Proved reserves should not be a basis for reducing supplemental assurance. The uncertainty associated with reserve estimates and decommissioning costs can easily negate the assumed buffer in BOEM’s 3 to 1 reserves to decommissioning costs ratio. That approach failed completely at the Carpinteria Field in the Santa Barbara Channel (Platforms Hogan and Houchin). See other points on this issue.
Given that the reverse chronological order process for determining predecessor liability was dropped from consideration last April, there is no defined procedure for issuing decommissioning orders to prior owners. The absence of such a procedure increases the likelihood of confusion, inequity, and challenges, particularly when orders are first issued to companies that owned the leases decades ago, in some cases prior to the establishment of transferor liability in the 1997 MMS “bonding rule.”
BOEM’s concern (below) about investment in US offshore exploration and production is interesting given that their 5 year leasing plan strongly implies otherwise.
BOEM’s goal for its financial assurance program continues to be the protection of the American taxpayers from exposure to financial loss associated with OCS development, while ensuring that the financial assurance program does not detrimentally affect offshore investment or position American offshore exploration and production at a competitive disadvantage
I’m just guessing here, but my sense is that BOEM was pressured to finalize this rule in a timely manner (<10 months is timely for such a complex rule) and was thus reluctant to make any significant changes to the proposal published last summer. A public workshop during the comment period would have been a good idea to facilitate informed discussion on the important issues addressed in this rule. Such workshops were once commonplace for major rules.
Bayou Bend CCS LLC commenced drilling an offshore (Texas State waters) and an onshore stratigraphic well for carbon sequestration in the first quarter 2024.
Is offshore carbon disposal ocean dumping?One of the provisions that was slipped into the “2021 Infrastructure Bill” exempted carbon sequestration from the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (Ocean Dumping Act). This exemption revises the OCS Lands Act and thus does not apply to State offshore lands. The Texas offshore wells must therefore be permitted by EPA as “Class VI wells,” as is the case for onshore disposal wells. However, Texas and Louisiana have asked the EPA for “primacy,” which would allow state agencies to approve and oversee these operations.
Meanwhile, the regulations for carbon disposal on the OCS, which the Infrastructure Bill mandated by November 2022, have yet to be published for comment. The latest Federal regulatory agenda indicates a publication date of 12/00/2023 for these regulations. Presumably the staff work has been completed and the rule is stalled in the review process.
Despite the absence of a regulatory framework, BOEM has accepted sequestration bids at the last three oil and gas lease sales. These bids were evaluated as if the leases were being acquired for oil and gas exploration and production, even though the bidders’ intentions were widely known. Why was BOEM a willing participant in this charade, not just at one sale, but at three sales in succession?
Given that the perceived carbon disposal bonanza is dependent on mandates and subsidies, one has to wonder about the massive revenue projections for this industry and raise concerns about the associated public and private financial risks. What is the long term business plan for this industry? Who will be monitoring the offshore wells (in perpetuity)? How will the public be protected from financial assurance and leakage risks? We will see how the myriad of carbon sequestration issues are addressed in the proposed regulations.
John Smith, a decommissioning specialist who retired from BOEM, has published numerous professional papers on the topic. He has kindly shared his comments (below) on the new GAO report.
The Appeal Process is Broken – The GAO should have emphasized this point. Companies routinely appeal orders to decommission platforms to forestall having to spend money on plugging wells and removing platforms, pipelines and other facilities. The appeal process commonly takes 5 or more years to reolove (e.g., DCOR appeal of BSEE order to decommission Platform Habitat).
Well P&A – BSEE has been negligent in requiring operators to plug and abandon wells no longer useful for operations. I’m shocked BSEE has curtailed or stopped issuing Inc’s for the failure of operators to P&A wells. That’s a major failure on the part of BSEE management. That may explain why operator performance criteria was proposed to be eliminated for financial assurance.
Failure to Issue Civil Penalties for Well P&A – From GAO Report “BSEE officials explained that their reluctance to pursue civil penalties stems in part from concerns about whether inducing financial harm against an operator is an effective approach to compel decommissioning. They expressed reservations about taking actions—such as issuing civil penalties—that might strain the financial resources of operators to the point of pushing them into bankruptcy.” This attitude underscores a real problem – an abrogation of regulatory and enforcement responsibility by BSEE.
POCS Well P&A – More than 700 wells have been drilled from the 23 California OCS platforms. The GAO report notes that approximately 200 are in the process of being plugged and abandoned – about 50% of those are probably associated with Gail, Grace, Harvest, Hermosa, Hidalgo, where P&A work has largely been completed by Chevron and Freeport McMoRan. The vast majority of the remaining 500 wells are no longer useful for operations and have been idle for several decades. Note POCS was never part of the Idle Well and Idle Iron Program, which was exclusive to the GOM. GAO gave POCS BSEE a pass by not highlighting that problem in POCS. It would have been interesting to know how many of the remaining 500 POCS wells are considered no longer useful for operations, and how many of those have been temporarily plugged and abandoned pursuant to regulations. The GAO report broke that down for the GOM.
Footnote 46 of GAO Report – “Two of the eight platforms due for decommissioning in the Pacific—platforms Hogan and Houchin—have posed serious safety, environmental, and financial risks, including poor safety compliance records, severe corrosion, and ongoing disputes about who will assume decommissioning liabilities for the platforms and their associated wells, according to BSEE officials and documentation. According to BSEE, these platforms are currently being attended, monitored, and maintained as part of an agreement between BSEE, BOEM, Interior’s Office of the Solicitor, and the three predecessor operators pending a decision from the Interior Board of Land Appeals on the predecessors’ appeal. BSEE estimates that approximately $5 million of the estimated costs to decommission 21 orphaned sidetrack wells associated with these platforms are uncovered by financial assurances.” $5 million divide 21 = $238,000 per well – extremely conservative cost estimate given age of wells, likely collapsed casing, and downwhole equipment that needs to be removed. The cost could easily be 3-4 times higher and there is no bonding so the federal government and taxpayers are on the hook for those costs.
Platform Hogan and Houchin Wells – approximately 75 wells were drilled from the platforms. It would be interesting to know the status of those wells. How many have been properly temporarily plugged and abandoned with long-term barriers installed to prevent leaks before decommissioning pursuant to OCS regulations? Are the 21 orphaned wells mentioned above the Signal wells? What about the other 54 wells? Have the predecessor lessees agreed they are responsible for plugging and abandoning those wells?
Platform Habitat – GAO could have noted this is another example of the broken appeal process. It would be interesting to know whether the 21 wells (primarily if not all gas wells) on Habitat have been temporarily abandoned. There are likely to be significant fugitive emission levels at the platform. Hopefully the APCD is on top of that. Note – the platform is unmanned and as I previously mentioned a potential catastrophe was avoided several years ago when a fire broke out on the platform.
Offshore facility decommissioning is a frequent target of Federal auditors given the complex financial and regulatory challenges. Unfortunately, the reviews have done little to better protect the public interest. As have previous inquiries, the new GAO report (attached for your convenience) calls for improved regulations and enforcement practices. That, of course, has been the objective for decades, but the problems have only worsened.
While the GAO recommendations are unsurprising, the body of the report is informative. Most notably, GAO (p. 29) raises a significant inconsistency on a key provision in the proposed decommissioning financial assurance regulations published last year:
One of the five criteria BOEM would no longer use under the proposed rule is demonstrated reliability, as shown by record of compliance with laws, regulations, and lease terms, among other factors. BOEM’s June 2023 regulatory analysis concluded this criterion is not a good predictive indicator of default on decommissioning obligations. However, BOEM and BSEE officials we spoke with told us that poor compliance records—such as safety and maintenance issues or delayed decommissioning obligations—can be an indicator of potential decommissioning noncompliance or financial stress.
Why was there such a disconnect between the opinions of BOEM and BSEE officials (who are directly involved with decommissioning) and BOEM’s decision not to include a company’s compliance record among the factors to be considered in determining the need for supplemental financial assurance? As pointed out here and here, safety performance is arguably the most important predictor of financial failure and decommissioning noncompliance.
The GAO report correctly acknowledges the difficulties in disqualifying operating companies. However, the regulations at 30 CFR § 250.135 specifically provide for disqualification for poor performance. While the regulations could be tighter, enforcing disqualifications regulations is dependent on persistence and strong support from management and DOI attorneys. Given the political risks associated with disqualifying operators, that support is often lacking.
Disqualification difficulties make it imperative that BOEM carefully consider past performance before approving lease assignments or determining financial assurance amounts. Provisions in 30 CFR §585.408 and §585.107 could have been used to disapprove assignments to Signal Hill, Fieldwood, Cox, and other problem operators. The failure to do so has significantly delayed decommissioning and increased public exposure to financial risks.
In some cases, lease assignments to unqualified companies have not only been approved but they have been facilitated by BOEM/MMS. The case of Platforms Hogan and Houchin, in the Santa Barbara Channel, is a particularly good example. (Did GAO inquire about the Inspector General report on this matter or ask why that report has still not been released?)
Most operating companies are responsible about planning for and fulfilling their decommissioning obligations. The problem is the exceptions, and they are not difficult to identify if you look at compliance data and obtain input from BSEE inspection personnel.
Other important decommissioning questions that need to be considered:
Given that decommissioning responsibility is divided between BSEE and BOEM, is regulatory fragmentation limiting their efficiency and effectiveness? Is coordination between BSEE and BOEM delaying action on fitness to operate and disqualification matters?
As concerns about wind leasing mount, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the rush to hold auctions may not be in the best long-term interest of the wind program. The primary objective should be cost-effective and responsible development, not gigawatt deadlines.The administration’s vision for wind energy capacity, particularly the 15 GW goal for floating turbines by 2035, is unlikely to be achieved and rushing the process is not helpful.
The Confederated Tribes of Coos, Lower Umpqua and Siuslaw tribal council unanimously passed a resolution opposing offshore wind energy development off the Oregon coast.
The federal government states that it has ‘engaged’ with the Tribe, but that engagement has amounted to listening to the Tribe’s concerns and ignoring them and providing promises that they may be dealt with at some later stage of the process. The Tribe will not stand by while a project is developed that causes it more harm than good – this is simply green colonialism.
Roughly 237 NARWs have died since the population peaked at 481 in 2011, exceeding the potential biological removal (PBR) level on average by more than 40 times for the past 5 years (Pace III et al. 2021).
Human-caused mortality is so high that no adult NARW has been confirmed to have died from natural causes in several decades (Hayes et al. 2023).
Most NARWs have a low probability of surviving past 40 years even though the NARW can live up to a century.
There were no first-time mothers in 2022.
About 42% of the population is known to be in reduced health (Hamilton et al. 2021)
A NASEM study confirmed that offshore wind has the potential to alter local and regional hydrodynamics
“Effects to NARWs could result from stressors generated from a single project; there is potential for these effects to be compounded by exposure to multiple projects.” (p. 14)
BOEM/NOAA strategy:
No new mitigation is recommended pending further study.
“BOEM and NOAA Fisheries will work together alongside our partners (including the OSW industry) to further develop the information and science the agencies will use to inform their decisions to responsibly develop OSW while protecting and recovering NARWs.” (Comment: While regulator-industry collaboration is essential for effective offshore development, be it wind or oil and gas, regulators and operating companies have distinctly different missions and responsibilities and should not be viewed as partners.)
(p. 15): “As the OSW industry continues to grow and as projects begin construction, BOEM and NOAA Fisheries will continue to work with our partners to evaluate existing strategies and to further collect and apply newly available information to inform future decisions. This Strategy is an integral step to organize BOEM, NOAA Fisheries, and their partners around a shared vision and clear path to effectively study and manage this issue moving forward.” (???)
(p.17): BOEM will “attempt to avoid issuing new leases in areas that may impact potential high-value habitat and/or high use areas for important life history functions such as NARW foraging, migrating, mating, or calving. For areas that are leased, permitting activities should minimize any known or potential threat to NARWs and their habitats, and developers and BOEM should support research and monitoring.”
Questions:
How are the NARW threats identified in the NASEM study being mitigated?
Why are the Rice’s whale litigants okay with the more compelling threat to the NARW?
What happens if the hydrodynamic threats identified by the NASEM panel are confirmed?
Why isn’t this collaborative approach being pursued in assessing and mitigating risks to the Rice’s whale?
Can we expect the Federal government’s leading offshore wind promoter to impose restrictions that further weaken the economics of offshore wind development?
Pictured below: density of NARWs near wind leases and hydrodynamic effects of turbines
15,531 of the 15,537 comments on the bid adequacy rule were from a single organization, Friends of the Earth. I have no problem with the Friends of the Earth campaign given that their comment letter is pertinent to the topic. Their main point is that the bid adequacy process fails “to factor in the climate and social costs of continued Outer Continental Shelf oil and gas lease sales into the bid process.” Although that may be a reasonable position, those issues are addressed in the programmatic and sale specific environmental reviews which factor into when and where sales are held, tract exclusions, special lease stipulations, and the comprehensive operating regulations. Once bids are submitted, the issue (and the sole purpose of the bid adequacy rule) is whether those bids represent fair market value for the oil and gas resource potential of the leases being offered.
The State of Alaska submitted very good comments (attached) that point to the historical differences in Gulf of Mexico and Alaska leasing. The State argues that a simpler approach to determining fair market value would encourage exploration and development on offshore lands that have seen little of either in recent years. Knowing BOEM’s expectations prior to the sale, perhaps through higher minimum bid requirements, would ensure that companies do not underbid and that tracts are successfully leased.
The Gulf of Mexico leasing program of today is looking more like the frontier area leasing of the past. As previously noted, the uncertainty regarding future sales changes the historic GoM leasing dynamic. The next opportunity for purchasing unleased GoM tracts is now a troubling unknown. This would seem to make it less prudent to reject bids based on uncertain prospect evaluations. Absent leasing and exploration, the true resource and revenue potential will never be known.
It was good to see the strong comments submitted by my former Minerals Management Service colleagues Dr. Marshall Rose and Ted Tupper. Marshall, who was our Chief Economist, commented that the proposed rule did not identify the problem and explain how the rule addressed that problem. Ted, a senior statistician, points to past failures of the bid adequacy process and proposes specific changes. It’s great to see the passion that our retired employees have for the program they were so instrumental in developing and managing.
Recent disclosures indicate that BOEM, which very publicly promotes the offshore wind projects that it regulates, has waived a fundamental financial assurance requirement at the request of Vineyard Wind (approval letter attached). Given its broad applicability, this precedential waiver could have the effect of revising a significant provision of the offshore wind decommissioning regulations without public review and comment.
The issue is the “pay as you build” financial assurance requirement at 30 CFR § 585.516, which was waived by BOEM. This requirement, which is intended to project the public from decommissioning liability, is fair and reasonable given that wind developers must only provide financial assurance “in accordance with the number of facilities installed or being installed.” Companies that don’t have sufficient financial strength to comply with this requirement should not be installing and operating offshore wind turbines.
Vineyard Wind was either unable or unwilling to comply with the requirement. They instead requested to defer providing the full amount of the required financial assurance until year 15 of actual operations. The waiver changes “provide assurance when you install” to provide assurance 15 years after installation if everything goes as planned (hoped?).
After their waiver request was denied in 2017, Vineyard Wind resubmitted the request in 2021 seeking a favorable decision from an administration concerned that project cancellation or delay might tarnish the program that they were enthusiastically promoting.
BOEM (as directed from above?) granted the waiver, citing the general departure authority at 30 CFR § 585.103. However, that authority is intended for special situations, not for broadly applicable waivers that have the effect of revising the regulations without the public review required by the Administrative Procedures Act and Executive Orders 12866 and 13563.
There are no criteria in the Vineyard Wind waiver approval that could not apply to other wind developers. Vineyard Wind has simply committed to the same “risk-reduction factors” that apply to all offshore wind projects: damage insurance, the “use of proven turbine technology,” and long-term power purchase agreements. How could BOEM deny the same request from other companies?
It’s noteworthy that the regulations specific to financial assurance at 30 CFR § 585.516 provide no criteria for waiving the assurance requirements; nor do the regulations provide for the 15-year payment plan approved by BOEM. Given the precedential nature of the BOEM action and its enormous financial implications, a revision to the decommissioning regulations that provides criteria for such payment schemes should be promulgating before any similar departures are approved.
In light of the waiver, the public will likely incur substantial costs if Vineyard Wind fails, walks away, doesn’t fully fund their decommissioning account in a timely manner, or seeks new concessions after some or all of the 62 turbines have been installed.
Given the decommissioning obligations, what company would want to step in and assume responsibility for a failing project 10-15 years from now? What happens if Vineyard Wind’s project revenues don’t meet expectations and contributions to their decommissioning account are insufficient or used improperly? More concessions? We’ve seen this dance before.
Whether the project is for oil, gas, or wind energy, protecting the public from decommissioning liabilities should always be prioritized over facilitating development.
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 