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The court filing is attached. See the previous post on this matter.

This Court should grant Plaintiffs—the State of Louisiana, the American Petroleum Institute (“API”), and Chevron U.S.A. Inc. (“Chevron”)—a preliminary injunction and prevent those unlawful provisions from permanently disrupting the result of the fast-approaching lease sale (which Congress has directed must occur by September 30, and which cannot be delayed without causing Plaintiffs even more serious injury).

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See the attached document.

From a regulatory policy standpoint, this appears to be a strong filing. Operationally, the most important points pertain to the costly and premature Rice’s whale restrictions first discussed on this blog.

Most notably, the plaintiffs seek (p.39):

  1. A preliminary and permanent injunction striking, setting aside, and enjoining BOEM from implementing the specific challenged provisions of the Final Notice of Sale and Record of Decision for Lease Sale 261;
  2. An order vacating the specific challenged provisions of the Final Notice of Sale and Record of Decision for Lease Sale 261;
  3. An order compelling Defendants to proceed with Lease Sale 261 on September 27, 2023, without the challenged provisions;

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Lease Sale 261 stipulations

In addition to the lease stipulation, the entire expanded Brice’s whale area has been excluded from the lease sale. Senator Manchin strongly criticized that decision:

Let me be clear, the exclusion of more than 6 million productive acres from the upcoming offshore oil and gas lease sale in the Gulf of Mexico based on a settlement reached in the name of protecting Rice’s whale while conveniently only targeting oil and gas is yet another example of this Administration’s intentional undermining of the strong energy security provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act.

Senator Manchin

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The attached comments were submitted to BOEM via Regulations.gov. The comments address specific provisions of the proposed rule and include a recommendation to hold companies fully accountable for their lease transfers, but not for subsequent transfers in which they are not a party.

Do I get a t-shirt for being one of the first 2000 entries? 😀

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1137 comments to date per Regulations.gov. This would imply one or more organized commenting campaigns.

I will share my comments on this blog after they have been submitted.

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For the first time in the history of the US OCS program, Federal ontracts have been awarded for the decommissioning of facilities in the Matagorda Island area of the Gulf of Mexico. The use of taxpayer funds for this purpose should be an embarrassment for the offshore industry and its regulators, past and present.

Rather than touting these contracts, the regulators should be explaining how this happened and how it will be prevented in the future. Fortunately, BOEM’s proposed decommissioning financial assurance rule is open for comment until the end of this month, so we have an opportunity to provide input.

Matagorda Island Gas, the company whose wells the public will be plugging, had a poor compliance record, and is another example of why compliance should be a primary factor in determining supplemental financial assurance requirements.

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See the Block Island Wind Farm’s reef environment in the BOEM video below.

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Gulf of Mexico 2023 oil production has dipped over the past 2 months, and is down 10% since January.

2023 production is reasonably well aligned with the EIA forecast which shows new production being offset by declines in existing fields.

Last year, BOEM forecast that production would average 2.0 million bopd in 2023. That forecast was justification for curtailing BOEM’s Proposed 5 Year Leasing Program. For the first time in the history of the OCS program, the primary concern of the program managers was that production might be too high for too long! This stunning quote from the 5 year leasing plan explains why so few lease sales were proposed:

BOEM’s short-term (20-year) production forecast for existing leases shows steady growth from 2022 through 2024 and declining thereafter (see Section 5.2.1)The long-term nature of OCS oil and gas development, such that production on a lease can continue for decades makes consideration of future climate pathways relevant to the Secretary’s determinations with respect to how the OCS leasing program best meets the Nation’s energy needs.

5 Year Leasing Program, p. 3

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Attached is a settlement agreement between NOAA and 4 NGOs that could have major implications for deepwater oil and gas operations in the Gulf of Mexico.

As background, the Rice’s Whale (formerly Bryde’s whale) area has been expanded (see map above) such that it fences off deepwater leases by creating a barrier to vessel transportation. The expansion is based on a single study that concluded that Rice’s whales were “the most plausible explanation” for moan calls observed in the northwest GOM shelf break area. No Brice’s whales were sighted in the expanded area during this study. The authors do point to a 2017 sighting offshore Corpus Christi, which is apparently the only actual sighting of a Brice’s whale along the NW GoM shelf break.

The settlement agreement commits BOEM, presumably with their concurrence, to exclude the expanded area from future leasing, to issue a Notice to Lessees and Operators (exhibit 1 below) and to attach stipulations to new leases (exhibit 2). Because BOEM’s authority to impose major new requirements without proposing a regulation for public review and comment is questionable, the Notice (NTL) describes the restrictions as “recommended measures.” However, the liability risks associated with the failure to comply with this “guidance” would be unacceptable to most companies. Adding to the muddle, the language in the lease stipulation differs by making it perfectly clear that compliance is required.

The most troubling restriction from an operational standpoint:

To the maximum extent practicable, lessees and operators should avoid transit through the Expanded Rice’s Whale Area after dusk and before dawn, and during other times of low visibility to further reduce the risk of vessel strike of Rice’s whales.

Comments:

  • Deepwater facilities are typically far from shore, and a requirement to transit only between dusk and dawn, particularly in the winter, is unrealistic and onerous. This is further complicated by the speed limit provision.
  • Those who have worked offshore know that periods of low visibility are unpredictable and can extend for days. The low visibility transit restriction is thus highly punitive and increases operational risks on the vessels and at the facilities they serve.
  • The vague “to the maximum extent practicable” caveat provides little comfort for planners, managers, and crews, and is a de facto acknowledgement that the requirement is unreasonable.
  • These restrictions, coupled with the required Automatic Identification System data, open the door to endless challenges, especially given the keen interest of the litigious organizations that are parties in the settlement agreement.
  • Deepwater GoM operations are few in number and highly dispersed, which is a more important mitigating factor than those included in the agreement. More on this tomorrow.
  • In addition to the deepwater operations that will be much more difficult to supply, there are currently 81 production platforms within the expanded Rice’s whale area (100 to 400 m water depth).These include important facilities like Amberjack, Cognac, Cerveza, and Lobster. What are the implications for these platforms? Will they be required to have full-time whale observers? Can they only be supplied during daylight hours with good visibility? Why not consider using these platforms as bases for more definitive studies?
  • Further to the previous point, there are 103 existing leases in the 100-400 m depth zone that is now excluded from leasing? 90 of these leases are still in their primary term, and 21 were issued in the past 2 years. How will the contractual rights of these leaseholders be protected? (In fact, the value of all 1550 active leases in >100 m water depth is affected by this agreement.)
  • Have BSEE and Coast Guard been consulted on the practicality and safety implications of these requirements?
  • Deepwater operations have been ongoing in the GoM for 50 years, and there is no apparent evidence of impacts to this species. Why can’t the consultation process and any necessary followup studies be completed before decisions are made regarding operating restrictions?
  • These types of restrictions, coupled with the diminished state of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and tightening oil markets, raise serious energy security and economic concerns.

Finally, BOEM’s third footnote in the NTL (pasted below), doesn’t demonstrate great confidence in the need for the onerous requirements that are being imposed.

This is not meant to be construed as a blanket determination as to whether BOEM, at present, has determined that there is a “reason to believe” that incidental take may occur, within the meaning of the ESA, the consultation regulations, or BOEM’s regulations. Those decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis in accordance with BOEM regulations referenced below.” Comment: Huh??? How are these blanket restrictions case-by-case, and how are they being imposed without public review?

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As previously posted, 14 of the 244 (not counting the 69 CCS bids) Sale 259 high bids were rejected. BOEM has published their bid evaluations for all of the tracts, and the 14 rejections are listed below.

lease #blockhigh bid ($)BOEM MROV ($)no. of bids
G37496DC 6222,101,8369,100,0001
G37515GC 173307,1071,300,0001
G37534GC 5471,783,49812,000,0001
G37538GC 5911,291,9935,200,0001
G37543GC 642605,5053,400,0001
G37548GC 777583,1034,200,0001
G37562AT 51,551,1304,700,0003
G37565AT 133607,1072,600,0001
G37616KC 745707,7773,600,0001
G37617KC 789707,7772,100,0001
G37647WR 750724,7443,500,0001
G37646WR 794724,7443,200,0001
G37648WR 795774,2425,000,0001
G37649WR 796774,2424,000,0001
MROV – Mean of the Range-of-Value

Observations:

  • Keathley Canyon (KC) Block 96, the tract receiving the highest bid in the entire sale ($15,911,947 by Chevron), had a BOEM MROV of only $576,000. Clearly, Chevron and the government have a very different view of the value of this tract. BP was the second bidder for KC 96, and their bid ($4,003,103) was also considerably higher than BOEM’s MROV. This one will very interesting to follow.
  • The only bid that was rejected in Sale 257 was the BP/Talos bid of $1.8 million for Green Canyon Block 777. BOEM’s MROV in the Sale 257 evaluations was $4.4 million. BP again bid on GC 777 in Sale 259, but their bid was only $583,000 (even though BOEM’s Sale 257 evaluation was public information). BOEM’s MROV was reduced only slightly to $4.2 million, and they again rejected BP’s bid. We’ll see what happens in the next sale.
  • 51 of the 230 accepted bids were >$1 million, all for deepwater tracts. All of the rejected bids were for deepwater tracts, and a higher percentage (4/14) were >$1 million. This makes sense given that the higher potential prospects are in deepwater.
  • These results demonstrate again that resource evaluation is far from an exact science. BOEM is not selling barrels of oil and cubic feet of gas. BOEM is evaluating prospects, and companies are bidding on the opportunity to explore these prospects.
  • Bidding strategies differ; the more companies participating, the better the long-term prospects for the OCS program.

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