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The National Academy of Engineering and the National Research Council have released the interim report of the Committee on the Analysis of Causes of the Deepwater Horizon Explosion, Fire, and Oil Spill to Identify Measures to Prevent Similar Accidents in the Future. The interim report includes the committee’s preliminary findings and observations on various actions and decisions including well design, cementing operations, well monitoring, and well control actions. The interim report also considers management, oversight, and regulation of offshore operations.

Comment: No significant surprises.

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Montara Blowout - Timor Sea - 2009

A spokesman for PTTEP says the damaged rig will be towed away next month and a replacement will be in place by June next year subject to government approvals. ABC-Australia

Food for thought:

  • Should a major blowout automatically disqualify a company from further exploration and development within that field?
  • Should PTTEP have voluntarily agreed to (been required to) assign their Montara rights to another company?
  • Should leases or operating licenses be automatically suspended after such major accidents?
  • Shouldn’t exploration and development rights be contingent on safe and responsible operating practices?
  • Do PTTEP and other operators deserve a second chance under such circumstances? Third chance? How many?

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BOP stack awaiting post-Macondo inspection (from gCaptain.com)

Other than the mildly amusing skirmish about the positioning of representatives of the various factions during the inspection process (Hey, how about access for bloggers!) and some silly comments about the independence of the inspection contractor, there has been very little attention paid to the Deepwater Horizon BOP examination that is scheduled to begin today at NASA’s Michoud facility in New Orleans. The absence of media interest is surprising given the importance of this part of the Macondo investigation. Presumably, there will be more extensive coverage beginning today.

While the inspection and testing will be quite technical, some important aspects should be rather straightforward.  What is the position of the rams, particularly the shear ram?  What is the condition of the ram elements and annular preventer?  Is there evidence of control line leakage?  What can be determined about the electronics and the sequencing system designed to automatically actuate the shear ram when power is lost or when the riser is disconnected?

Hopefully, the official investigation website, which currently has no information on the BOP inspection program, will provide updates.  While we don’t expect immediate information on the findings, there should be reports explaining how the inspection program is being conducted and what has been accomplished.

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This week I read two pioneering PSA publications: HSE and Culture and Thought Processes.  In January 2002, Norway became the first offshore petroleum regulator to require that companies have a sound health, safety, and environmental culture. The purpose of the two publications was to help industry better understand the concept of HSE and Culture and the goals of the regulation. I recommend that you take a few moments and  take a look at the publications.

Excerpt from HSE and Culture:

Organisations with a sound HSE culture are characterised by the ability to learn, and constantly question their own practice and patterns of interaction. Informed organisations accommodate dialogue and critical reflection on their own practices. People respect each other’s expertise and are willing to share and furtherdevelop their HSE knowledge.

Excerpt from Thought Processes

Vulnerability deals with the relationship between cause and effect. A vulnerable system can be completely disabled – permanently – by a single non-conformance or a series of errors. That sounds dramatic, and fairly unlikely. But it has happened:

• Alexander L Kielland flotel
• P-36 floating platform
• Piper Alpha platform
•Sleipner A GBS

And it can happen again. Because vulnerability begins in the brain. When things are going well, people easily become over-confident. Traditional constraints are challenged and established practices rejected. The consequences spread to the rest of the production system in the formof untried technology, complex solutions, faster execution times and narrower safety margins.

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With all of the discussion about the float collar issues, I thought I was listening to the Montara hearings this morning.   I’m surprised that neither the Commission questioners nor the panelists have mentioned Montara. When you have two major blowouts within 8 months and they have very similar root causes, the similarities should be of enormous interest. The absence of information transfer that might have prevented Macondo should be a major consideration in these and other hearings.

We have been talking about the similarities between Montara and Macondo for months.  Colin Leach’s 28 September post draws further attention to this issue.  Colin also hit the nail on the head with his comment that an additional barrier should have been installed above the float collar before proceeding.

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Hats off to the Commission attorneys and staff for today’s presentations and questioning.  They were very well prepared, conducted themselves in a professional manner, and focused on the causes (not who should be blamed). The format was excellent with the Commission presenting their tentative findings and then asking the industry panel how they felt about each finding.

Oddly, the only real speculation was by the industry panelists, most notably the comments below about the flow path and BOP performance. Not very subtle!

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Based on lower than expected pressure readings during the cementing operation, Halliburton (Richard Vargo) contends that hydrocarbons entered the annulus (outside production casing) during cementing, rose to the wellhead before the seal assembly was set, and raised the seal assembly after it was set.  They believe that subsequent flow was inside production casing, but that the initial burst was up the annulus. This position is inconsistent with current view of the Commission and all of the other parties.

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The incident occurred on 19 May 2010.  We appreciate Statoil’s timely completion and public release of the report.  The report is in Norwegian, but an English summary is provided.

What happened:

  1. A platform well on Gullfaks C was drilled in managed pressure drilling (MPD) mode to a total depth of 4800 meters.
  2. During the final circulation and hole cleaning of the reservoir section, a leak in the 13 3/8” casing resulted in loss of drilling fluid (mud) to the formation.
  3. The loss of back pressure led to an influx of hydrocarbons from the exposed reservoirs until solids or cuttings packed off the well by the 9 5/8” liner shoe.
  4. The well control operation continued for almost two months before the well barriers were reinstated.

Statoil’s near-term action items:

  1. Develop new acceptance criteria and best practices for MPD on Gullfaks.
  2. Update pressure prognoses for the field.
  3. Document that the shear ram is capable of cutting the drill string.
  4. Change the shift relief plan for the Drilling Supervisor and Toolpusher on Gullfaks C.
  5. Review the procedures for communication and mustering with the emergency preparedness organization.

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The hearing will focus on the causes of the Deepwater Horizon explosion and will be broadcast live on C-SPAN2.  The panelists and speakers are listed here.

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Odd Finnestad alerted us to some brilliant engineering solutions at There I Fixed It. We have selected a few in honor of our structural engineering colleagues, whose commitment to safety, continuous improvement, and innovation never ceases to amaze us!

 

structural engineering solution to paperwork management challenges

 

 

correcting dangerous structural weakness without stopping "production"

 

 

backup seat belt option using existing structure and systems

 

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