The platform was supported by an attendant barge that provided living quarters and equipment and materials needed for the drilling operations. This was reportedly the first drilling tender.
BSEE’s borehole file records indicate that 31 wells were drilled on this block beginning in September 1947.
BOEM’s production file shows initial production rates of 7000 to 10,600 bbls of oil per month. The accuracy of these old data is uncertain.
This was reportedly the first time drilling crews worked 12-hour tours for seven days and then rotated to shore for seven days off.
Without much hype, shelf operators continue to find and extract oil and gas from beneath the shallow waters of the GoM. The 1700 shelf platforms that remain provide energy for our economy and important hardbottom substrate for marine life. Keep it going! Only 25 more years until the 100th anniversary! 😀
Foremost energy experts like Daniel Yergin understand that oil and gas will be critical to our economy and security for decades, and that offshore production is an important component of our energy supply chain. Unfortunately, our massive outer continental shelf has, from an oil and gas standpoint, been effectively reduced to the central and western GoM.
Opportunities in the GoM are being seriously constrained by the extended pause in leasing. A lease sale has not been held for 615 days, the longest US offshore leasing gap since the 1950’s.
Reserve replacement and sustained production are dependent on exploration. The charts below illustrate the decline in GoM exploratory drilling and the reduced activity by some of the more important operating companies.
Per BSEE data, the number of exploratory well starts averaged only 3/month for the last 18 months (chart 2). This level of activity is the lowest since the early days of deepwater operations (chart 1). There was even more drilling during the post-Macondo moratorium (2010-2011).
ConocoPhillips and Exxon have not drilled a GoM exploratory well since 2016 and 2018 respectively. Activity by other operators has also declined significantly (chart 3). BP has not spudded an exploratory well since Sept. 2021.
…that the SPR legislation authorized the sale of large volumes of oil for the purpose of easing worldwide prices. Per section 151 of the statute, which was passed following the oil embargoes in the 1970’s, the SPR was intended todiminish the vulnerability of the United States to the effects of a severe energy supply interruption.
…that SPR oil could be sold to all entities including Chinese companies that are also buying oil from Russia, the country being boycotted. How absurd is that? (The confirmation of one such transaction is pasted below.)
Operating companies (listed alphabetically): Arena, Anadarko (Oxy), BHP, bp, Cantium, Chevron, Hess, Murphy, Shell, and Walter
Criteria:
Must average <0.3 incidents of compliance (INCs) per inspection. (This is less than half the GoM 2022 YTD average of 0.64 INCs/inspection.)
Must operate at least 3 production platforms.
Must have drilled at least one well.
Pacific and Alaska operations will be considered in a separate post.
Comments:
Impressive performance by Hess: 21 inspections and no INCs
Cantium and Walter averaged less than 0.1 INCs/inspection. The INC rates for Anadarko (Oxy), BHP, and BP were only slightly higher.
Among the Honor Roll companies, Shell (highest production, 9 deepwater platforms, and 13 well starts) and Arena (115 shelf platforms and 12 well starts) were the deepwater and shelf activity leaders.They thus had the highest INC exposure.
Although CSI and FSI INCs are typically more significant than W INCs, that is not always the case, so the INCs have not been weighted by type.
As has been previously noted, more inspection data should be readily available online. At a minimum, the specific INC (type) numbers (e.g. P-103, G-110, etc) should be posted so the public can better assess performance. Absent this information, interested parties are left to speculate about the significance of the violations.
While compliance is not synonymous with safety, most experienced observers believe there is a strong correlation. In the 1990’s, John Shultz, a PhD candidate at Carnegie Mellon Univ., studied US offshore facilities and safety data and developed expert and regression models to predict the likelihood of accidents and spills. That was a data rich era in that there were ~4000 US offshore platforms (more than twice the current number) and ~100 well starts/month (>10 times the current rate). In John’s thesis, he found that INCs are a very good predictor of accidents and spills. The offshore world has changed and further study of the correlation between compliance and safety performance is highly recommended.
Chevron may be the only GoM operator to own its helicopter fleet. Data on their safety performance relative to GoM helicopter contractors do not appear to be available online.
Their news release focuses on hurricane preparedness and the benefits of owning their fleet. I’m not sure how significant these advantages are given that other companies can ensure similar availability through their contracts. A comparative analysis would be of interest.
“Other companies that depend on contracted helicopters to evacuate can’t create their own schedule and might have to start departing the platform days in advance,” said Jose Jaramillo, manager of Chevron’s aircraft operations in the Gulf of Mexico. “With our own helicopters on standby, we have more flexibility in determining when to safely shut down the platform, and after the storm passes, we can quickly remobilize, assess our facilities and bring production back online days faster.”
The leading causes, not all inclusive, of the accidents since 1999 are listed below, and secondary causes of these events include 13 related to helideck size or design related issues. • 21 engine related, • 25 loss of control or improper procedures, • 18 helideck obstacle strikes, • 13 controlled flight into terrain, and • 12 other technical failures
Given the differences in our views on energy policy, particularly with regard to oil and gas, this WP opinion piece is pretty reasonable. The Post acknowledges the continued need for oil and gas, and the importance of domestic production. That said, two statements in the paragraph pasted below warrant immediate comment.
“In reality, neither argument is convincing. The Biden administration’s proposal — which opens the door to up to 11 potential lease sales, 10 in the Gulf of Mexico and one off the coast of Alaska — would have little impact on current energy prices. It would take between five and 10 years to produce oil after a new offshore lease issuance, according to the Interior Department, while more than three-quarters of already-leased offshore federal waters are not in production.”
The purpose of the 5 year leasing plan is to minimize future energy supply and security risks, not to reduce current prices. However, acknowledgement of the importance of offshore production and support for regular lease sales could influence market psychology.
The old and tired arguments about non-producing leases have been frequently addressed on this blog. When you purchase leases, you are not buying oil and gas. You are buying only the opportunity, for a limited period of time, to explore for these commodities. The current percentage of producing leases is actually rather high by historical standards. For more on this topic, see this and this.
In particular, the Energy and Interior Secretaries would benefit from a visit to a deepwater production facility. They would no doubt be impressed and would be better able to make informed decisions affecting US offshore leasing, exploration, and development.
The offshore workers would be respectful and would welcome the opportunity to discuss the technology, safety precautions, and environmental protection measures.
“The (worldwide) drop in reserves is driven by the 30 billion barrels of oil produced last year, plus a significant reduction in undiscovered resources, to the tune of 120 billion barrels. The US offshore sector has contributed the largest total to that drop, where 20 billion barrels of oil will remain in the ground, largely thanks to leasing bans on federal land.“
The decline in reserves should come as no surprise to those who follow the US offshore sector. Note the sharp decline in exploratory drilling in the (updated chart below) and the calls for action on this blog a year ago and more recently.
The OCS oil and gas program requires a sustained, consistent commitment by government and industry. Such a consistent commitment, even though required by legislation, is difficult to achieve in our political system, .
The commitment by the oil and gas industry has also been uneven and in some cases disappointing. BOE continues to be troubled by the reduction in exploration by some companies and the decision by others, including leading US companies with a long history of Gulf of Mexico operations, to exit the US offshore sector completely (see the chart below). The exploration decline began before the leasing shutdown (now 600 days in duration). Inconsistent signals from the Federal government and corporate directors, market considerations, and competing investment opportunities are major factors, but there are no doubt other considerations. Constructive dialogue to address these issues is badly needed.
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 