Were sheen samples fingerprinted and are those results definitive?
Given that the source has not been identified, what was the basis for the large (and rather sensational) spill volume estimate? The sheen was not indicative of a spill of that magnitude.
How much production has been shut-in since the slick was first identified? November production data indicate a GoM-wide oil production decline of ~80,000 bopd decline from September.
Given the public claims that were made about the size and potential implications of this spill, the authorities need to be more forthcoming regarding their findings to date.
Less than a month ago BSEE issued an alert that addressed chronic and persistent helideck safety issues. This week BSEE again issued an alert (attached) following yet another near-miss. Per BSEE:
After receiving clearance for landing at an offshore helideck, the aircrew noticed upon landing that a section of the helideck’s safety skirting was not properly secured to the support structure and was blowing upward and downward due to the helicopter’s rotor downwash. This created an imminent hazard to safe helicopter operations with potentially catastrophic results.
The latest near-miss is yet another reminder that the muddled regulatory regime for helideck safety needs to be addressed. The most recent Coast Guard – BSEE MOA for fixed platforms only added to helideck regulatory uncertainty by assigning decks and fuel handling to BSEE and railings and perimeter netting to the Coast Guard. What about safety skirting? As is the case with all safety regulations, a holistic, systems based approach to helideck safety oversight is needed.
To their credit, BSEE has been addressing these helideck issues with safety alerts. Since they are bearing the responsibility for these incidents, they should have the unambiguous authority needed to take enforcement actions regardless of which helideck elements are involved.
Updated BSEE incident data tables. The last data are for 2021. The public should have timely access to information about safety and pollution events on Federal lands and the performance records of companies conducting these operations. During the MMS era, these tables were updated quarterly and the Directors (all administrations) did not tolerate delay.
The final NTSB report on the 12/29/2022 GoM helicopter crashthat killed 4. The preliminary report was timely, but the final report has yet to be published. Is the NTSB considering the muddled regulatory regime for helidecks. (Regulatory fragmentation is a safety risk factor).
Corrected IRF performance data. This is arguably the IRF’s most important work stream and the data should be accurate. Some commentary about safety performance would also be helpful. What do the incident trends tell us? How does safety performance compare internationally?
Data on safety incidents associated with the OCS wind program during the site assessment, construction, and operational phases.
Information on the mysterious sinking of the Aban Pearl semi-submersiblein May 2010. We know an investigation was conducted. 14 years have now elapsed and the report has still not been shared.
Jean-Louis Daeschler, a native of France who lives in Scotland, was a pioneering subsea engineer who worked on rigs worldwide. Below, he recounts a 1969 incident on the Sedco 135 E.
Sedco 135 E
Sept. 1969 on the Sedco 135 E offshore Miri, East Malaysia
At about 10.00 PM the crew was running 24 ” riser pipe. The rig used a 2 stack BOP system. The weather was superb – no wind and a temperature of 26 deg C.
When the 4th joint of riser pipe (45 ft) was picked up through the “V” door and was almost vertical, it unlatched from the elevator. There was a massive clang followed by silence. The riser pipe hit the drill floor, fell backward into the derrick frame and got jammed there. No one was hurt.
The incident would have been much worse if the pipe had fallen through the catwalk, perforated the maindeck, fell into the water, and damaged the the rig’s sponson tanks !!!! A piece of pipe falling overboard turns into a high velocity torpedo. A dropped 13 3/8″ casing joint is sometimes found 400 ft away. Heavy drill collars go almost straight down, which is the worst case given the potential for damage to the wellhead equipment.
I left the office and went to the rig floor, which was silent. Everyone was looking up and down. With the brake tied down, I asked Bill Ellis what we were going to do now. Bill was an experienced 45+ year old driller from Ruidoso New Mexico. His answer was “Go back home to the USA” with a big smile. He was always in control.
Bill demonstrated great leadership; there was no panic or blame. The all-Chinese and Malay crew was listening and smiling. After some rigging up, we got the operations back into swing. We checked the elevator latch and other equipment, laid down the joint that had been stuck, picked up another one, and continued running the riser.
I met again with Bill and Jo, his wife, in Aberdeen in 1975, and we still talked about that night-shift event.
Putin suggests that people consider who had an interest in sabotaging the pipelines and who had the capability. He also asks why Germany isn’t allowing gas to flow through the one Nord Stream line that wasn’t damaged.
As the Minerals Management Service’s liaison to the Marine Board of the National Academies and subsequently as a Marine Board member, I had the privilege of working with many outstanding engineers on matters related to offshore safety and environmental protection. Dr. Martha Grabowski was a clear standout because of her exceptional leadership and communications skills, modest ego, and willingness to assist.
Dr. Grabowski excels in analyzing and mitigating operational risks including those associated with human and organizational factors. As such, she was a great resource in our work on safety management and culture.
The conclusion of the investigation is that Swedish jurisdiction does not apply and that the investigation therefore should be closed,” the Swedish Prosecution Authority said in a statement.
Little has changed since our last update. Will we finally get a substantive update from an official investigator?
STOCKHOLM, Feb 5 (Reuters) – The prosecutor leading Sweden’s probe into the Nord Stream gas pipeline blasts in the Baltic Sea in 2022 plans to announce a decision this week on whether to drop the case, press charges or request that someone is detained, his office said on Monday.
The statement confirmed an earlier report by Swedish daily Expressen. It was not immediately clear which day an announcement would be made, a spokesperson for the prosecutor’s office said.
On January 28, 1969, well A-21, the 5th well to be drilled from Union Oil Company’s “A” platform began flowing uncontrollably through fractures into the Santa Barbara Channel.
The absence of any well casing to protect the permeable, fractured cap rock meant that the operator couldn’t safely shut-in a sudden influx of hydrocarbons into the well bore (i.e. a “kick”). Shutting-in the well at the surface would create well bore fractures through which oil and gas could migrate to shallow strata and the sea floor. The probability of an oil blowout was thus essentially the same as the probability of a kick (>10-2). Compare this with the historical US offshore oil blowout probability (<10-4) and the probability of <10-5 for wells with optimal barrier management.
Here, in brief, is the well A-21 story:
Well drilled to total depth of 3203′ below the ocean floor (BOF).
13 3/8″ casing had been set at 238′ BOF. The well was unprotected from the base of this casing string to total depth.
Evidence of natural seeps near the site suggested the presence of fracture channels
The well was drilled through permeable cap rock and a small high pressured gas reservoir before penetrating the target oil sands.
When the well reached total depth, the crew started pulling drill pipe out of hole to in preparation for well logging.
The first 5 stands of drill pipe pulled tight; the next 3 pulled free suggesting the swabbing of fluids into the well bore..
The well started flowing through the drill pipe. The crew attempted to stab an inside preventer into the drill pipe, but the well was blowing too hard. The crew then attempted unsuccessfully to stab the kelly into the drill pipe and halt the flow.
The crew dropped the drill pipe into the well bore and closed the blind ram to shut-in the well.
Boils of gas began to appear on the water surface. Oil flowed to the surface through numerous fracture channels. The above sketch by former colleague Jerry Daniels (RIP) depicts the fracturing, which greatly complicated mitigation of the flow.
We need to continue studying these historically important incidents, not just the technical details but also the human and organizational factors that allowed such safety and environmental disasters to occur. The idea is not to shame, but to remember and better understand.
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 