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Jane Cutler, CEO of the National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority, makes important comments on leadership in this interview.

I’m privileged to work with some great people who are passionate about improving safety. This role within NOPSA provides me with a great opportunity to make a difference and allows me to foster a really proactive work culture, removing obstacles that make it harder for people to do their work well.

Almost everyone involved with offshore safety is passionate about their work and wants to make a difference.  Unfortunately, they are often frustrated by administrative and organizational processes that prevent them from identifying and addressing important safety issues in the most effective and efficient manner.  While there has been much post-Macondo talk about safety policy, there has been little discussion about the organizational constraints that stifle initiative and creativity within regulatory programs.  The focus should be on enabling bright and dedicated people to create and sustain an optimal regulatory environment for safety achievement by the operating companies and their contractors.

Greenpeace Photo

Despite protests, the UK has approved Chevron’s exploratory well in 1640′ of water west of the Shetland Islands.

It was a choice between producing oil and gas here in U.K. waters, where we have one of the most robust safety and regulatory regimes in the world, with all the economic benefits that will bring, or paying to import oil and gas from elsewhere. UK Department of Energy and Climate Change statement

It’s pretty hard to argue with that logic.

Capt. Hung Nguyen, David Dykes, and Jason Mathews question the witness. Sylvia Murphy and Kirk Malstrom monitor attentively from the 2nd row.

The panel that is most closely investigating the technical and operational aspects of the Macondo blowout reconvenes on Monday morning at 0800 CT in New Orleans.

I would assume that one of the CSpan stations will be covering the hearings, but their broadcast schedule for next week has not yet been posted.

Scarabeo 9

According to the Miami Herald an Italian rig, the Scarabeo 9, will drill the long-awaited exploratory well offshore Cuba.  The article indicates that the new-build rig is expected to arrive in Cuba late this year.

Per Oil and Gas Interntional:

The Scarabeo 9 embodies the latest technology for deepwater drilling operations and is capable of drilling in waters 3,600 meters in depth. Expectations are it will mobilize to Cuban waters during the second or third quarter of 2011 and commence drilling during the third or fourth quarter. (note: the Miami Herald article projects an earlier arrival). Repsol holds the six blocks in the Cuban sector of the Gulf of Mexico in a production-sharing agreement with Union Cubapetroleo (Cupet), the Cuban national oil company. The concession encompasses Blocks N25, N26, N27, N28, N29, and N36, a combined area of some 10,200 sq km along the island’s northwest coast. Repsol is the operator of the six blocks with 40% interest in partnership with Statoil, holding 30% and Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) with the remaining 30%.

Today, BOEM released fact sheets describing the Drilling Safety and Safety and Environmental Management (SEMS) rules. The complete documents will be available for review as soon as they are published in the Federal Register.

Based on the fact sheet, the Drilling Safety Rule does not appear to include any significant surprises.  The rule seems to be generally consistent with the recommendations in Secretary Salazar’s 27 May Safety Measures Report to the President (the “30-Day Report”).  This is an Interim Final Rule that will be effective upon publication.

According to the fact sheet, the SEMS Rule will incorporate all elements of API RP 75 into BOEM regulations.  This is an improvement, in my opinion, from the proposed rule which incorporated only 4 elements of RP 75.  The effective date for this rule is not indicated in the fact sheet.

Safety culture is how the organization behaves when no one is watching.

Also, NOPSA’s September Newsletter has some interesting updates including information on the jackup failure offshore China.

And how does a reporter question the humility of engineers? 🙂

Engineers do amazing things, but they aren’t always as smart as they think, nor their systems as robust as they seem on paper.

In our last Cuba update, we noted that their next deepwater well always seems to be a year away. So it came as no surprise when we saw this in a New York Times article:

Yet next year, a Spanish company will begin drilling new wells 50 miles from the Florida Keys — in Cuba’s sovereign waters.

Comment: We have been hearing this for five years.  Will the well really be spudded next year?

The nascent oil industry in Cuba is far less prepared to handle a major spill than even the American industry was at the time of the BP spill. Cuba has neither the submarine robots needed to fix deepwater rig equipment nor the platforms available to begin drilling relief wells on short notice.

Comments: (1) Not a good time for the US to be lecturing Cuba about oil spills.  (2)In the event of a spill, all well intervention, relief well, and spill response equipment would no doubt be made available to Cuba without hesitation and with the full support of the US government. (3)A Cuban blowout is unlikely because every operator and contractor in the world will be focusing on well integrity and BOP performance issues that were factors in the Macondo blowout. (4)Informed international contacts have advised us that Cuban offshore officials are knowledgeable and committed to internationally accepted safety and pollution prevention standards.

My biggest concern with regard to Cuban offshore operations, assuming a moored rig is used, is that the rig would be set adrift during a hurricane and that anchors, mooring lines, or hulls could damage coral reefs and other sensitive seafloor features.  In the US, the MMS and industry did a lot of good work on mooring risk assessments and improved anchoring systems and mooring lines.   Given the significant probability that Cuban rigs will be exposed to hurricane conditions, it is imperative that US and Cuban specialists meet to discuss these issues.  Once a rig is adrift, there is not much that can be done to stop it.

Also, in an award winning project, a multi-agency US government team demonstrated enhanced satellite monitoring capabilities that provide timely information on the location of evacuated rigs.   These capabilities can be combined with gps systems to ensure continuous rig-tracking.

US-Cuban cooperation on offshore safety and pollution prevention issues is in the best interest of both countries, and should be encouraged without hesitation.

BP has announced a new safety unit and other organizational changes. For more on the changes, see the Upstream report.

From a BOE perspective, the most interesting comment in the BP release was this Bob Dudley quote:

Our response to the incident needs to go beyond deepwater drilling. There are lessons for us relating to the way we operate, the way we organize our company and the way we manage risk.

I hope the rest of the offshore industry has the same view and is prepared to work together to assess and mitigate operational risks. To date, industry has reacted impressively to issues raised since the Macondo well blew out on 20 April.  However, what is being done to identify operational and safety risks that could trigger the next disaster? When will complete, consistent, and verified international incident data be collected and published?.  How do you manage risks without such data?  Why weren’t the lessons from Montara quickly disseminated around the world?  If they were, Macondo may have been prevented.

Aban Pearl listing off Trinidad in August 2009

For those who haven’t been following this saga, the Aban Pearl, a semi-submersible drilling rig, sank off of Venezuela on 13 May 2010. The seas were calm and the skies were clear, so the cause of the accident is a mystery.  We have learned from a reliable and knowledgeable source that PDVSA, the national oil company of Venezuela, has conducted an official investigation to determine the cause(s) of this accident.  We urge them to release their report so that all may benefit from their findings.

While searching the web for other information on the Aban Pearl, I was surprised to find that the rig was reported to be listing offshore Trinidad & Tobago in August 2009, and that assistance was requested from the T&T Coast Guard. This incident occurred nine months before the rig sank offshore Venezuela.

According to Public Relations Officer at the T&T Coast Guard Lt Kirk Jean Baptiste, the T&T Coast Guard received a distress call from the rig around 2.45 pm. “The Coast Guard received a call that one of the flotation devices on the rig was taking in water which caused the rig to lean on one side,” he said. Sources said it belonged to an Indian company, but was registered in Singapore. They said it was not working, but just passing through T&T waters. Rigs are normally moved with the help of other boats.

We have commented frequently about the similarities between the Montara and Macondo blowouts, particularly the root cause casing shoe issues. In this post, Colin Leach draws attention to the float shoe and collar issues that permitted oil and gas to enter both wells. Click here to view the full post.

The Bly report (page 70) noted some significant “inconsistencies” in the operation of the float shoe/float collar (see full post). This is so similar in nature to the “inconsistencies” in the 9 5/8″ cement job on the Montara well to be scary. The bottom line is that both disasters could have been prevented if these “inconsistencies” had been recognized and additional barriers placed above the float collar. In fact even if there are no “inconsistencies”, the placing of an additional barrier or so seems like an exceptionally prudent step, which would not take that much time or effort.