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Posts Tagged ‘Deepwater Horizon’

Aug. 19, 2010 letter, click to enlarge

With the new BOP in place, and the capability to enter the well from the top, squeeze cement into the annulus, and set and test plugs, the relief well intercept appears to add nothing but risk.  Is the relief well being finished because of the repeated “read my lips” statements about its necessity or is there a valid reason that we are missing?

Also, with the well killed, should the Incident Commander be directing and approving operations that seem to fall under the plugging and abandonment category?  Those operations are under the purview of the Bureau of Offshore Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE) in the Department of the Interior.  (Actually, according to the applicable MOU, (see section 10), BOEMRE should have had the lead on well control and flow abatement since the well blew out on April 20.)

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Like all swinging voters, Dirty Harry – a saltwater crocodile admired for his prediction prowess – took his time sniffing out the candidates in his enclosure at Crocosaurus Cove in Darwin today. Refusing to make a snap decision, Harry – reluctantly it seemed – chose the chicken carcass that was attached to a caricature of Prime Minister Julia Gillard.

Link

Should the croc be correct, BOE friend Martin Ferguson will presumably retain his cabinet position and release the Montara report as promised.  Why is the release of this report so important?

  1. While the transcripts of the Inquiry hearings do a pretty good job of identifying the well planning, cementing, barrier, and management issues that were contributing factors, the Commission’s confirmation of the specific root causes of the blowout is essential.
  2. Only a few BOE geeks and a handful of others have actually read all of the testimony and submissions.  The Macondo planners and Deepwater Horizon crew either were totally unaware of what happened at Montara or ignored what they had learned.  I suspect that the former was the case.
  3. Important emergency response issues, which received minimal attention during the Montara hearings, will likely be discussed in the report.  Montara demonstrated that capping and containment operations can be more difficult for a surface well than they are for a subsurface well.   For safety reasons, a surface capping operation was prohibited at Montara.  Even if the operation was allowed, it probably wouldn’t have been successful because of the way the well was suspended.  Should well suspension practices take into account the possibility of a surface capping operation?
  4. The decision to move a rig from Singapore to drill the Montara relief well, rather than use rigs that were operating off Australia, has broad industry and regulatory implications.  Will this decision be assessed in the report?
  5. Finally, the Montara Commission makes recommendations for Australia’s offshore regulatory regime. These recommendations will be of great importance to the US and other nations that are reorganizing or initiating their regulatory programs.  We expect the Commission to recommend that a single agency regulate operational safety offshore Australia.  This is consistent with the recommendation in my testimony before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and the approach taken by Norway and other leading offshore regulators.  A regulatory regime that includes multiple agencies with overlapping or segmented jurisdiction guarantees conflict, confusion, gaps, and inefficiency.  Wells, platforms, and pipelines are integrated drilling and production systems, and must be regulated as such. Similarly, permitting, auditing, and inspection are integrated regulatory functions that cannot be effectively divided among multiple agencies.  One regulator must be responsible and accountable.

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We are currently working with BP engineers and our science team to look at test results and do investigations to lead us to the best way to mitigate any risk of intercepting the annulus and increasing the pressure in the annulus. Admiral Allen

This insistence on drilling into a “killed well” reminds me of the Unified Command’s plan to end to end the “well integrity test” and vent the well after it had been successfully capped on July 15.  Fortunately, the Command showed good judgement and reversed that decision. Perhaps they should do the same with the relief well intercept, which no longer appears to be necessary and may be hazardous.

The obvious next step is to re-enter the well from the top, perforate the production casing and squeeze cement into the annulus, and proceed with the plugging and abandonment operation.  If the Command has reasons why this would not be the best approach, we’d like to hear what they are.

Despite the repeated “my way is the relief well” pronouncements, I trust that the Command will choose the option that accomplishes the objectives with the fewest risks to safety and the environment.

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While the author was apparently unaware of the recent crane failure and fatality on Transocean’s Jack Ryan, that and other offshore crane incidents (not only on Transocean rigs) came immediately to mind in reading this Washington Post article.  Readers should also be aware of the crane safety program of the International Regulators’ Forum.  From the  Washington Post article:

Case in point: In April, the company that owned the rig gave parts of two cranes (on the Deepwater Horizon) its worst rating, indicating that they did not work or should be removed from service.

Were the cranes removed from service pending corrective action?

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Letter from Admiral Allen to BP:

… in response to BP’s request to consider foregoing the relief well, the government scientific technical team has determined that the benefits of the bottom kill procedure outweighs the risks.

  1. Did BP really ask to forgo the relief well or was this just a point of discussion?  If so, it would be nice to hear BP’s side of this.
  2. Is BP confident the annulus is plugged?  If so, what is the basis for their confidence?
  3. If the annulus is plugged, what is the objective for the relief well?  To confirm that cement is in place?  Inject additional cement? Is there sufficient information to properly assess the risks associated with such an injection procedure?
  4. If not unprecedented, it is certainly unusual to drill a relief well into a well that has been killed.  Could measures taken during the abandonment operation (e.g. cut the production casing and set a plug over the production casing  stub) assure the Unified Command that the annulus is sealed?

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Yesterday we were watching the evening news and the reporter raised concerns about a rise in well pressure.  I hadn’t heard anything about that, so I checked the transcript from Admiral Allen’s briefing, and he said no such thing.  Here is a direct quote from the transcript:

Finally, we have finished approximately 24 hour period of doing an ambient pressure test on the well head.  The pressure has not changed depreciably (must mean appreciably) over that time period.  So the one thing we can rule out right now that it has direct communication with the reservoir.  Had the pressure risen, we would have known that there were hydrocarbons being forced up from the reservoir.  So we know there’s some kind of a – something that is between the annulus and the reservoir that is not allowing the flow of hydrocarbons forward.

Given the absence of technical details and people to explain them (an ongoing issue), one can understand the reporter’s confusion.  Attempting to read between the lines, I would assume they conducted a negative pressure test (reduced pressure at the wellhead to ambient or that of a column of sea water), and that pressure readings remained constant for the duration of the test.  This would imply that there was no influx of oil and gas up the annulus.  Perhaps the annulus was sealed during the recent cementing operation or flow up the annulus is otherwise blocked.

Of course, we are still waiting for the Unified Command to comment on the well’s flow path.  While this information is fundamental to the root cause analysis of the blowout, there is no apparent political pressure (unlike with flow rates) to inform the public about the latest thinking in that regard.  This is interesting because some of the prescriptive responses to Macondo that are already in progress may be based on erroneous information about the cause of the blowout.

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We have heard plenty about Macondo’s real, imagined, and convenient villains, but very little about the heroes.  Let’s pay tribute to them:

  1. First and foremost the eleven men who lost their lives exploring for energy for our economy and security.  Sadly, were it not for the massive spill, their sacrifice would have received little public attention.
  2. The rescue crews who brought the other 115 workers safely to shore.
  3. The responders who worked under difficult conditions to minimize the environmental effects of the spilled oil.
  4. The relief well crews who demonstrated how complex drilling operations should be conducted.
  5. The ROV and well intervention teams.  The performance of the ROVs and subsea tools is perhaps the biggest Macondo success story.  Their pioneering work will be studied in developing the well intervention, capping, and collection plans that will be a part of future drilling programs.
  6. The people of Louisiana, who despite their personal adversity continue to believe that energy, fishing, and other offshore interests can and must co-exist.
  7. The MMS oil spill research program.  In the lean years following the Valdez oil spill research surge, MMS continued to conduct important burning, dispersant, remote sensing, and mechanical cleanup studies, while upgrading and expanding the use of the nation’s major oil spill response test facility – Ohmsett.
  8. The Unified Command scientists who are providing comprehensive scientific data about the effects of the spill, and refuse to be swayed by sensational media reports.
  9. Oil consuming bacteria!
  10. Others?

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A newspaper says it has obtained an internal audit conducted by BP PLC on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig that details severe safety flaws months before the Gulf of Mexico spill.

link

Comment: Was this a planned leak?  If so, how does this strengthen BP’s legal position?  The DWH had deficiencies (bad for Transoocean), but BP knew about the deficiencies and didn’t ensure that they were corrected (worse for BP?).  As indicated by the poster below (More “Mike Talk”), the poor working relationship between the operator and contractor may have been the real core problem.

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  1. Now that the Unified Command has had a couple of days to review the static kill data (which were certainly considered in planning the cementing operation that was concluded yesterday), please provide an update on the latest thinking with regard to the well’s flow path.
  2. Please post a cross section schematic (best estimate) of the well after the completion of yesterday’s cementing operation.

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Kent Well’s response to a reporter’s question and Colin Leach’s comment on BOE seem to give credence to our suspicion that the flow path for the Macondo well was inside the production casing!  If true, this is enormously significant for the following reasons:

  1. The root cause of Macondo is eerily similar to that at Montara in that oil and gas entered the well via compromised cement in the casing shoe and a failed float.  Did the BP engineers and TO crew even know about Montara?  This shows why accident information must be promptly circulated and brought to the attention of key personnel everywhere in the world. It also demonstrates why the Montara report needs to be released without further delay.
  2. Presumed contributing factors that would be irrelevant or less significant: the long string vs. liner/tieback decision, and the failure to run a Cement Bond Log, additional centralizers, or a lockdown sleeve on the casing seal.
  3. Contributing factors that would have even greater importance: selection of the casing point (integrity at the base of the well), waiting on cement time, timing of the positive and negative pressure tests (this is a topic that warrants much more scrutiny and discussion), and failure to set a cement plug before displacing the mud with sea water.

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