The DrillMAX is en route from Guyana to drill the Persephone wildcat well 500 km NE of Newfoundland in the highly prospective Orphan basin (3000 m water depth). This looks like the farthest from shore any well has been drilled in the Atlantic. The late spring date is prudent.This is definitely a well to watch because of the resource potential and difficult operating conditions.
I had the pleasure of working with Jason Mathews when he was a young MMS engineer. He truly cared about our safety mission and has taken that commitment to the next level at BSEE. Jason shared this important, heartfelt message on the anniversary of the Macondo blowout.
One of the greatest gifts I ever received in life is having a little girl and having the opportunity to go home every evening and spending time with her at cheer, softball, doing homework, etc. I have a great deal of respect for the men and women who work offshore and put their lives on hold for 14-28 days to deliver much needed OCS production to meet US demand. Undoubtedly, they are better / tougher people than me.
Over the last year, my team has seen multiple incidents that had a high potential severity that could have led to a fatal / serious injury or major incident in the GOM. Although we can sit and debate the causal factors for hours, one that jumps to the top of the discussion is the Human Factor – Complacency. Of all the things a leader should fear, complacency heads the list. There is no doubt success breeds complacency, and complacency breeds failure.
To this day, I am still shook by the mindset and complacency of many onboard the Deepwater Horizon prior to the incident. During testimony in the public hearings, John Guide, the BP well team leader for the Horizon, believed that the rig crew had become “too comfortable” because of its good track record for drilling difficult wells. Ross Skidmore, a BP contractor on the rig on April 20, testified that the crew became complacent after completing drilling because “when you get to that point, everybody goes to the mindset that weʹre through, this job is done.” To me, the complacency on the Deepwater Horizon could be attributable to the crew not having access to all of the well data (OptiCem reports – cement job risk) available to BP personnel onshore and the well site leaders on the rig. Our investigation concluded, the overall complacency of the Deepwater Horizon crew was a possible contributing cause of the kick detection failure.
As regulators, we have special roles in the GOM as it relates to safety:
Driving the avoidance of complacency and risk-free mindsets of the offshore employees
Understanding we can’t be selfish – Our success is not our individual personal growth / gains, but it is being unwavering in your promotion of offshore safety to ensure all offshore employees return home to their families safely
Holding each other (internally) and industry (externally) accountable when necessary
In order to achieve greatness offshore, we ,as a regulator, have to believe we can, and never sit still until we achieve it.
Everyone on this email has a very critical function and role. Never underestimate the value of what you do, have the proper mindset, and avoid complacency.
Do whatever it takes to ensure the people offshore are gifted the same gift we receive every day – going home to our families.
All In –
Jason P. Mathews, Petroleum Engineer, Field Operations – OSM
Friday Night LIghts: Coach Mathews and his daughter
The active rig count in the GoM in 2001 was 148 (AL-4, LA-119, TX-25), which is >8 times the current Baker Hughes rig count of 18. The 2001 rig count was not a one year blip; the number of rigs active in the GoM exceeded 100 for the ten year period from 1994-2003.
While the current rig count is anemic by comparison, the capabilities of the fleet are anything but. Below is a list derived from drilling contractor status reports of deepwater rigs now operating in the Gulf.
All of these rigs are dynamically positioned and are capable of drilling in 12,000′ of water. They have dual derricks and 15,000 psi rated BOP rams (one has a 20,000 psi stack, and another can be upgraded to 20,000 psi). The annular preventers are rated at 10,000 psi. All have impressive storage and hook load capacities, the latest tubular handling equipment, advanced control systems, and efficient power generation.
Note that most of the rigs fly the flag of the Marshall Islands. This “flag of convenience” registration is preferred for reasons related to taxation and operational freedom. For the record, the fact that the Deepwater Horizon was registered in the Marshall Islands had little to do with the Macondo blowout. The DWH was subject to all Coast Guard and MMS regulations under the OCS Lands Act.
The main cause of the Macondo blowout was the poorly planned and executed well suspension operation. Certain equipment capability, maintenance, and employee training issues were contributing factors. However, with that said, the Marshall Islands report on the blowout candidly acknowledges that “the complexity of and interdependence between the drilling and marine systems and personnel suggests a need for increased communication and coordination between the flag State and coastal State drilling regulators.” Hopefully, that coordination is being achieved and the risks associated with the fragmented regulationof mobile drilling units are being effectively managed.
Contractor
Rig
Operator
Est. end date
Flag
Transocean
Deepwater Titan
Chevron
3/2028
Marshall Islands
Transocean
Deepwater Atlas
Beacon
4/2025
Marshall Islands
Transocean
Deepwater Poseidon
Shell
4/2028
Marshall Islands
Transocean
Deepwater Pontus
Shell
10/2027
Marshall Islands
Transocean
Deepwater Conqueror
Chevron
3/2025
Marshall Islands
Transocean
Deepwater Proteus
Shell
5/2026
Marshall Islands
Transocean
Deepwater Thalassa
Shell
2/2026
Marshall Islands
Transocean
Deepwater Asgard
Hess
4/2024
Marshall Islands
Stena
Evolution
Shell
4/2029
Marshall Islands
Noble
Stanley Lafosse
???
11/2024
Liberia
Noble
Valiant
LLOG
2/2025
Marshall Islands
Noble
Globetrotter I
Shell
5/2024
Liberia
Noble
Globetrotter II
Shell
5/2024
Liberia
Valaris
DS-18
Chevron
8/2025
Marshall Islands
Valaris
DS-16
Oxy
6/2026
Marshall Islands
Diamond Offshore
BlackHawk
Oxy
10/2024
Marshall Islands
Diamond Offshore
BlackHornet
bp
3/2027
Marshall Islands
Diamond Offshore
BlackLion
bp
9/2026
Marshall Islands
Short video about the Stena Evolution, the newest entry to the Gulf of Mexico fleet:
Swimming upstream against the Federal policy current, Gulf of Mexico drilling is demonstrating impressive forward progress. Baker Hughes reports 22 active GoM rigs on 3/15/2024, an increase of 3 from the previous week.
Glancing at the charts, this appears to be the highest GoM rig count since Nov. 2019, and is double the recent low of 11 in 2022.
It’s unclear whether Baker Hughes is including the CCS drilling operation offshore Texas. If so, the actual oil and gas rig count is 21 rather than 22.
Baker Hughes also reports 1 active rig offshore California (decommissioning?) and 1 active rig offshore Alaska (Endicott or Northstar?)
Per Baker Hughes, no rigs are currently active offshore Canada.
Given the intermittency, space preemption, aesthetic, and wildlife issues associated with wind and solar power, more attention has been shifting to geothermal energy. Quaise’s plan to tap ultradeep heat resources has been on our radar for several years and has been attracting private funding and a bit of media buzz.
Quaise is exciting not only because of the unlimited energy potential, but because of the fascinating gyrotron technology that vaporizes hard rock and could enable wells to be drilled to depths of 20-30 km and temperatures of >1000° C. Nabors, a leading drilling contractor, is one of the Quaise investors, and will be involved with the test drilling.
Demonstrating the gyrotron technology in the field is a big step up from doing so in the lab. Those of us in the “peanut gallery” are awaiting more definitive information on the lab tests that have been conducted to date and the important field tests, which are scheduled for this year.
A Fortune article about Autry Stephens, Endeavor Energy Resources CEO, pegs him as the world’s richest oilman following the sale of his company to Diamondback Energy. His story reinforces many of the success messages previously discussed on BOE:
Humble beginnings: As the son of peanut-and-melon farmers, his work ethic was no doubt established at a young age.
Private land: Stephens started buying Texas Permian rights early in his career.
Technology leader: His company embraced the horizontal drilling and advanced well stimulation practices critical to Permian success.
Contrarian who stuck with his plan: When major oil companies left for more lucrative opportunities overseas, he continued adding Permian leases acquiring a total of 344,000 acres.
Low debt: His insistence on using cash to acquire drilling rights helped him survive the 2008 financial crisis, which crushed oil demand and bankrupted some US operators.
Lean organization: He focused on maintaining a lean staff and efficient operations, which no doubt facilitated effective communication and instilled common values.
Take care of your employees: He insisted that none of Endeavor’s 1200 employees be let go after the merger with Diamondback.
Support the community: Served Midland and merged with the company that was located right across the street.
Former Federal employee 😉: Not known as a key to success, but I’ll take it 😀. (Stephens once worked for the Army Corps of Engineers.)
Last summer, Trident Energy exercised multiple options for the use of the Island Innovator semi-submersible (pictured above), extending the duration of the Equatorial Guinea contract to approximately 230 days.
The rig arrived in Equatorial Guinea in Nov. 2023.
On 7 Feb, a Trident team briefed Equatorial Guinea Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons Antonio Oburu Ondo about problems with the Innovator’s BOP system. Apparently, Island Drilling, the rig owner, was not present at that meeting.
Mr. Ondo subsequently reported that the BOP had serious problems and failed to respond to control system commands.
Trident terminated the rig contract on safety grounds.
Island has publicly responded that (1) the Trident statements are inaccurate, (2) there have been no critical safety incidents, (3) the BOP has been checked and tested by the OEM representative on the rig and declared safe and ready for operations, and (4) they will challenge the contract termination.
Questions & comments:
Since the rig had just arrived on location, the BOP issues were presumably identified during onboard stump testing. Were corrective measures discussed? Why was contract termination deemed necessary?
Island’s statement indicates that the rig was tested with the OEM representative present. Presumably those tests were in accordance with API S53 or the ISO equivalent.
Had inspections and maintenance also been conducted in accordance with the standard? Did Trident inspect the rig and review maintenance and testing records before signing the contract?
Have other companies had similar issues with the Innovator? None have been identified in my web search.
Was a bridging document in place to address differences in Trident/Island management systems? If so, what does that document say about BOP inspection and oversight.
Why was the drilling contractor not present at the meeting with the Equatorial Guinea authorities? Was Island advised that the contract was being terminated prior to that meeting? Did the authorities speak with Island to hear their side of the story?
Does the contract provide for mandatory arbitration in the event of such disagreements?
Could other factors have influenced the cancellation decision? I was involved with an arbitration case involving an operator that used safety issues as the reason for terminating an expensive long-term rig contract. The arbitration panel ruled in favor of the drilling contractor resulting in a very large payment to the rig owner. Ironically, serious safety violations by the operating company (but not the drilling contractor) were identified during the arbitration process.
Island Drilling is a Norwegian Company with an experienced management team. The Innovator has conducted operations in the Norwegian and UK offshore sectors. These factors typically imply a strong commitment to safe operations.
Hopefully, we’ll be able to learn more about the specifics of this dispute in the near future.
In 1980, Don Kash, the great leader who was Chief of the Conservation Div. of USGS (the current equivalent of the Conservation Div. is BSEE plus the resource evaluation functions in BOEM plus some royalty management functions now in ONRR) asked me to move to Cape Cod to head a new office responsible for overseeing exploratory drilling operations on Georges Bank. We established a small office in an old maintenance building at Barnstable Municipal Airport in Hyannis. The space was decidedly unglamorous but functional and ideal for helicopter transit to the offshore rigs.
Karen was a Cape Cod artist and art teacher at Nauset Middle School in Orleans (for baseball lovers, that is where the Orleans Firebirds of the famous Cape Cod League play). Some of her teacher friends were connected to a running club I belonged to, and unknown to me at the time, Karen had designed my beloved Provincetown Dunes Run t-shirt.
We had another connection in that we had bought condominiums built by the same company. Hers was in Orleans and mine was in Hyannis. A couple that owned a condo in each project got to know both of us and thankfully introduced us. A year and many great experiences later we were married at the historic Captain Linnell House in Orleans.
Interestingly, Karen’s mother was an opponent of Georges Bank drilling until she realized that her only daughter would be leaving Cape Cod when the drilling ended. She then changed her position, proving once again that all politics is local 😀
I was very lucky to have spent 4 challenging and exciting years on Cape Cod. The Georges Bank drilling story was uniquely remarkable for me and led to a daughter born at my next duty station (Santa Maria, CA) and 5 grandchildren (good ratio 😀). While I was particularly fortunate, I think the Georges Bank drilling experience was generally positive for all that participated including the State and local officials, Woods Hole scientists, media, industry personnel, commercial fishermen, and even the Greenpeace protesters who were on the scene 155 miles southeast of Nantucket!
Jean-Louis Daeschler, a native of France who lives in Scotland, was a pioneering subsea engineer who worked on rigs worldwide. Below, he recounts a 1969 incident on the Sedco 135 E.
Sedco 135 E
Sept. 1969 on the Sedco 135 E offshore Miri, East Malaysia
At about 10.00 PM the crew was running 24 ” riser pipe. The rig used a 2 stack BOP system. The weather was superb – no wind and a temperature of 26 deg C.
When the 4th joint of riser pipe (45 ft) was picked up through the “V” door and was almost vertical, it unlatched from the elevator. There was a massive clang followed by silence. The riser pipe hit the drill floor, fell backward into the derrick frame and got jammed there. No one was hurt.
The incident would have been much worse if the pipe had fallen through the catwalk, perforated the maindeck, fell into the water, and damaged the the rig’s sponson tanks !!!! A piece of pipe falling overboard turns into a high velocity torpedo. A dropped 13 3/8″ casing joint is sometimes found 400 ft away. Heavy drill collars go almost straight down, which is the worst case given the potential for damage to the wellhead equipment.
I left the office and went to the rig floor, which was silent. Everyone was looking up and down. With the brake tied down, I asked Bill Ellis what we were going to do now. Bill was an experienced 45+ year old driller from Ruidoso New Mexico. His answer was “Go back home to the USA” with a big smile. He was always in control.
Bill demonstrated great leadership; there was no panic or blame. The all-Chinese and Malay crew was listening and smiling. After some rigging up, we got the operations back into swing. We checked the elevator latch and other equipment, laid down the joint that had been stuck, picked up another one, and continued running the riser.
I met again with Bill and Jo, his wife, in Aberdeen in 1975, and we still talked about that night-shift event.
As we approach the 55th anniversary of the Santa Barbara blowout (more to follow), pioneering subsea engineer JL Daeschler reminds us of a lesser known, but very serious, drilling blowout that occurred the same year offshore Northern Australia.
As is the case with most historic incidents, the lessons learned are still pertinent today and should be studied by those involved with well operations. Training sessions should consider what went wrong then, how technology and practices have changed since, how similar incidents could still occur, and innovations and improved practices that could further mitigate well control risks.
While well control technology and procedures are much improved, the fundamental issues discussed in the attached video remain the same. Well control must always be considered a work in progress with continuous improvement being the objective.
(The Sedco 135G semisubmersible that drilled this well is of the same design as the Sedco 135B rig that sank offshore Borneo in 1965.)