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Posts Tagged ‘Gulf of Mexico’

GoM Production Held Steady in May

Posted in drilling, Gulf of Mexico, offshore, Uncategorized, tagged , , , on August 6, 2021| Leave a Comment »

A previous BOE post estimated that current stabilized GoM oil production rates were 1.7 – 1.8 million BOPD. EIA recently announced that May production was 1.791 million BOPD, which is consistent with our estimate. Per the chart below, GoM production was essentially unchanged from the beginning of the year despite a 37% increase in the price of oil (WTI) from 1 January to 31 May. This suggests that stabilized GoM production may have peaked pending first oil from several new projects.

Key production questions:

  • Will new production from Mad Dog 2, Vito, PowerNap, Thunder Horse South 2, and the recently sanctioned Whale project offset high depletion rates elsewhere in the deepwater GoM?
  • Looking further ahead, is deepwater GoM production sustainable without increased drilling activity? Per BSEE data, only 33 deepwater wells were started in 2021 YTD, just 18 of which are classified as exploratory. Drilling is thus at historic low levels. For reference, there were 477 wells started in 2001, 149 of which were exploratory. This level of activity facilitated a 30% growth in oil production, peaking at 2 million BOPD in 2019.

Regardless of one’s views on the urgency and timing of the “energy transition,” is there any doubt that oil and gas will continue to be important to our economy and security for years to come? If not, should deepwater GoM production, with its relatively low carbon intensity, be a core element of our energy strategy? To better understand the trade-offs, I suggest that BOEM’s Environmental Studies Program conduct a peer reviewed assessment of the carbon intensity of domestic and international supply alternatives. Product transportation considerations should be included in this assessment.

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Must read piece for those following the Macondo investigations

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , on August 4, 2011| 4 Comments »

Phil Rae piece in Fuel Fix

  1. The well clearly had losses through the shoe during the initial displacement of the heavy spacer with seawater, immediately prior to the negative test.
  2. Allowing for, and accepting, losses of ~80 bbls during spacer displacement, explains ALL pressure and flow anomalies without the need to create or invoke undocumented and unsubstantiated valve closures or manipulations that contradict witness testimony of events. It also eliminates the need to adopt unrealistically-low pump efficiencies for the rig pumps, hypothetical washed-out tubing and ridiculously high viscosities for the drilling mud, in an effort to fit questionable computer models.
  3. Despite extensive examination by investigators and the publication of several reports, the fact that the well experienced losses, making it even more severely underbalanced than was planned, has been given little credence or has received little or no attention, despite several clear indications that this was the case. While this statement regarding losses may be self-evident, its significance on the outcome at Macondo merits closer examination since it explains many previous, apparently-contradictory aspects of the disaster.
  4. Under-displacement of heavyweight spacer, as a result of losses during displacement, caused U-tubing and partial evacuation of the kill line, the lower end of which was later refilled with heavyweight spacer, driven by pressure and flow from the formation. The vacuum, initially, and subsequent invasion of heavy fluid rendered the kill line useless for monitoring the well since the line was effectively blind to pressure changes in the well.
  5. While initial flow into the well was through the shoe, pressure above the casing hanger seal during the negative test was reduced to levels that could have allowed the casing to lift, compromising the seal and possibly also allowing flow from the external annulus.
  6. The well encountered further losses during the second displacement (to displace the riser), after completion of the negative test. These losses, which were perhaps as much as 200 bbls, effectively replaced heavy mud with sea water in the casing below the drill pipe. This further underbalanced the well to the point that it was being kept under control only by pumping friction pressure. As the pump rate was reduced prior to shut down for the sheen test, effectively reducing system backpressure, the now severely underbalanced well began to flow.

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Rapid bacterial consumption of Gulf oil confirmed

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , on August 2, 2011| Leave a Comment »

 

oil-eating bacteria

Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute scientists have published important new findings on the rapid bacterial degradation of the Macondo spill.

They found that bacterial microbes inside the slick degraded the oil at a rate five times faster than microbes outside the slick—accounting in large part for the disappearance of the slick some three weeks after Deepwater Horizon’s Macondo well was shut off.

 

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Cheryl Anderson’s Macondo Oil Spill Update

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , on August 1, 2011| 1 Comment »

Dauphin Island tarballs, May 2011

Cheryl’s update after reviewing the latest reports:

  • There is a USCG unified command specific to BP spill residue after storms.
  • The tarballs are not considered toxic, just an unattractive nuisance.
  • Tarball cleanup on Dauphin Island was halted on May 1 to protect nesting birds.
  • BP estimates a total Macondo spill volume of about 4 million bbl as opposed to the government estimate of 4.9 million bbl.
  • BP estimates that 850,000 barrels were captured, burned or skimmed off the water.
  • 1,260 people remain employed in spill cleanup as of [July 14, 2011], down from a peak of 48,200 a year ago

Articles of interest:

Alabama.com

WALA New Orleans

Bloomberg Business Week 

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“The floggings will continue until morale improves.”

Posted in drilling, Offshore Energy - General, Regulation, tagged , , , , , , on July 26, 2011| 1 Comment »

Much ado about nothing courtesy of the Associated Press:

Copies of the forms submitted by more than 100 inspectors, engineers and permit reviewers in five Gulf coast offices were obtained by the AP under the Freedom of Information Act. Personal information, such as the names of the employees, their friends and their family members, was blacked out to protect privacy. But the companies with ties to government workers were disclosed, and they represent a who’s who of the offshore oil and gas industry, from majors like Chevron, Shell and BP to smaller companies such as W&T Offshore Inc., Ankor Energy LLC and Hilcorp Energy Co.

So yesterday we linked an article about proposed legislation that would, among other things, require that offshore inspectors have “at least three years experience in the oil and natural gas field.” Today, we read contradictory (and silly) comments like the one below in the AP piece that criticize such experience. How would you like to be an oil and gas inspector or prospective offshore regulator?

“It’s nearly impossible to determine where the oil industry ends and the government’s regulatory agency begins,” said Scott Amey of the Project on Government Oversight, after reviewing AP’s data. “These new instances indicate that BOEMRE staff are connected to individuals and oil companies, which raises concerns about lax oversight and the integrity of the agency. Without enhanced enforcement authority and independent oversight of these potential conflicts, I’m uncertain that BOEMRE can assure the public that it is truly watchdogging the offshore oil industry.”

Give these people a break. I have seen absolutely no evidence that improper government-industry relationships or compromised inspections had anything to do with the Macondo blowout or any other recent incident. Inspection and engineering personnel are under continuous scrutiny well beyond what most employees would accept, and recuse themselves from assignments if there could be even a perception of a conflict of interest.

The US offshore program, and every other safety regulator, needs people who understand the operations and technology that they regulate. These regulators need to communicate regularly with industry personnel on operational and regulatory issues. Too little interaction with their professional peers is a greater danger than too much. You don’t advance safety technology and procedures, and resolve concerns, without communication.

DOI offshore personnel have had and will continue to have more than enough oversight; time to move on to another cause.

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How deepwater and surface spills differ

Posted in accidents, tagged , , , , , on July 21, 2011| Leave a Comment »

Very interesting findings for those interested in the fate of spilled oil:

The deep sea entrainment of water-soluble hydrocarbons has far-reaching implications for deep water oil spills. Our results demonstrate that most of the C1-C3 hydrocarbons and a significant fraction of water-soluble aromatic compounds were retained in the deep water column, whereas relatively insoluble petroleum components were predominantly transported to the sea surface or deposited on the seafloor, although the relative proportions are not known.

The resulting apportionments of hydrocarbon transfers to the water column and atmosphere are therefore very different for a deep water oil spill versus a sea-surface oil spill. During seasurface oil spills, highly water-soluble components such as BTEX, C3-benzenes, and naphthalene quickly volatilize and are rapidly lost to the atmosphere within hours to days, thereby limiting the extent of aqueous dissolution into the water column. In the case of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, however, gas and oil experienced a significant residence time in the water column with no opportunity for the release of volatile species to the atmosphere. Hence, water-soluble petroleum compounds dissolved into the water column to a much greater extent than is typically observed for surface spills.

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Gulf of Mexico Ultra-deep Gas: Will the promise finally be realized?

Posted in gas, Offshore Energy - General, tagged , , on July 1, 2011| 1 Comment »

From Platts Oilgram News:

Shares of McMoRan Exploration jumped more than 12% June 29 after the company announced that additional drilling has confirmed its geological theories about the high potential of drilling ultra-deep natural gas prospects in the shallow waters of the Gulf of Mexico.

Hype, reality, or something in-between? One has to weigh the resource promise against the operational challenges, high costs, and gas market uncertainties.

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Transocean Releases Macondo Investigation Report

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , , on June 22, 2011| Leave a Comment »

Links

Animation of Transocean’s BOP analysis

Transocean’s BOP Defense:

Forensic evidence from independent post-incident testing by Det Norske Veritas (DNV) and evaluation by the Transocean investigation team confirm that the Deepwater Horizon BOP was properly maintained and did operate as designed. However, it was overcome by conditions created by the extreme dynamic flow, the force of which pushed the drill pipe upward, washed or eroded the drill pipe and other rubber and metal elements, and forced the drill pipe to bow within the BOP. This prevented the BOP from completely shearing the drill pipe and sealing the well.

In other words, Transocean contends that properly maintained BOPE was not up to the task of shutting-in and securing a high-rate well. If true, this finding has significant implications for the offshore industry.  I’m looking forward to reading the government’s findings on the BOP failure when the Joint Investigation Team report is issued next month.

 

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Important Macondo Settlement

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , on June 21, 2011| 2 Comments »

BP settled Macondo litigation with Weatherford, manufacturer of the float equipment equipment used in the Macondo well. The failure of this equipment was a key contributing factor in the Macondo blowout. Under the agreement, Weatherford will pay BP $75 million.  This money will be applied to the $20 billion Macondo trust fund.

Weatherford is the first of BP’s contractors to formally agree with BP that the entire industry can and should learn from the Deepwater Horizon incident. Accordingly, Weatherford has committed to working with BP to take actions to improve processes and procedures, managerial systems, and safety and best practices in offshore drilling operations. BP and Weatherford will encourage other companies in the drilling industry to join them in this improvement and reform effort.

Comments:

  1. $75 million seems like a rather modest payment by Weatherford given the magnitude of Macondo damage costs. BP will “indemnify Weatherford for compensatory claims resulting from the accident.”  Presumably, Weatherford’s sales agreements provide good legal protection.
  2. One of the root causes of the Montara blowout was also a float collar failure. That float collar was also supplied by Weatherford.  I’m surprised that this common cause and supplier have received almost no attention. Of course, no one has paid much attention to Montara, either before or after Macondo. Had more attention been paid to the Montara inquiry, Macondo might have been avoided.  (Note that most of the post-Macondo commentary still implies that deep water is the threat even though Montara was in 80 m of water and the root causes of Macondo were not water depth related).
  3. When do we learn more about the “improvement and reform effort” described in the quote above?

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Deepwater Horizon trial could be an ultra-marathon

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , , , on May 17, 2011| Leave a Comment »

Hundreds of witnesses expected.

The trial won’t proceed quickly, if the parties call all the witnesses on their lists.

Transocean’s roster of 304 included 82 of its own employees, 87 from oil company BP, and 18 from cement contractor Halliburton.

BP listed 71 witnesses from Halliburton, 110 others, plus anyone else who has been or will be deposed.

The United States listed 56 from BP, 32 from Halliburton, and 76 others.

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