Prior to the installation of these platforms, the last deepwater platform addition was Shell’s Appomattox in 2018. That gap in deepwater platform installations was the longest since Bullwinkle was installed in 1988.
The 5 new structures will increase the deepwater platform count by 9% from 56 to 61, and in the next few years should account for approximately 1/4 of GoM oil production.
Promoting the offshore wind program is a very high BOEM priority. The bureau is charged with deploying 30 gigawatts of offshore wind energy capacity by 2030, which requires extensive advocacy. However, BOEM is also a core regulator for offshore wind projects, and the concern is that their regulatory role could be compromised by their advocacy priorities.
Per Notice to Lessees 2023 N-01, which arguably should have been published for public comment given its regulatory significance, BOEM has retained important responsibilities for wind project development and operations. These include review and approval of construction and operations plans, site assessment plans, and general activities plans. BOEM may also exercise enforcement authority through the issuance of violation notices and the assessment of civil penalties.
BOEM exists because in 2010 the Administration wanted to separate the OCS program’s leasing (sales/advocacy) and safety (regulatory/enforcement) functions. The intent was to avoid conflicting missions (or the appearance thereof) in the post-Macondo era. (More on this in an upcoming post.)
Ironically, the Save LBI comment describes BSEE as “a distinct unit within BOEM.” That may seem to be the case, but BSEE is actually a separate bureau in the Department of the Interior.
The Department of Energy approved Alaska Gasline Development Corp’s (AGDC) exports of LNG from the project to countries with which the United States does not have a free trade agreement.
Backers of the roughly $39 billion project hope it will be operational by 2030 if it gets investments and all required permits. The LNG would be exported mainly to countries in Asia.
This picture was posted by MaritmePhoto. The”Blue Marlin” heavy lift vessel is arriving in Texas (2005) with the massive semisubmersible production platform “Thunder Horse” on board.
Above (from BOE archives): Pre-commissioning inspection of Thunder Horse
Thunder Horse has a most interesting history. The project was initially named Crazy Horse, but the name was changed out of respect for concerns raised by the Lakota nation. The massive structure is 136 m in length and 113 m in width, and is located in 6300′ of water in the Mississippi Canyon area of the Gulf of Mexico.
Many of you no doubt remember the near disaster during Hurricane Dennis (2005) when the platform was being commissioned. In light of the extensive pre-production hype for the “world’s largest production platform,” this was a costly and embarrassing incident for BP and the OCS program.
Findings indicate that failures associated with the hydraulic control system and its isolation on evacuation led to the partial opening of multiple hydraulically actuated valves in the ballast and bilge systems of the vessel. This allowed ballast water migration to take place, causing the initial listing (to approximately 16 degrees) of the vessel shortly after the hydraulic system was isolated.
The findings also indicate that ballast water migrated into manned spaces in the lower hull, via faulty and improperly installed check valves in the integrated ballast/bilge piping system. As the degree of list increased beyond the 16 degree mark, downflooding of seawater occurred, initially through overboard discharge lines and/or vents, and possibly later through the deck box as it entered the water. Since the PDQ was already listing at a 16 degree angle prior to the passage of Hurricane Dennis, wave action associated with the passage of the hurricane may also have contributed to the downflooding of seawater.
Although not an initiating event, failed Multiple Cable Transits (MCTs) and two unintended openings in the bulkheads allowed water transfer between watertight compartments, which led to extensive flooding and water damage in the lower hull.
Fortunately, there were no injuries. Repairs were made and production was finally initiated in June 2008.
After 12 consecutive weeks at the 371.6 million barrel level, the SPR has declined another 2 million barrels to 369.6 million barrels as of 4/7/2022. The SPR is now at its lowest level since 11/11/1983 when the reserve was still being filled.
Keep in mind that the SPR deficit is now 357 million barrels, and the maximum refill rate is only 685,000 bopd. So a complete refill at the maximum rate would require 521 days plus acquisition, operational, and maintenance delays. Filling the reserve to its 727 million barrel capacity was a 28 year process.
DOE management nonetheless seems maddingly unconcerned.
On 12/14/2022 I posted that California North Floating LLC was a subsidiary of Copenhagen Infrastructure Partners (CIP), and RWE Offshore Wind Holdings, LLC, a German multinational energy company. Andrew Doba, Director of Communications, has informed me that California North Floating is owned solely by CIP, and is not affiliated with RWE in any way. That post has been updated. Many thanks to Andrew for the correction.
HOUSTON, April 10, 2023 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Amplify Energy Corp. (“Amplify” or the “Company”) (NYSE: AMPY) today announced that it has received the required approvals from federal regulatory agencies to restart operations at the Beta Field. Initial steps to resume full operations will involve filling the San Pedro Bay Pipeline with production, a process which commenced over the past weekend and is expected to take approximately two weeks to complete. Following the line fill process, the pipeline will be operated in accordance with the restart procedures that were reviewed and approved by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA).
Odd that the news release didn’t mention BSEE, the agency which would have had to approve the resumption of production.
18 months after the pipeline spill near Huntington Beach, settlements have been reached, fines have been paid, and production from the Beta Unit has resumed, but the Federal investigation report is still unavailable. Why?
One would hope that this spill will lead to an independent review of the regulatory regime for offshore pipelines. Consideration should be given to designating a single regulator that is responsible and accountable for offshore pipeline safety (a joint authority approach might also merit consideration) and developing a single set of clear and consistent regulations.
The authors conclude that inventory emissions of CO2 (as reported to BOEM) “are generally consistent with observations from our aircraft survey, suggesting that combustion is well represented in the federal inventory.“
However, that is not the case for methane (CH4) emissions which are underestimated by the Federal inventories. As summarized in the chart below, deepwater facility methane emissions are consistent with the reported inventories, but shelf emissions in State and Federal waters differ significantly.
Comments:
As previously discussed, the lower CI for deepwater production is entirely consistent with expectations. When the most modern 5% (57) of GoM platforms are producing 93% of the oil and 76% of the gas, their CI should be impressive (which indeed it is).
As summarized using ONRR data, more gas-well gas was vented from 2015-2021 than was flared, which is not what you want from a GHG standpoint. Gas wells are predominantly at shallow water facilities, many of which are not equipped with flare booms.
Oil-well gas, most of which is produced at deepwater platforms, is flared rather than vented by a ratio of approximately 4 to 1.
One bad actor may have been a major contributor to the shelf methane emissions observed during the study’s observational flights. That company entered into bankruptcy proceedings. Presumably those issues have been resolved and more rigorous monitoring and enforcement practices have been implemented. I’ll be looking at the 2022 ONRR flaring and venting data for evidence of such improvement. The remainder of the 2022 data should be available in May.
The subject study’s only observational measurements were in August 2020. Followup airborne measurements would be helpful.
The study only considered production emissions. Shelf facilities are primarily natural gas producers and would thus have a lower relative CI when consumed.
“We don’t rule out anything, but that it is a state actor who is directly or at least indirectly behind this is of course our absolute main scenario, given all the circumstances.”
