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Posts Tagged ‘safety’

Hart E&P shares reader feedback about the infamous Tiger Mike. (also, see our precious post)

Meanwhile BOE Senior VP Odd Finnestad recalls experiences with Mike-like characters offshore Norway:

For some reason I think there were many – and still are some – Tiger Mikes around in the business. I know they were here in Norway when our first field, the Ekofisk, was discovered by the “Ocean Viking” and later developed the field way back in the sixties. And when you would be sacked simply for having been clumsy enough to have had your fingers crushed by the makeup or breakout tongs. The comment of the ODECO supervisor would then probably be: “Five minutes for a smoke. Then you come back or you f…. jump on the first f…. helicopter!” He might even have added: “And, if you do, I don’t want to see your f…. face again!” well knowing that it was not really necessary for him to elaborate on the fate of the poor Norwegian roustabout that had just signed on for the good money!

You do not find so many of these supervisors in the offshore NCS today. But I think I can still see some – busily harassing employees in other types of oil and gas related organisations.

The Tiger Mikes of today are much more subtle.  While they may say the right things (at least officially), their actions and offhand comments send other signals.  They insist on making every decision, create an atmosphere where employees are afraid to raise safety concerns, and ignore warning signs that might delay operations and increase costs.

When things go wrong, the temptation for both operators and regulators is to be more like Tiger Mike – more memos, more prescription, and more approvals. While this approach may address certain technical or operational details that contributed to a specific accident, it does not address the fundamental leadership, organizational, and cultural shortcomings that must be corrected to improve operational performance and reduce safety and environmental risks.

Great organizations stimulate and harness employee energy and ingenuity such that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Similarly, great regulations foster organizational excellence on the part of both the regulated community and the regulator.

Don’t be like Mike!

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G’Day Australia.  There are now only 2 weeks until the Federal election. Ironically, the election, which may have delayed the release of the Montara Inquiry report, will be held on the first anniversary of that blowout.

This report will play an important role in keeping our workers safe, protecting our environment and safeguarding our energy security. Minister Martin Ferguson

BOE fully agrees with Minister Ferguson’s statement about the importance of the Montara Inquiry report and hopes that he or his successor promptly releases the report after the election.  The lessons learned at Montara will not only prevent accidents in Australia, but elsewhere in the world. In light of the disturbing similarities between the two blowouts, it is possible that closer international attention to Montara might even have prevented the Macondo blowout.

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  1. Now that the Unified Command has had a couple of days to review the static kill data (which were certainly considered in planning the cementing operation that was concluded yesterday), please provide an update on the latest thinking with regard to the well’s flow path.
  2. Please post a cross section schematic (best estimate) of the well after the completion of yesterday’s cementing operation.

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Upstream has confirmed the crane incident on the Jack Ryan during operations offshore Nigeria.

According to a summary incident report into the accident, seen by Upstream, the port aft crane boom and cab, together with the three men, went overboard during load testing.

Upstream understands that the crane boom snapped during the tests.

The Upstream report is consistent with information provided separately by Malcolm Sharples.  One worker is still missing.

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Kent Well’s response to a reporter’s question and Colin Leach’s comment on BOE seem to give credence to our suspicion that the flow path for the Macondo well was inside the production casing!  If true, this is enormously significant for the following reasons:

  1. The root cause of Macondo is eerily similar to that at Montara in that oil and gas entered the well via compromised cement in the casing shoe and a failed float.  Did the BP engineers and TO crew even know about Montara?  This shows why accident information must be promptly circulated and brought to the attention of key personnel everywhere in the world. It also demonstrates why the Montara report needs to be released without further delay.
  2. Presumed contributing factors that would be irrelevant or less significant: the long string vs. liner/tieback decision, and the failure to run a Cement Bond Log, additional centralizers, or a lockdown sleeve on the casing seal.
  3. Contributing factors that would have even greater importance: selection of the casing point (integrity at the base of the well), waiting on cement time, timing of the positive and negative pressure tests (this is a topic that warrants much more scrutiny and discussion), and failure to set a cement plug before displacing the mud with sea water.

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Click to read the full “Oil Budget” report (just released).

The vast majority of the oil from the BP oil spill has either evaporated or been burned, skimmed, recovered from the wellhead or dispersed – much of which is in the process of being degraded.

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I awoke to an email message from Odd Finnestad linking the BP announcement.  It’s only fitting that Odd delivered the news. He and I have been following Montara and Macondo on a daily basis since August 21, 2009, the day the Montara well blew out in the Timor Sea.  A few thoughts:

  • The real end date for the blowout was July 15th, when the containment cap shut-in the well.  It was an uncertain ending with the capping described as a temporary integrity test and talk about re-opening well vents. Fortunately, good judgement and common sense prevailed, and the well remained shut-in.
  • The efforts to prevent recurrence can now proceed with fewer distractions. It’s difficult to calmly address the issues while video images of oil gushing into the Gulf are being broadcast worldwide.
  • We need to do more than react to Macondo, and every offshore operator and contractor needs to be involved. Only 20% of Gulf of Mexico operators attended a critical industry-government hurricane conference after Katrina and Rita.  (No, I’m not going to stop ranting about this!)
  • Industry needs to look at EVERY aspect of offshore operations, not just the drilling issues associated with Macondo.  Fixing what happened at Macondo doesn’t prevent production, pipeline, and other types of drilling disasters.  Helicopter safety, lifting operations, and workplace safety issues also need to be further addressed.
  • This is a major effort and everyone needs to participate.  If you aren’t committed to improving overall safety performance, in the US and worldwide, you shouldn’t be in the business.

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Upstream reports that a worker is missing from Transocean’s Jack Ryan drillship which is working in the Akpo field offshore Nigeria. Two other workers were recovered from the water.  The accident occurred on Saturday, but neither TO nor the Nigerian Petroleum Corporation are providing any details.  Hopefully, more information will be forthcoming in the near future.

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End game mysteries?:  As BP prepares for the static kill operation, the well’s flow path is still not clear.   While the consensus seems to be that the flow originates in the annulus outside the production casing, irregularities during the cementing and testing of that casing suggest the possibility of flow inside the casing.  The condition of the well bore and casing strings is also uncertain. Perhaps of greatest importance will be the inspection of the BOPE after the well is plugged and the stack is pulled.  This inspection process should be closely supervised by the regulators.

Press conference etiquette?: After admitting that they joined yesterday’s Unified Command press briefing late, two reporters asked questions that had been answered earlier.  Perhaps they think their time is more important than Admiral Allen’s, or that of the other attendees, viewers, and listeners.  One of these questioners asked when the static kill operation would begin.  Admiral Allen, who answered the question politely and patiently, should have asked when it would be most convenient for the reporter. Surely, the Unified Command would want to accommodate the reporter’s busy schedule. 😉

Dispersants: As has been demonstrated at oil spill workshops and conferences for the past 30 years, you can always stir up passions by questioning the use of dispersants.  Dispersants, unlike burning and skimmers, don’t remove oil from the water (at least not directly).  The On-Scene Commander (OSC) must consider the tradeoffs and make the decisions that he or she thinks will minimize the net impact of the spill.  Given the magnitude of location of the Macondo spill, I think the OSCs made the correct calls.  Dispersants were also used (not without controversy of course) in responding to last year’s Montara blowout in the Timor Sea.

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This incident isn’t receiving much attention, perhaps because the volumes being discharged are small by comparison to Macondo and there is no “supermajor” to criticize.  I expect that there would be a tad more coverage if BP was the operator. In any event, we thank the folks at NOLA.com for tracking this one.

Despite the dearth of media attention, this is a very disturbing leak/discharge/blowout (you choose) from a safety and environmental management standpoint.  The well was apparently no longer producing and was left without any downhole barriers that would prevent flow in the event of hurricane damage, a fire, or a vessel collision (what happened).  While pollution spectaculars like Macondo deserve the notoriety, industry should be just as determined to address more systemic problems like this one.

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