Thirty years ago, when industry majors shied away from exploration offshore Israel, Noble Energy (then Samedan) boldly stepped forward and partnered with the Delek Group to explore the Eastern Mediterranean.
Exploration success was accompanied by national security, legal, and regulatory challenges. Nonetheless, Israel’s gas production has grown rapidly and is expected to exceed 3 bcf/day in 2026, which is > current gas production in the Gulf of America.
Chevron is now the main operator in Israel, having purchased Noble’s assets in 2020. The company has taken another major step by signing an MOU with Syrian Petroleum Co. and Qatar-based Power International Holding. The document is not currently accessible online, but appears to be substantive based on press reports.
The agreement focuses on preliminary cooperation for exploring and developing offshore oil and gas resources offshore Syria. It’s noteworthy that the MOU will only remain in effect for two months, after which “formal contracts and operational work are expected to follow.”
Having done some work for Noble Energy in the 2010s, I’m very impressed by the progress that has been made given the geopolitical challenges.
Production at Chevron’s Leviathan, a giant gas field offshore Israel
The EIA’s Eastern Mediterranean overview is attached.
This video reports on the United Oil and Gas geochemical exploration program. At the 3 minute mark, Jamaican Energy Minister Daryl Vaz does a good job of expressing optimism about Jamaica’s prospects while downplaying expectations and warning about uninformed rumors.
More difficult to understand is why the Jamaican govt granted 3 license extensions to a company that doesn’t have the financial strength to drill an exploratory well. Would it not have made more sense for the govt to deal directly with stronger companies that want full ownership, not just a share?
“The company is also operating under financial constraints. It currently has no producing assets and remains reliant on equity raises and a successful farm-out to fund future activity, according to its latest annual report. That reality makes low-cost, high-information work programmes particularly important.”
Jarrod Agen is Deputy Assistant to the President and Executive Director, National Energy Dominance Council. A question about Sable Offshore’s Santa Ynez Unit project was raised at a Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) event on “The State of American Energy Dominance.” See the Bloomberg blurb and X post below. The full event video is here.
Here is the extent to which the Trump administration is helping $SOC, from a talk w Trump lackey Jarrod Agen. Sounds convincing lol pic.twitter.com/1NrCmyY6jt
In 2025, NRW/Array operations accounted for 486 incidents of non-compliance (INCs), 36.2% of the Gulf of America total. Array and NRW had INC/facility inspection rates of 2.1 and 7.0 respectively, well above the Gulf average of 0.42 and the top performers’ rates of 0.05 to 0.13.
In Array’s defense, their violations declined sharply in the second half of 2025. However, the number of inspections of their facilities declined even more sharply, so the INCs/facility inspection ratio actually increased in the second half.
For the 2025 data in the table below:W=warning, CSI=component shut-in, FSI=facility shut-in. The 3 numbers for Array in each box are full year 2025 data (top), first half 2025 (middle), and second half 2025 (bottom)
operator
W
CSI
FSI
total INCs
Facility Insp.
INCs/isp
Array
352 311 41
93 46 47
6 6 0
451 363 88
218 184 34
2.1 2.0 2.6
NRW
10
24
1
35
5
7.0
Three other companies had more than 10 shelf platforms and INC/facility inspection ratios >1.0: Greyhound Energy (23 platforms), Renaissance (21 platforms) and Sanare Energy (38 platforms).
operator
W
CSI
FSI
total INCs
facility insp
INCs/ fac. insp
Greyhound Energy
32
1
0
33
23
1.4
Renaissance Offshore
26
19
3
47
44
1.1
Sanare Energy
60
20
2
82
75
1.1
The table below provides 2025 oil and gas production through Oct (with Gulf of America rank) for the 5 companies mentioned in this post. In determining rankings, subsidiaries and affiliates were counted as a single company (e.g. Chevron, Unocal, and Hess counted as one company).
No bids were accepted during BBG1’s Phase 1 review. This means that none of the tracts receiving bids were determined to be nonviable as was the case for the 199 tracts that were improperly acquired for carbon disposal purposes in Sales 257, 259, and 261. (Unsurprisingly, neither of the acquiring companies has submitted an exploration plan for any of these CCS leases. The leases will likely expire without activity. Much to the dismay of the large and diverse group of opponents, the carbon disposal industry is focusing on onshore locations along the Gulf Coast.)
Attached isJohn Smith’s updated Sable litigation table. John is a BOEM retiree who has been closely monitoring Sable’s legal and regulatory challenges. His summary:
“Sable Offshore Corp. is involved either directly or indirectly in no less than 12 lawsuits that have been filed by environmental groups, state and county regulatory agencies, and the Attorney General of California, all of whom are committed to stopping Sable from restarting Santa Ynez Unit (SYU) oil and gas production. All of the lawsuits are active and many are likely to result in prolonged judicial proceedings extending over several years. Will Sable have the will and financial resources to continue these legal battles indefinitely? – that’s a multi-million dollar question.”
The 2025 Gulf of America Safety Compliance Leaders are ranked below according to the number of incidents of non-compliance (INCs) per facility inspection. To be ranked, a company must:
operate at least 2 production platforms
have drilled at least 2 wells during the year
average <1 INC for every 5 facility inspections (0.20 INCs/facility inspection). This is a higher standard (fewer INCs) than in previous years.
average <1 INC for every 10 inspections (0.1 INCs/inspection). Note that each facility inspection may include multiple types of inspections (e.g. production, pipeline, pollution, Coast Guard, site security, etc). In 2025, there were on average 3.2 inspections for every facility inspection.
operator
W
CSI
FSI
total INCs
facility insp
INCs/ fac insp
insp
INCs/ insp
Shell
3
8
1
12
231
0.05
557
0.02
Chevron
10
8
0
18
260
0.07
772
0.02
Oxy
2
6
1
9
133
0.07
325
0.03
BP
8
2
0
10
122
0.08
304
0.03
Murphy
6
2
0
8
70
0.11
177
0.05
Cantium
5
7
4
16
121
0.13
488
0.03
Gulf-wide 2025
815
445
84
1344
3179
0.42
10218
0.13
Gulf-wide 2024
957
398
109
1464
3133
0.47
10664
0.14
Notes: Numbers are from published BSEE data; INC=incident of non-compliance; W=warning INC; CSI=component shut-in INC; FSI=facility shut-in INC; INCs/fac insp= INCs issued per facility inspection; each facility-inspection may include multiple types of inspections (e.g. production, pipeline, pollution, Coast Guard, site security, etc), in 2025, there were on average 3.2 inspections for every facility inspection
Criteria: This ranking is based solely on BSEE’s published compliance data. The absence of timely public information on safety incidents (e.g. injuries, fires, pollution, gas releases, property damage) precludes inclusion of these data. Although Panel Investigations are conducted for fatalities, serious injuries, and significant pollution events, the last panel report was for an incident on 3/25/2022, and no information is available for any ongoing investigations. BSEE District offices investigate the more significant incidents that don’t qualify for panel investigations. These District Investigation reports are more timely, but some are not issued within 90 days of the incident. The District reports will be reviewed later in the year. Note that there were no occupational fatalities in 2025.
Observations:
The overall inspection and INC results for 2025 were similar to those for 2024.
The top companies performed better in 2025 than in 2024. In 2024, only 2 companies had INC/facility inspection ratios of <0.10 and only 3 had ratios <0.15. In 2025, all 6 of the performance leaders had ratios <0.15.
Shell’s total INCs and INCs/facility inspection decreased by 73% and 78% respectively vs. 2024
Cantium, which operates 85 shallow water platforms, has demonstrated that a shelf operator can be an outstanding safety performer. Cantium’s total INCs and INCs/facility inspection decreased by 50% vs. 2024
Should fewer inspections be conducted at facilities that have such low INC rates? On the one hand, fewer inspections would reduce regulatory costs and transportation risks. On the other hand, there are benefits from BSEE inspection visits besides compliance enforcement. These include direct communication with offshore workers (including contractors) regarding regulatory policies and safety practices, witnessing safety tests, evaluating new technology, and assessing management system implementation and corporate culture at the facility level.
Absent specific details on the violations, no attempt was made to weight the INCs. Although shut-in INCs are generally considered to be more significant than warnings, that is not always the case. For example, a component shut-in INC for a safety device that is marginally out of tolerance and is corrected on the spot may be less serious than a warning that is indicative of structural deterioration, poor maintenance, or organizational shortcomings.
Not meeting one of the activity level requirements, but nonetheless noteworthy, were the compliance records of LLOG and BOE Exploration & Production (younger than and unrelated to the BOE blog 😀). See their impressive results below:
Pasted below are excerpts from Sable’s Prospectus Supplement. Is Sable serious about pursuing a Santa Ynez Unit strategy that employs a production and treatment vessel 3.5 miles from shore ala the development option that was reluctantly approved by the Federal govt in 1974, two decades before the onshore infrastructure was in place?
The OS&T option is inferior to onshore treatment and pipeline transportation in every way – spill risks, air emissions, economics, ultimate oil recovery, transportation to market, natural gas utilization, and public benefit.
This blogger supports a resumption of Santa Ynez Unit production. However, the only responsible path forward is to do the right thing and continue to pursue the onshore pipeline approvalsadministratively and legally. It is far better to defend a good project than a contrived workaround.
When will BOEM share Sable’s proposed “update”(actually a massive revision) to the SYU Development and Production Plan, as they are obligated to do?
Evaluation of the revised plan will require a detailed environmental review.
Operationally, BSEE and the Coast Guard will need to carefully consider vessel integrity, treatment capabilities, mooring and offloading plans, transportation schemes, gas utilization/injection, and many other technical details.
Meanwhile, does Exxon, the previous (and future?) owner, remain on the sidelines when the OS&T permitting circus begins in earnest?
On September 29, 2025, Sable announced that it is evaluating and pursuing an offshore storage and treating vessel (“OS&T”) strategy to provide access to domestic and global markets via shuttle tankers for federal crude oil produced from the SYU in the Pacific Outer Continental Shelf Area (the “OS&T Strategy”). Continued delays related to the Santa Ynez Pipeline System have prompted Sable to evaluate and pursue the OS&T Strategy. On October 9, 2025, Sable submitted a Development and Production Plan update for the SYU to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (“BOEM”). Prior to implementation of the OS&T Strategy, regulatory authorizations are required, including clearance from BOEM.
Preparations for the OS&T Strategy include the acquisition of a suitable OS&T vessel, certain refitting and upgrades to the vessel and the SYU equipment, transportation of the vessel to SYU, and related installation. In connection with implementation of the OS&T Strategy, the Company expects to opportunistically acquire an existing OS&T in the first quarter of 2026, with delivery of the vessel to SYU expected in the third quarter of 2026. Following the acquisition of the vessel, and vessel and platform upgrades and installation, Sable would expect to begin sales from all SYU platforms in the fourth quarter of 2026, with expected comprehensive oil production rates of over 50,000 barrels of oil per day, utilizing the OS&T within the SYU federal leases, provided the Company receives regulatory clearances. Sable estimates that the total capital required to execute the OS&T Strategy is approximately $475.0 million. The Company has already incurred a small portion of such capital expenditures, with the vast majority of such capital expenditures remaining, provided the Company receives regulatory clearances. See “Risk Factors—Risks Associated with Our Operations—In order to commence operations pursuant to an OS&T offtake strategy, we will require clearances and permitting, including from BOEM.”