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Posts Tagged ‘decommissioning’

In the attached supplement to his comments on BOEM’s financial assurance rule for offshore oil and gas facilities, decommissioning specialist John Smith raises concerns about reliance on cost data submitted by operators. John contrasts operator estimates for platforms in California state waters with estimates provided by independent consultants.

As summarized below and explained in the attachment, the more realistic independent estimates were 2-3 times higher than the operators’ “high end” estimates.

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Decommissioning Vindeby wind project, Denmark

BOEM’s “Rule to Streamline and Modernize Offshore Renewable Energy Development” is intended to “make offshore renewable energy development more efficient, [and] save billions of dollars. Unfortunately, the savings associated with relaxed decommissioning financial assurance requirements translates to increased risk for customers and taxpayers.

BOEM signaled their intentions on offshore wind (OSW) decommissioning three years ago when they granted a precedent setting financial assurance waiver to Vineyard Wind. Despite compelling concerns raised by commenters, the “streamlining” regulations have codified this decision.

Cape May County, New Jersey, was among the commenters objecting to BOEM’s departure from the prudent “pay as you build” financial assurance requirement. The County commented as follows (full comment letter attached):

“[e]nergy-utility projects are in essence traditional public-private partnerships where technical and financial risks are transferred to the private sector in exchange for the opportunity to generate revenues and profit. Under the proposed rule, the Federal government is instead transferring risks associated with decommissioning to the consumer rather than to the private sector.

Cape May added:

[w]hile BOEM believes that if a developer becomes insolvent during commercial activity that a solvent entity would assume or purchase control, the County believes this is a risky assumption as the most likely reason for default is that a constructed wind farm developer is unable to meet its contractual obligations set forth under a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) because its energy production revenues are not in excess of its operating costs. A change of hands would not remove these circumstances or make the project profitable.”

Cape May and others also commented on the threat of premature decommissioning as a result of storm damage. In response, BOEM asserts that these risks have been addressed in the latest standard for North American offshore wind turbines (Offshore Compliance Recommended Practices: 2022 Edition (OCRP-1-2022)). However, design standards, particularly those for offshore facilities, are not static. The recommended practice for OSW is likely to change multiple times in the coming years as storm, operating, and turbine performance data are updated and analyzed. The design standard for Gulf of Mexico platforms has been repeatedly refined and improved and is now in its 22nd edition.

In their response to public comments on the decommissioning risks, BOEM repeatedly asserts that they can adjust the amount and timing of required financial assurance as they monitor a lessee’s financial health. Unfortunately, a company’s finances can change quickly and BOEM’s options will be limited when it does. Increasing the financial burden on a struggling company that is providing power to a regional power grid will not be a simple proposition.

Strong comments from Cape May County:

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Decommissioning specialist John Smith has summarized the major provisions of BOEM’s decommissioning financial assurance rule for OCS oil and gas operations. He has highlighted his comments in red.

Previous post on this final rule: “BOEM’s decommissioning financial assurance rule is arguably a step backward in protecting the public interes

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The final decommissioning financial assurance rule has been published and is largely unchanged from the proposed rule that we reviewed last summer.

Major concerns:

  • Despite ample evidence regarding the importance of compliance and safety performance in determining the need for supplemental financial assurance, BOEM has dropped all consideration of these factors. Did BSEE field personnel concur with this decision?
  • Proved reserves should not be a basis for reducing supplemental assurance. The uncertainty associated with reserve estimates and decommissioning costs can easily negate the assumed buffer in BOEM’s 3 to 1 reserves to decommissioning costs ratio. That approach failed completely at the Carpinteria Field in the Santa Barbara Channel (Platforms Hogan and Houchin). See other points on this issue.
  • Given that the reverse chronological order process for determining predecessor liability was dropped from consideration last April, there is no defined procedure for issuing decommissioning orders to prior owners. The absence of such a procedure increases the likelihood of confusion, inequity, and challenges, particularly when orders are first issued to companies that owned the leases decades ago, in some cases prior to the establishment of transferor liability in the 1997 MMS “bonding rule.”

BOEM’s concern (below) about investment in US offshore exploration and production is interesting given that their 5 year leasing plan strongly implies otherwise.

BOEM’s goal for its financial assurance program continues to be the protection of the American taxpayers from exposure to financial loss associated with OCS development, while ensuring that the financial assurance program does not detrimentally affect offshore investment or position American offshore exploration and production at a competitive disadvantage

final decommissioning rule, p. 40

I’m just guessing here, but my sense is that BOEM was pressured to finalize this rule in a timely manner (<10 months is timely for such a complex rule) and was thus reluctant to make any significant changes to the proposal published last summer. A public workshop during the comment period would have been a good idea to facilitate informed discussion on the important issues addressed in this rule. Such workshops were once commonplace for major rules.

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Platform Houchin, Santa Barbara Channel

Important article by E&E News reporter Heather Richards.

BOE blog post: “The troubling case of Platforms Hogan and Houchin, Santa Barbara Channel”

Decommissioning uncertainty

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Rincon Island, “the 9th Channel Island

Per John Smith, Rincon Island (Phase 2) will be the first major production facility decommissioning project in California state waters since the Chevron 4-H platform removals in 1996.

Rincon Island and the onshore facility were constructed in 1959 and used for oil and gas production. In December 2017, Rincon Island Limited Partnership, the most recent lessee, transferred its lease interests to the State after becoming financially insolvent. Phase 1 of decommissioning included the plugging and abandonment of all oil and gas wells and removal of service equipment at Rincon Island.

The proposed Phase 2 project, analyzed within the Environmental Impact Report (executive summary attached), would prudently retain Rincon Island and the Rincon Island Causeway in their current configuration. Phase 3 will prepare Rincon Island and the Onshore Facility to be leased for yet-to-be determined new uses.

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John Smith, a decommissioning specialist who retired from BOEM, has published numerous professional papers on the topic. He has kindly shared his comments (below) on the new GAO report.

The Appeal Process is Broken – The GAO should have emphasized this point.  Companies routinely appeal orders to decommission platforms to forestall having to spend money on plugging wells and removing platforms, pipelines and other facilities. The appeal process commonly takes 5 or more years to reolove (e.g., DCOR appeal of BSEE order to decommission Platform Habitat).

Well P&A – BSEE has been negligent in requiring operators to plug and abandon wells no longer useful for operations. I’m shocked BSEE has curtailed or stopped issuing Inc’s for the failure of operators to P&A wells.  That’s a major failure on the part of BSEE management. That may explain why operator performance criteria was proposed to be eliminated for financial assurance.

Failure to Issue Civil Penalties for Well P&A – From GAO Report “BSEE officials explained that their reluctance to pursue civil penalties stems in part from concerns about whether inducing financial harm against an operator is an effective approach to compel decommissioning. They expressed reservations about taking actions—such as issuing civil penalties—that might strain the financial resources of operators to the point of pushing them into bankruptcy.”   This attitude underscores a real problem – an abrogation of regulatory and enforcement responsibility by BSEE. 

POCS Well P&A –  More than 700 wells have been drilled from the 23 California OCS platforms. The GAO report notes that approximately 200 are in the process of being plugged and abandoned – about 50% of those are probably associated with Gail, Grace, Harvest, Hermosa, Hidalgo, where P&A work has largely been completed by Chevron and Freeport McMoRan.  The vast majority of the remaining 500 wells are no longer useful for operations and have been idle for several decades.  Note POCS was never part of the Idle Well and Idle Iron Program, which was exclusive to the GOM. GAO gave POCS BSEE a pass by not highlighting that problem in POCS. It would have been interesting to know how many of the remaining 500 POCS wells are considered no longer useful for operations, and how many of those have been temporarily plugged and abandoned pursuant to regulations.  The GAO report broke that down for the GOM.

Footnote 46 of GAO Report – “Two of the eight platforms due for decommissioning in the Pacific—platforms Hogan and Houchin—have posed serious safety, environmental, and financial risks, including poor safety compliance records, severe corrosion, and ongoing disputes about who will assume decommissioning liabilities for the platforms and their associated wells, according to BSEE officials and documentation. According to BSEE, these platforms are currently being attended, monitored, and maintained as part of an agreement between BSEE, BOEM, Interior’s Office of the Solicitor, and the three predecessor operators pending a decision from the Interior Board of Land Appeals on the predecessors’ appeal. BSEE estimates that approximately $5 million of the estimated costs to decommission 21 orphaned sidetrack wells associated with these platforms are uncovered by financial assurances.”    $5 million divide 21 = $238,000 per well  – extremely conservative cost estimate given age of wells, likely collapsed casing, and downwhole equipment that needs to be removed.  The cost could easily be 3-4 times higher and there is no bonding so the federal government and taxpayers are on the hook for those costs.

Platform Hogan and Houchin Wells – approximately 75 wells were drilled from the platforms.  It would be interesting to know the status of those wells.  How many have been properly temporarily plugged and abandoned with long-term barriers installed to prevent leaks before decommissioning pursuant to OCS regulations?  Are the 21 orphaned wells mentioned above the Signal wells?  What about the other 54 wells?  Have the predecessor lessees agreed they are responsible for plugging and abandoning those wells?  

Platform Habitat – GAO could have noted this is another example of the broken appeal process. It would be interesting to know whether the 21 wells (primarily if not all gas wells) on Habitat have been temporarily abandoned. There are likely to be significant fugitive emission levels at the platform.  Hopefully the APCD is on top of that.  Note – the platform is unmanned and as I previously mentioned a potential catastrophe was avoided several years ago when a fire broke out on the platform.

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Offshore facility decommissioning is a frequent target of Federal auditors given the complex financial and regulatory challenges. Unfortunately, the reviews have done little to better protect the public interest. As have previous inquiries, the new GAO report (attached for your convenience) calls for improved regulations and enforcement practices. That, of course, has been the objective for decades, but the problems have only worsened.

While the GAO recommendations are unsurprising, the body of the report is informative. Most notably, GAO (p. 29) raises a significant inconsistency on a key provision in the proposed decommissioning financial assurance regulations published last year:

One of the five criteria BOEM would no longer use under the proposed rule is demonstrated reliability, as shown by record of compliance with laws, regulations, and lease terms, among other factors. BOEM’s June 2023 regulatory analysis concluded this criterion is not a good predictive indicator of default on decommissioning obligations. However, BOEM and BSEE officials we spoke with told us that poor compliance records—such as safety and maintenance issues or delayed decommissioning obligations—can be an indicator of potential decommissioning noncompliance or financial stress.

Why was there such a disconnect between the opinions of BOEM and BSEE officials (who are directly involved with decommissioning) and BOEM’s decision not to include a company’s compliance record among the factors to be considered in determining the need for supplemental financial assurance? As pointed out here and here, safety performance is arguably the most important predictor of financial failure and decommissioning noncompliance.

The GAO report correctly acknowledges the difficulties in disqualifying operating companies. However, the regulations at 30 CFR § 250.135 specifically provide for disqualification for poor performance. While the regulations could be tighter, enforcing disqualifications regulations is dependent on persistence and strong support from management and DOI attorneys. Given the political risks associated with disqualifying operators, that support is often lacking.

Disqualification difficulties make it imperative that BOEM carefully consider past performance before approving lease assignments or determining financial assurance amounts. Provisions in 30 CFR §585.408 and §585.107 could have been used to disapprove assignments to Signal Hill, Fieldwood, Cox, and other problem operators. The failure to do so has significantly delayed decommissioning and increased public exposure to financial risks.

In some cases, lease assignments to unqualified companies have not only been approved but they have been facilitated by BOEM/MMS. The case of Platforms Hogan and Houchin, in the Santa Barbara Channel, is a particularly good example. (Did GAO inquire about the Inspector General report on this matter or ask why that report has still not been released?)

Most operating companies are responsible about planning for and fulfilling their decommissioning obligations. The problem is the exceptions, and they are not difficult to identify if you look at compliance data and obtain input from BSEE inspection personnel.

Other important decommissioning questions that need to be considered:

Additional comments on the GAO report from decommissioning specialist John Smith will be posted tomorrow.

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The financial, technical, and regulatory aspects of decommissioning have received much attention on this blog. Andrew Konczvald sends this photo with regrets that the behemoth “Pioneering Spirit” wasn’t available when he was concerned with such matters.

For comparison (size only given the different missions), the massive Thunder Horse floating production platform (see below) in the Gulf of Mexico is 136 m x 112 m, only 12 m narrower but just over 1/3 of the Pioneering Spirit’s length.

The worlds largest 403,342 gross tonnage ship ‘Pioneering Spirit’ (formerly Pieter Schelte) is a catamaran crane vessel owned by the Switzerland-based All Seas Group designed for the single-lift installation and removal of large oil and gas platforms and the installation of record-weight pipelines. The 382-metre-long (1,253 ft), 124-metre-wide (407 ft) vessel is the world’s largest vessel by gross tonnage, and since September 2021 also the largest floating sheer-leg in the world. It was built in South Korea by Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering in 2013 at a cost of €2.6 billion. It commenced offshore operations in August 2016.
Thunder Horse

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Safety first: As a descendant of troubled Fieldwood Energy, which had a very poor safety and compliance record, QuarterNorth Energy (QNE) had much to prove. That said, QNE has had a good compliance record in its brief 2 year history. During 76 facility inspections in 2022 and 2023, QNE was cited for only 15 Incidents of noncompliance, all but 2 of which were warnings. This is on par with the companies that had the best compliance records during that period.

BSEE’s incident statistics are hopelessly out-of-date, with the latest data being for 2021, so we have limited information on QNE safety incidents. However, BSEE’s District Investigation Reports, which document the more significant incidents, are relatively current and no QNE incidents were investigated in 2022 and 2023.

Platforms: Consistent with the general sense that QNE inherited the best of Fieldwood’s facilities, the company’s 15 platforms include Bullwinkle, the Thunder Hawk floating production unit in 6050′ of water, and prominent shelf platforms Tarantula and Hickory.

The acquisition reunites 2 iconic Shell platforms under the same ownership. QNE’s Bullwinkle, installed in 1988 in 1353′ of water, is the world’s tallest (non-compliant) steel tower platform. Talos’s Cognac, installed in 1978 in 1023′ of water, is the first platform in >1000′ of water.

Production and reserves: Per Talos, QNE adds 30,000 boe/d of production and 69 million boe of reserves.

Drilling: Per BSEE records, QNE was the operator for 2 deepwater exploration wells, both of which are classified as completed.

Active leases: The QNE acquisition will add 51 leases to the Talos’s 143 lease inventory.

Recent lease sale activity:

SaleQNETalos
2572/110/10
2596/45/4
2616/414/13
total/high bids for QuarterNorth (QNE) and Talos

Sales price and decommissioning: QNE was already on the market for “more than $2 billion,” shortly after the company was formed. Talos is paying $1.29 billion consisting of 24.8 million shares of Talos’s common stock and approximately $965 million in cash. A case study of the complex Fieldwood bankruptcy and the outcomes for the various parties would be most interesting. Also of interest would be a study of the decommissioning obligations of the former companies and the extent to which the sale proceeds are being applied.

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