Posted in accidents, Gulf of Mexico, well control incidents, tagged 11 workers, Deepwater Horizon, macondo, Trace Atkins, tribute on April 18, 2022| 1 Comment »
This week I’ll be posting background information, new details, and personal opinions about the April 20, 2010 Macondo tragedy. As a prelude, I wanted to share this touching tribute to the 11 men who died on the Deepwater Horizon. These American heroes gave their lives exploring for energy to power our economy. The video is introduced by singer Trace Atkins, a former Gulf of Mexico rig worker.
Posted in Uncategorized, tagged CCS, Easter, macondo, offshore safety on April 14, 2022| 2 Comments »
… to be able to speak openly and candidly about issues that have been an important part of my professional life for 50 years. Thankful for our First Amendment rights; they must be protected.
Whether you represent Big Oil, Big Gas, Big Wind, Big Green, Big Climate, Big Stick (regulators 😀), Big Swamp (Washington DC friends 😉), or none of the above, thank you for visiting this modest, independent, and rather obscure blog.
Over the next couple of weeks, I will be posting about an interesting study that links compliance and safety, some unpublished thoughts on the Macondo blowout 12 years later, and comments on the industry push for carbon sequestration in the Gulf of Mexico (sorry advocates, I’m not a fan).
Regardless of your faith, nationality, political views, or thoughts about world events and offshore energy, I hope you have the opportunity to spend time with friends and family this weekend.
For those who observe Easter…..
Posted in well control incidents, drilling, Gulf of Mexico, tagged macondo, top kill, bp, LSU, blowout, Mayank Tyagi on September 28, 2021| Leave a Comment »
While the official BOEMRE-USCG and National Commission/Chief Counsel investigation reports were quite good and there are countless court documents and ad hoc reviews of the blowout, some important Macondo issues have not been fully addressed. BOE will touch on these issues periodically starting with the decision to terminate the top kill operation on 5/28/2010.
The top kill operation (see diagram above) was intended to overcome and halt the flow of oil by pumping heavy mud into the well bore. The operation was not successful because the pumping rate and mud weight did not generate sufficient pressure. Per an excellent paper by Dr. Mayank Tyagi and colleagues at LSU (Analysis of Well Containment and Control Attempts in the Aftermath of the Deepwater Blowout in MC252):
It is very likely that if the top kill had been designed to deliver more than 109 bpm of 16.4 ppg drilling fluid below the BOP stack for a sustained period, the Macondo blowout could have been stopped between May 26-28, 2010. Given that the well was successfully shut-in with the capping stack in July, and that the subsequent bullhead (static) kill was successful, certainly a higher rate top kill would have been successful at that time.
The American Thinker, citing the New York Times, reports that Energy Secretary Chu stopped the top kill operation over the objections of some BP engineers. While it was reasonable to be concerned about possible casing leaks and the fracturing of subsurface formations, the subsequent (7/15/2010) closure of the capping stack demonstrated that the well had sufficient integrity to support the top kill operation. Questions regarding why a higher rate top kill effort was not attempted and how that decision was made are therefore important and merit discussion. Did the Macondo well flow unnecessarily into the Gulf for an additional 48 days (5/28-7/15)? Did the National Incident Command facilitate or delay source control?
Keep in mind that the NIC almost made a similar mistake in July. Even after the capping stack successfully shut-in the well on 7/15, Incident Commander Thad Allen (USCG) continued to call the closure of the capping stack a temporary test and threatened to require BP to resume flow from the well. Fortunately, informed input from experienced engineers prevailed. The well remained shut-in and the static well-kill operation was successful.
Posted in Gulf of Mexico, Regulation, Uncategorized, tagged BSEE, Gulf of Mexico, IRF, Lars Herbst, macondo on August 26, 2021| Leave a Comment »
After an amazing 38 year career with MMS and BSEE, Lars Herbst has announced that he will retire at the end of 2021. Lars had important technical and managerial roles in the development of the deepwater Gulf of Mexico, the response to major hurricanes including Ivan, Katrina, and Rita, controlling the Macondo blowout and addressing the related regulatory issues, and the offshore industry’s response to the COVID-19. Lars was an active participant in the International Regulator’s Forum and is recognized worldwide for his operational and regulatory expertise. Best wishes to Lars as he transitions to the next phase of his life.
Posted in accidents, Mexico, Offshore Energy - General, tagged macondo, Mexico, Pemex fire, safety, Talos, Zama on August 24, 2021| Leave a Comment »
the Mexican government’s recent decision to anoint Pemex operator of the billion barrel Zama field would seem to merit further scrutiny. Houston-based Talos Energy discovered the Zama field in 2017. The field underlies both Pemex and Zama acreage, and there are common reservoirs. Per Bloomberg:
Mexico’s energy ministry has designated Petroleos Mexicanos as the operator of the country’s largest oil discovery by private companies, in the latest sign of the government’s nationalist approach to the energy industry.
Talos said it was “very disappointed” with the decision and will explore “legal and strategic options” regarding Zama. The company added that the energy ministry had informed Talos of its “sudden” decision only three days after the driller received a letter directly from Pemex arguing for operatorship.
Bloomberg, 7/5/2021
The Mexican government’s decision is indicative of the Lopez Obrador administration’s commitment to rolling back the reforms that had encouraged private sector participation in Mexican offshore exploration and development.
Questions had already been raised about Pemex’s ability to fund Zama development and operate the field safely. This week’s deadly incident and a July pipeline fire add to those concerns. In light of the background political and financial issues, will it be possible to for Pemex and the Mexican regulators to conduct a fully independent investigation of the tragic fire that just occurred?
Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged accidents, blowouts, Deepwater Horizon, drilling, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, offshore drilling, safety, well control on August 4, 2011| 4 Comments »
- The well clearly had losses through the shoe during the initial displacement of the heavy spacer with seawater, immediately prior to the negative test.
- Allowing for, and accepting, losses of ~80 bbls during spacer displacement, explains ALL pressure and flow anomalies without the need to create or invoke undocumented and unsubstantiated valve closures or manipulations that contradict witness testimony of events. It also eliminates the need to adopt unrealistically-low pump efficiencies for the rig pumps, hypothetical washed-out tubing and ridiculously high viscosities for the drilling mud, in an effort to fit questionable computer models.
- Despite extensive examination by investigators and the publication of several reports, the fact that the well experienced losses, making it even more severely underbalanced than was planned, has been given little credence or has received little or no attention, despite several clear indications that this was the case. While this statement regarding losses may be self-evident, its significance on the outcome at Macondo merits closer examination since it explains many previous, apparently-contradictory aspects of the disaster.
- Under-displacement of heavyweight spacer, as a result of losses during displacement, caused U-tubing and partial evacuation of the kill line, the lower end of which was later refilled with heavyweight spacer, driven by pressure and flow from the formation. The vacuum, initially, and subsequent invasion of heavy fluid rendered the kill line useless for monitoring the well since the line was effectively blind to pressure changes in the well.
- While initial flow into the well was through the shoe, pressure above the casing hanger seal during the negative test was reduced to levels that could have allowed the casing to lift, compromising the seal and possibly also allowing flow from the external annulus.
- The well encountered further losses during the second displacement (to displace the riser), after completion of the negative test. These losses, which were perhaps as much as 200 bbls, effectively replaced heavy mud with sea water in the casing below the drill pipe. This further underbalanced the well to the point that it was being kept under control only by pumping friction pressure. As the pump rate was reduced prior to shut down for the sheen test, effectively reducing system backpressure, the now severely underbalanced well began to flow.
Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged blowouts, Deepwater Horizon, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, oil spill, oil-eating bacteria, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute on August 2, 2011| Leave a Comment »
oil-eating bacteria
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute scientists have published important new findings on the rapid bacterial degradation of the Macondo spill.
They found that bacterial microbes inside the slick degraded the oil at a rate five times faster than microbes outside the slick—accounting in large part for the disappearance of the slick some three weeks after Deepwater Horizon’s Macondo well was shut off.
Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged accidents, blowouts, bp, Deepwater Horizon, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, offshore drilling, oil spill on August 1, 2011| 1 Comment »
Dauphin Island tarballs, May 2011
Cheryl’s update after reviewing the latest reports:
Articles of interest:
Posted in drilling, Offshore Energy - General, Regulation, tagged BOEMRE, Gulf of Mexico, inspections, macondo, MMS, offshore oil and gas, safety on July 26, 2011| 1 Comment »
Much ado about nothing courtesy of the Associated Press:
Copies of the forms submitted by more than 100 inspectors, engineers and permit reviewers in five Gulf coast offices were obtained by the AP under the Freedom of Information Act. Personal information, such as the names of the employees, their friends and their family members, was blacked out to protect privacy. But the companies with ties to government workers were disclosed, and they represent a who’s who of the offshore oil and gas industry, from majors like Chevron, Shell and BP to smaller companies such as W&T Offshore Inc., Ankor Energy LLC and Hilcorp Energy Co.
So yesterday we linked an article about proposed legislation that would, among other things, require that offshore inspectors have “at least three years experience in the oil and natural gas field.” Today, we read contradictory (and silly) comments like the one below in the AP piece that criticize such experience. How would you like to be an oil and gas inspector or prospective offshore regulator?
“It’s nearly impossible to determine where the oil industry ends and the government’s regulatory agency begins,” said Scott Amey of the Project on Government Oversight, after reviewing AP’s data. “These new instances indicate that BOEMRE staff are connected to individuals and oil companies, which raises concerns about lax oversight and the integrity of the agency. Without enhanced enforcement authority and independent oversight of these potential conflicts, I’m uncertain that BOEMRE can assure the public that it is truly watchdogging the offshore oil industry.”
Give these people a break. I have seen absolutely no evidence that improper government-industry relationships or compromised inspections had anything to do with the Macondo blowout or any other recent incident. Inspection and engineering personnel are under continuous scrutiny well beyond what most employees would accept, and recuse themselves from assignments if there could be even a perception of a conflict of interest.
The US offshore program, and every other safety regulator, needs people who understand the operations and technology that they regulate. These regulators need to communicate regularly with industry personnel on operational and regulatory issues. Too little interaction with their professional peers is a greater danger than too much. You don’t advance safety technology and procedures, and resolve concerns, without communication.
DOI offshore personnel have had and will continue to have more than enough oversight; time to move on to another cause.
Posted in accidents, tagged accidents, blowouts, Deepwater Horizon, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, oil spill on July 21, 2011| Leave a Comment »
Very interesting findings for those interested in the fate of spilled oil:
The deep sea entrainment of water-soluble hydrocarbons has far-reaching implications for deep water oil spills. Our results demonstrate that most of the C1-C3 hydrocarbons and a significant fraction of water-soluble aromatic compounds were retained in the deep water column, whereas relatively insoluble petroleum components were predominantly transported to the sea surface or deposited on the seafloor, although the relative proportions are not known.
The resulting apportionments of hydrocarbon transfers to the water column and atmosphere are therefore very different for a deep water oil spill versus a sea-surface oil spill. During seasurface oil spills, highly water-soluble components such as BTEX, C3-benzenes, and naphthalene quickly volatilize and are rapidly lost to the atmosphere within hours to days, thereby limiting the extent of aqueous dissolution into the water column. In the case of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, however, gas and oil experienced a significant residence time in the water column with no opportunity for the release of volatile species to the atmosphere. Hence, water-soluble petroleum compounds dissolved into the water column to a much greater extent than is typically observed for surface spills.
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 