Earlier this month we awarded a Chutzpah Award to groups that helped block every attempt to resume production in the Santa Ynez Unit and are now suing to terminate the leases for non-production.
We now learn that the State Fire Marshall has rejected the resumption of production because Sable, the current operator, is not installing automatic shutdown valves on the oil pipeline. The catch is that Sable was denied permits needed to install the valves. So, on the one hand the Fire Marshall is requiring shutdown valves (a reasonable requirement), and on the other hand the County is prohibiting the installation of those valves!
According to the Fire Marshall’s office, this is the first time a company has been denied permits to install valves mandated by the State – yet another dubious distinction for the Santa Ynez Unit.
On Sunday (7/14), Capt. Carl Bois, of the fishing charter Topspin out of Nantucket, told the Current he noticed a significant amount of debris in the Vineyard Wind lease area.
“There was so much debris at the wind farm,” Bois said. “We covered many miles and only saw the debris at the wind farm site: big sheets of fiberglass with foam core and lots of loose foam.”
On Saturday night (7/13) the Coast Guard warned Mariners as follows: “Coast Guard received a report of 03 floating debris 10 meters by 2 meters in the vicinity of approximately 26 NM SE of Marthas Vineyard and 22 NM SW of Nantucket in position 40 59.559N 070 25.404W. All marines are requested to use extreme caution while transiting the area.“
On Monday (7/15), Vineyard Wind confirmed that a turbine blade incident occurred on 7/13: “On Saturday evening, Vineyard Wind experienced blade damage on a wind turbine in its offshore development area. No personnel or third parties were in the vicinity of the turbine at the time, and all employees of Vineyard Wind and its contractors are safe and secure.”
On 7/16, Vineyard Wind issued another statement advising that they were deploying teams to Nantucket to clean up debris from the incident.
Comments:
Not a good look for the first large-scale offshore wind project in the US.
It’s unclear what the status of operations was at the time of the incident.
Vineyard Wind seems to be passing the buck a bit when they note that “GE, as the project’s turbine and blade manufacturer and installation contractor, will now be conducting the analysis into the root cause of the incident.” While GE’s findings are critical, Vineyard Wind, as operator, is fully responsible and accountable for the incident and should be leading the analysis.
Was their a third party review of the turbine design?
Was the incident reported to BSEE, the safety regulator for offshore wind? State and local government?
BSEE and the Coast Guard should ensure that Vineyard Wind’s findings and their own independent report are made publicly available in a timely manner. Ditto for Safety Alerts.
What other incidents have occurred during offshore wind facility construction and operations?
Secret Service being scrutinized following assassination attemptHeroic volunteer fire chief Corey Comperatore, who died shielding his family at the Trump rally
As is the case with many Federal and corporate entities, the Secret Service website is long on promotion and short on substantive details and performance data. The limited “Measurable Impact” statistics on their webpage advise that the Secret Service protected 6623 foreign and domestic visits “without incident” in Fiscal Year 2022, which ended 22 months ago.
Their 2024 budget request overview includes a bit more information (pasted below). The Secret Service gives themselves a perfect score if protectees arrive and depart safely. When your scores are always 100%, your performance measures are clearly inadequate.
Like drilling blowouts, assassinations are low frequency, high consequence events. Prevention requires gathering data on lesser events, identifying leading indicators, and tracking high-potential precursors. You don’t prevent high consequence events by only tracking high consequence events.
Inspections are also critical. Does the Secret Service inspect events to assess protective measures such as verifying that the surrounding areas are cleared and being observed? If so, what do those numbers look like.
Some of us remember the Brent Spar saga (1995). The subsequent Brent field decommissioning activities have been less controversial, including the removal of the Brent C topsides on July 9. The Allseas single lift technology is most impressive. Check out the video!
Jean-Louis Daeschler, is an artist and pioneering subsea engineer. A native of France (Brittany), he has worked in the offshore industry worldwide and lives in Scotland. His wife is from Singapore and his children and grandchildren live in England and Canada.
Before beginning his engineering career, JL had the distinct honor of exhibiting his artwork at the French National Assembly (Parliament) in Paris (article below). How many offshore engineers can say that? None would be a good guess.
When he was called upon to work in Total’s onshore office, his boss told him “the best offshore job is in the office!” The photo below suggests that JL made the most of those onshore assignments! 😀
JL Daeschler, part of Total’s subsea team, enjoying his onshore assignment in 1985
Congratulations to JL on his many contributions to the offshore industry, art, and society!
For decades, Gulf of Mexico operators have reported facility evacuation and production curtailment data to MMS/BSEE as tropical storms or hurricanes approached. Requirements for this reporting are found in the regulations (30 CFR 250.192(a)) supplemented by NTL 20I5-G02.
Operators must submit reports by 11:00 a.m. (CT) daily throughout the period of evacuation and shut-in with the understanding that BSEE will post the compiled data by 1 pm CT. This reporting has been diligently accomplished for decades and MMS/BSEE posted the data each day, including weekends and holidays, without fail. Everyone in industry and government understood the importance of safely evacuating personnel, shutting down production, and ensuring that these hurricane data were made available to the public each day. (All of the daily updates for 2011 onward can be found here.)
On Wednesday, July 3, Shell informed the media that they had begun evacuating non-essential personnel and shutting-in production at certain facilities. Both Shell and Chevron issued general statements on the status of their operations on Thursday, July 4. Both companies no doubt submitted the required reports to BSEE, as did other companies with operations near the projected path of the storm.
BSEE failed to post any evacuation and shut-in data on any date from July 3 through today (July 8).
Beryl missed the heart of the Gulf of Mexico basin, but Shell and other companies with facilities in the more westerly areas evacuated personnel and curtailed production. BSEE’s unprecedented failure to post this information needs to be addressed before more significant storms threaten offshore personnel and production in the Gulf.
Shell evacuated non-essential personnel and shut-in production at Perdido (pictured)
Winterfell from the water surface (5400′ water depth). The field is produced with subsea wells tied back to Oxy’s Heidelberg platform, which is 13 miles away. Deepwater development is characterized by high energy density and low facility density.
Beacon Offshore Energy (BOE, but not this blog 😉) and its partners, all independent producers, have initiated production at the Winterfell project in the Green Canyon area of the Gulf of Mexico. The 3 initial wells are expected to produce 20,000 bbls of oil equivalent (again BOE 😉) per day. The Winterfell partners are:
On July 1, U.S. Federal Judge James Cain Jr. (Western District of Louisiana) issued a preliminary injunction suspending DOE’s LNG exports “pause.” The judge’s full ruling is attached.
Judge Cain: “It appears that the DOE’s decision to halt the permit approval process for entities to export LNG to non-FTA countries is completely without reason or logic and is perhaps the epiphany of ideocracy.”
Nothing subtle about that comment 😉
Despite the court order, the Administration seems intent on keeping the “pause” in place. Per White House spokesperson Angelo Fernández Hernández, “We remain committed to informing our decisions with the best available economic and environmental analysis, underpinned by sound science.” ????
Nearly 80% of current OCS gas production is from deepwater leases. This production is primarily associated (oil-well) gas that operators are rightfully required to market for resource conservation and environmental reasons. Expanding LNG marketing opportunities could thus improve the economics of deepwater development.
The other 20% of OCS gas production is largely from gas-well (non-associated) gas produced by independent companies that continue to operate in the shallower waters on the shelf. LNG sales could improve the challenging economics for these producers and increase the ultimate recovery of shelf resources.
Followers of the US OCS oil and gas program have observed some impressive chutzpah over the years, but a new law suit challenging the extension of Santa Ynez Unit leases raises the bar.
Groups that helped block every attempt to resume production in the Santa Ynez Unit are now suing to terminate the leases for non-production.Brilliant!🥇
“Without these extensions, each of the leases would have expired and ExxonMobil would have been required to permanently cease its oil and gas operations, plug its wells, and decommission its other infrastructure.”See the full text of the law suit.
EIA has released the April oil production data. The Federal waters of the Gulf of Mexico produced 1.831 million BOPD in April, which is essentially level with corrected March production (1.817 million).
GoM production fell more than 12% from nearly 2 million BOPD in September 2023 to 1.743 million BOPD in January 2024 before climbing back to 1.8 million BOPD over the past 3 months (see chart below). What’s up?
The mysterious Main Pass Oil Gathering (MPOG) system shutdown in November 2023 no doubt contributed to the decline, but that system was reported to be fully online in April. Based on the GoM data, the MPOG shutdown may have reduced production by 50-80,000 BOPD. That would account for less than half of the GoM decline since Sept 2023.
We may learn more about the MPOG shut-in volumes when the NTSB investigation report is published. (Don’t expect a report soon. The NTSB report on the Huntington Beach pipeline spill took nearly 2 years to complete. The final NTSB report on the deadly December 2022 GoM helicopter crash has still not been issued.)
In 2022, EIA projected that additional GoM capacity would offset production declines, but would not sustain crude oil production at levels of 2.0 million BOPD. That forecast has proven to be accurate.
Bottom line: 1.8 million BOPD does in fact appear to be the current GoM production baseline. The GoM is thus significantly under-performing BOEM forecasts. This should be a concern to those who support responsible OCS production.