Breaking report from the Nantucket Current:
Posts Tagged ‘turbine blade failure’
Vineyard Wind will be replacing turbine blades!
Posted in Offshore Wind, tagged GE Vernova, Nantucket Current, turbine blade failure, Vineyard Wind on October 23, 2024| Leave a Comment »
BSEE letter to Vineyard Wind: shut-in order remains in effect, environmental damage study required
Posted in accidents, Offshore Wind, tagged BSEE, debris, environmental study, FOIA, shut-in order, turbine blade failure, Vineyard Wind on October 17, 2024| Leave a Comment »
The attached letter was obtained by the Nantucket Current through a FOIA request. Key points:
- Vineyard Wind power generation and blade installation suspension order remains in effect.
- Vineyard Wind directed to conduct a site-specific study that evaluates the environmental harm and other potential damage from the blade failure, and to identify potential mitigation measures.
- Vineyard Wind was required to submit a plan for the study by Oct. 11. It’s not clear whether the plan was submitted.
- The study must include a mass balance of unrecovered debris material based on the weight of debris recovered and the weight of the subsea debris retrieved.
Comments:
- The study requirement is appropriate given the significance of the blade incident and the implications for offshore wind development.
- Why was a FOIA request needed to learn about the study requirement?
- What about the 6 turbine blades being returned to France? Were they defective?
Good reporting by the New Bedford Light on turbine blades being returned to France
Posted in accidents, Offshore Wind, Regulation, tagged BSEE, Cherbourg France, GE Vernova, New Bedford Light, Rolldock Sun, turbine blade failure, Vineyard Wind on October 9, 2024| 1 Comment »
Per the New Bedford Light, the turbine blade delivery vessel Rolldock Sun was seen on Friday carrying at least two blades out of New Bedford. It was not headed for the Vineyard Wind site. According to vessel tracking websites, the Rolldock Sun was en route to the Port of Cherbourg, where GE Vernova has a blade manufacturing facility.
The most likely explanation for returning the blades to Cherbourg is that defects were detected or suspected. The blade that failed, reportedly as a result of a manufacturing issue, is probably not the only one that was defective.
The New Bedford Light asked GE Vernova, Vineyard Wind, and the Federal regulator BSEE why the blades were being transported to Cherbourg. They received the following responses (my comments in parentheses):
GE Vernova: “No comment on this matter.” (This is the worst possible response. In the absence of information, people are left to speculate. If there was no problem with the blades, why wouldn’t GE simply provide an explanation? Their non-response simply reinforces suspicions that the blades were defective. If that is the case, why not take credit for procedures that identified the suspect defects, albeit belatedly?
Vineyard Wind: “The weekend has gotten in the way of the information flow,” and they would share information should they hear anything. Another request for information was not answered as of noon Monday. (Not exactly confidence inspiring from the company whose blade failure littered beaches and the offshore environment. They are deservedly being watched, and need to be more transparent and responsive.)
BSEE: A BSEE spokesperson did not answer questions and said by email that the agency has no new information. (Disappointing, but not surprising.)
Spider-Man?
Posted in accidents, Offshore Wind, tagged GE Vernova, Haliade-X, Nantucket Current, Offshore Wind, Spider-Man, turbine blade failure, Tyler Paton, Vineyard Wind on August 27, 2024| Leave a Comment »
This real-life Spider-Man, seen on a Vineyard Wind turbine blade, is Tyler Paton. Tyler is an independent composite specialist who inspects and repairs blades on site. The Nantucket Current shared these images on X.
Another GE Vernova turbine blade failure at Dogger Bank
Posted in accidents, Offshore Energy - General, Offshore Wind, tagged Dogger Bank Wind Farm, GE Vernova, turbine blade failure, Vineyard Wind on August 23, 2024| Leave a Comment »
The operator of the wind farm released this short statement yesterday (8/22/2024):
We are aware of a blade failure which occurred this morning on an installed turbine at Dogger Bank A offshore wind farm, which is currently under construction. In line with safety procedures, the surrounding marine area has been restricted and relevant authorities notified. No one was injured or in the vicinity at the time the damage was sustained.
We are working closely with the turbine manufacturer, GE Vernova, which has initiated an investigation into the cause of the incident.
Further updates will be issued in due course as more information becomes available.
There have thus been at least 3 GE Vernova Haliade-X turbine failures at new offshore wind farms in 2024 – two at Dogger Bank and one at Vineyard Wind.
Is the fragmented turbine blade symbolic of the regulatory regime?
Posted in accidents, energy policy, Offshore Energy - General, Offshore Wind, tagged BOEM, BSEE, Macondo blowout, regulatory fragmentation, turbine blade failure, Vineyard Wind on August 14, 2024| 2 Comments »
From the Nantucket Current:
Additionally, ultimate authority over the wind farm remained unclear, with various federal agencies claiming responsibility over different portions of the permitting, licensing, review, and operation of the wind farm.
“Sometimes I have a hard time figuring out, who do we talk to? Who is going to keep us safe? Who is the responsible boss here? Who is going to make the hard decision?” Select Board member Matt Fee asked.
As previously discussed, regulatory fragmentation is a safety and environmental risk factor.
Causes of regulatory fragmentation:
- Separate legislation granting redundant or overlapping authority to different departments or agencies.
- Legislation that is non-specific, assigning broad authority to the President or cabinet level level officials, leaving it up to the bureaus to resolve.
- Bi- and multi-lateral agreements like MOA’s and MOU’s, which are intended to “coordinate the redundancy,” often cause more confusion than they prevent, creating gaps in the process.
- “Fixing” problems by adding redundancy.
The Dept. of the Interior’s division of responsibilities for offshore wind, which was finalized in January 2023, inexplicably assigns review and approval of Construction and Operations Plans to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (i.e. the land manager, lessor, and wind energy promoter) rather than the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (i.e. the principal regulator of the activities described in those plans).
More significantly, the offshore wind responsibilities of the 2 bureaus are so intertwined (as is also the case for offshore oil and gas), that attempts to separate the functions have, at a minimum, created inefficiencies and increased regulatory and operational costs.
FTR, the idea that having the BOEM and BSEE functions combined in a single bureau, as was the case with the predecessor bureau (MMS), had anything to do with the Macondo blowout is a complete fallacy. Regarding the accusations that were made toward MMS, the Chief Counsel for the national commission that investigated the tragic incident found no evidence that ethical lapses on the part of MMS employees played any role in causing the blowout.
There were important regulatory changes made after the Macondo blowout. These included capping stack requirements, mandatory safety management systems, and updated rules and standards for cementing/zonal isolation and blowout preventer systems. None of these improvements were precipitated by or dependent on the division of MMS into two bureaus.
Update from the Town of Nantucket
Posted in accidents, Offshore Energy - General, Offshore Wind, tagged debris, Nantucket, turbine blade failure, update, Vineyard Wind on August 11, 2024| Leave a Comment »
The Town of Nantucket would like to provide you with an important update regarding the controlled detachment of the Vineyard Wind turbine blade and the ongoing efforts to manage any resulting debris.
August 11, 8:00 PM – Early this morning, portions of the remaining hanging sections of the Vineyard Wind turbine blade detached from the hub. The controlled detachment follows a series of exercises conducted late last week to pitch the blade, which, in combination with storm winds, led to the safe separation of the sections below the root of the blade.
Vineyard Wind and GE Vernova are currently assessing the situation to determine if any remaining sections pose a risk of detachment. The root of the blade, still attached to the turbine, is being monitored, and we are informed that plans are in place for its removal. Vineyard Wind has maritime crews on site to secure and contain any debris immediately.
The U.S. Coast Guard continues to enforce a 500-meter safety exclusion zone around the turbine. Vineyard Wind is utilizing ocean current and wind pattern models to predict potential debris movement. Depending on wind direction, more debris could potentially arrive on Nantucket beaches over the next hours or days. The Town of Nantucket will provide updates when necessary.
Under a federal preservation order, Vineyard Wind is responsible for retaining all debris, and only their employees, contractors, or those appointed by town officials are authorized to handle and recover debris materials. We urge the public to avoid handling any debris.
REMINDER TO THE PUBLIC
- DO NOT put any debris in your home garbage.
- DO NOT bring the debris to the landfill.
- DO notify the proper authorities immediately if you have debris so they can remove it for analysis and proper disposal.
Only trained employees or contractors are responsible for collecting and removing the debris. To report any remaining debris, please contact:
- Phone: 833-609-5768
- Reports of debris can also be sent to the cleanup contractor here.
Quality control is a big challenge for wind turbine manufacturers
Posted in accidents, energy policy, Offshore Wind, Regulation, tagged BOEM, GE Vernova, Norway, Offshore Wind, quality control, safety culture, Siemens Gamesa, turbine blade failure, Vestas, Vineyard Wind on August 8, 2024| 1 Comment »
As the above examples illustrate, turbine blade failures, like the Vineyard Wind incident near Nantucket, are not unique to GE Vernova. GE’s rivals, Siemens Gamesa and Vestas, have also experienced serious quality control issues.
Per ReviewEconomy (2023), “Unexpected and increasing wind turbine failure rates, largely in newer and bigger models, are savaging the profits of some of the world’s biggest manufacturers, as Siemens Gamesa, GE and Vestas report heavy repair and maintenance losses.”
All 3 manufacturers will be providing turbines for US Atlantic wind development. The table below lists the manufacturers for active projects with approved Records of Decision (RODs).
In light of the manufacturing challenges, all 3 companies report increased emphasis on quality control. Why has quality control to date been inadequate and how will the past problems be corrected?
Has the wind industry’s sense of entitlement, as evidenced in their tax credit, rate increase, and departure expectations, affected their safety and quality culture? Has industry and governmental wind energy promotion rushed development and compromised design and fabrication decisions? It’s time for wind developers, manufacturers, and regulators to make sure their priorities are in order.
| project | turbine towers | manufacturer |
| Coastal VA Offshore Wind | 202 | Siemens Gamesa |
| Revolution Wind | 100 | Siemens Gamesa |
| Sunrise Wind | 94 | Siemens Gamesa |
| Atlantic Shores South | 200 | Vestas |
| Ocean Wind 1 | 98 | GE Vernova |
| Vineyard Wind 1 | 100 | GE Vernova |
| Empire Wind 1 & 2 | 147 | Vestas |
| New England Wind (phases 1&2) | 150 | Vestas |
BOEM waived fabrication report requirement so Vineyard Wind project could stay on schedule
Posted in accidents, energy policy, Offshore Wind, Regulation, tagged BOEM, BSEE, CVA, departures, DNV, fabrication, investigation, quality control, turbine blade failure, Vineyard Wind on August 6, 2024| 2 Comments »
BOEM’s long list of approved departures from the renewable energy regulations includes the eyebrow-raising approval of Vineyard Wind’s request to shortcut the review of design, fabrication, and installation reports.
Contrary to the regulations, Vineyard Wind was authorized to begin the fabrication of facilities before BOEM “received and offered no objections to the their Facility Design Report (FDR) and Fabrication and Installation Report (FIR).” The approval letter is attached, and excerpts (emphasis added) are pasted below. [Note: The requirement that was then at §585.700(b) is found at §585.632 in the current regulations.]
“Vineyard Wind requests a regulatory departure from §585.700(b) requiring that fabrication of approved facilities not begin until BOEM provides notification that it has received and has no objections to the submitted Facility Design Report (FDR) and Fabrication and Installation Report (FIR). Vineyard Wind proposes to fabricate, but not install the following project elements:
1) Monopile foundations;
2) Electrical service platform;
3) Export cable;
4) Inter-array cables; and
5) Wind turbine generator facilities.
….allowing these fabrication activities to take place earlier in time would allow Vineyard Wind to adhere to its construction schedule, maintain its qualification for the Federal Investment Tax Credit, and meet its contractual obligations under the Power Purchase Agreements with Massachusetts distribution companies.
30 cfr 585.103 requires that a departure provide safety and environmental protection equal to or greater than the provision in the regulations that is waived. BOEM’s letter fails to explain how allowing fabrication to begin before fundamental design and fabrication reports are submitted and reviewed meets this test.
It’s noteworthy that GE Vernova has attributed the Vineyard Wind turbine blade failure to a fabrication issue. The FIR is thus particularly pertinent, because it addresses quality assurance measures, significant factors in the Vineyard Wind blade failure.
Perhaps even more troubling is BOEM’s response to subsequent requests by other companies to waive the FDR and FIR requirement (example). In these responses, BOEM asserts that their “current interpretation” is that no departure is needed because “the regulation prohibits only fabrication and installation activities on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) itself.” How does that make sense given the important activities, including the fabrication of turbine blades and other turbine components, that take place onshore?
In their letters approving the Vineyard Wind and other departures, BOEM implies that their review of these reports is unnecessary because “the design and fabrication of these components would occur under the supervision of the approved CVA” (Certified Verification Agent). That assertion misconstrues the role of the CVA. These agents, nominated and funded by the operator, provide third party oversight that is complementary to, not a substitute for, BOEM/BSEE project reviews.
According to this memo, DNV was the CVA for Vineyard Wind. Their insights on the turbine blade failure will presumably be included in BSEE’s investigation report.
The Vineyard Wind and other departures reinforce concerns that BOEM’s commitment to promoting offshore wind and accelerating development influenced their regulatory decisions. This concern, along with the division of responsibilities between BOEM and BSEE, should be part of the Vineyard Wind investigation. Hopefully, the investigation panel will be accorded a high degree of independence.
Kudos to the Nantucket Current …
Posted in accidents, energy policy, Offshore Energy - General, Offshore Wind, Wind Energy, tagged Dogger Bank Wind Farm, GE Vernova, incident reporting, Nantucket Current, turbine blade failure, turbine failures, Vineyard Wind on July 30, 2024| 3 Comments »
… for their coverage of the Vineyard Wind turbine blade incident and their investigative reporting. From a recent Current article (emphasis added):
“The technology may not be new, but the size and scale of the Haliade-X turbine is novel for the offshore wind industry. And these jumbo-sized turbines have only recently been installed in just two locations in the world within the last year – at Vineyard Wind off Nantucket, and the Dogger Bank Wind Farm off the northeast coast of England. The Haliade-X turbine blades – which are supposed to have at least a 25-year lifespan – have suffered failures in both locations.“
“At the Dogger Bank Wind Farm – which is being completed in three sections which combined will make up the largest offshore wind farm in the world – the first GE Vernova Haliade-X turbine was installed in the fall of 2023 and began producing power on Oct. 10. But little is known about the blade failure that occurred just months later during the first week of May 2024. The damaged blade was disclosed by Dogger Bank’s owners – SSE Renewables, Equinor, and Vårgrønn – a week after the incident. In a statement, the companies said only that “damage was sustained to a single blade on an installed turbine at Dogger Bank A offshore wind farm.”
“One reason the turbine blade incident at the Dogger Bank may not have generated more attention at the time is that the wind farm is located 100 miles off the coast of England, rather than just the 15 miles in the case of Vineyard Wind and Nantucket. If any debris was generated, it would have a far wider area to disperse in before nearing land – if it made it that far at all.“
Interestingly per the Current:
- The Haliade-X turbine is the same one Orsted – a partner in Vineyard Wind – is planning to use for offshore wind farms slated for the waters off New Jersey and Maryland.
- GE Vernova has allegedly refused to acknowledge responsibility for repairing the damaged turbines and generators in Oklahoma.
- Land-based turbines have come apart in Sweden, Germany, Lithuania, Cypress, Brazil, and the US (and presumably elsewhere).
Greater transparency regarding turbine incidents, both in the US and internationally, is clearly needed. As we have learned from decades of experience with the oil and gas industry, most companies prefer reporting systems (if any) that protect details and information about the responsible parties from public disclosure. It’s the responsibility of the regulators to make sure that incident data and investigation reports are timely, complete, and publicly available. This is made more difficult by the promotional role that government agencies have assumed for offshore wind.
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 