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Posts Tagged ‘Fieldwood Energy’

How effectively does the Center for Offshore Safety measure industry performance?

Posted in accidents, Gulf of Mexico, Offshore Energy - General, tagged , , , , , , , , , on November 18, 2025| Leave a Comment »

deepwater floating production unit
shelf production complex

The Center for Offshore Safety (COS) was established in response to a recommendation by the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling for improved self-regulation by the offshore industry. The Commission supported the creation of a non-profit, industry-funded organization similar to the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, to promote the highest levels of safety and operational excellence. 

The COS has been effective in strengthening corporate Safety and Environmental Management Systems, influencing the industry’s safety culture, and sharing best practices and lessons learned. These are important accomplishments.

The COS has fallen short in gathering the data needed to assess the offshore industry’s safety performance. As is the case with most voluntary reporting programs, data completeness and accuracy issues limit the significance of COS performance reviews.

Observations regarding the most recent COS Offshore Safety Performance Report follow:

  • The COS uses accepted performance indicators and a logical classification scheme.
  • COS reports that their members accounted for 78% of OCS oil and gas activity in 2024. This is accurate when cross-checked with BSEE hours worked data. However, the % of hours worked is not a good measure of the % of incidents reported in any category.
  • Companies not participating included important operators like LLOG, Cantium, Walter, and W&T, a host of smaller Gulf independents, the 2024 violations leader (by a wide margin) Cox, and troubled Fieldwood. (See Fieldwood’s 2021 and 2022 performance.)
  • Only two drilling contractors – Helmerich & Payne and Valaris – are members. Major contractors like Noble, Transocean, and Seadrill are not members. Their incidents will thus not be reported if they are not working for a COS member.
  • No production contractors are COS members. These companies conduct most of the platform operations on the shelf, where many of the lease operators are not COS members.
  • Pacific and Alaska Region operators do not participate.
  • Looking only at fatalities (table below), the most important and easily verified incident category, there are troubling omissions:
    • COS reports no 2024 fatalities when in fact there was a fatality during an operation for a COS member.
    • COS reports no 2022 fatalities when there were actually five. A workover incident took the life of one worker, and four died in a helideck crash on an OCS platform. In both cases, the facility operator was a non-member company.
    • COS records one 2021 fatality, but fails to include a 2021 Fieldwood fatality. There were also 6 “non-occupational” fatalities on OCS facilities in 2021, as classified by BSEE. Given the importance of worker health (the H in HSE), such a high number of non-occupational fatalities should be of interest industry-wide.
    • The COS report includes only two of the six 2020 fatalities, 2 of which were classified by BSEE as non-occupational.
    • The bottom line is that COS accounted for only 3 of 12 (25%) occupational fatalities during the 2020-24 period. There were at least 20 fatalities if you include the non-occupational incidents.
fatalities per COSoccupational
fatalities (from BSEE data)		non-occupational
fatalities (from BSEE data)
202401?
202300?
202205?
2021126
2020242

The offshore industry is only as good as its worst performer, so complete participation is essential. Voluntary reporting is seldom complete reporting, because some companies are more concerned about confidentiality than completeness and information sharing.

For industry reporting programs to be comprehensive and credible:

  • The entity receiving the reports and managing the data must be independent and not affiliated with an industry advocacy organization.
  • All operating companies must participate and complete reporting must be required. This can be accomplished contractually. If necessary, the regulator can require participation (either as a separate regulation or as a SEMS element).
  • Company incident submittals should be audited by the independent entity.
  • Fees should be solely for the purpose of supporting the independent reporting system.
  • For SP1 and SP2 incidents (per the COS classification scheme), the names of the responsible companies should be included in the performance reports. The current COS system prioritizes confidentiality over accountabiity and information sharing.

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Cox legacy operations are GoA violations leaders. Will the lessons from past bankruptcies ever be learned?

Posted in accidents, California, decommissioning, energy policy, Gulf of Mexico, Offshore Energy - General, Regulation, tagged , , , , , , , , , , , on July 29, 2025| 1 Comment »

Background: On February 12, 2024, the bankruptcy court approved the sale of certain Cox Operating assets to Natural Resources Worldwide LLC (NRW), a company that “does not mine, drill, or produce minerals, has no operations, and conducts business solely in an office environment.”

NRW contracted with Array Petroleum to operate the former Cox Assets. Array subsequently sued NRW, asserting that NRW received $78,000,000 in revenue, but disbursed only about $48,000,000 to pay Array’s invoices and those of the subcontractor.

The court filing claimed that NRW failed to pay Array $2.5 million, the subcontractors $10.7 million, and the United States $12 million. A large share of the subcontractor costs were probably for well operations given that 21 Array workover applications were approved in 2024 and 2025. The $12 million due to the Federal government is reportedly for royalty payments. Were any revenues set aside for decommissioning liabilities?

Array’s lawsuit was dismissed by the court on January 3, 2025, after a joint motion to dismiss was filed by the defendants. Information on the reasons for the dismissal is not publicly available.

Old platforms: According to BOEM records, Array operates 154 platforms previously owned by Cox. These platforms are in the Ship Shoal, South Marsh Island, and West Delta areas of the Gulf of America. Most are >30 years old and four are more than 70 years old (see chart below). 41 are classified as major structures including 15 of the 26 platforms installed in the 1950s and 1960s. 44 are manned on a 24 hour basis. 79 have helidecks. Massive decommissioning liabilities loom.

Violations: NRW/Array ranks 37th out of 42 companies in GoA oil production (2025 YTD) and 36th out of 42 companies in gas production, but leads the pack in Incidents of Noncompliance (INCs):

  • Array accounted for nearly half of all GoA INCs issued in the first half of 2025 (chart below).
  • Array was issued 9 times more warning INCs (311) than any other operator. Apache was second with 34.
  • Array had more component shut-in INCS (46) than any other operator. W&T, another operator of Cox legacy platforms, was second with 32.
  • Array had more facility shut-in INCs (6) than any other operator. W&T was again second with 5.
  • Array averaged 2.0 INCs/facility inspection vs. a combined average of 0.3 INCs/facility inspection for all other operators.
violation typewarningscomponent shut-insfacility shut-ins
Array311466
all others21116449

Lessons that should have been learned from the Cox, Fieldwood, Black Elk, Signal Hill, and other bankruptcies dating back to the Alliance Operating Corp. failure in 1989:

  • There are many small and mid-sized companies that are responsible operators. Their participation in the OCS program should be encouraged. However, others have demonstrated, by their inattention to financial and safety requirements, that they are not fit to operate OCS facilities.
  • The growth of Fieldwood, Cox, Signal Hill, and Black Elk was in part facilitated by lax lease assignment and financial assurance policies. 
  • Operating companies should have to demonstrate that they can operate safety and comply with the regulations before they are approved to acquire more properties.
  • Despite ample evidence of the importance of compliance and safety performance in determining the need for supplemental financial assurance, BOEM’s 2024 rule dropped all consideration of these factors.,
  • Expect the ultimate public cost of the Cox bankruptcy, in terms of decommissioning liabilities and the need for increased oversight, to be large.
  • The Federal govt (Justice/Interior) should strongly oppose bankruptcy court asset sales that increase public financial, safety, and environmental risks.

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Report on the May 2021 GoM fatality is finally released, and there are many troubling findings. Were the regulations a contributing factor?

Posted in accidents, Gulf of Mexico, Offshore Energy - General, Regulation, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , on November 27, 2023| Leave a Comment »

link: Investigation of May 15, 2021, Fatality, Eugene Island Area Block 158 #14 Platform

Firstly, taking 2.5 years to publish an investigation report is unacceptable for an organization with BSEE’s talent, resources, and safety mandate. Unfortunately, such delays now seem to be the rule as the summary table (below) for the last 4 panel reports demonstrates. The most recent report implies that the actual investigation was completed in 2-3 months. Why were another 2+ years needed to publish the report? (Note that the lengthy and complex National Commission, BOEMRE, Chief Counsel, and NAE reports on the Macondo blowout were published 6 to to 17 months after the well was shut-in.)

incident datereport dateelapsed time (months)incident type
5/15/202110/31/202329.5fatality
1/24/20217/24/202330fatality
8/23/20202/15/202330fatality
7/25/20202/15/202331spill
Four most recent BSEE panel reports

The subject (May 2021) fatality occurred during a casing integrity pressure test, and some of the risk factors were familiar:

  • The operator, Fieldwood Energy, was facing bankruptcy, and had a poor performance record.
  • The platform was installed 52 years prior to the incident, and had been shut-in for more than a year.
  • The well of concern (#27) was drilled in 1970, sidetracked in 1995, and last produced in February 2013.
  • Diagnostic tests clearly demonstrated communication between the tubing, production casing, and surface casing.

In light of the known well integrity issues and the absence of production for more than 8 years, the prudent action would have been to plug and abandon the well in a timely manner. However, under 30 CFR 250.526 as interpreted at the time, Fieldwood had another option – submit a casing pressure request to BSEE to confirm the integrity of the outermost 16″ casing and (per p. 10 of the report) “continue to operate the well in its existing condition.” Given that the well had not produced for 8 years and that the platform had been shut-in for more than a year, the option to continue operating the well should not have been applicable.

The only issue for Fieldwood to resolve with the regulator should have been the timing of the plugging operation. Additional well diagnostics would only serve to create new risks and further delay the well’s abandonment.

The resulting pressure test of the outermost (16″) casing was solely for the purpose of confirming a second well bore barrier. Per the report (p.10), there is a “known frequency of outermost casings in the GOM experiencing a loss of integrity as a result of corrosion.” Whether or not the 16″ casing passed the test, the inactive well had clear integrity issues and should have been plugged.

Fieldwood proceeded with the pressure test rather than correcting the problem. The regulations, as interpreted, thus facilitated the unsafe actions that followed. These factors heightened the operational risks:

  • Extensive scaffolding and a standby boat were needed for the test.
  • Process gas via temporary test equipment was used to conduct the test.
  • The Field-Person In Charge (PIC) heard about the test for the first time on the morning of the incident.
  • The PIC and victim had no procedures to follow, and had to figure out how to conduct the test on the fly.
  • A high pressure hose was connected without a pressure regulator or pressure safety valve.
  • The digital pressure gauge had two measurement modes, one to display pressure in psi and the other in bars. (One bar is equivalent to 14.5 psi. Assuming that the readings were in psi rather than bars would thus result in serious overpressure of the casing.)

Seconds after the victim told the field-PIC the pressure was 175 psi (presumably 175 bar and 2538 psi), the casing ruptured. The force of the explosion propelled the victim into the handrail approximately 4 feet away, which bent from the impact. The victim’s hardhat was projected 60 to 80 feet upwards, lodging into the piping.

The investigation report fails to address the wisdom of conducting the pressure test and the regulatory weaknesses that enabled Fieldwood to defer safety critical well plugging operations. The pressure test option in 30 CFR § 250.526, was not intended for long out-of-service wells with demonstrated well integrity issues. The only acceptable option was corrective action (plugging the well) without further delay. The pressure test option added risks without addressing the fundamental problem and helped enable the operator to further delay decommissioning obligations.

The report also fails to address the lease administration practices that enabled a problem operator to expand their lease holdings. Indeed, BOEM’s inexplicable proposal to eliminate a company’s performance record in determining the need for supplemental bonding would exacerbate the risk of more such incidents. (See these comments on the BOEM proposal).

Postscript: According to BOEM data, the lease where the fatal incident occurred expired on 7/31/2021. Per the BSEE Borehole and structures files, neither the platform (#14) nor any of the other 4 structures remaining on the lease have been removed, and the well (#27) has yet to be plugged.

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Gulf of Mexico violations surged in 2021; one company is largely responsible

Posted in accidents, Gulf of Mexico, Offshore Energy - General, Regulation, tagged , , , , , on January 20, 2022| Leave a Comment »

Per BSEE’s Incidents of Non-Compliance (INC) data base, the number of violations surged in 2021, both in terms of the total number of INCs and the INCs/inspection ratio (see chart below). Remarkably, a single company – Fieldwood Energy – was responsible for 845 INCs or 44% of the total number issued. Normalizing for the number of inspections, Fieldwood facilities were cited for 1.46 INCs/inspection versus 0.46 INCs/inspection for all other companies. An unprecedented 61 of Fieldwood’s 2021 INCs called for facility shut-ins, many times more than any other operator. Through the first 17 days of 2022, Fieldwood has already been cited for 21 INCs, 5 of which required facilities to be shut-in.

Fieldwood and its affiliates have experienced multiple bankruptcies and the company has once again been reorganized with the blessing of the courts. Chevron’s comprehensive objection to the reorganization plan asserted that Fieldwood has $9 billion in current and anticipated decommissioning obligations. These enormous decommissioning liabilities and their implications for predecessor lessees (former facility owners) and the Federal government were the main issue in these proceedings, and the bankruptcy plan includes settlements with predecessor companies and the government.

Even more significant than the financial matters and INCs are the following:

While BSEE regulations provide for the removal of operating rights for poor safety performance, companies can reorganize and problem managers can reappear elsewhere. As a result, marginally financed and ineffective operating companies are a major challenge for BSEE as evidenced by the INCs, civil penalties, and investigations. (See the related saga of Platforms Hogan and Houchin in the Pacific Region.)

Poor safety performers drag down the entire industry. The costs of mega-disasters like the Santa Barbara and Macondo blowouts have been widely discussed. However, chronic poor performance and the associated incidents also weaken the industry and damage the integrity of the offshore oil and gas program. These performance issues can’t be left entirely to BSEE and the Coast Guard to resolve. The industry needs to do a better job of self-evaluation, calling out poor performers, and exercising judgement in the assignment of offshore properties.

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