A helideck incident killed 4 workers in 2022. Why are we still waiting for the final NTSB report?
The most recent Coast Guard – BSEE MOA for fixed platforms added to helideck regulatory uncertainty by assigning decks and fuel handling to BSEE and railings and perimeter netting to the Coast Guard. How does that make sense?
As is the case with all safety regulations, a systems based approach is needed.
Despite the muddled regulatory regime, BSEE is showing strong leadership in addressing helideck safety.
The broader issue of regulatory fragmentation is an important risk factor that needs to be addressed.
David Scarborough, Island Operating Co., was one of the 4 workers who died in the 2022 crashat a West Delta 106 platform.
199 oil and gas leases were wrongfully acquired at Sales 257, 259, and 261 with the intent of developing these leases for carbon disposal purposes. Repsol was the sole bidder at Sale 261 for 36 nearshore Texas tracts in the Mustang Island and Matagorda Island areas (red blocks at the western end of the map above). Exxon acquired 163 nearshore Texas tracts (blue in map above) at Sales 257 (94) and 259 (69).
Despite false starts by Exxon and Repsol (see above summary), no carbon sequestration (disposal) leases may be issued or developed until implementing regulations have been promulgated. In that regard, no news is good news for those who are less than enamored with CO2 disposal in the Gulf of Mexico.
The implementing regulations will be controversial. Most operating companies prioritize GoM production over GoM disposal. Most environmental organizations are strongly opposed to CO2 disposal schemes that sustain fossil fuel production and benefit fossil fuel producers. Taxpayers are leery of subsidizing these projects and absorbing increased costs for energy and consumer goods.
The Administration is, of course, well aware of this opposition and will not be publishing implementing regulations prior to the election. The next Administration, regardless of the election outcome, will no doubt take a hard look at these issues before proposing regulations.
The few oil and gas producers that are rather cynically hoping to cash in on CO2 disposal in the GoM will therefore have to wait, perhaps for a long time.
In light of Hurricane Milton’s more southerly and easterly track, Chevron’s Blind Faith floating production unit is the only GoM platform reported to be shut-in at this time. Blind Faith was installed in 2008 in 6480′ of water in the Mississippi Canyon area, and is reportedly producing 65,000 bopd.
Some of us are long-time observers of North Sea operations. Others like JL Daeschler are pioneers who were involved with North Sea exploration and development from the outset. It’s sad to see what is happening to the UK offshore industry.
And for what purpose? Virtue signaling by politicians? Pandering to the international climate cartel? Shutting down North Sea production will have no measurable effect on our climate.
Now that the entire U.S. Atlantic and Pacific, and nearly all of offshore Alaska, are closed to oil and gas leasing, the goal of some is to shut down the Gulf of Mexico. That intent is clear in the 5 year leasing plan that provides for a maximum of 3 sales, the fewest of any 5 year plan in the history of the US offshore program. This is really a 5 year moratorium, not a 5 year leasing plan.
As noted in the post below, GoM production is 1.8 million bopd. BOEM’s reasonable forecast of >2 million bopd through 2027 will not be achieved because of policy decisions, not resource limitations or technical capabilities.
And shame on those who are attributing Hurricane Helene’s destruction to GHG emissions. This is uninformed opportunism at its worst.
This video shows the real cost of Ed Miliband’s plans to shut down the North Sea.
200,000 workers left stranded, billions in tax revenue lost, and clean energy investment deterred.
The stability in Gulf of Mexico oil production rates, as noted when the data for June were released, continued into July. Oil production once again remained remarkably consistent at 1.8 million bopd.
Average daily production was within 1.4% of 1.8 million bopd for each month from February to July. As previously observed, this is as stable as production has been for any 6 month period in the past 10 years.I’m not sure this observation is terribly significant, but it’s interesting nonetheless. 😀
If the streak didn’t end in August, it most certainly did in September given the shut-ins for Hurricanes Francine and Helene.
Update: BSEE reports that as of 9/29/2024, essentially all production had been restored.
As of 9/28, 210,000 BOPD remained shut-in with only 4 platforms still evacuated. Presumably, production had not resumed (or had only partially resumed) on some high rate deepwater platforms.
BSEE shut-in, evacuation, and relocation data in the table below are as of 12:30 p.m. ET on the specified date.
The previously discussed sale of Cox assets in 6 GoM fields to W&T was completed in January for $72 million, $16.5 million less than the proposed price. W&T, an established GoM operator, believes they can increase the pre-bankruptcy production (8300 boepd) through workovers, recompletions, and facility repairs.
The extent to which W&T is assuming decommissioning liability for the Cox assets is unclear to this observer. Decommissioning information from W&T’s SEC filing is pasted at the end of this post.
In February, Cox won court approval to sell “about a dozen oil fields to Natural Resources Worldwide LLC for about $20 million following a bankruptcy court auction.” This sale is more concerning given that the purchaser has no operating history in the GoM, and scant information about the company can be found online. Perhaps they are affiliated with Natural Resources Partners L.P., an energy investment firm which “owns mineral interests and other rights that are leased to companies engaged in the extraction of minerals,” but “does not mine, drill, or produce minerals, has no operations, and conducts business solely in an office environment.”
Per BOEM data, Cox filed requests to assign a number of leases to Natural Resources Worldwide (NRW) in May, but those requests have yet to be approved. Hopefully, BOEM is taking a hard look at these requests and their obligations following the court auction. Decommissioning liabilities should be their number one concern. (Note: NRW was just listed as the operator of the former Cox platform at EI 361, so presumably at least some of those assignments have now been approved.)
According to BOEM’s platform data base, Cox and affiliates Energy XXI and EPL still operate 243 platforms, down from 435 in June 2023. Also per the data base, the Cox companies have not removed any platforms during 2023 or 2024 YTD, so the reduction in platforms is presumably the result of the W&T transaction. Most of the remaining Cox platforms are old – 16 of their 77 major platforms were installed in the 1950s!
Meanwhile, Cox and affiliates continue to be the GoM violations leader by far with 549 incidents of non-compliance (INCs) in 2024 YTD, 45% of the GoM total for all operators. No other company has more than 100 INCs (although Whitney Oil and Gas has a disappointing 93 INCs, including 33 facility shut-ins on only 65 inspections!)
operator
platforms/ major platforms
warning INCs
component shut-in INCs
facility shut-in INCs
Cox
209/69
407
44
4
Energy XXI
19/7
73
1
2
EPL
5/1
16
1
1
Total Cox
233/77
496
46
7
Total GoM
1519/736
831
317
68
INCs are for 2024 as of 9/17/2024. A major platform has at least 6 well completions or more than 2 pieces of production equipment.
The Company may be subject to retained liabilities with respect to certain divested property interests by operation of law. Certain counterparties in past divestiture transactions or third parties in existing leases that have filed for bankruptcy protection or undergone associated reorganizations may not be able to perform required abandonment obligations. Due to operation of law, the Company may be required to assume decommissioning obligations for those interests. The Company may be held jointly and severally liable for the decommissioning of various facilities and related wells. The Company no longer owns these assets, nor are they related to current operations.
During the three months ended March 31, 2024, the Company incurred $2.6 million in costs related to these decommissioning obligations and reassessed the existing decommissioning obligations, recording an additional $5.3 million. As of March 31, 2024, the remaining loss contingency recorded related to the anticipated decommissioning obligations was $20.8 million.
Although it is reasonably possible that the Company could receive state or federal decommissioning orders in the future or be notified of defaulting third parties in existing leases, the Company cannot predict with certainty, if, how or when such orders or notices will be resolved or estimate a possible loss or range of loss that may result from such orders. However, the Company could incur judgments, enter into settlements or revise the Company’s opinion regarding the outcome of certain notices or matters, and such developments could have a material adverse effect on the Company’s results of operations in the period in which the amounts are accrued and the Company’s cash flows in the period in which the amounts are paid. To the extent that the Company does incur costs associated with these properties in future periods, the Company intends to seek contribution from other parties that owned an interest in the facilities.
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 