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Posts Tagged ‘Lease Sale 259’

Big Beautiful Gulf of America

Will the oil and gas lease sale boldly named Big Beautiful Gulf 1 (BBG1) live up to its grand name? Given the more favorable lease terms and the 2 year gap since the last sale, BBG1 should surpass the previous 3 sales (table below). Questions:

  • Which majors will be the most active bidders? Chevron? Shell? BP? Oxy/Anadarko?
  • Will former Gulf of Mexico stalwarts Exxon and Conoco Phillips participate for the first time in years? Probably not, but US super-majors should participate in the US offshore program.
  • How many companies will submit bids? Would like that to be a number >35.
  • How many tracts will receive bids? A number >300 would be very encouraging.
  • Will the total high bids exceed $400 million?
  • Will we see an increase in shelf interest?
  • Which independents will be the most active?
  • After the not-so-clever carbon disposal acquisitions in the last 3 sales, will the number of carbon disposal bids be zero? For the first time ever, the Federal government felt compelled to stipulate the obvious (see the proposed notice for OCS Sale 262) – that an Oil and Gas Lease Sale is only for oil and gas exploration and development.

See the summary data below for the last 3 Gulf lease sales. We’ll fill in the blanks next week.

Sale No.257259261BBG1
date11/17/20213/29/202312/20/202312/10/2025
companies
participating
333226
total bids223328423161
tracts receiving bids214324422751
sum of all bids
$millions
198.5309.8441.9
sum of high bids
($millions)
101.7263.8382.2
highest bid
company
block
$10,001,252.00
Anadarko
AC 259
$15,911,947
Chevron
KC 96
$25,500,085
Anadarko
MC 389
most high bids
company
sum ($millions)
46
bp
29.0
75
Chevron
108.0
65
Shell
69.0
sum of high bids ($millions)
company
47.1
Chevron
108
Chevron
88.3
Hess
most high bids by independent14-DG Expl.13-Beacon
13-Red Willow
22-Red Willow
1excludes 36 leases improperly acquired for carbon disposal purposes; 2excludes 69 leases improperly acquired for carbon disposal purposes; 3excludes 94 leases improperly acquired for carbon disposal purposes

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OCS Lease Sale 259 was mandated by Congress, and was held on March 29, 2023, two days before the deadline established in the Inflation Reduction Act. Ah, but compliance with environmental law, which is of course subject to interpretation, was still required.

So the formula for eNGOs in such cases is to sue on NEPA grounds in a friendly Federal court. In the case of Sale 259, the plaintiffs asserted that BOEM’s climate change and Rice’s whale analyses were inadequate.

With regard to climate change, the reality is that incremental Gulf of America production will have virtually no effect on petroleum consumption and global GHG emissions. Increased GoA production will actually have a slight positive effect on worldwide GHG emissions given the relatively lower carbon intensity for deepwater Gulf production.

With regard to the Rice’s whale, Darren Ireland’s analysis is compelling:

Based on the limited data available on the use and occurrence of Rice’s whale in the central and northwestern GOMx (one acoustic study (Soldevilla et al. 2022b), one confirmed sighting (NMFS 2018a) and a few unconfirmed sightings (Rosel et al. 2021)), there is insufficient scientific evidence to determine that essential features for Rice’s whale conservation are indeed present in the central and northwestern GOMx. In fact, data on the life-history requirements of Rice’s whale even in the core habitat are still lacking and need further investigation.

Unsurprisingly, Judge Amit P. Mehta of the US District Court for the District of Columbia, has ruled that BOEM’s environmental assessments on climate change and the Rice’s whale were deficient, and has ordered the parties and intervenors to jointly submit a proposed briefing schedule by April 3, 2025. “The court will also order additional briefing on remedy” (e.g. onerous operating restrictions).

In case you haven’t suffered enough, the judge’s full opinion is attached.

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The table in the Sale 259 bid rejections post has been corrected below. That table incorrectly reported that subsequent bids for Keathley Canyon Blocks 745 and 789 were rejected at Sale 261. Those bids were in fact accepted. Houston Energy was identified as the submitter rather than Beacon Offshore Energy, the company that, per the bidding data, had the largest ownership share. (See the bidding partnership pasted below.)

The acceptance of those 2 bids significantly increases the net gain to the government as a result of the Sale 259 bid rejections. See the corrections in red to the table:

area and blockSale 259 rejected high bid – companySale 261 high bidbid acceptedgovt gain (loss*)
DC 6222,101,836 – Shell615,628 – Shellyes(1,486,208)
GC 173307,107 – Woodsideno bidNA(307,107)
GC 5471,783,498 – Chevronno bidNA(1,783,498)
GC 5911,291,993 – Chevronno bidNA(1,291,993)
GC 642605,505 – Anadarkono bidNA(605,505)
GC 777583,103 – bpno bidNA(583,103)
AT 51,551,130 – Anadarko5,215,628 – Shellyes3,664,498
AT 133607,107 – Woodsideno bidNA(607,107)
KC 745707,777 – Beacon2,422,222 – Beacon Houstonno yes(2,422,222)
1,714,445
KC 789707,777 – Beacon2,143,299 – Beacon Houstonno yes(2,143,299)
1,435,522
WR 794724,744 – Beacon1,487,624 – Beaconyes762,880
WR 795774,242 – Beacon5,301,107 – Woodsideyes4,526,865
WR 796774,242 – Beacon3,310,107 – Woodsideyes2,535,865
WR 750724,744 – Beacon1,498,555 – Beaconyes773,811
total govt. gain1,032,877
8,748,365

More on the Sale 261 bidding next week.

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14 of the high bids at Gulf of Mexico Lease Sale 259 were rejected. Did those tracts receive bids at sale 261? What was the net gain or loss of revenue? See the summary bullets and table below

  • 6 of the 14 tracts received no bids whatsoever
  • 5 of the 14 tracts received higher bids that were accepted.
  • 2 tracts received substantially higher bids that were again rejected
  • 1 tract received a lower bid that was accepted
  • net bonus revenue gain to the govt from the bid rejections (pending re-offering at future sales): $1,032,877
  • net bonus revenue gain = 0.27% of the total high bids at sale 261
  • net loss in future rental and royalty payments: ????

For a net bonus revenue gain to date of only 1/4 of one per cent, 8 of the 14 sale 259 tracts with rejected high bids remain closed to exploration. The timing of any future sales is very much in doubt given the minimalist 5 year leasing plan and the associated legal challenges.

Current bid evaluation practices only make sense if regular lease sales are held on a predictable schedule, as has historically been the case.

Meanwhile, 100% of the improper CCS bids (199/199) were accepted at the last 3 oil and gas lease sales.

area and blockSale 259 rejected high bid – companySale 261 high bidbid acceptedgovt gain (loss*)
DC 6222,101,836 – Shell615,628 – Shellyes(1,486,208)
GC 173307,107 – Woodsideno bidNA(307,107)
GC 5471,783,498 – Chevronno bidNA(1,783,498)
GC 5911,291,993 – Chevronno bidNA(1,291,993)
GC 642605,505 – Anadarkono bidNA(605,505)
GC 777583,103 – bpno bidNA(583,103)
AT 51,551,130 – Anadarko5,215,628 – Shellyes3,664,498
AT 133607,107 – Woodsideno bidNA(607,107)
KC 745707,777 – Beacon2,422,222 – Beaconno(2,422,222)
KC 789707,777 – Beacon2,143,299 – Beaconno(2,143,299)
WR 794724,744 – Beacon1,487,624 – Beaconyes762,880
WR 795774,242 – Beacon5,301,107 – Woodsideyes4,526,865
WR 796774,242 – Beacon3,310,107 – Woodsideyes2,535,865
WR 750724,744 – Beacon1,498,555 – Beaconyes773,811
total govt. gain1,032,877
*Loss based on rejected sale 261 high bid. If no sale 261 bid, loss based on sale 259 high bid. These tracts could receive bids at a future sale.

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Keathley Canyon and Walker Ridge bids at Sale 259: blue=1 bid, red=2 bids, green=3 bids

Based solely on a comparison of the bids (Sale 261 vs. Sale 259), the Sale 259 rejections were, on balance, to the benefit of the public (table below). On the plus side:

  • Assuming all of the high Sale 261 bids are accepted, the net gain to the US Treasury is $8,749,365
  • Of the 14 tracts with rejected high bids at Sale 259, 8 received bids at Sale 261
  • Seven of those 8 bids were higher than the Sale 259 high bids, and 5 of those 7 were more than $1 million higher.
  • The Sale 259 bid rejections in the Keathley Canyon and Walker Ridge areas proved to be 100% beneficial. All 6 of those tracts received much higher bids at Sale 261.
  • The best BOEM decisions were the rejections of the Sale 259 bids for AT 5 and WR 795 and 796. The Sale 261 high bids on these 3 tracts were $10.8 million higher than the Sale 259 bids.
  • WR 795 and 796 were single bid tracts at Sale 259.
  • AT 5 received 3 bids at Sale 259. BOEM rejected the high bid despite the competitive bidding. That proved to be the right call given that the Sale 261 high bid was $3.5 million higher.

On the other hand:

  • None of the 5 Green Canyon rejections received any bids at Sale 261.
  • The high bid for GC 777 was rejected twice (Sales 257 and 259) at a cost of $1.8 million, the BP/Talos high bid at Sale 257. At sale 259, BP was the sole bidder for GC 777, and their bid was only $583,000, less than 1/3 of their Sale 257 bid. GC 777 received no bids at Sale 261.
  • The worst BOEM Sale 259 decisions were the rejections of the DC 622, GC 547, and GC 591 bids at a cost of $4.6 million ($5.2 if the Sale 261 bid for DC 622 is rejected).
  • This is not to say that the tracts with rejected bids will not ultimately be leased. However, the uncertainty regarding future sales changes the historic GoM leasing dynamic. The next opportunity for purchasing unleased tracts is a troubling unknown. Absent leasing and exploration, their resource and revenue potential will never be known.
area and blockSale 259 high bid – companySale 261 high bidgovt gain (loss)
DC 6222,101,836 – Shell615,628* – Shell(1,486,208)
GC 173307,107 – Woodsideno bid(307,107)
GC 5471,783,498 – Chevronno bid(1,783,498)
GC 5911,291,993 – Chevronno bid(1,291,993)
GC 642605,505 – Anadarkono bid(605,505)
GC 777583,103 – bpno bid(583,103)
AT 51,551,130 – Anadarko5,215,628* – Shell3,664,498
AT 133607,107 – Woodsideno bid(607,107)
KC 745707,777 – Beacon2,422,222 – Beacon1,714,445
KC 789707,777 – Beacon2,143,299 – Beacon1,435,522
WR 794724,744 – Beacon1,487,624 – Beacon762,880
WR 795774,242 – Beacon5,301,107 – Woodside4,526,865
WR 796774,242 – Beacon3,310,107 – Woodside2,535,865
WR 750724,744 – Beacon1,498,555 – Beacon773,811
*The BOEM sale 261 bid summary misidentifies the DC 622 and AT 5 bids as being for MC 622 and GC 5 respectively. The corrected identification above is based on the “Blocks Receiving Bids” file correlated with the block number and company code.

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As previously posted, 14 of the 244 (not counting the 69 CCS bids) Sale 259 high bids were rejected. BOEM has published their bid evaluations for all of the tracts, and the 14 rejections are listed below.

lease #blockhigh bid ($)BOEM MROV ($)no. of bids
G37496DC 6222,101,8369,100,0001
G37515GC 173307,1071,300,0001
G37534GC 5471,783,49812,000,0001
G37538GC 5911,291,9935,200,0001
G37543GC 642605,5053,400,0001
G37548GC 777583,1034,200,0001
G37562AT 51,551,1304,700,0003
G37565AT 133607,1072,600,0001
G37616KC 745707,7773,600,0001
G37617KC 789707,7772,100,0001
G37647WR 750724,7443,500,0001
G37646WR 794724,7443,200,0001
G37648WR 795774,2425,000,0001
G37649WR 796774,2424,000,0001
MROV – Mean of the Range-of-Value

Observations:

  • Keathley Canyon (KC) Block 96, the tract receiving the highest bid in the entire sale ($15,911,947 by Chevron), had a BOEM MROV of only $576,000. Clearly, Chevron and the government have a very different view of the value of this tract. BP was the second bidder for KC 96, and their bid ($4,003,103) was also considerably higher than BOEM’s MROV. This one will very interesting to follow.
  • The only bid that was rejected in Sale 257 was the BP/Talos bid of $1.8 million for Green Canyon Block 777. BOEM’s MROV in the Sale 257 evaluations was $4.4 million. BP again bid on GC 777 in Sale 259, but their bid was only $583,000 (even though BOEM’s Sale 257 evaluation was public information). BOEM’s MROV was reduced only slightly to $4.2 million, and they again rejected BP’s bid. We’ll see what happens in the next sale.
  • 51 of the 230 accepted bids were >$1 million, all for deepwater tracts. All of the rejected bids were for deepwater tracts, and a higher percentage (4/14) were >$1 million. This makes sense given that the higher potential prospects are in deepwater.
  • These results demonstrate again that resource evaluation is far from an exact science. BOEM is not selling barrels of oil and cubic feet of gas. BOEM is evaluating prospects, and companies are bidding on the opportunity to explore these prospects.
  • Bidding strategies differ; the more companies participating, the better the long-term prospects for the OCS program.

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ENERGYWIRE has reported that the Department of the Interior will publish the legislatively mandated carbon sequestration rule later this year. Given that even close followers of the OCS program were completely unaware of the enabling legislative provisions prior to their enactment, the proposed DOI rule will provide the first opportunity to formally comment.

Within the oil and gas industry and the environmental community, there are considerable differences of opinion about carbon sequestration in general, and more specifically, offshore sequestration. All interested parties are encouraged to submit comments on these important regulations.

Some background information on the sequestration legislation and subsequent actions:

Exxon and other companies intend to commercialize carbon sequestration, and Exxon projects an astounding $4 trillion CCS market by 2050. Such a market will of course be dependent on mandates and subsidies, and the costs will ultimately be borne by taxpayers and consumers.

Is it not a bit unsavory and hypocritical for hydrocarbon producers to capitalize on the capture and disposal of emissions associated with the consumption of their products? Perhaps companies that believe oil and gas production is harmful to society should exit the industry, rather than engage in enterprises that sustain it.

More:

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This is a surprisingly high number of rejections given that only one Sale 257 bid was rejected and all 69 of the carbon sequestration bids were accepted (even though such bidding was not authorized).

Specifics on the Sale 259 rejections have not yet been posted, but one of the rejections was bp’s bid for Green Canyon Block 777. This is not terribly surprising given that the bp/Talos GC 777 bid was the sole Sale 257 rejection, and bp’s sale 259 bid was less than 1/3 of their Sale 257 bid.

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Last week, BOEM announced the acceptance of all 69 of Exxon’s Sale 259 carbon sequestration bids. This is despite these facts: (1) Exxon’s intentions were known, (2) there were no provisions for CCS bidding in the Notice of Sale, (3) no environmental review of CCS leasing was conducted, and (4) there are no procedures for evaluating CCS bids.

Absent some type of legislative maneuver, carbon sequestration is not authorized under these leases. If Exxon is just acquiring the leases for evaluation purposes in preparation for a possible CCS sale in the future, their lease acquisitions may be okay. If they are planning on retaining these leases for actual sequestration operations, that is not okay, at least not until a competitive process has been established for awarding or reclassifying such leases.

It’s also noteworthy that there was a second bidder for th blocks (in red above). Presumably that company, Focus Exploration, was interested in acquiring the tract for oil and gas exploration purposes. However, the Focus bid was a bit lower, so Exxon got the tract.

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Per BOEM’s latest update, 137 of the 313 Sale 259 tracts receiving bids have now been accepted. No decision has been made on the other 176 high bids, including the 69 bids for carbon sequestration purposes. For the reasons previously expressed, I continue to believe those sequestration bids were invalid.

Also, no decision has been made on Green Canyon 777, another block of particular interest.

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