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Posts Tagged ‘inspections’

To date, BSEE has used carryover funds and offsetting collections from inspection, rental, and cost recovery fees to continue their priority permitting and inspection programs during the govt shutdown. However, these funds are limited.

At some point, BSEE will have to stop issuing new permits. If the shutdown continues, the next step could be to curtail drilling and production operations. Needless to say, this would not be completely unacceptable.

In the meantime, BSEE employees continue to work without pay. Flying offshore everyday to inspect operations is no picnic and can be hazardous. I lost a colleague in a helicopter crash and others have been injured. It’s shameful that these people are not being paid while members of congress are!

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Good: OCS oil and gas permitting and inspections appear not to be significantly affected by the govt shutdown to-date. 14 planning documents were approved on Oct. 21, and 37 drilling permits have been approved in Oct. (through 10/21).

152 facility inspections were conducted from 10/1 through 10/19. Natural Resources Worldwide (NRW), which is currently the operator of just one Cox legacy platform, has the dubious distinction of being the Shutdown’s Shut-in Leader. 16 Incidents of Non-Compliance (9 warnings and 7 component shut-ins) were issued to NRW during a single facility inspection in October.

Bad: This level of effort is not sustainable given limits on offsetting funds from fees, rentals, etc.

Ugly: The personnel who are performing these duties are not being paid during the shutdown. The longer the shutdown drags on, the greater the hardship on those individuals and their families. Shameful!

Warren Buffett’s proposal would stop deficit spending and address the root cause of shutdowns:

Buffett: I could end the deficit in five minutes. You just pass a law that says that any time there’s a deficit of more than three percent of GDP, all sitting members of Congress are ineligible for re-election.

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The 2023 Safety Honor Roll list will be posted tomorrow.

As background information, below is a summary of compliance data for 2022 and 2023.

The performance of Fieldwood and Cox skewed the 2022 and 2023 data. In 2022, Fieldwood was issued 448 INCs, 26% of the Gulf of Mexico total. In 2023, Cox was by far the leading violator with 718 INCs, 39% of the GoM total (780/43% when Cox affiliates are included). These data point to the importance of considering safety and compliance in approving lease assignments and making supplemental bonding determinations.

20222023
facility inspections33093100
inspection types1085610341
W INCs8091050
CSI INCs530600
FSI INCs376180
total INCs17151830
INCs/facility inspection0.520.59
INCs/inspection type0.160.18
Pacific facility inspections280300
Pacific inspection types802744
Pacific W INCs2211
Pacific CSI INCs1314
Pacific FSI10
Pacific total INCs3625
Pacific INCs/facility inspection0.130.08
Pacific INCS/inspection type0.040.03
Alaska facility inspections85
Alaska inspection types3722
Alaska W INCs01
Alaska CSI INCs01
Alaska FSI INCs00
Alaska INCs total02
Alaska INCs/facility inspection00.4
Alaska INCS/inspection type00.09
INC=incident of noncompliance, W=warning, CSI=component shut-in, FSI=facility shut-in.
No Alaska facilities are located on the Federal OCS. One Alaska facility, Hilcorp’s Northstar island, has wells that are completed on the OCS; hence the limited BSEE inspections.

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Consistent with the findings of their inspections and data gathering (as discussed further here), BSEE has published a safety alert (attached) that identifies significant shortcomings in medical evacuation planning and performance.

The findings suggest that a renewed focus on medevac preparedness should be an immediate industry priority. Note the evacuation time, supply, training, and other planning issues summarized in the BSEE alert. Also note the helideck safety issues that were identified. These issues are particularly troubling in light of last December’s fatal crash.

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This quote from an AP article is consistent with the view expressed here after our review of the inspection reports for the Beta Unit (Platform Elly to shore) pipeline. Further per the AP article:

Safety inspections in 2015, 2017 and 2019 found anomalies in Amplify’s pipeline, including instances of metal loss and three dents that were previously repaired. But several experts who reviewed the reports said the metal loss — which can be a sign of a pipe wall thinning as it corrodes with age — was relatively minor. The dents were not in the same area as the spill.

AP

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Aqueos 2020 external (ROV) inspection:

The 16” oil pipeline was found to be in good condition with no visible damage or anomalies.
One (1) CP test point that was installed in 2014 was found to be displaced from its location on the pipeline (this was also noted in the 2018 survey), and no damage was noted at the location (Fix #101).

Aqueos inspection report, May 2020

Pipe‐to‐electrolyte potential values recorded were:
 ‐ 921 millivolts (mV) on the 6” gas pipeline
 ‐ 910 millivolts (mV) on the 10” water pipeline
 ‐ 963 millivolts (mV) on the 10” gross fluids pipeline
 ‐ 906 millivolts (mV) on the 16” oil pipeline

As the NACE Standard SP0169‐2013 “Control of External Corrosion on Underground or Submerged Metallic Pipelines” criterion is ‐800 mV, all readings indicate that Cathodic Potential is within specifications.

Aqueos inspection report, May 2020

Metal loss data from Baker Hughes internal inspection (12/2019):

Depth of Metal LossExternal AnomaliesInternal Anomalies
30+%00
20-29%10
10-19%00
total10
Baker Hughes In-line Inspection Report, 12/30/2019

The metal loss findings are consistent with those reported in a previous internal inspection (Baker Hughes, 11/2017).

BSEE has general authority to require pipeline inspections under 30 CFR 250.1005. BSEE, the State Lands Commission, and the operator appear to have implemented an effective inspection program for the Beta Unit.

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Much ado about nothing courtesy of the Associated Press:

Copies of the forms submitted by more than 100 inspectors, engineers and permit reviewers in five Gulf coast offices were obtained by the AP under the Freedom of Information Act. Personal information, such as the names of the employees, their friends and their family members, was blacked out to protect privacy. But the companies with ties to government workers were disclosed, and they represent a who’s who of the offshore oil and gas industry, from majors like Chevron, Shell and BP to smaller companies such as W&T Offshore Inc., Ankor Energy LLC and Hilcorp Energy Co.

So yesterday we linked an article about proposed legislation that would, among other things, require that offshore inspectors have “at least three years experience in the oil and natural gas field.” Today, we read contradictory (and silly) comments like the one below in the AP piece that criticize such experience. How would you like to be an oil and gas inspector or prospective offshore regulator?

“It’s nearly impossible to determine where the oil industry ends and the government’s regulatory agency begins,” said Scott Amey of the Project on Government Oversight, after reviewing AP’s data. “These new instances indicate that BOEMRE staff are connected to individuals and oil companies, which raises concerns about lax oversight and the integrity of the agency. Without enhanced enforcement authority and independent oversight of these potential conflicts, I’m uncertain that BOEMRE can assure the public that it is truly watchdogging the offshore oil industry.”

Give these people a break. I have seen absolutely no evidence that improper government-industry relationships or compromised inspections had anything to do with the Macondo blowout or any other recent incident. Inspection and engineering personnel are under continuous scrutiny well beyond what most employees would accept, and recuse themselves from assignments if there could be even a perception of a conflict of interest.

The US offshore program, and every other safety regulator, needs people who understand the operations and technology that they regulate. These regulators need to communicate regularly with industry personnel on operational and regulatory issues. Too little interaction with their professional peers is a greater danger than too much. You don’t advance safety technology and procedures, and resolve concerns, without communication.

DOI offshore personnel have had and will continue to have more than enough oversight; time to move on to another cause.

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