Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged accidents, blowouts, Deepwater Horizon, drilling, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, Montara, offshore oil, oil spill, safety, well control on September 5, 2010| Leave a Comment »
This article is nicely done, but like most commentary on the factors contributing to the Macondo blowout, it assumes that the well flowed in the annulus outside the production casing. Steps 1-3 would be irrelevant if the well flowed up through the shoe track and inside the production casing (ala Montara).
Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged blowouts, Deepwater Horizon, drilling, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, safety, well control on September 4, 2010| Leave a Comment »
“Under the direction of the federal science team and U.S. government engineers, BP used the Development Driller II to successfully install a fully functioning and tested Blow Out Preventer (BOP) on the cemented Macondo 252 well. Earlier today, BP lifted the damaged BOP, which will now be lifted to the surface and recovered. During the period of time between the removal of the damaged BOP and installation of the replacement BOP, there was no observable release of hydrocarbons from the well head. This procedure was undertaken in accordance with specific conditions I set forth last week in a directive authorizing this procedure. This is an important milestone as we move toward completing the relief well and permanently killing the Macondo 252 well. I will continue to provide updates as necessary.” Admiral Allen
You have to love the wording of these Unified Command announcements. I trust (hope) that the language in bold is added by the public relations staff, and that the Admiral and the science team are secure enough in their leadership roles that they don’t need to continuously remind people about their importance.
Have the Admiral and the science team also directed the operations that have not gone so well, or only the successes? In particular, we would be interested in learning about the decision making process that led to the early cessation of the dynamic top-kill, the Unified Command’s insistence that pressure be vented after the well had been capped (fortunately, this decision was reversed), and the rationale for finishing the relief well intercept.
Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged accidents, blowouts, bp, Coast Guard, Deepwater Horizon, drilling, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, offshore oil, oil spill, relief well, safety, unified command, well control on September 3, 2010| Leave a Comment »
BP has issued a report on the response capabilities and innovative new technology and procedures demonstrated following the Macondo blowout. While the report is somewhat promotional (understandably), the information is summarized and compiled in a useful manner and underscores the magnitude of the response. Although most close observers probably have issues with certain actions taken by BP or the Unified Command, one cannot deny the unprecedented size and complexity of the response. We can only imagine how chaotic this response could have been if the operator did not have the resources and the will to mount such an enormous effort.
I hope BP will be similarly forthcoming with the results of their internal review of the blowout’s causes. When will that very important report be released?
At some point, BP’s candid observations on the functioning and effectiveness of the Unified Command system would also be helpful. The more we can learn about the differences of opinion and problems that arose during the response, the better we can prepare for future incidents. Will any of the official investigations be looking into these aspects of the response? At BOE, we are particularly interested in the well intervention, capping, containment, and relief well decisions.
Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged accidents, blowouts, BOE, Deepwater Horizon, drilling, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, Montara, offshore oil, oil spill, safety, well control on September 2, 2010| 1 Comment »
While there are no new details on the causes of the blowout, available information on the possible contributing factors is nicely summarized. The presentation also includes a very good summary of risk management considerations.
Barriers against accidents are not only technical and operational and “physical” but are also non-physical built around strategic and organizational measures and decisions
During the Montara hearings and later in Macondo discussions, we raised concerns about the timing of the production casing pressure test. This issue has not received enough attention in our view, possibly because most of the Macondo focus has been on annulus flow and barriers. It was good to see this comment in the presentation:
Pressure tested well far too early – could have blown out cement of shoe track
Posted in Uncategorized, tagged accidents, blowouts, chemical safety board, Deepwater Horizon, drilling, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, national academies, National Commission, offshore oil, safety, well control on September 1, 2010| 1 Comment »
Some readers have suggested links and information on the official US investigations of the Macondo blowout. Some basic information is provided below. The links will be added to the blogroll in the right column.
We will be examining the relevant facts and circumstances concerning the root causes of the Deepwater Horizon explosion and developing options to guard against, and mitigate the impact of, any oil spills associated with offshore drilling in the future. This may include recommending improvements to federal laws, regulations, and industry practices.
The purpose of this joint investigation is to develop conclusions and recommendations as they relate to the Deepwater Horizon Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) explosion and loss of life on April 20, 2010. The facts collected at this hearing, along with the lead investigators’ conclusions and recommendations will be forwarded to Coast Guard Headquarters and Minerals Management Service (MMS) for approval. Once approved, the final investigative report will be made available to the public and the media. No analysis or conclusions will be presented during the hearing.
This study will address the performance of technologies and practices involved in the probable causes of the Macondo well blowout and explosion on the Deepwater Horizon. It will also identify and recommend available technology, industry best practices, best available standards, and other measures in use around the world in deepwater exploratory drilling and well completion to avoid future occurrence of such events.
The CSB intends to proceed with an investigation of the root causes of the accidental chemical release that destroyed the Deepwater Horizon rig and took the lives of 11 workers. The investigation will include the key investigators who were involved in the CSB’s 2005-2007 investigation of the March 23, 2005, explosion at the BP Texas City refinery.
Various congressional committees are also reviewing issues associated with the blowout, most notably the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. As time permits, BOE will post updates on post-Macondo legislative actions.
Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged accidents, blowouts, BOE, Deepwater Horizon, drilling, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, offshore oil, safety, well control on August 30, 2010| Leave a Comment »
Posted in accidents, tagged accidents, Australia, blowouts, Deepwater Horizon, drilling, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, Magne Ognedal, Montara, Norway, offshore oil, ONS, well control on August 28, 2010| Leave a Comment »
BOE does not officially resume posting until 30 August, but we wanted to make sure you were aware of Magne Ognedal’s recent remarks to Upstream
“It is very frustrating,” Ognedal said. “We do not have the information we need to finish the job. We know from the transcripts of the inquiry that the Macondo and Montara blowouts appear to have very similar causes. However we cannot draw any conclusions until we have access to the report.”
I also suggest that you read the text of Magne’s excellent speech during the Safety Luncheon at ONS in Stavanger.
Magne Ognedal Addresses ONS Safety Luncheon
Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged accidents, blowouts, Deepwater Horizon, drilling, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, offshore oil, safety, well control on August 21, 2010| Leave a Comment »
Colin Leach brought this paper to my attention: Subsea Accumulators – Are They a False Reliance? As BOP actuation and shearing power issues take center stage, this paper warrants further review. Unfortunately, we were only able to link the abstract at this time. We will post the full paper if permission is granted.
Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged accidents, blowouts, Deepwater Horizon, drilling, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, offshore oil, oil spill, relief well, safety, well control on August 19, 2010| Leave a Comment »
Aug. 19, 2010 letter, click to enlarge
With the new BOP in place, and the capability to enter the well from the top, squeeze cement into the annulus, and set and test plugs, the relief well intercept appears to add nothing but risk. Is the relief well being finished because of the repeated “read my lips” statements about its necessity or is there a valid reason that we are missing?
Also, with the well killed, should the Incident Commander be directing and approving operations that seem to fall under the plugging and abandonment category? Those operations are under the purview of the Bureau of Offshore Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE) in the Department of the Interior. (Actually, according to the applicable MOU, (see section 10), BOEMRE should have had the lead on well control and flow abatement since the well blew out on April 20.)
Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged accidents, Australia, blowouts, croc, Deepwater Horizon, Gillard, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, Montara, offshore oil, safety, well control on August 19, 2010| Leave a Comment »
Like all swinging voters, Dirty Harry – a saltwater crocodile admired for his prediction prowess – took his time sniffing out the candidates in his enclosure at Crocosaurus Cove in Darwin today. Refusing to make a snap decision, Harry – reluctantly it seemed – chose the chicken carcass that was attached to a caricature of Prime Minister Julia Gillard.
Should the croc be correct, BOE friend Martin Ferguson will presumably retain his cabinet position and release the Montara report as promised. Why is the release of this report so important?
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 