Feeds:
Posts
Comments

Posts Tagged ‘safety’

End game mysteries?:  As BP prepares for the static kill operation, the well’s flow path is still not clear.   While the consensus seems to be that the flow originates in the annulus outside the production casing, irregularities during the cementing and testing of that casing suggest the possibility of flow inside the casing.  The condition of the well bore and casing strings is also uncertain. Perhaps of greatest importance will be the inspection of the BOPE after the well is plugged and the stack is pulled.  This inspection process should be closely supervised by the regulators.

Press conference etiquette?: After admitting that they joined yesterday’s Unified Command press briefing late, two reporters asked questions that had been answered earlier.  Perhaps they think their time is more important than Admiral Allen’s, or that of the other attendees, viewers, and listeners.  One of these questioners asked when the static kill operation would begin.  Admiral Allen, who answered the question politely and patiently, should have asked when it would be most convenient for the reporter. Surely, the Unified Command would want to accommodate the reporter’s busy schedule. 😉

Dispersants: As has been demonstrated at oil spill workshops and conferences for the past 30 years, you can always stir up passions by questioning the use of dispersants.  Dispersants, unlike burning and skimmers, don’t remove oil from the water (at least not directly).  The On-Scene Commander (OSC) must consider the tradeoffs and make the decisions that he or she thinks will minimize the net impact of the spill.  Given the magnitude of location of the Macondo spill, I think the OSCs made the correct calls.  Dispersants were also used (not without controversy of course) in responding to last year’s Montara blowout in the Timor Sea.

Read Full Post »

This incident isn’t receiving much attention, perhaps because the volumes being discharged are small by comparison to Macondo and there is no “supermajor” to criticize.  I expect that there would be a tad more coverage if BP was the operator. In any event, we thank the folks at NOLA.com for tracking this one.

Despite the dearth of media attention, this is a very disturbing leak/discharge/blowout (you choose) from a safety and environmental management standpoint.  The well was apparently no longer producing and was left without any downhole barriers that would prevent flow in the event of hurricane damage, a fire, or a vessel collision (what happened).  While pollution spectaculars like Macondo deserve the notoriety, industry should be just as determined to address more systemic problems like this one.

Read Full Post »

AP Photo/Patrick Semansky

From NOLA.com:

CEDYCO Inc. of Houston owns the wellhead, but the company declared it “orphaned” under the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources “orphaned well” program in 2008.
That program allows companies to abdicate some responsibility for the well and gives the state permission to plug it and prepare the site for redevelopment.

Comments:

  1. Lots of explaining to do on this one.  What barriers were in place in the well bore?
  2. How can you “orphan” a well that hasn’t been temporarily abandoned or equipped with downhole plugs, especially in an area with vessel traffic?
  3. No “deep pockets” responsible party on this one.  Cleanup costs will be paid from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.  Good luck collecting damage costs.
  4. Bad practices yield bad results, regardless of location or water depth.

Read Full Post »

Fighting Deepwater Horizon Fire

This question is receiving a lot of attention since the topic was discussed at the Department of the Interior – Coast Guard investigation.

To the best of my knowledge, this concern was first raised by a one of our very smart and experienced contributors, Dr. Malcolm Sharples, who did not wish to be identified at the time.  Malcolm is now comfortable being identified, and I thought I would draw attention to his insightful comment.  See item 3 in this 30 April post.

Read Full Post »

As promised in “Deepwater is Not the Problem,” comparative performance data for surface and seafloor BOPs follow.  Every study and informal review that I have seen has indicated that subsea BOPs are more reliable than surface BOPs. These data are not surprising.  Because of the time and cost involved in pulling and repairing subsea stacks, preventive maintenance programs tend to be more comprehensive.

The studies cited below were completed 10+ years ago, but to the best of my knowledge the conclusions are still valid.  If there are any more recent studies, BOE would like to hear about them.

West Engineering Chart

West Engineering Paper

Recent data indicate surface BOP reliability is only one-tenth that of subsea BOP equipment.

Tertrahedron Study

Subsea BOPs have smaller failure rate than surface BOPs.

SINTEF study: This study is limited to seafloor stacks, and shows there is no difference between failure rates for deepwater and ultra-deepwater wells.

(For wells in >400 m WD) It seems that there is no correlation at all between the failure rate and the downtime related to the water depth.

SINTEF

Sintef Subsea BOP Reliability Study (click to enlarge)


Read Full Post »

In the Gulf of Mexico, deepwater drilling is more risky because that is where the high-rate wells are, not because the water is deep.
  • Water depth had little to do with the well integrity problems at Macondo. Similar errors in planning and execution would have yielded similar results in any water depth or on land.  Has Montara already been forgotten?
  • Subsea BOP stacks have a much better performance record than the surface stacks used in shallow water drilling (more on this later in the week).
  • Historical data indicate that blowouts occur less frequently in deep water, not more frequently (more to follow).
  • Obviously, blowouts involving high-rate wells are likely to do more damage.   This applies regardless of the water depth.   You can reduce the spill risk by prohibiting drilling in the areas with the highest production potential, but that wouldn’t be very sound energy policy and you won’t find many buyers for the leases.
  • It is safer to conduct intervention and capping operations on subsea wells.  Regulators would not even allow surface capping to be considered at Montara because of the high risk to workers.  The subsurface ROV work is perhaps the biggest Macondo success story.
  • If the Macondo well was in shallow water (with the wellhead above the water surface), and well integrity concerns precluded a risky surface capping operation, how would the flow have been contained and collected?
  • Other things being equal, the environmental risk is less at deepwater locations which tend to be farther from shore.

Water depth is just one well planning consideration.  Abnormal pressures and temperatures, shallow gas, hydrogen sulfide, ice, permafrost, storms, currents, extended reach targets, and horizontal completions are some of the others.  To prevent another Macondo, in the US or anywhere else in the world, we need to focus our attention on the 3 categories of issues listed below.  These issues are important in all water depths and in all environments.

  1. Well integrity including design, construction, barriers, verification, and monitoring.
  2. BOPE performance and reliability under all conditions.
  3. Capping, containing, and collecting oil in the event of a blowout.

Read Full Post »

Energy Training and Resources Macondo Well Diagram

A former colleague sent me a link to this comprehensive ETR report on Macondo.  The report provides a good primer on drilling and the issues associated with the blowout. Nicely done!

Read Full Post »

Click on photo to enlarge.  MWCC information sheet.

Read Full Post »

link

Exxon, Shell, Chevron Corp. and ConocoPhilips will each give $250 million to establish a non-profit organization, the Marine Well Containment Co., to produce and manage the equipment. The system will be designed and built over the next 12 to 18 months to handle spills of 100,000 barrels a day in waters as deep as 10,000 feet (3,048 meters), the companies said in a statement yesterday.

Comments:

  1. Excellent and necessary initiative.
  2. Will other GoM operators participate?  Unless they can provide a similar capability, they will probably have no choice.
  3. It may be difficult to manage a capability that will probably (hopefully) never be used?  Realistic simulations and drills will be critical.
  4. Could major components of this capability be used for other purposes?  Colin Leach has suggested that an FPSO (Cascade-Chinook?) might provide the necessary collection and processing capability.  Such an FPSO could be promptly relocated to the site of a blowout.
  5. More on this later, but there are advantages to a seafloor blowout (as opposed to a blowout from a surface wellhead), particularly from a safety standpoint.  Also, seafloor BOPE has a better historicial performance record than surface BOPE.  This new capability will address the major subsea well deficiencies –  intervention, containment, and collection. 
  6. I don’t think surface wellheads should be left out of the picture.  A surface capping operation on a platform or jack-up rig is far from a slam dunk, and is more hazardous than a subsurface capping operation.
  7. Well integrity is, of course, critical to the success of any well containment operation, and that should be the primary area of consideration for all offshore operators.

Read Full Post »

Platts has an interesting report on yesterday’s hearing:

Guide said the decision to use a long string of casing instead of a liner
was made because it provided better long-term well bore integrity, not because a liner would have cost an additional $7 million to $10 million. He said the liner would have added only one additional barrier in the well.
  John Guide, BP’s Well Team Leader 

Comment:  One additional barrier is very significant when you only have 2 others and there are issues with the primary barrier (production casing cement).

Jason Mathews, a BOEM panel member, asked Guide if he knew that in the past year, Schlumberger had been brought to rigs 74 times for cement bond logs, and only three times they had been sent away without doing the logs; in two instances BP, sent the crews away.

Comment: Interesting statistic; good research by Jason and the BOEMRE team.

Read Full Post »

« Newer Posts - Older Posts »