. The bankruptcy case docket has 64 pages of linked documents including many objections to the terms of the sale.

The bankruptcy court’s priorities should be 1) minimizing safety and environmental risks and 2) protecting the public from the massive decommissioning liabilities.

Per the latest BOEM information, Cox and affiliates Energy XXI and EPL operate 477 platforms, which is 31% of the Gulf of Mexico total! (See the related information posted last June.) BSEE estimates that the decommissioning costs for these platforms will exceed $4.5 billion!

Per BSEE data, Cox and its affiliates were cited for 780 incidents of noncompliance (violations) in 2023. They thus accounted for 43% of all 2023 GoM INCs.

Questions:

  • How will taxpayers be protected from Cox’s $4.5+ billion decommissioning obligations?
  • What is the plan for both safely decommissioning facilities and operating those that remain?
  • Why was Cox allowed to continue expanding GoM operations without demonstrating financial assurance and operational competence?
  • Why did BOEM propose to eliminate consideration of a company’s compliance record in determining the need for supplemental financial assurance?
  • How was a failing operator (Cox) selected just 8 months ago for a Federally funded (DOE) project to repurpose GoM facilities for carbon sequestration purposes?

The Cox bankruptcy is yet another costly lesson for Federal regulators. Moving forward, decommissioning and lease assignment policies must prioritize safety, environmental protection, and protection of the public’s financial interests.

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BOEM diminishes the credibility of their important (and generally excellent) scientific, lease administration, and regulatory work with over-the-top wind energy promotion. The tweet below is a recent example.

This is not a good look for the bureau that is expected to objectively evaluate offshore wind projects. Leave the hype to the wind industry and its NGO supporters.

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