Timeframe for government and industry actions following the 2005 hurricane season.
Optimally, the regulator establishes clear objectives for the operating companies and a schedule for achieving those objectives. This approach was demonstrated with great success following the 2005 hurricane season (Katrina and Rita) when numerous mooring system and other stationkeeping issues were identified.
Minerals Management Service Director Johnnie Burton sent a letter (attachment 1) to industry leaders calling for a face-to-face meeting with Department of the Interior Secretary Gale Norton. The Secretary outlined her concerns and informed offshore operators that there would be no drilling from moored mobile drilling units or jackup rigs during the next hurricane season until the issues identified during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were addressed.
The collaborative effort that followed was a resounding success (2nd attachment). In addition to addressing station keeping concerns, a comprehensive list of hurricane issues was developed. Industry and government then worked together to assess mitigations and develop new standards and procedures. The essential MODU standards were completed before the 2006 hurricane season, and all of the related concerns were effectively addressed prior to the 2009 hurricane season. Had the government elected to promulgate regulations to address all of these issues, much of this work would have never been completed.
“GE Vernova is aiming to deploy small nuclear reactors across the developed world over the next decade, staking out a leadership position in a budding technology that could play a central role in meeting surging electricity demand and reducing carbon dioxide emissions.“
Just when we were settling on Der Spiegel’s account of the Nord Stream sabotage, Michael Kobs provides reasons for skepticism. Are the detailed revelations in Der Spiegel part of a coordinated effort to relieve governments of any responsibility and glorify the destruction of economically important pipelines?
“Since the German arrest warrant for a participant in the Nord Stream terrorist attack, efforts have also increased in Germany to portray the terrorist attack as a “legitimate” or even “admirable” war effort. However, the greatest effort is to relieve the burden on state actors. And so, since recently, the alleged perpetrators seem to be chatting without reservation, spreading out every little detail in front of journalists, and putting every (already revealed) fact in the “right” non-governmental light.” ~Michael Kobs
Meanwhile, independent journalist Jeffrey Brodsky continues to delve deeply into Nord Stream issues. A recent interesting and detailed piece refutes assertions that Gazprom and Russia somehow benefited from the Nord Stream attack. Mr. Brodsky provides evidence to the contrary concluding that the destruction of the pipelines has contributed significantly to Gazprom’s financial problems. He noted that:
Gazprom announced a loss of $6.9 billion for 2023, marking its first annual loss in more than two decades.
Nord Stream 1 supplied EU nations with a whopping 35% of all Russian gas imports.
Gazprom contributed $80 million of Russia’s $407 million in Federal govt revenues in 2022, and was a source of revenue that Russia would not want to jeopardize.
Unsurprisingly, the “experts” and politicians who argued that the Nord Stream sabotage would benefit Gazprom and Russia have failed to modify or correct their assertions. Mr. Brodsky concludes his detailed analysis as follows:
“However, despite the numerous facts that have emerged since the attack, the damage caused to Russia and Gazprom by the sabotage remains willfully ignored. Politicians and experts who claimed that the sabotage would be beneficial to Russia or Gazprom financially, legally or geopolitically seem to have merely skimmed the first chapters of the Nord Stream story. So far, almost none of them have publicly corrected themselves after hastily familiarizing themselves with its complex plot. But since the perpetrator of the sabotage has not yet been unmasked, they still have the opportunity to pre-order the unfinished sequel to the book. Perhaps it will end up being an international bestseller. ~ Jeffrey Brodsky
Production from Equinor’s important Johan Sverdrup field, which accounts for 755,000 bopd (36% of Norway’s oil production), was shut-in on Monday as a result of a power outage. Production was in the process of being restored on Tuesday.
According to Equinor, the outage was caused by overheating at an electric converter station onshore.
A 2022 BOE post questioned Norway’s push to power offshore platforms with electricity transmitted from shore. This incident reinforces those concerns. Summary:
Most offshore platforms produce sufficient gas to support their power demands
Assuming gas that is not used to power a platform is marketed and consumed elsewhere, the net (global) reduction in CO2 emissions from electrifying offshore platforms is negligible. (Perhaps there is actually a small increase in net emissions given the power required to transport the gas to markets and the emissions associated with onshore power generation).
Offshore power demands are highly variable, especially when drilling operations are being conducted.
Gas turbines are reliable, and capable of responding to variable power demand. Excess generation capacity is typically provided.
Power from shore increases the cost of platform operations and could decrease ultimate recovery of oil and gas resources.
Per NPD, electrification of the shelf will increase electricity prices for onshore consumers and increase the need for onshore facility investment.
Gas turbines or diesel generators are still necessary to satisfy emergency power needs at the platforms.
Long power cables are vulnerable to damage (accidental or intentional), as are onshore power stations.
I hope the investigation of this incident considers some of these broader electrification policy issues.
Equinor diagram: The purple cable shows power from shore to Johan Sverdrup phase 1, established in 2018. The yellow power cable shows power from shore to Johan Sverdrup phase 2 and the Utsira High area solution, from 2022. The orange cable shows power from shore to the Sleipner field centre and connected fields from late 2022. Black cable shows existing power cables at Sleipner field centre and to the Gudrun installation.
LM/GE Vernova turbine blade plant. Photo credited by the New Bedford Light to Jean-Philippe Thibault/Journal Gaspésie Nouvelles.
On Oct. 24, Radio Gaspesie reported serious data falsification allegations related to the manufacturing GE Vernova turbine blades at their Gaspé, Quebec facility. GE Vernova’s delay in commenting on those charges is surprising given their economic and legal implications in both Canada and the US.
GE Vernova has informed the New Bedford Light that they have taken corrective actions at their blade facility in Gaspé after an extensive internal review of their blade manufacturing and quality assurance program. However, they have yet to comment on the data falsification allegations.
Actions speak louder than words, and the Light reports that GE Vernova laid off nine managers and suspended 11 unionized floor workers at the Gaspé factory. A representative for the union informed the Light that the production manager has been dismissed and the general manager has resigned.
Neither Vineyard Wind nor BSEE, the Federal safety regulator for the Vineyard Wind project, has commented on the matter. BSEE’s investigation of the blade failure is still pending and has seemingly gotten more complicated as a result of the manufacturing issues.
In addition to legal proceedings in Quebec, GE Vernova and Vineyard Wind are subject to possible civil and criminal penalties in the US. Civil penalties, which are administered by BSEE, seem likely given the extensive pollution from turbine blade fragments.
Criminal penalties, which are possible if the data falsification charges are proven true, are imposed by the Dept. of Justice. The applicable criminal penalties statute is pasted below.
Any person who knowingly and willfully (1) violates any provision of this subchapter, any term of a lease, license, or permit issued pursuant to this subchapter, or any regulation or order issued under the authority of this subchapter designed to protect health, safety, or the environment or conserve natural resources, (2) makes any false statement, representation, or certification in any application, record, report, or other document filed or required to be maintained under this subchapter, (3) falsifies, tampers with, or renders inaccurate any monitoring device or method of record required to be maintained under this subchapter, or (4) reveals any data or information required to be kept confidential by this subchapter shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than $100,000, or by imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both. Each day that a violation under clause (1) of this subsection continues, or each day that any monitoring device or data recorder remains inoperative or inaccurate because of any activity described in clause (3) of this subsection, shall constitute a separate violation.
See the translated excerpts below from a Radio Gaspesie report. This is a massive scandal if true.
“Yesterday, the vice-president of global operations at GE Vernova reportedly addressed all employees at the Gaspé plant to provide an update on the situation.
The investigation, led by GE Vernova’s lawyers, reportedly revealed that employees were asked by senior company executives to falsify quality control data. Data associated with a well-made blade was then associated with poorly made blades. Our sources indicate that this is a widespread practice in the industry.
The senior management of the Gaspé plant also allegedly implemented a points system that encouraged employees to skip verification steps, thus prioritizing production quantity over quality.
Our sources say the points system allegedly involved tight management oversight that bordered on intimidation of employees.
The oversized 107m blades that were produced in Gaspé for the construction of marine parks are said to be affected. The integrity of the entire production of the longest blades in America is currently being called into question.“
“On Sept. 16, 2024, a routine helicopter approach at an offshore facility nearly resulted in a serious accident due to a failure to follow proper helideck procedures. Before landing, the helicopter pilot visually confirmed that a nearby crane was securely stowed and stationary (Figure 1). However, as the helicopter neared the helideck, the crane operator unexpectedly raised the crane boom, bringing it alarmingly close to the landing area as the helicopter was 10 feet from touchdown. The pilots swiftly executed a go-around maneuver, successfully avoiding a collision and ensuring the safety of the crew and passengers onboard.”
The attached letter was obtained by the Nantucket Current through a FOIA request. Key points:
Vineyard Wind power generation and blade installation suspension order remains in effect.
Vineyard Wind directed to conduct a site-specific study that evaluates the environmental harm and other potential damage from the blade failure, and to identify potential mitigation measures.
Vineyard Wind was required to submit a plan for the study by Oct. 11. It’s not clear whether the plan was submitted.
The study must include a mass balance of unrecovered debris material based on the weight of debris recovered and the weight of the subsea debris retrieved.
Comments:
The study requirement is appropriate given the significance of the blade incident and the implications for offshore wind development.
Why was a FOIA request needed to learn about the study requirement?
A helideck incident killed 4 workers in 2022. Why are we still waiting for the final NTSB report?
The most recent Coast Guard – BSEE MOA for fixed platforms added to helideck regulatory uncertainty by assigning decks and fuel handling to BSEE and railings and perimeter netting to the Coast Guard. How does that make sense?
As is the case with all safety regulations, a systems based approach is needed.
Despite the muddled regulatory regime, BSEE is showing strong leadership in addressing helideck safety.
The broader issue of regulatory fragmentation is an important risk factor that needs to be addressed.
David Scarborough, Island Operating Co., was one of the 4 workers who died in the 2022 crashat a West Delta 106 platform.
Particularly noteworthy is Nord Stream’s response to the insurers’ claim (par. 22.2 (a) of their filing) that the pipeline damage was the result of “the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.” In par. 13.1 of their response (attached), Nord Stream called the insurers’ assertion “embarrassing for want of particularity.” (clever wording that may prove useful in the future 😉)
Nord Stream AG calls the insurers (Lloyd’s and Arch) failure to provide evidence for the country that blew up the pipelines “embarrassing.” (See above comment.)
Mahmoudi: “The defendants’ argument is prima facie irrelevant if one cannot prove that the damage is caused by a named government that has been directly involved in a war in the area. The burden of proof in this case is…on the defendant.”
Mahmoudi: “Even if the sabotage is an act of terrorism, the author of the act can be a state or a private entity.”
Mahmoudi: “If a private entity, the insurance company, is the only source for the compensation; if a state is responsible for the terrorist act, it is the insurance company & that state that have a legal obligation to compensate for the damage.”
Related comment by Erik Andersson: Nord Stream AG has consistently claimed they should receive compensation regardless of whether or not a government was responsible for the sabotage. Nord Stream AG does not seem interested in providing an alternative to Lloyds’ claim that Ukraine did thisas an act of war. (That horse might be too big to ride 😉)
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 