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Archive for the ‘accidents’ Category

I had the pleasure of working with Jason Mathews when he was a young MMS engineer. He truly cared about our safety mission and has taken that commitment to the next level at BSEE. Jason shared this important, heartfelt message on the anniversary of the Macondo blowout.

One of the greatest gifts I ever received in life is having a little girl and having the opportunity to go home every evening and spending time with her at cheer, softball, doing homework, etc. I have a great deal of respect for the men and women who work offshore and put their lives on hold for 14-28 days to deliver much needed OCS production to meet US demand. Undoubtedly, they are better / tougher people than me.

Over the last year, my team has seen multiple incidents that had a high potential severity that could have led to a fatal / serious injury or major incident in the GOM. Although we can sit and debate the causal factors for hours, one that jumps to the top of the discussion is the Human Factor – Complacency. Of all the things a leader should fear, complacency heads the list. There is no doubt success breeds complacency, and complacency breeds failure.

To this day, I am still shook by the mindset and complacency of many onboard the Deepwater Horizon prior to the incident. During testimony in the public hearings, John Guide, the BP well team leader for the Horizon, believed that the rig crew had become “too comfortable” because of its good track record for drilling difficult wells. Ross Skidmore, a BP contractor on the rig on April 20, testified that the crew became complacent after completing drilling because “when you get to that point, everybody goes to the mindset that weʹre through, this job is done.”  To me, the complacency on the Deepwater Horizon could be attributable to the crew not having access to all of the well data (OptiCem reports – cement job risk) available to BP personnel onshore and the well site leaders on the rig. Our investigation concluded, the overall complacency of the Deepwater Horizon crew was a possible contributing cause of the kick detection failure.

As regulators, we have special roles in the GOM as it relates to safety:

  • Driving the avoidance of complacency and risk-free mindsets of the offshore employees
  • Understanding we can’t be selfish – Our success is not our individual personal growth / gains, but it is being unwavering in your promotion of offshore safety to ensure all offshore employees return home to their families safely
  • Holding each other (internally) and industry (externally) accountable when necessary

In order to achieve greatness offshore, we ,as a regulator,  have to believe we can, and never sit still until we achieve it. 

Everyone on this email has a very critical function and role. Never underestimate the value of what you do, have the proper mindset, and avoid complacency.

Do whatever it takes to ensure the people offshore are gifted the same gift we receive every day – going home to our families.

All In –

Jason P. Mathews, Petroleum Engineer, Field Operations – OSM

Friday Night LIghts: Coach Mathews and his daughter

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PSA Norway, now Havtil, has long been a pacesetter in analyzing offshore incident and performance data, and publishing timely, comprehensive assessments. Their key findings for 2023 are pasted below (emphasis added):

  • Hydrocarbon leaks: four on the NCS in 2023 – the lowest figure since the RNNP survey began. None of them are considered particularly serious.
  • Well control incidents: 11 in 2023. The level is stable, with the figure unchanged from 2022, and all had a low potential.
  • Structural damage: three incidents were reported in 2023, a halving from the year before.
  • Total major accident indicator: the annual value is the lowest ever, and the average for the past three years declined. No particularly serious incidents occurred in 2023.
  • Personal injuries: no accidents resulting in fatalities occurred in the petroleum sector during 2023, while 25 serious personal injuries were reported. The serious injury frequency rose to 0.6 per million hours worked (back to the 2021 level), and lay within the expected range based on the 10 previous years.
  • Questionnaire survey: responses to this biennial poll showed an improvement from 2021 in most of the indices for the HSE climate and the psychosocial working environment. Furthermore, some challenges are seen with regard to language and parallel operations leading to hazardous conditions.

Havtil informs me that the complete “Trends in Risk Level (RNNP)” report for 2023 will be available in English later this month. A link to the report will be posted on this blog.

On a related note, JL Daeschler has brought The Norwegian Oil Pioneer Club’s website to my attention. Those interested in the history of North Sea exploration and production should take a look! A couple of pictures from the site are pasted below.

Svein and Axel, North Sea pioneers, 1966
Sinking of the Ocean Prince, 1968

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Houston, TX, March 29, 2024. Beacon Offshore Energy LLC (“Beacon”) announced today the completion of the divestment of its non-operated interests in certain fields in the deepwater Gulf of Mexico in accordance with a previously executed definitive agreement with GOM 1 Holdings Inc., an affiliate of O.G. Oil & Gas Limited. The divestment includes Beacon’s 18.7% interest in the Buckskin producing field, 17% interest in the Leon development, 16.15% interest in the Castile development, 0.5% interest in the Salamanca FPS/lateral infrastructure, and 32.83% interest in the Sicily discovery.

Beacon

According to BOEM records, GOM 1 HOLDINGS INC, a Delaware company, registered with BOEM effective 3/15/2024. The parent entity, O.G. Oil & Gas Limited, is a privately held E&P company incorporated in 2017 and based in Singapore.

O.G. Oil & Gas Ltd is part of the Ofer Global Group, “a private portfolio of international businesses active in maritime shipping, real estate and hotels, technology, banking, energy and large public investments.”

After a partial takeover by O.G Oil & Gas Limited in 2018, New Zealand Oil and Gas is now 70% owned by the Ofer Global Group. Among other interests, NZ Oil and Gas produces from fields offshore Taranaki, NZ.

Because they are jointly and severally liable for safe operations and decommissioning, minority investors should take a strong interest in safety management and financial assurance. Investors should remember that partners are adversely affected by the mistakes of the operating company. Anadarko and Mitsubishi took a hit following the Macondo blowout. To what extent had they been monitoring bp’s risk and safety management programs for drilling operations?

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Remembering the 123 offshore workers who lost their lives on this day in 1980 in one of the offshore industry’s great tragedies 🙏

See the excellent interview with Magne Ognedal that describes the evolution of Norway’s highly regarded offshore regulatory regime following the Alexander Kielland tragedy.

Photo: Norwegian Petroleum Museum

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Pictured: pig for cleaning gas pipelines. Will Nord Stream’s suit against the insurers unplug investigation findings?

Nord Stream AG has sued insurers Lloyds and Arch in the English High Court for failing to pay for pipeline damage incurred during the Sept. 2022 Baltic Sea explosions. The estimated pipeline repair costs range from €1.2 to €1.35 billion, and Nord Stream is seeking €400 million from the insurers.

Could this litigation help us learn more about the findings of the official Nord Stream investigations? After 17 months of investigation, Denmark recently concluded that “there are not sufficient grounds to pursue a criminal case in Denmark.” Only nineteen days before Sweden had announced that “Swedish jurisdiction does not apply and that the investigation therefore should be closed.” These weak announcements at the end of lengthy investigations seem too convenient, and may lend credence to Hersh’s Nord Stream account or a recent variation that implicates the UK. Germany is presumably still investigating, and it remains to be seen whether they will release findings.

Could the parties in the Nord Stream case pursue documents or testimony from the Swedish, Danish, or German investigation teams? Both sides in this case, Nord Stream AG and the insurers, would benefit from details that could help identify the responsible parties.

It’s more than a little hypocritical for Western governments and their NGO partners to rail against offshore oil and gas operations while quietly accepting (without investigation) the economic and environmental consequences of the Nord Stream sabotage. Compare the Nord Stream methane emissions with those associated with Gulf of Mexico operations.

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As we enter the third month of 2024, BSEE has finally updated the incident tables to include 2022 data.

The OCS program managers I was privileged to work for would never have accepted such delays in posting fundamental safety data. Carolita Kallaur (RIP) wouldn’t tolerate a delay of 14 days in publishing quarterly incident statistics, let alone a delay of 14 months for annual data with no quarterly updates. Transparency and timeliness in informing the public about offshore safety performance was her highest priority. Cynthia Quarterman, Tom Readinger, and other OCS program leaders were similarly insistent on timeliness and transparency in the reporting of incident data.

The belated 2022 BSEE tables also include a glaring error. The most important figure, the number of fatalities, is incorrect. Five workers died from US OCS incidents in 2022, not one. The fatal helicopter crash at the West Delta 106 A helideck on 12/29/2022 that killed four workers (photos below) is inexplicably not included. 

Is the failure to include this fatal incident a regulatory fragmentation issue? OCS safety data should be reported holistically and should not be parsed based on perceived regulatory jurisdiction? In any event, the tragic accident at the West Delta 106 A platform occurred at the helideck, which per the MOA with the Coast Guard is under BSEE jurisdiction.

It’s unfortunate that 2023 data are not available, even in summary form. At a minimum, BSEE should be proudly reporting that 2023 was the first zero fatality year on the US OCS since at least 1963! While acknowledging that this outstanding achievement will be difficult to repeat, it most certainly deserves public attention.

Lastly, what about incident data for the offshore wind program? When will these data be posted?

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“The Sikorsky S-92 helicopter is the most advanced aircraft in Sikorsky’s civil product line, certified to the most stringent safety requirements of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).” 

One person has died following the helicopter crash outside Bergen in Norway on the night of Wednesday 28th February. The helicopter was on a training assignment for Equinor ’s SAR service for the Oseberg area in the North Sea.

Equinor

Search and rescue service is critical to offshore safety, and North Sea operators have excellent SAR capabilities. Sadly, one person died and five were injured (two seriously) when a Sikorsky S-92 helicopter, owned by Bristow and under contract to Equinor, crashed offshore Bergen last night. The crew was training to serve offshore workers in need.

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Either the investigators were incompetent (unlikely) or the political pressure was too great (likely).

“The investigation has led the authorities to conclude that there was deliberate sabotage of the gas pipelines. However, the assessment is that there are not sufficient grounds to pursue a criminal case in Denmark,” a Copenhagen police statement said.

Reuters

After 17 months of investigation, that’s a pretty lame statement. Will we see their report?

The ball is now in Germany’s court. Should we expect more of the same?

Our June 2023 summary remains unchanged.

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After 3 months of investigation, only a small connector leak has been identified in or near the Main Pass Oil Gathering system. According to the Coast Guard, that leak was not the source of the large November spill (pictured). The absence of findings raises many questions:

  • Is the Main Pass Oil Gathering system still being implicated? Surrounding pipelines?
  • Was a vessel or some other source responsible?
  • Were sheen samples fingerprinted and are those results definitive?
  • Given that the source has not been identified, what was the basis for the large (and rather sensational) spill volume estimate? The sheen was not indicative of a spill of that magnitude.
  • How much production has been shut-in since the slick was first identified? November production data indicate a GoM-wide oil production decline of ~80,000 bopd decline from September.

Given the public claims that were made about the size and potential implications of this spill, the authorities need to be more forthcoming regarding their findings to date.

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Short answer: Yes!

Ocean Ranger sign
recovered Ocean Ranger sign

A good article and video on the topic are linked. During my last visit to St. John’s, the late Charles Smith gave me an excellent tour of the Marine Institute that is featured in the video. The Institute is an outstanding training facility that has reduced operating risks offshore Newfoundland and elsewhere.

Posts about the Ocean Ranger tragedy.

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