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Thanks for supporting BOE; please stay in touch!

August 6, 2011 by offshoreenergy

I didn’t know what to expect when I kicked off this independent blog 18 months ago. I wanted to share some fun stuff, most notably the “Not My Job Award” favorites and the long list of “rigs-to-reefs” spinoffs. The blog was also a good way to follow and comment on emerging offshore energy issues and events.

Things didn’t go quite as planned, and two major accidents shaped our commentary and discussion. During the early days of the blog, attention was focused on the Montara hearings.  Each day’s transcripts were posted within hours by the very efficient Montara Inquiry staff, so we were able to read the transcripts in the early morning hours (US eastern time). Our small band of Montara watchers commented daily on the events and received mention during the hearings.

Next came Macondo.  The tragic fire and explosion killed 11, and the pollution spectacular that followed was streamed live for a worldwide audience. While officials in the US and around the world were busy solving problems that had yet to be identified, true offshore safety leaders were closely monitoring the investigations to learn what happened and why. Unfortunately, important gaps in our understaning of the accident still remain.

In light of increased personal and professional commitments, I have decided to discontinue BOE.  The blog will be removed from the web on August 12th.  I want to thank those who have visited the blog. Surprisingly, our obscure site had lots of visitors in the US and around the world.

In particular, I would like to thank Odd Finnestad and Cheryl Anderson.  Odd is an expert on regulatory policy who helped shape Norway’s highly respected offshore safety program and has advised governments around the world about regulatory and safety issues. Odd has been an important contributor to BOE from the outset. Cheryl is the world’s leading authority on oil spill occurrence rates and causes, and has contributed numerous entries to the blog.

I also want to thank JL Daeschler, a pioneering subsea engineer, for his insights and commentary. In addition to being an outstanding engineer, JL is a very talented artists whose works are now on display at prestigious galleries in Edinburgh, Scotland.  In you visit that wonderful city, make sure you view some of JL’s artwork.  There are others who have made major contributions to BOE, but have chosen to remain anonymous.  You know who you are; thank you for the support!

For good coverage of offshore safety issues, I encourage you to monitor Platts, Upstream, Fuel Fix, and Nola.com.  I hope these or other professional sites develop tracking systems for offshore accidents and hold operators and regulators accountable for publishing updates and reports in a timely manner.  I will continue to push for improvements in the collection and reporting of incident data.

I also recommend that you monitor the regulators’ websites. The site of the Petroleum Safety Authority of Norway (psa.no) provides timely information, reports, risk assessments, and updates on activities in the Norwegian sector, and is an excellent example of what a safety regulator’s website should look like.

In closing, I want to say that I am very optimistic about the future of offshore oil and gas operations in the US and around the world. I continue to be amazed by the dedication, competence, and commitment of offshore energy professionals. Although we don’t agree on everything, we are all committed to safety and pollution prevention. We can’t change the past, but we can shape the future. The world needs offshore energy, and it’s our job to respond to the challenge.

Feel free to contact me at edanenberger@gmail.com if there are any matters you wish to discuss.

Offshore to the future!

Bud

Posted in Uncategorized | 8 Comments »

Must read piece for those following the Macondo investigations

August 4, 2011 by offshoreenergy

Phil Rae piece in Fuel Fix

  1. The well clearly had losses through the shoe during the initial displacement of the heavy spacer with seawater, immediately prior to the negative test.
  2. Allowing for, and accepting, losses of ~80 bbls during spacer displacement, explains ALL pressure and flow anomalies without the need to create or invoke undocumented and unsubstantiated valve closures or manipulations that contradict witness testimony of events. It also eliminates the need to adopt unrealistically-low pump efficiencies for the rig pumps, hypothetical washed-out tubing and ridiculously high viscosities for the drilling mud, in an effort to fit questionable computer models.
  3. Despite extensive examination by investigators and the publication of several reports, the fact that the well experienced losses, making it even more severely underbalanced than was planned, has been given little credence or has received little or no attention, despite several clear indications that this was the case. While this statement regarding losses may be self-evident, its significance on the outcome at Macondo merits closer examination since it explains many previous, apparently-contradictory aspects of the disaster.
  4. Under-displacement of heavyweight spacer, as a result of losses during displacement, caused U-tubing and partial evacuation of the kill line, the lower end of which was later refilled with heavyweight spacer, driven by pressure and flow from the formation. The vacuum, initially, and subsequent invasion of heavy fluid rendered the kill line useless for monitoring the well since the line was effectively blind to pressure changes in the well.
  5. While initial flow into the well was through the shoe, pressure above the casing hanger seal during the negative test was reduced to levels that could have allowed the casing to lift, compromising the seal and possibly also allowing flow from the external annulus.
  6. The well encountered further losses during the second displacement (to displace the riser), after completion of the negative test. These losses, which were perhaps as much as 200 bbls, effectively replaced heavy mud with sea water in the casing below the drill pipe. This further underbalanced the well to the point that it was being kept under control only by pumping friction pressure. As the pump rate was reduced prior to shut down for the sheen test, effectively reducing system backpressure, the now severely underbalanced well began to flow.

Posted in accidents, well control incidents | Tagged , , , , , , , , | 4 Comments »

Rapid bacterial consumption of Gulf oil confirmed

August 2, 2011 by offshoreenergy

 

oil-eating bacteria

Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute scientists have published important new findings on the rapid bacterial degradation of the Macondo spill.

They found that bacterial microbes inside the slick degraded the oil at a rate five times faster than microbes outside the slick—accounting in large part for the disappearance of the slick some three weeks after Deepwater Horizon’s Macondo well was shut off.

 

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Methane Hydrates Production

August 2, 2011 by offshoreenergy

Cheryl Anderson forwarded this interesting Anchorage Daily News update on hydrate production research and linked information about the specific Department of Energy research projects.

The methane – carbon dioxide exchange project is particularly interesting and is summarized nicely by the Daily News:

Conoco Phillips will try injecting carbon dioxide into the hydrate. Laboratory tests show that injecting carbon dioxide displaces methane, which comes out of the hydrate as a gas. The idea is that the carbon dioxide molecules take the place of the methane molecules in the hydrate, keeping it stable.

This could be neat, if it works. Carbon dioxide would be permanently sequestered, or stored, underground, while the methane is extracted and the hydrate is left intact.

One question the Conoco Phillips production test will attempt to answer is whether this reaction in the hydrate can occur fast enough for methane production to reach practical volumes.

The comment below is an understatement, but the enormous energy potential justifies the research.
This isn’t a slam dunk, though. The technical challenges are considerable.

Posted in energy, natural gas | Tagged , , , , | Leave a Comment »

Cheryl Anderson’s Macondo Oil Spill Update

August 1, 2011 by offshoreenergy

Dauphin Island tarballs, May 2011

Cheryl’s update after reviewing the latest reports:

  • There is a USCG unified command specific to BP spill residue after storms.
  • The tarballs are not considered toxic, just an unattractive nuisance.
  • Tarball cleanup on Dauphin Island was halted on May 1 to protect nesting birds.
  • BP estimates a total Macondo spill volume of about 4 million bbl as opposed to the government estimate of 4.9 million bbl.
  • BP estimates that 850,000 barrels were captured, burned or skimmed off the water.
  • 1,260 people remain employed in spill cleanup as of [July 14, 2011], down from a peak of 48,200 a year ago

Articles of interest:

Alabama.com

WALA New Orleans

Bloomberg Business Week 

Posted in accidents, well control incidents | Tagged , , , , , , , | 1 Comment »

“The floggings will continue until morale improves.”

July 26, 2011 by offshoreenergy

Much ado about nothing courtesy of the Associated Press:

Copies of the forms submitted by more than 100 inspectors, engineers and permit reviewers in five Gulf coast offices were obtained by the AP under the Freedom of Information Act. Personal information, such as the names of the employees, their friends and their family members, was blacked out to protect privacy. But the companies with ties to government workers were disclosed, and they represent a who’s who of the offshore oil and gas industry, from majors like Chevron, Shell and BP to smaller companies such as W&T Offshore Inc., Ankor Energy LLC and Hilcorp Energy Co.

So yesterday we linked an article about proposed legislation that would, among other things, require that offshore inspectors have “at least three years experience in the oil and natural gas field.” Today, we read contradictory (and silly) comments like the one below in the AP piece that criticize such experience. How would you like to be an oil and gas inspector or prospective offshore regulator?

“It’s nearly impossible to determine where the oil industry ends and the government’s regulatory agency begins,” said Scott Amey of the Project on Government Oversight, after reviewing AP’s data. “These new instances indicate that BOEMRE staff are connected to individuals and oil companies, which raises concerns about lax oversight and the integrity of the agency. Without enhanced enforcement authority and independent oversight of these potential conflicts, I’m uncertain that BOEMRE can assure the public that it is truly watchdogging the offshore oil industry.”

Give these people a break. I have seen absolutely no evidence that improper government-industry relationships or compromised inspections had anything to do with the Macondo blowout or any other recent incident. Inspection and engineering personnel are under continuous scrutiny well beyond what most employees would accept, and recuse themselves from assignments if there could be even a perception of a conflict of interest.

The US offshore program, and every other safety regulator, needs people who understand the operations and technology that they regulate. These regulators need to communicate regularly with industry personnel on operational and regulatory issues. Too little interaction with their professional peers is a greater danger than too much. You don’t advance safety technology and procedures, and resolve concerns, without communication.

DOI offshore personnel have had and will continue to have more than enough oversight; time to move on to another cause.

Posted in drilling, Offshore Energy - General, Regulation | Tagged , , , , , , | 1 Comment »

How many times does MMS have to be abolished?

July 26, 2011 by offshoreenergy

We now have yet another legislative proposal, this time from the House, that fails to address the fundamental offshore safety and regulatory policy issues.

Posted in Regulation | Tagged , | Leave a Comment »

How deepwater and surface spills differ

July 21, 2011 by offshoreenergy

Very interesting findings for those interested in the fate of spilled oil:

The deep sea entrainment of water-soluble hydrocarbons has far-reaching implications for deep water oil spills. Our results demonstrate that most of the C1-C3 hydrocarbons and a significant fraction of water-soluble aromatic compounds were retained in the deep water column, whereas relatively insoluble petroleum components were predominantly transported to the sea surface or deposited on the seafloor, although the relative proportions are not known.

The resulting apportionments of hydrocarbon transfers to the water column and atmosphere are therefore very different for a deep water oil spill versus a sea-surface oil spill. During seasurface oil spills, highly water-soluble components such as BTEX, C3-benzenes, and naphthalene quickly volatilize and are rapidly lost to the atmosphere within hours to days, thereby limiting the extent of aqueous dissolution into the water column. In the case of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, however, gas and oil experienced a significant residence time in the water column with no opportunity for the release of volatile species to the atmosphere. Hence, water-soluble petroleum compounds dissolved into the water column to a much greater extent than is typically observed for surface spills.

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Inspection fees debate still lacks substance

July 20, 2011 by offshoreenergy

from Platts Oilgram News:

Representatives Ed Markey of Massachusetts and Rush Holt of New Jersey introduced the so-called No Free Inspections for Oil Companies Act (H.R. 2566) July 15, in reaction to House Republicans’ proposal for funding the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement. About $35 million short of the Obama administration’s request, the GOP’s $154 million budget rejected new and more expensive fees on offshore operators. The administration wanted to ratchet up industry fees to $65 million a year, from $10 million, to pay for a tougher inspections regime.

The annual inspection fees debate, a budget season ritual for 20+ years, has picked up intensity and financial significance in the post-Macondo spotlight. However, discussions about regulatory philosophy and the fundamental program decisions that dictate inspection strategy are still absent. Safety and pollution prevention are the goals, not inspections. While inspections are an essential part of any safety regime, they are just one component of a comprehensive regulatory program. More inspections would not have prevented Macondo. Better standards, training, technology, and attention to prior incidents (most notably Montara) may have.

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FAA won’t require helicopter gear box retrofits

July 19, 2011 by offshoreenergy

In light of the 2009 helicopter crash that killed 17 workers offshore Newfoundland and the rash of other helicopter incidents around the world, helicopter safety is a major concern for the offshore industry and regulators. This FAA decision (link courtesy of Cheryl Anderson) is sure to be controversial in Atlantic Canada and elsewhere.

The U.S. aviation regulator says it won’t require the retrofit of a gearbox blamed in a fatal helicopter crash off Newfoundland because it would be too expensive for the industry.

 The decision by the Federal Aviation Administration rejects a call by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada to phase-in a requirement that all Sikorsky S-92A gearboxes be capable of operating at least 30 minutes after losing oil.

The March 2009 crash of Cougar Flight 491 resulted in 17 deaths during a flight to an offshore oil platform, and has brought demands from the families of the victims that regulators in the United States, Canada and Europe change the rules governing the gearbox.

The FAA memo on the decision, obtained by The Canadian Press under U.S. freedom of information legislation, says the service record of the helicopter no longer supports the certification’s basic premise that the chances of an oil leak are “extremely remote.”

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