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Archive for the ‘Norway’ Category

In light of energy security and price considerations, rebounding oil demand, uncertainty about the long-term viability of non-conventional onshore production, and the elimination of most other offshore options, sustaining deepwater GoM production should be a high-priority U.S. policy objective. The deepwater GoM also offers significant environmental advantages in that approximately 1.6 million BOPD are produced from only 58 widely dispersed surface facilities that are well maintained, closely monitored and inspected, and distant from shore. Another advantage of US deepwater production is the low carbon intensity relative to other sources of petroleum (more on this in a later post).

EIA (Chart 1) projects relatively stable GoM production over the next 2 years. Platt’s (Chart 2) is forecasting a slight decline in 2021 production primarily because of COVID-related delays in the initiation of production at Shell’s VIto and PowerNap and BP’s Mad Dog 2 and Thunder Horse South 2 facilities. Based on the latest available EIA data, current stabilized GoM oil production appears to be in the 1.7-1.8 million BOPD range.

Going forward, the concern is the high rate of reserve depletion and the absence of drilling activity needed to replace reserves. Schlumberger data through 2016 (Chart 3) show depletion rates rising to above 20%, the highest (by far) of the offshore regions analyzed. I was unable to find more recent data, but unless this trend line has made a sharp turn, production declines are likely in the next 3-5 years. Further, drilling trends do not suggest the likelihood of significant reserve growth. Data from BSEE’s Borehole File (Chart 4) indicate deepwater well start activity that is comparable to the moratorium years of 2010 and 2011. Even more concerning is the absence of exploratory drilling (chart 5) and the very few operating companies that are drilling deepwater wells. Only five operators have spudded deepwater exploratory wells in 2021 YTD. One US supermajor hasn’t started a well since 2019, and another US major has essentially exited the Gulf.

Deepwater production trends are not easily reversed, so dialogue is urgently needed to assess the implications of declines in drilling, reserves, and industry interest. As the resource manager on behalf of the public, BOEM is the logical choice for initiating these discussions. BOEM’s Norwegian equivalent, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) demonstrates the importance of pro-active land management. The NPD has done an outstanding job of sustaining exploration activity and production consistent with Norwegian safety and environmental values, which are among the highest in the world. On their website, NPD provides ongoing updates on exploration, production, and reserve depletion parameters. Their competency and commitment to sustaining production on the Norwegian shelf is underscored in this news release, an excerpt from which is pasted below:

Exploration is of great importance for the long-term value creation on the shelf. The supply of oil and gas resources from new discoveries, as we have seen so far this year, is necessary so that activity in the petroleum industry does not fall sharply after 2030. Without new discoveries, production can fall by more than 70 percent in 2040 compared to 2020, says Torgeir Stordal, director of Technology and coexistence in the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate.

NPD, July 21, 2021
monthly crude oil production from U.S. federal gulf of Mexico
Chart 1, EIA GoM Production Forecast
Chart 2

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Chart 3: Depletion calculated as annual production divided by proved-developed reserves at end of same year

Chart 4: Data from BSEE Borehole File; 2021 Data as of 7/23
Chart 5: Data from BSEE Borehole File; 2021 Data as of 7/23

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Per Upstream:

A fire at BP’s Valhall oil platform off Norway in the southern part of the North Sea forced the UK supermajor to halt production and evacuate the facility today. 

Valhall Complex (www.mfox.nl)

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Because of recent involvement with products and systems that have Safety Integrity Level (SIL) ratings, I read the comment (below) in the PSA Deepwater Horizon review with interest. While administrative and effectiveness issues must be carefully assessed, the application of SIL should be part of the BOP performance dialogue.  SIL ratings may also be appropriate for entire well control or well integrity systems.

Today’s requirements stipulate a risk analysis for the control system of a drilling BOP, with specified minimum requirements for its safety integrity level (SIL). As a result of the DwH incident and of the fact that blowouts are not confined to drilling operations, the question is whether such an analysis, with a specified minimum SIL level, should also apply to all types of BOPs, including well-intervention models. In addition, consideration should be given in this context to whether other control and management systems related to well integrity/control exist which should be subject to such requirements.

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From the standpoint of post-Macondo safety and regulatory issues, this concise summary is the most comprehensive and useful report that I have read since the blowout.

I have pasted (below) comments about information management – one of the many important topics considered in the report – and hope you take time to read the entire summary. It is only 12 pages.

Conducting a critical review of the information used to manage major accident risk is one of the measures relevant for the companies. This work could include an assessment of
 the relevance, reliability and modernity of the indicators used to follow up risk trends
 inappropriate use of indicators, incentives and reward systems
 the need for better indicators and other information about the business which can be used to secure an early warning about a weakening in safety-critical barrier elements.
The PSA is of the opinion that the quality of information applied in managing major accident risk is also a question of what overview the players have of their own business, and thereby a question of the players’ own control. The PSA assumes that managing major accident risk cannot be outsourced. In light of the DwH accident, it could be relevant for the companies to review the processes intended to provide the necessary information about the business, assess in part how these processes support a culture of accountability and how various management and audit functions, third-party verifications and so forth contribute in this connection.


					

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Children's Parade in Oslo, Stortinget (Parliament) in Background

This is the second Syttende Mai for the BOE blog. Best wishes to our many Norwegian friends on their National Day, which celebrates the signing of their Constitution on May 17, 1814.

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PSA has posted the Gullfaks B gas release report in English.  Also posted is the report on a lifting incident at Njord A.  The reports are comprehensive and timely.

The gas leak occurred during leak testing after maintenance work on a production well. The gas derived from a volume trapped between the downhole safety valve and the Xmas tree. It proved impossible to operate the emergency shutdown valves on the well. The leak lasted about an hour, with an initial rate of 1.3 kilograms of gas per second. The volume of gas released is estimated at about 800 kilograms.
No people were injured in the incident, but the leak created a serious position on the installation.

Gas Cloud - Gullfaks B



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The HSE has told Shell to submit a revised safety case for the Brent Charlie platform after gas was detected on its topsides following leaks on 12 January this year and 27 September 2010, Upstream can reveal.

Shell, which took the decision itself to close the platform after the January incident, has been battling for some time to resolve technically complex issues related to the venting of gas from inside one the platform’s huge concrete legs — Column 1 (C1) — and dispersing it effectively away from the platform.

The operator now expects the ageing Brent field to remain shut down for several more months.

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Surprisingly, the post-Macondo discussion about regulatory approaches has been largely devoid of value and cost-benefit assessments. While PSA has been praised for Norway’s outstanding offshore safety record, little attention has been paid to their relatively low regulatory costs.

According to data in the 2010 Annual Report, PSA has 161 employees, and had total operating expenses of NOK 202,762,689  ($US 38.1 million) for 2010. These modest cost and staffing numbers are particularly impressive when the magnitude and complexity of Norwegian offshore operations are considered. In March 2011, Norwegian oil production averaged 2.017 million barrels per day (no. 2 offshore oil producer slightly behind Brazil) and gas production averaged 11.6 billion cubic feet per day (world offshore leader). PSA is also responsible for onshore processing facilities.

PSA’s costs are relatively modest for the same reason that their regulatory program is successful. They hold companies responsible for managing their operations and conducting inspections. They don’t approve every detail of every operation, but focus on ensuring that the company management systems are effectively implemented.  They identify risks and insist that industry address them. As Magne Ognedal said in his interview with BOE: 

Our regulatory philosophy is indeed firmly based on the legislated expectation that those who conduct petroleum activities are responsible for complying with the requirements of our acts and regulations. Furthermore, our regulations require that they employ a management system that systematically probes and ensures such compliance at any time.  The approach to achieving this should be risk-based.  So, ensuring compliance with rules and regulations is the operator’s job – not ours.

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link

In the 21st licensing round, additional requirements have been introduced with regard to the qualifications of the licensees that will undertake particularly demanding deep-water drilling operations or drill in areas in which high temperature/high pressure (HTHP) conditions are expected. Under these licences, there must be at least one competent partner in addition to the operator. The partner must have drilled at least one well as an operator on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, or have similar relevant experience from another offshore petroleum province.

I had never thought about a requiring a partner, and specifying the qualifications that the partner must have. This makes some sense in that the operator will not only have internal oversight, but also oversight by the partner(s). The result is a verification program administered by competent partners who have an incentive to ensure safe operations.  Interesting approach.

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John Milne Book Launch

John C Milne

“Dubs” is a term used in Aberdeen and northeast Scotland to describe all varieties of mud. That is the first thing I learned in reading John Milne’s excellent book “DUBS, How the Oil Came North.”  John’s first job in the offshore industry was with a drilling mud supplier back in 1969 when he was still a college student.  John presents a series of amusing and informative anecdotes about hie work experiences between 1969 and 1973 during the early years of North Sea offshore exploration. The book is available through the publisher, PlashMill Press. Good read!

I also recommend Bjørn Vidar Lerøen’s excellent book “Drops of Black Gold,” which

Drops of Black Gold - Statoil

chronicles the history of Statoil and Norwegian offshore oil and gas development. The book includes a now famous 1962 letter from Phillips Petroleum to the Norwegian government. In the letter, Phillips seeks exclusive rights to the entire Norwegian continental shelf in return for conducting a seismic survey program. Hey, nothing wrong with asking! 🙂

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