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Archive for the ‘accidents’ Category

The Center for Offshore Safety (COS) was established in response to a recommendation by the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling for improved self-regulation by the offshore industry. The Commission supported the creation of a non-profit, industry-funded organization similar to the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, to promote the highest levels of safety and operational excellence. 

The COS has been effective in strengthening corporate Safety and Environmental Management Systems, influencing the industry’s safety culture, and sharing best practices and lessons learned. These are important accomplishments.

The COS has fallen short in gathering the data needed to assess the offshore industry’s safety performance. As is the case with most voluntary reporting programs, data completeness and accuracy issues limit the significance of COS performance reviews.

Observations regarding the most recent COS Offshore Safety Performance Report follow:

  • The COS uses accepted performance indicators and a logical classification scheme.
  • COS reports that their members accounted for 78% of OCS oil and gas activity in 2024. This is accurate when cross-checked with BSEE hours worked data. However, the % of hours worked is not a good measure of the % of incidents reported in any category.
  • Companies not participating included important operators like LLOG, Cantium, Walter, and W&T, a host of smaller Gulf independents, the 2024 violations leader (by a wide margin) Cox, and troubled Fieldwood. (See Fieldwood’s 2021 and 2022 performance.)
  • Only two drilling contractors – Helmerich & Payne and Valaris – are members. Major contractors like Noble, Transocean, and Seadrill are not members. Their incidents will thus not be reported if they are not working for a COS member.
  • No production contractors are COS members. These companies conduct most of the platform operations on the shelf, where many of the lease operators are not COS members.
  • Pacific and Alaska Region operators do not participate.
  • Looking only at fatalities (table below), the most important and easily verified incident category, there are troubling omissions:
    • COS reports no 2024 fatalities when in fact there was a fatality during an operation for a COS member.
    • COS reports no 2022 fatalities when there were actually five. A workover incident took the life of one worker, and four died in a helideck crash on an OCS platform. In both cases, the facility operator was a non-member company.
    • COS records one 2021 fatality, but fails to include a 2021 Fieldwood fatality. There were also 6 “non-occupational” fatalities on OCS facilities in 2021, as classified by BSEE. Given the importance of worker health (the H in HSE), such a high number of non-occupational fatalities should be of interest industry-wide.
    • The COS report includes only two of the six 2020 fatalities, 2 of which were classified by BSEE as non-occupational.
    • The bottom line is that COS accounted for only 3 of 12 (25%) occupational fatalities during the 2020-24 period. There were at least 20 fatalities if you include the non-occupational incidents.
fatalities per COSoccupational
fatalities (from BSEE data)
non-occupational
fatalities (from BSEE data)
202401?
202300?
202205?
2021126
2020242

The offshore industry is only as good as its worst performer, so complete participation is essential. Voluntary reporting is seldom complete reporting, because some companies are more concerned about confidentiality than completeness and information sharing.

For industry reporting programs to be comprehensive and credible:

  • The entity receiving the reports and managing the data must be independent and not affiliated with an industry advocacy organization.
  • All operating companies must participate and complete reporting must be required. This can be accomplished contractually. If necessary, the regulator can require participation (either as a separate regulation or as a SEMS element).
  • Company incident submittals should be audited by the independent entity.
  • Fees should be solely for the purpose of supporting the independent reporting system.
  • For SP1 and SP2 incidents (per the COS classification scheme), the names of the responsible companies should be included in the performance reports. The current COS system prioritizes confidentiality over accountabiity and information sharing.

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The Canada-Newfoundland Labrador Offshore Energy Regulator (C-NLOER) informs that once again no bids were received for tracts in the Eastern Newfoundland or Labrador South regions. According to this article, the outcome (no bids)was the same from 2021-2024.

Difficult operating conditions, high costs, and relatively modest oil price projections are no doubt factors contributing to the absence of bids. Energy NL has also pointed to the “complex, inconsistent and burdensome regulatory system” as a contributing factor.

Newfoundland’s newly elected Premier, Tony Wakeham, has said his Progressive Conservative Government will advocate for the cancellation of the emissions cap as it is a cap on production. He also supports incentives for offshore oil and gas projects such as an investment tax credit or the former Petroleum Incentive Program and indicated he would work with Energy NL to review incentives that could be implemented provincially.

The C-NLOER is committed to “review its land tenure system in collaboration with governments and others, to identify opportunities to enhance competitiveness in the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area.”

On a separate policy matter, C-NLOER is applauded for announcing offshore safety/environmental incidents, including significant near misses, without delay. In the US, you have to scour BSEE investigation reports to find out about significant incidents or wait a year or more until the incident table is updated. This is inexcusable!

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Plymouth MA wind turbine that lost a blade. (Stuart Cahill/Boston Herald)

Friday’s turbine blade failure in Plymouth MA is perhaps getting added attention given its proximity to the 7/13/2024 Vineyard Wind blade failure offshore Nantucket. The Plymouth blade landed in a nearby cranberry bog (video and picture below).

Per the MV Times, the turbines for the Plymouth project were manufactured by Gamesa, which is now part of Siemens Gamesa. Both the South Fork Wind and Revolution Wind projects off the coast of the Martha’s Vineyard are being developed by Ørsted using turbines from Siemens Gamesa. Coastal Virginia Offshore Wind, the largest offshore wind project in the United States, is also being developed with Siemens Gamesa turbines. This is not to imply a higher degree of risk for those turbines. Vineyard Wind, where the only US offshore failure has occurred to date, is using GE Vernova turbines.

Unfortunately, turbine blade failures are much too common. Last October, Lars Herbst reported, based on a Wind Power article, that “with an estimated 700,000 blades in operation globally, there are, on average, 3,800 incidents of blade failure each year.” Lars noted that the annual blade failure rate of about 0.5% translates to 1.5% of all operating wind turbines experiencing a blade failure every year, a remarkably high failure frequency.

Scotland Against Spin data indicate that blade failure is the second most common accident type in the wind industry, and the most common cause of accidents at operational wind turbine sites. SAS reports further that pieces of blade are documented as travelling up to one mile, and have gone through the roofs and walls of nearby buildings.

Lastly, we are still awaiting BSEE’s report on the Vineyard Wind failures so we can better understand what happened and why.

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(from the BOE archives)

Vineyard Wind’s finest! Note the blade failures!

Wild Well Control!

Our North Atlantic District crew, Hyannis, Halloween 1981 <sigh>

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JL Daeschler brought the report on the Titan submersible tragedy to my attention. In June 2023, five died when the Titan dove to the Titanic wreckage in the North Atlantic (map below).

The full NTSB report has now been issued and is attached.

The NTSB found that OceanGate’s engineering process for the Titan was inadequate and resulted in the construction of a carbon fiber composite pressure vessel that contained multiple anomalies and failed to meet necessary strength and durability requirements. Because OceanGate did not adequately test the Titan, the company was unaware of the pressure vessel’s actual strength and durability, which was likely much lower than their target, as well as the implications of how certain operational changes, including storage condition and towing, could impact the integrity of the pressure vessel and overall safety of the vessel. Additionally, OceanGate’s analysis of Titan pressure vessel real-time monitoring data was flawed, so the company was unaware that the Titan was damaged and needed to be immediately removed from service after dive 80.

As is the case with most NTSB reports, the technical analysis and findings are very sound. However, it would be helpful if the NTSB also considered the organizational factors that contributed to the engineering process failures, testing inadequacies, and data analysis flaws. Was there pressure to accelerate the mission? Budget crunch? Training deficiencies? Oversight issues? This type of information can help improve management systems and prevent accidents throughout the marine industry and beyond.

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Kudos to Scotland Against Spin (SAS) for compiling and updating turbine incident data. Their latest summary through Sept. 30, 2025 is attached. Their detailed historical table (334 pages) is linked.

The SAS data indicate that the number of wind turbine incidents has risen sharply in recent years (see chart below). The increased number of turbines worldwide, and perhaps better news coverage of incidents, presumably contributed to the sharp increase. Nonetheless, the growing number of incidents is disconcerting, as is the absence of industry and government summaries and reports.

SAS acknowledges that their list, which is dependent on publicly available reports, is merely the “tip of the iceberg.” For example, the list does not include the June 2, 2025, Empire Wind project fatality.

The SAS list does capture the 2018 collapse of the Russell Peterson liftboat, which was collecting data offshore Delaware for a wind project. One worker died and another was seriously endangered. The Coast Guard never issued a report on this tragic incident. Serious questions remain about the positioning of a liftboat in the Mid-Atlantic for several months beginning in March when major storms are likely, the liftboat’s failure mechanisms, the operator’s authority to be conducting this research, and the actions that were taken in preparation for storm conditions.

Liftboat Russell Peterson, May 12, 2008

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Earlier this week a tree service company was removing some large branches in our backyard. The 2 young workers stopped the job before they finished. They knocked on our door and told me that their foreman was off and they were uncomfortable tackling a large, high branch without him and a crane operator. They would come back with a full crew.

I congratulated them and told them they did exactly the right thing. I told them I was involved with offshore safety and many serious incidents would have been prevented if workers, with their employers encouragement, had been more assertive in stopping work. Developing that type of culture takes time and requires strong leadership and consistent, unambiguous messaging. Leadership matters, both at the site and in the office!

The Macondo well is a worst case example on many fronts, including the reluctance or inability of management and workers to stop taking actions that increased well control risks. Given the narrow pore pressure/fracture gradient, the prudent decision would have been to set a cement plug in the open hole and carefully assess next steps. However, delays and cost overruns were the overriding concerns, and well construction continued despite the long list of issues described here. Sadly, we know how that worked out.

Even after the well started to flow, the crew had time to actuate the emergency disconnect sequence and avert disaster. However, some combination of deficient training, uncertain authority, and fear of repercussions prevented that from happening.

Be it a small tree service company or a major oil company, safety culture development is a journey that has no end point and requires continuous leadership from everyone in the organization.

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and should be an integral part of Job Safety Analyses!

According to BSEE, there is a recurring trend of equipment misuse contributing to fire and explosion hazards during offshore oil and gas operations in the Gulf of America.

Workers have used tools not rated for electrical work on live circuits (Figure 1) and mismatched hydraulic or pneumatic tools for high-pressure systems (Figure 2). In several cases, non-intrinsically safe hand tools were used in explosive atmospheres, including mudrooms and drilling floors.

The Safety Alert is attached.

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Ed Punchard today; Piper Alpha survivor

JL Daeschler shared a London Sunday Times piece about the Piper Alpha fire that killed 167 workers, the worst tragedy in the history of the offshore industry. We were troubled by the headline, because it seems inconceivable that any UK offshore worker could call July 6, 1988, the best day of their life. However, Punchard helped a number of workers escape the fire, so his mixed message is somewhat understandable.

Lord Cullen’s comprehensive inquiry into the Piper Alpha tragedy challenged traditional thinking about regulation and how safety objectives could best be achieved, and was perhaps the most important report in the history of offshore oil and gas operations. That report and the US regulatory response to the tragedy are discussed in this post.

BSEE’s new downhole commingling rule, which responds to a Congressional mandate, is contrary to Cullen’s Safety Case principles in that it puts the burden of proof on the regulator to conclusively demonstrate that a potentially hazardous operation is unsafe. This is exactly the opposite of the approach recommended by Cullen. It’s also the first time in the history of the OCS program that Congress has dictated approval of complex downhole operations. More on this in a later post.

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