Feeds:
Posts
Comments

Archive for the ‘accidents’ Category

Germany’s national elections are on 23 FEB. The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party, which has gained strength in the polls, supports a Nord Stream restart.

Denmark’s energy agency granted Nord Stream AG permission to conduct preservation work on the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea (Reuters). One of the two Nordstream 2 lines is undamaged.

-An Equinor executive stated on February 5, 2025, that the Nord Stream 1 pipeline is “permanently destroyed.”

-The Swiss canton of Zug extended the moratorium on debt restructuring for Nord Stream AG until May 9. The moratorium is seen as a way for the German government to preserve its influence over the future of the pipeline. If the company is liquidated, investors, including the German state-owned energy firm Uniper, would lose control over the pipeline and the considerable funds invested by German taxpayers in its construction.

-Consideration is being given to transporting hydrogen from Finland via the undamaged Nord Stream 2 string. (The H2 might have to be mixed with methane to prevent embrittlement.)

-Resumption of Nord Stream flow could be part of a Russia-Ukraine ceasefire deal (along with Ukraine’s rare minerals).

-American investor Stephen Lynch continues his pursuit of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.

Chat GPT was asked what the likelihood was of the US orchestrating the Nord Stream sabotage. Response (see below): 60-80%

Read Full Post »

Johan Sverdrup field, 155 km from shore

On Tuesday, Equinor halted all production from the Johan Sverdrup field, western Europe’s biggest producer. An outage in the offshore power system has been cited as the cause.

A Jan. 26, 2022 BOE post questioned Norway’s electrification policy for offshore platforms. Another post discussed a loss of power to the Sverdrup field only 10 weeks ago.

In addition to the production losses, these incidents increase safety risks and onshore electricity prices with no net environmental benefit.

Hopefully, the investigation reports will be posted so that the lessons learned can be shared.

Electric cables from shore power the Johan Sverdrup field

Read Full Post »

The NTSB has finally issued their report (attached) on the 12/29/2022 helicopter crash that resulted in 4 fatalities at Walter’s West Delta 106 A platform. The NTSB report on the Huntington Beach pipeline spill took a comparable amount of time (26 months) to complete. By comparison, the lengthy and complex National Commission, BOEMRE, Chief Counsel, and NAE reports on the Macondo blowout were published 6 to to 17 months after the well was shut-in.

The gist of the NTSB’s findings is pasted below.

The report summarizes operations standards, but does not consider the associated operator/contractor safety management systems that are intended to prevent such incidents. The report notes that:

Was the contractor/operator aware of these deviations from company policy? Should they have been?

The report implies that human (pilot) error was the cause of the dynamic rollover, but fails to assess the organizational controls that are intended to prevent such errors. How was a pilot with 1667.8 flight hours (1343.8 as the PIC), who had made 23 trips to this platform, repeatedly making fundamental positioning and takeoff errors?

The report also notes that:

This is interesting wording given that the perimeter light was identified as the pivot point, one of the 3 requirements for a dynamic rollover. Why wasn’t that violation observed by the operator/contractor and corrected? What helideck inspection procedures were in place? Did NTSB consider the fragmented regulatory regime for helicopter safety, particularly with regard to helidecks?

Read Full Post »

Pioneering offshore engineer J.L. Daeschler, a Frenchman who lives in Scotland and has worked on drilling rigs worldwide, shared his 1974 training certificate signed by Bill Hise, the first director of the Blowout Prevention and Well Control Training Center at LSU. JL recalls his training:

The LSU well control course was new and very well organized. Training options were limited at that time. LSU took a step forward and incorporated equipment donated by Cameron Iron Works, Armco Steel /National, VETCO, and others.

The course was split between indoor class room style and outdoor training on a live well to remind us of the real things, like hard hats, tally books, and safety shoes.

LSU had a 1200 ft vertical well and a small 2″ diameter gas injection line to create a bottom hole gas kick, using a nitrogen truck as the supply. (note: the live well was a first for any well control school.) You had a choice of several manual chokes.  I selected the Cameron Willis choke to circulate the gas kick out with no increase in mud weight (drillers method).

The mud return level, kick detection, and general management of the operation were realistic as if on a rig. The gas would whistle and escape thru a vent line.

The training was simple and effective in that proper well control procedures were learned. In the process, there were many errors. Mud was seen flying out of the mud shaker/pits. School management would bring things under control and explain the errors that were made !!!

Given the importance of minimizing drilling risks, the Minerals Management Service (MMS) was the primary funder of the LSU facility. MMS predecessor, the Conservation Division of USGS, first established well control training requirements in 1975 (pasted below).

LSU’s well control center video:

Read Full Post »

… Union Oil Company’s reckless well plan forever scarred the U.S. offshore program. Learn more about the details.

Santa Barbara blowout

Examinations of the Santa Barbara, Montara, and Macondo blowouts, the Piper Alpha fire, and other major incidents should be a part of every petroleum engineering curriculum, and should be mandatory for those who conduct and regulate offshore oil and gas operations.

There is no better learning experience than studying the failures that had such enormous human and economic consequences.

Read Full Post »

Shetland News: Parts of a Viking turbine blade which broke in October remain on the hills around the wind farm site – almost three months later.

Too many of these incidents are occurring, and this one is particularly troubling:

Shetland News received a number of photos from the site, with the person who sent them – who wished to remain anonymous – saying there was “truly a monumental mess of fibreglass and plastic blowing through the hills.”

They said “some of the debris was as far as 700m away from the turbine.”

Shouldn’t the operators have contingency plans (ala oil spill response plans) that provide for prompt and complete cleanup after turbine system failures?

Debris can still be seen strewn around, some distance from the turbines.”

Read Full Post »

The suspension order for the Vineyard Wind project was lifted on the last business day before the change in Administration and before the completion of the Federal investigation into the blade failure.

New Bedford Light report

Read Full Post »

The NTSB has still not issued a final report, which is troubling. However, the detailed Operations Group Factual Report (including attachments) can be accessed in the case docket This and other items in the docket should be of interest to those involved with offshore operations and helicopter safety.

From the factual report, below are graphics showing the helideck damage and assumed final position of the helicopter.

Excerpts from the testimony of a worker at the platform who was part of an attempted search and rescue operation in the platform’s Whitaker escape capsule:

Read Full Post »

Given the absence of industry and government data on wind turbine incidents, Scotland Against Spin (SAS) has done yeoman’s work in filling the void. SAS gathers information from press reports and official releases. A PDF of the latest SAS update summary (through 2024) is attached. You can view their complete incident compilation (324 pages) here. Kudos to SAS for their diligence.

Be sure to see the introductory text at the top of the attached table. Some key points:

  • The table includes all documented cases of wind turbine incidents which could be found and confirmed through press reports or official information releases.
  • SAS believes that this compendium of accident information may be the most comprehensive available anywhere.
  • SAS believes their table is only the “tip of the iceberg” in terms of numbers of accidents and their frequency:
    • On 11 March 2011 the Daily Telegraph reported that RenewableUK confirmed that there had been 1500 wind turbine incidents in the UK alone in the previous 5 years.
    • In July 2019 EnergyVoice and the Press and Journal reported a total of 81 cases where workers had been injured on the UK’s windfarms since 2014. SAS data includes only 15 of these (<19%).
    • In February 2021, the industry publication Wind Power Engineering and Development admitted to 865 offshore accidents during 2019. SAS data include only 4 of these (<0.5%).
    • SAS includes other examples supporting their “tip of the iceberg” claim.

Although SAS is committed to reforming the Scottish government’s wind energy policy, their incident data summaries are credible. It’s disappointing that the wind industry is unwilling to publish comprehensive incident data that would help protect lives and the environment, and improve the performance of all participants.

Read Full Post »

After a zero fatality year in 2023, the first in at least 60 years, Jason Mathews of BSEE advises that one worker was killed during US OCS oil and gas operations in 2024.

The fatality occurred during decommissioning operations on the Helix D/B EPIC HEDRON at Talos Energy’s Ship Shoal Block 225 “D” platform in the Gulf. The platform was to be reefed in Eugene Island Block 276.

The victim, who worked for Triton Diving Services, was moving hoses on the port side of the barge and got caught between the bulwark and counterweight of the crawler crane (see picture below).

The victim’s family have filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Helix Energy Services and Triton Diving Services. The plaintiffs assert that prior to the crane movement the crane operator and crew had not undertaken measures to assure that the crane’s swing area was clear of other crew members. Per their filing, Triton and Helix were negligent as follows:

They further assert that:

The incident remains under investigation by BSEE.

Read Full Post »

« Newer Posts - Older Posts »