Liftboat Russell Peterson, May 12, 2008
Malcolm Sharples reminds us that the Coast Guard still hasn’t completed the investigation of the tragic liftboat accident in May 2008. The boat was conducting research for a proposed offshore wind project. Why the delay?
Here is more information from Malcolm:
Liftboat Russell W. Peterson damaged in storm, 1 person died, 1 person injured ; “One dead, one rescued as research vessel sinks off Rehoboth”. One crewman died today after gale force winds pounded a specialized research ship that was launched in March to study Delaware’s offshore wind power resources, forcing the Coast Guard to pull two crewmen from the sinking vessel. Coast Guard Petty Officer Nick Cangemi said one of the two crew members of the RV Russell W. Peterson did not have any vital signs when a helicopter arrived on the scene this morning. “We took both people to the hospital in Maryland, where the hospital declared one of the gentlemen deceased,” Cangemi said. They were taken to Peninsula Regional Medical Center in Salisbury, MD. The ship was left adrift and ran aground at Bethany Beach.
Posted in accidents, Offshore Wind, Wind Energy | Tagged Coast Guard, liftboat, Offshore Wind, Russell Peterson, Wind Energy | 2 Comments »
Our 15 September post suggested that a properly conducted and interpreted negative pressure test would likely have prevented both the Macondo and Montara blowouts. As more information about Macondo surfaces, there is no dispute about the significance of the negative pressure test errors. Despite differences of opinion about the contributing factors, all companies involved with the blowout seem to agree that a properly conducted and interpreted negative pressure test would likely have prevented the blowout.
Posted in accidents, well control incidents | Leave a Comment »
I hate to say nice things about lawyers :), but the Commission attorneys handled the two days of hearings very effectively. The outstanding staff preparation and support were quite obvious.
BOE has have long advocated more industry leadership on guiding principles, incident data gathering and verification, risk assessment, peer-audits, standards improvements, cooperative research, and failure data for critical equipment. In that regard, we are pleased that Chairmen Reilly and Graham, the other Commissioners, and the industry and government witnesses commented positively on some of these important programs.
We need to effectively manage the safety and environmental risks associated with offshore exploration and production, because we can’t afford the economic and security risks associated with a diminished offshore oil and gas program. BOE advocates conservation and renewables, but projections by IEA and other leading energy forecasters make it clear that oil and gas will continue to be an important part of our energy mix for decades.
Posted in accidents, well control incidents | Tagged accidents, blowouts, Bob Graham, Deepwater Horizon, drilling, Fred Bartlitt, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, National Commission, William Reilly | Leave a Comment »
With all of the discussion about the float collar issues, I thought I was listening to the Montara hearings this morning. I’m surprised that neither the Commission questioners nor the panelists have mentioned Montara. When you have two major blowouts within 8 months and they have very similar root causes, the similarities should be of enormous interest. The absence of information transfer that might have prevented Macondo should be a major consideration in these and other hearings.
We have been talking about the similarities between Montara and Macondo for months. Colin Leach’s 28 September post draws further attention to this issue. Colin also hit the nail on the head with his comment that an additional barrier should have been installed above the float collar before proceeding.
Posted in accidents, well control incidents | Tagged accidents, Australia, blowouts, Deepwater Horizon, drilling, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, Montara, National Commission, offshore oil, safety, well control | 1 Comment »
Hats off to the Commission attorneys and staff for today’s presentations and questioning. They were very well prepared, conducted themselves in a professional manner, and focused on the causes (not who should be blamed). The format was excellent with the Commission presenting their tentative findings and then asking the industry panel how they felt about each finding.
Oddly, the only real speculation was by the industry panelists, most notably the comments below about the flow path and BOP performance. Not very subtle!
Posted in accidents, well control incidents | Tagged accidents, blowouts, Deepwater Horizon, drilling, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, National Commission, offshore oil, safety, well control | 1 Comment »
Based on lower than expected pressure readings during the cementing operation, Halliburton (Richard Vargo) contends that hydrocarbons entered the annulus (outside production casing) during cementing, rose to the wellhead before the seal assembly was set, and raised the seal assembly after it was set. They believe that subsequent flow was inside production casing, but that the initial burst was up the annulus. This position is inconsistent with current view of the Commission and all of the other parties.
Posted in accidents, well control incidents | Tagged accidents, blowouts, Deepwater Horizon, drilling, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, National Commission, offshore oil, oil spill, safety, well control | Leave a Comment »
Bill Ambrose, Director of Special Projects, Transocean:
Transocean believes the BOP worked within the limits it was designed for.
Posted in Uncategorized | Leave a Comment »
If you are not watching the National Commission hearing, you should be. The Commission attorneys are doing an excellent job with their presentation of the events leading up to the blowout – very balanced and professional. You can watch on CSPAN-2 or online.
Posted in Uncategorized | 1 Comment »
The incident occurred on 19 May 2010. We appreciate Statoil’s timely completion and public release of the report. The report is in Norwegian, but an English summary is provided.
What happened:
- A platform well on Gullfaks C was drilled in managed pressure drilling (MPD) mode to a total depth of 4800 meters.
- During the final circulation and hole cleaning of the reservoir section, a leak in the 13 3/8” casing resulted in loss of drilling fluid (mud) to the formation.
- The loss of back pressure led to an influx of hydrocarbons from the exposed reservoirs until solids or cuttings packed off the well by the 9 5/8” liner shoe.
- The well control operation continued for almost two months before the well barriers were reinstated.
Statoil’s near-term action items:
- Develop new acceptance criteria and best practices for MPD on Gullfaks.
- Update pressure prognoses for the field.
- Document that the shear ram is capable of cutting the drill string.
- Change the shift relief plan for the Drilling Supervisor and Toolpusher on Gullfaks C.
- Review the procedures for communication and mustering with the emergency preparedness organization.
Posted in accidents, well control incidents | Tagged Gullfaks, Norway, safety, Statoil, well control | Leave a Comment »
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 