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Posts Tagged ‘macondo’

Ponder this: What if the responsible party was not BP or one of the other “supermajors” (i.e. Shell, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, and Total)? This would have been the likely scenario:

  1. The responsible party, which we’ll call Company XYZ, would have quickly exhausted its financial resources, including insurance.  Bankruptcy would be a high probability.
  2. XYZ would have to control costs and would not contract a second relief well rig, employ an armada of support vessels and ROVs, fund protective barrier islands, or install a complex floating production system for oil containment and recovery purposes.  The Federal government could, of course, direct XYZ to do all of these things, but how could XYZ comply?
  3. The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund would be exhausted.  The per barrel production and transportation fees would have to be quickly and  significantly increased to pay the ongoing spill response costs.
  4. XYZ would limit damage payments to the $75 million maximum specified in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.  Congress could, of course, change that limit, but could they do so retroactively?
  5. In light of the above, the entire mess would become the responsibility of the Federal government.  The government would have to design and manage the relief well operations, subsea collection programs, and all aspects of the spill response.  All this would have to be accomplished amidst loud (think vuvuzela noise levels) public criticism, finger-pointing, and emergency hearings and litigation.  Multiply the current level of acrimony and discontent by 100 and you get a sense of how ugly this would be.

What happens to the Macondo field? We don’t know much about the size of the Macondo reservoir(s), but we have certainly learned about the impressive flow potential.  After the well is plugged and the regulatory issues are addressed, will BP seek to develop the field, assign their interests to other companies, or relinquish their leases?  Will BP even have the option of making these choices, or will the Federal government seek to disqualify the company from developing the field?

Relief well plans: While BP has done a better job of providing technical information, the precise relief well target has not been specified.  In that regard, BOE has received a number of complaints from engineers and other interested parties.  Since the region and nation are literally and figuratively dependent on this well for relief, the public needs to know more about the plan.  We now have the casing program details for the well that is flowing (thanks to DOE), so the key piece of information needed is the specific intercept point in the well bore.   We also need to know the suspected flow path(s) for the oil.  Surely BP and the Unified Command have an informed opinion on that important matter.  Again, the right to confidentiality on these matters was forfeited when the well blew out.

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New 5MB hard drive to be used for spill rate estimates.

BOE exclusive: We have learned that the Flow Rate Technical Group (FRTG) has imported sophisticated new computer equipment (pictured above) which will finally settle the Macondo flow rate debate.  The dart boards used in making previous estimates are being shipped to the Smithsonian for public viewing 🙂

The FRTG has four teams of distinguished scientists and engineers, but only 2 have provided estimates – the Plume Team and the Mass Balance Team.  The Plume Team seems to be getting the most publicity, probably because their large range (20,000 – 40,000 bopd) includes the highest “official” flow estimate to date.  Before embracing these results, you may want to take a look at their statement and the summary paper, neither of which instills great confidence.

The Reservoir Modeling Team seems to be the best hope for a reasonably accurate estimate, but has yet to provide any findings.  Their approach is described below:

This team will describe the geologic formations as well as composition and pressures of the oil, natural gas, and other compounds that are being released.  Using open-hole logs; pressure, volume, and temperature data; core samples; and analog well or reservoir data; the team will populate computer models and determine flow rate from targeted sands in the well as a function of bottomhole pressure.

Don’t expect this controversy to be settled soon.

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Has US bloodlust at BP gone too far?

Many will argue that BP deserves to die, and anger is entirely understandable. But critics should be careful what they wish for. America is a nation with a tradition of due process and everybody – even “big oil” – is entitled to a fair trial.

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I have received the letter from Chairmen Waxman and Stupak of the of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, requesting that the CSB investigate the BP Deepwater Horizon blowout.  It is my desire that the CSB do everything it can to facilitate the request and to undertake the investigation and determine what factors led to the explosion and failure of the blowout prevention system. ~John Bresland, CSB Chairman

In addition to the House and Senate Hearings, this would bring the number of official investigations to four:

  1. MMS-Coast Guard investigation required by the OCS Lands Act
  2. National Academy review requested by the Department of the Interior
  3. National Commission established by the President
  4. Chemical Safety Board review requested by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce

I have long advocated an independent investigation capability for major OCS incidents and recommended a special commission in my testimony before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources Committee on May 11.  However, is four official reviews too many?  The MMS-CG investigation is well underway and is required by statute, but the 3 independent reviews have yet to begin.  Perhaps these efforts can be consolidated.  If not, their respective missions must be very clearly defined.  Otherwise, there is a significant risk of gaps, confusion, and unnecessary overlap.  We need to make sure that each group knows their role and is staffed to obtain the information needed to prevent the recurrence of other offshore tragedies, in the US and elsewhere.

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BOE reader Tore Fjågesund of WellBarrier AS has provided this schematic of the Macondo well’s casing program.  The color-coded format simplifies assessment of the barriers, and identifies a probable flow path.  Click here to view the full-size diagram (pdf) – Macondo Well Barriers.

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Kudos to Secretary Chu and the Department of Energy for providing online access to Macondo schematics, pressure tests, diagnostic results and other data. This is the type of data that BOE and others have been requesting.  Well done!

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By the end of June, BP hopes to have the following arrangements in place:

  1. New well cap with improved sealing mechanism
  2. New seafloor manifold feeding production to a floating production storage and offloading (FPSO) vessel
  3. Shuttle tankers supporting FPSO
  4. Alternative flow path via choke and kill lines back to the Q4000 support vessel

The challenge will be minimizing production system downtime and the associated spikes in spillage, particularly during hurricane evacuations.

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When they sheared the riser prior to installing the LMRP cap, the video clearly shows two segments of sheared drill pipe inside the riser.  How that happened is a mystery.  Did the explosion break the work string into multiple segments which fell back toward the BOP?

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Vancouver, BC, Canada

 

The program for the International Regulators’ Offshore Safety Conference has been updated to include keynote presentations on the Montara and Macondo blowouts, and roundtable sessions that will address the lessons learned and how they should be applied by operators, contractors, and regulators.  The presentations, discussions, and debates are sure to be thought provoking and informative.  If you would like to participate, visit the conference website for more information.

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Dette kan skje igjen (This could happen again)~ Magne Ognedal, Director General, Petroleum Safety Authority Norway

Magne’s quote in the Stavanger Aftenblad acknowledges that tragic accidents like the Macondo/Horizon blowout or Alexander Kielland sinking could happen again (see English translation of full article by BOE Europe Chief Odd Finnestad).  Magne goes on to say:

We must appreciate there are risks associated with our petroleum activities, and in our yearly risk assessments we attempt to put in concrete terms what those inherent risks are.  It is up to our national political system to determine whether this risk picture should be accepted or not.

and

We must endeavor to learn from whatever happens around the world, and if there is something that is also relevant to Norway we must apply those lessons, both regulators and industry

Industry and government officials would be wise to follow Magne’s lead and avoid “can’t happen here” statements.  A few of these statements were made in the US after the Montara (Timor Sea) blowout, and we know how that worked out.

Some very experienced and capable offshore managers have had “there but for the grace of God go I” moments in the wake of this disaster.  They know that this is not the time for boasting, piling-on, or schadenfreude.  Like Magne, real leaders are focused on monitoring the investigations, studying the findings and recommendations, and applying the lessons as necessary to further reduce their operating risks and the risks of others who conduct offshore oil and gas operations.

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