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Posts Tagged ‘financial assurance’

In a draft rule published on June 29, 2023, BOEM proposes to discontinue using a company’s record of compliance in determining the need for supplemental financial assurance for decommissioning. BOEM’s full explanation for this surprising change is pasted at the end of this post.

Opposing view:

  • BOEM should be more attentive, not less, to safety performance and compliance data. If they were, taxpayers would have been better protected from the risks associated with the lease acquisitions by Fieldwood, Cox, Black Elk, Signal Hill, and others, and their subsequent bankruptcies.
  • Safe operations, as reflected in compliance and performance data, are critical to a company’s financial success.
  • BOEM wrongly infers that Incidents of Noncompliance (INCs) are solely dependent on the number and complexity of facilities. Decades of normalized compliance data have told us that there are marked differences among operators in terms of compliance and safety performance. Companies at the bottom of the performance table don’t usually survive.
  • Accidents are not mere matters of chance; management and culture matter.
  • Honor Roll companies, large and small, have superior compliance records, and in 2022 these companies had 50-90% fewer INCs/facility-inspection than the Gulf of Mexico average.
  • Does BOEM expect noncompliance leaders to be concerned about decommissioning obligations? The record shows that they are not.
  • Cox’s 2023 bankruptcy was predictable given their past safety performance. In 2022, Cox was a violations leader by any measure, and was responsible for 9 of the 30 safety incidents that were significant enough to require investigation by BSEE.
  • Fieldwood’s terrible 2021 safety performance has been discussed, and there was ample evidence of performance problems prior to their bankruptcy declaration in 2018. In 2016 and 2017 Fieldwood was, by far, the GoM violations leader with 818 INCs, 401 of which required a facility or component shut-in.
  • Ironically (or maybe not), the only other company that was even in the same noncompliance ballpark as Fieldwood in 2016 and 2017 was future Cox affiliate Energy XXI GOM. Energy XXI earned 465 INCs (240 shut-ins) during that 2 year period. Did BOEM object to or otherwise comment on the 2018 Cox-Energy XXI merger?
  • Black Elk Energy was new in 2007 and quickly became a violations leader. Between 2010 and 2012, BSEE cited Black Elk 415 times. 218 of these violations were serious enough to require facility or component shut-ins. On November 16, 2012, explosions at Black Elk’s West Delta 32 platform killed 3 workers, and 2 others suffered severe burns. Criminal charges and a complex bankruptcy followed. BSEE records show 1107 INCs during the company’s short history, 464 of which required facility or component shut-ins.
  • The rapid growth of Fieldwood, Cox, and Black Elk was in part facilitated by lax lease assignment and financial assurance policies. Operating companies should have to demonstrate that they can operate safety and comply with the regulations before they are approved to acquire more properties.
  • The Signal Hill saga was documented nearly 2 years ago, and none of the questions raised in that post have been answered. Violations data and inspector feedback predicted the Signal Hill/POOI failure. Nonetheless, and despite the objections of regional staff, Signal Hill was allowed to tap into its decommissioning account to cover operating expenses. Responsibility for decommissioning Platforms Hogan and Houchin is still uncertain.
  • Bankruptcy has been used to avoid or transfer decommissioning obligations. In that regard, Chevron’s comprehensive objection to Fieldwood’s restructuring plan is telling.
  • Given that BSEE, not BOEM, is responsible for safety and compliance, I sincerely hope that regulatory fragmentation was not a factor contributing to BOEM’s decision to discontinue the use of compliance data in determining financial assurance needs.

BOEM’s explanation for the proposal to eliminate the record of compliance criterion:

BOEM also proposes to eliminate the existing “record of compliance” criterion found in the current version of § 556.901(d)(1)(v). BOEM has determined that the number of INCs a company receives correlates with the number of OCS properties it owns, not its financial stability, and therefore, BOEM has concluded that it is not an accurate predictor of its financial health. BOEM reviewed BSEE’s Incidents of Non-Compliance (INCs) records and its Increased Oversight List, which represent BSEE’s cumulative records of violations of performance standards on the part of OCS operators and lessees and determined that the number of incidents of non-compliance typically increases with the size and complexity of the operator’s or lessee’s operations, including the ratio of incidents to number of components. Because larger companies (regardless of credit score) tend to have more properties and components and therefore more INCs, BOEM determined that record of compliance criterion does not accurately predict financial default. BOEM’s review of this information confirmed the feedback BOEM received in response to the 2016 NTL, namely that companies with a large number of properties and facilities tended to receive a large number of INCs and had more individual properties on the Increased Oversight List. BOEM specifically requests comments regarding the use of fines and violations as a criterion in the determination of a company’s ability to fulfill decommissioning obligations, and any data or analysis addressing any correlation between the number of violations and the risk of financial default. BOEM also requests comments on whether the elimination of the INC’s criteria would create a disincentive to comply with regulations. BOEM also requests comment on whether or not the cost of decommissioning is likely to increase based on the type, quantity, and magnitude of previous violations.

On a related note, BOEM/BSEE should consider a followup to the John Shultz thesis which found that INCs are a very good predictor of accidents and spills.

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Some preliminary thoughts about BOEM’s proposed revision to the decommissioning financial assurance regulations for US offshore oil and gas operations:

  1. BOEM has rather surprisingly proposed to eliminate consideration of a company’s compliance record in determining the need for supplemental financial assurance. An opposing view will be posted tomorrow.
  2. If a lease has proved reserves with a value of at least three times that of the estimated decommissioning cost, no supplemental financial assurance would be required. Comparing two imprecise and variable estimates is neither a simple nor reliable method for determining the need for supplemental financial assurance. BOEM should look at the history of the Carpenteria field (Santa Barbara Channel) and the reserve estimates that were provided to discount decommissioning risks. More on this at a later date.
  3. Transferor liability applies only to those obligations existing at the time of transfer; new facilities, or additions to existing facilities, that were not in existence at the time of any lease transfer are not obligations of a predecessor company and are considered obligations of the party that built such new facilities and its co- and successor lessees. This is a good policy, but is difficult to implement. Some of the complexities may need to be addressed. More later.
  4. The “reverse chronological order” provision was withdrawn in April, so there is no defined process for issuing decommissioning orders to predecessor lessees. Is it good policy to first issue such orders to companies who may have owned leases decades ago, in some cases prior to the establishment of transferor liability in the 1997 MMS “bonding rule?”
  5. The proposed rule would clarify that BOEM will not approve the transfer of a lease interest until the transferee complies with all applicable regulations and orders, including the financial assurance requirements. BOEM needs to be firmly enforce this policy. See tomorrow’s post.
  6. The proposed rule would not allow BOEM to rely upon the financial strength of predecessor lessees when determining whether, or how much, supplemental financial assurance should be provided. This is a good provision.
  7. BOEM proposes to use the P70 probabilistic value to set the amount of any required supplemental financial assurance. These estimates do not seem sufficiently conservative to protect other parties and the public in the event of default. This is particularly true after storm damage which can increase plugging costs more than tenfold.
  8. The probabilistic cost estimates were updated in 2020 and are based on data submitted subsequent to 2016 and 2017 NTLs. How often will these estimates be updated?
  9. The final rule should specify that funds may not be withdrawn from decommissioning accounts for operational purposes, and that BOEM approval is required for such withdrawals.

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Just posted in the Federal Register.

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The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) today announced proposed changes to modernize financial assurance requirements for the offshore oil and gas industry, in order to better protect American taxpayers from incurring the costs associated with the oil and gas industry’s responsibility to decommission offshore wells and infrastructure, once they are no longer in use. The proposed changes will publish in the Federal Register on June 29, which will open a 60-day public comment period that ends on August 28. 

It looks like BOEM punted on the contentious issue of considering predecessors when determining financial assurance requirements:

The proposed regulatory changes would provide additional clarity and reinforce that current grant holders and lessees bear the cost of ensuring compliance with lease obligations, rather than relying on prior owners to cover those costs. BOEM is interested in public comments on the costs and benefits of considering predecessors when determining how much financial assurance a company must provide.

On that point, comments will differ 😉.

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An important figure in the history of the US offshore program passed away last week. Gerry Rhodes was a petroleum engineer with an attorney’s gift for understanding laws and regulations. Among other leadership roles in the offshore regulatory program, Gerry was Chief of the Minerals Management Service’s Branch of Rules, Orders, and Standards in the 1990’s.

Gerry was among the first in the Federal government to fully understand the financial responsibility risks associated with the decommissioning of offshore facilities and the urgent need to update requirements for the plugging of wells and removal of platforms. The enormity of this challenge is described in the 1991 Forbes article pasted below. Despite sharp divisions within the offshore industry and the resulting political pressure, Gerry succeeded in finalizing regulations (including this 1995 rule) that are the basis for the current financial responsibility programs in BOEM and BSEE. Without Gerry’s resolve, subsequent financial assurance challenges and government outlays would have been far greater.

RIP Gerry. You were a true gentleman, a dedicated father and grandfather, and a diligent and highly accomplished colleague.

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Observations and comments on the offshore findings and recommendations in the Dept. of the Interior’s report:

  • From an offshore perspective, this report is more moderate than expected. No major complaints.
  • The report was issued the Friday after Thanksgiving. Was there a desire to minimize attention?
  • The report does not include a recommendation on raising royalty rates. DOI will continue to study such actions (prudent decision).
  • BSEE estimates current liability for “orphaned infrastructure” at only $65 million. They must be using a very narrow definition of orphaned infrastructure.
  • “Financial assurance coverage should be strengthened.” (Few would argue with that statement.)
  • “BSEE and BOEM will carefully consider comments on the 2020 proposed financial assurance rule.” (Deja vu? Expect a long, slow process.)
  • BOEM will establish a “fitness to operate standard.” Comments: (1) This is an old concept that has proven to be difficult to execute. Hold companies accountable, make them demonstrate financial assurance, and don’t pander to bad actors (see the case of Hogan and Houchin) (2) Why is BOEM establishing this standard and not BSEE, the safety bureau? (The division of responsibilities between BOEM and BSEE has created serious overlap, inefficiency, and confusion and needs to be addressed.)
  • “BOEM should consider advancing alternatives to the practice of area-wide leasing.” Tract selection makes sense in frontier areas with little operational history. It would have been perfect for the Mid- or South Atlantic or the EGoM, all of which were cynically removed from future leasing consideration by the previous President just before the 2020 election. The Central and Western Gulf of Mexico is too mature for a return to tract selection; employing that approach after 40 years of area-wide leasing is likely to generate less revenue and production.

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A recent Washington Post (WP) article, based in part on a March 2021 General Accountability Office (GAO) report, raises interesting pipeline decommissioning issues, but might benefit from some additional context, which I have attempted to provide below:

  • Decommissioning liability issues are not simply a matter of “companies trying to get out of that obligation.” Much of the complexity is associated with decades-long chains of lease ownership and the respective responsibilities of prior lessees. Pertinent questions include the following:
    • If a company sold a lease decades ago and there have since been multiple owners, to what extent is the original owner still liable for decommissioning lease facilities? (Note that guidance from the Federal government has not been entirely consistent over the decades.)
    • If current leaseholders fail to fulfill their obligations, who is next in line and why?
    • To what extent are prior lessees liable for wells and structures constructed subsequent to their ownership?
    • Knowing that decommissioning costs can vary significantly, what amounts of security should be required? How should these funds be protected or managed? Should an assigning company also collect funds to protect their interest?
    • How do inconsistent Federal policies and financial assurance requirements, and improper practices by subsequent owners, affect the liability of prior lessees? In that regard, the case of Platforms Hogan and Houchin in the Pacific OCS Region is interesting and pertinent.
  • Per the WP, “Federal regulations require the removal of offshore pipelines once they are decommissioned, but the rules are rarely enforced.” This statement is doubly incorrect.
    • 30 CFR § 250.1750 provides for decommissioning pipelines in place when the Regional Supervisor (BSEE) determines that the pipeline does not constitute a hazard (obstruction) to navigation and commercial fishing operations, unduly interfere with other uses of the OCS, or have adverse environmental effects. The consensus opinion of the regulators’ engineers and scientists has been that the safety and environmental risks associated with pipeline removal were significantly greater than those for decommissioning in place in accordance with the procedures specified in 250.1751.
    • The comment about enforcement is unfounded. BSEE and its predecessors have strictly enforced decommissioning requirements despite the challenges related to inconsistent policy direction, industry downturns, and hurricane damage. BSEE has an effective program to ensure that idle wells are plugged and platforms are removed in a timely manner. For this reason, 3315 platforms have been removed since 2001; 1933 since 2010. Only about 1800 platforms remain. This very significant loss of habitat is a concern to fishing organizations, another factor that complicates decommissioning policy.
  • In situ decommissioning of buried or trenched offshore pipelines is the standard throughout the world. The seafloor disturbance and safety risks associated with the removal of such pipelines are universally viewed as unwarranted. The pipeline decommissioning procedures followed elsewhere are similar to those described in 30 CFR 250.1751. In the Gulf of Mexico, pipelines installed in less that 200′ of water are typically buried (30 CFR 250.1003) to minimize interference with commercial fishing and other activities.
  • The decommissioning of wind turbines, which are typically more densely located and closer to shore, and their attendant power cables and substructures, will also be challenging. In their 9/16/2019 Congressional testimony, the Responsible Offshore Development Alliance expressed concern about the practice of leaving structural foundations when turbines are abandoned.

In remarks to the WP, Syed Khalil, a coastal restoration geologist for the State of Louisiana, commented that they have enough sand to meet their short term needs, but future needs were a major concern. The Gulf of Mexico Offshore Sand Management Working Group would seem to be the best mechanism for timely action and a workable, long-term action plan. The minutes of their meetings are quite instructive. Rulemaking is not a solution unless the parties want to tie their fate to both the 25 year pipeline rule rewrite (draft published in 2007, another draft coming? final?) and the contentious and similarly interminable financial assurance rule.

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