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Posts Tagged ‘Gulf of Mexico’

Has US bloodlust at BP gone too far?

Many will argue that BP deserves to die, and anger is entirely understandable. But critics should be careful what they wish for. America is a nation with a tradition of due process and everybody – even “big oil” – is entitled to a fair trial.

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I have received the letter from Chairmen Waxman and Stupak of the of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, requesting that the CSB investigate the BP Deepwater Horizon blowout.  It is my desire that the CSB do everything it can to facilitate the request and to undertake the investigation and determine what factors led to the explosion and failure of the blowout prevention system. ~John Bresland, CSB Chairman

In addition to the House and Senate Hearings, this would bring the number of official investigations to four:

  1. MMS-Coast Guard investigation required by the OCS Lands Act
  2. National Academy review requested by the Department of the Interior
  3. National Commission established by the President
  4. Chemical Safety Board review requested by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce

I have long advocated an independent investigation capability for major OCS incidents and recommended a special commission in my testimony before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources Committee on May 11.  However, is four official reviews too many?  The MMS-CG investigation is well underway and is required by statute, but the 3 independent reviews have yet to begin.  Perhaps these efforts can be consolidated.  If not, their respective missions must be very clearly defined.  Otherwise, there is a significant risk of gaps, confusion, and unnecessary overlap.  We need to make sure that each group knows their role and is staffed to obtain the information needed to prevent the recurrence of other offshore tragedies, in the US and elsewhere.

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BOE reader Tore Fjågesund of WellBarrier AS has provided this schematic of the Macondo well’s casing program.  The color-coded format simplifies assessment of the barriers, and identifies a probable flow path.  Click here to view the full-size diagram (pdf) – Macondo Well Barriers.

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Kudos to Secretary Chu and the Department of Energy for providing online access to Macondo schematics, pressure tests, diagnostic results and other data. This is the type of data that BOE and others have been requesting.  Well done!

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By the end of June, BP hopes to have the following arrangements in place:

  1. New well cap with improved sealing mechanism
  2. New seafloor manifold feeding production to a floating production storage and offloading (FPSO) vessel
  3. Shuttle tankers supporting FPSO
  4. Alternative flow path via choke and kill lines back to the Q4000 support vessel

The challenge will be minimizing production system downtime and the associated spikes in spillage, particularly during hurricane evacuations.

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Dette kan skje igjen (This could happen again)~ Magne Ognedal, Director General, Petroleum Safety Authority Norway

Magne’s quote in the Stavanger Aftenblad acknowledges that tragic accidents like the Macondo/Horizon blowout or Alexander Kielland sinking could happen again (see English translation of full article by BOE Europe Chief Odd Finnestad).  Magne goes on to say:

We must appreciate there are risks associated with our petroleum activities, and in our yearly risk assessments we attempt to put in concrete terms what those inherent risks are.  It is up to our national political system to determine whether this risk picture should be accepted or not.

and

We must endeavor to learn from whatever happens around the world, and if there is something that is also relevant to Norway we must apply those lessons, both regulators and industry

Industry and government officials would be wise to follow Magne’s lead and avoid “can’t happen here” statements.  A few of these statements were made in the US after the Montara (Timor Sea) blowout, and we know how that worked out.

Some very experienced and capable offshore managers have had “there but for the grace of God go I” moments in the wake of this disaster.  They know that this is not the time for boasting, piling-on, or schadenfreude.  Like Magne, real leaders are focused on monitoring the investigations, studying the findings and recommendations, and applying the lessons as necessary to further reduce their operating risks and the risks of others who conduct offshore oil and gas operations.

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Jason Mathews

Kudos to Jason Mathews, David Dykes, John McCarroll, and their Coast Guard colleagues for their excellent work on the MMS-USCG investigation of the Macondo blowout.  Catch some of the testimony on C-Span.

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Good news; production has ramped up nicely via the LMRP cap.

Getting a better picture of the well’s flow rate potential.

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We won’t get a good read on the cap’s effectiveness until its placement is adjusted and oil production is stabilized.  Flow to the surface may also be initiated through the choke and kill lines, which could supplement and improve the effectiveness of the cap system.

Update from Deepwater Horizon Response Facebook page:

The LMRP Cap is in place and nitrogen pressure head is slowly being reduced in the riser. Throughout the day, the vents in the cap will be closed as production begins on the surface. The goal is to ensure methane hydrates do not form in the cap.

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  • “Worst environmental disaster in US history” –  Reporters may want to wait until all of the data are in before making those kind of statements.  Largest oil spill doesn’t necessarily equate to the worst environmental disaster.  Some very large spills have had minimal long-term environmental damage, while the effects of some smaller spills have been quite serious.  The extensive long-term monitoring program will give us the answers.
  • Loss of wetlands – Louisiana has experienced serious wetland losses for years with little attention from the national media.  The barrier islands, which were approved by Admiral Allen, have been on the drawing board for some time and are primarily for wetlands restoration purposes.  Ironically, these islands may not have been approved and funded were it not for the oil spill.
  • BP employees – I’d like to see some reporting from the standpoint of typical BP employees.  Their lives have also been shattered.  The very existence of their company, which has lost 1/4 of its market value, is threatened.  While few BP employees had anything to do with the Macondo disaster, they are all working hard to set things right and continue their domestic and international operations.  It must be frustrating to realize that no matter how hard they work, it won’t be good enough to satisfy the critics.
  • Will the national reaction do more damage than the spill?  US production is threatened in the Gulf and elsewhere, and jobs are already being lost.  Preventing offshore drilling and production doesn’t prevent oil consumption.  As long as we consume oil, there will be a risk of spilling it during the production and transportation process.  We need to better manage those risks.  We didn’t eliminate tanker transport after Valdez, and we shouldn’t eliminate offshore exploration and production in the wake of Macondo.  Let’s not boycott ourselves and make OPEC the primary beneficiary of this disaster.
  • “Nationalize BP”- Just when you thought the commentary couldn’t get any sillier, you hear this kind of nonsense.  Hugo Chavez must be smiling.

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