The comment (pasted below) by the trade associations asserts that BSEE ignored the requirements of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTAA).
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BSEE and its predecessors (MMS and the Conservation Div. of USGS) have been incorporating industry standards since 1969, 27 years prior to the enactment of the NTTAA (1996).
The keystone of the BOP regulations, API Standard 53, is cited in 250.730, the very section of the rule that is under discussion. Seven other industry standards are cited in that section of the rule. Does this imply ignoring the NTTAA?
Regulators cannot cede their authority to standards development organizations. If a standard is outdated or deficient, the regulator must address the issues of concern.
Deviations between provisions in the regulations and API Standard 53 are expected and specifically provided for in 250.730 as follows: “If there is a conflict between API Standard 53 and the requirements of this subpart, you must follow the requirements of this subpart.“
For years, the production safety system regulations specified different leakage rates for surface and subsurface safety valves than those allowed in the API standards. An MMS research project addressed and helped resolve these differences.
While essential to safety and regulatory programs, standards are not a panacea; nor is the standards development process without weaknesses. One need only consider the case of the delayed cementing (zonal isolation) standard to appreciate both the importance of standards and the potential weaknesses in the development process.
I recommend we Nationalize the Oil and gas industry. I think the government is the right entity at this time to seize all the assets and infrastructure of the cartels. The resources mostly on public lands and water, belong to the USA anyway. It is time we transition more rapidly to renewables to break the leverage of the cartels on governments, and people, to stop wars and profiteering.
People are paying high prices and cartels like API, Exxon, Sinclair are making record profits from American’s purses. All the while escaping the costs of oil spills and leaks, and denying responsibility for climate change disasters and their costs.
Diverse input on proposed regulations is healthy and desirable. However, comments should not be posted at Regulations.gov unless (1) the commenter is identified and (2) the comments include at least one sentence about the regulation being proposed.
Per Regulations.gov. BSEE received 30 comments on the proposed revisions to the Well Control Rule, 25 of which have been posted. The other comments were presumably deemed inappropriate for posting per the guidance at Regulations.gov.
Two of the responses were submitted collectively by 8 industry trade associations. Only 3 operating companies commented and their comments largely echoed the trade association responses. Only 2 drilling contractors responded independently. Four service and engineering companies commented.
Three environmental organizations, a group of Atlantic states, a government watchdog, and a law school provided comments.
Three individuals and 4 anonymous or unknown parties commented.
Below is a list of the respondents preceded by their comment identifiers. More to follow.
Comments on the proposed revisions to BSEE’s Well Control Rule are due on Monday (11/14/2022). My comments were submitted yesterday, and I have attached a copy for those who might be interested. Bud
Comments on BSEE’s proposed revisions to the Well Control Rule are due in 27 days (by Nov. 14). Given the fundamental importance of well control to offshore safety and pollution prevention, all interested parties are encouraged to comment. Although some of the proposed revisions are rather nuanced, the document is neither long nor complex.
My completely independent comments are being drafted and will be posted here after they have been submitted to Regulations.gov.
My comments will explain why the proposal may reduce the rigor of the BOP system performance standard and will address a related shear ram issue. The comments will also discuss the management of BOP equipment failure and other safety data, the use of independent third parties and standards development organizations, dual shear rams on surface BOP stacks, ROV intervention capabilities, and BOP test data reporting and management.
Contrary to some post-Macondo commentary, well control has always been the highest priority of the US offshore regulatory program. This was the case regardless of the administration, party in power, responsible bureau, or politics of the day. The first specific well control requirements were in OCS Order No. 2 (Drilling) which dates back to 1958.
Continuous improvement must always be the objective; hence the many revisions to these regulations over the years.
BSEE’s recently proposed Well Control Rule includes updates that should be reviewed by all who are interested in drilling safety and well control regulations. I will be submitting comments to the docket and will post some of those comments on this blog. I hope others take the time to review the relatively brief BSEE proposal and submit comments
Industry comments are typically consolidated which limits the technical discussion and diversity of input. Consensus industry recommendations tend to be less rigorous from a safety perspective than some companies might submit independently. There are also far fewer operating companies than there were in the past. Most of you surely remember Texaco, Gulf, Getty, Amoco, Arco, Mobil, Unocal, and other important offshore operators that have merged into even larger corporations. This further limits the diversity of input.
Of course, the operating company is fully accountable for any safety incident at an OCS facility, including well control disasters like the 1969 Santa Barbara and 2020 Macondo blowouts. This should be ample incentive for comprehensive safety management programs. Unfortunately, risk management, culture, and human/organizational factors are complex, and good intentions don’t always lead to good results.
Although the operating company is legally accountable, the regulator and industry as a whole also bear some responsibility for safety performance. What is the purpose of the regulator if not to prevent safety and environmental incidents? Also, the industry can do better in terms of assessing data, updating standards, and publicly calling out poor performance.
On a more positive note, the offshore industry has collectively had some spectacular well control successes. Perhaps most impressive is this: Prior to 2010, 25,000 wells had been drilled in US Federal waters over the previous 25 years without a single well control fatality, an offshore safety record that was unprecedented in the U.S. and internationally. That number of offshore wells over a 25 year period is by itself a feat that will never again be achieved in any offshore region worldwide. The well control safety record makes that achievement extraordinary.
Kudos to BSEE’s Gulf of Mexico Region for their timely safety alerts and comprehensive updates on offshore incidents, trends, and compliance issues. Their most recent update is linked below.
For the past 50 years. my main goal for US offshore operations has been a zero fatality year. Sadly, that goal has never been achieved and will not be achieved this year (see slide 15).
Many casualties are associated with activities that are not perceived to be of high risk. The message on slide 22 of Jason’s presentation is thus very important:
Perceived low risk activities can still result in impactful injuries. Continually risk assess the work being undertaken, no matter if it permitted or nonpermitted work.
Know your personal limits and stop before you reach your limit. Pause and ask for help before you are at your limit.
“Our knowledge and expertise in geoscience and petroleum engineering represent advantageous foundation for CCS development, leading us towards our carbon emissions reduction target.”
Those who closely followed Australia’s Montara Inquiry in 2010 may be less convinced about PTTEP’s expertise. The Montara well suspension program was completely irresponsible. Even though the production casing cement was clearly compromised, PTTEP suspended the well without a single barrier in the well bore. The company was extremely lucky to have avoided a major safety, environmental, and economic disaster. Perhaps they are a very different company now; I certainly hope so.
Montara blowout, Timor Sea
The PTTEP announcement adds to our skepticism about the motives of some CCS proponents. Is CCS prudent public policy? That question is by no means settled and there has been very little opportunity for comment and debate. BOE has raised concerns and there are no doubt many more that have yet to be addressed.
[Disclosure: I assisted the legal team that defended Bob Kaluza. That said, I completely disagreed with the charges against him and Don Vidrine before my involvement in the case.]
Bob Kaluza (L) and Don Vidrine
Unsurprisingly, there was a lot of tough guy talk in Washington DC after the blowout:
“Our job is basically to keep the boot on the neck of British Petroleum”
It was therefore predictable that the Department of Justice (DOJ) would choose to prosecute BP employees individually. There were BP managers who would have been good candidates, but instead DOJ chose to criminally prosecute the working stiffs – the two BP well site leaders on the rig. They were the lowest ranking BP employees associated with the incident. This was apparently acceptable to BP, since their plea agreement blamed Kaluza and Vidrine’s for their role in overseeing the negative pressure test (#blametheworker). Never mind that:
BP management was responsible for the well planning and shortcuts that were the root causes of the blowout (see the previous posts in this Macondo series).
the extent to which the negative pressure test was misconducted and misinterpreted was and remains a topic of dispute.
there were no regulations or standards requiring this test or explaining how it should be conducted, and BP’s internal guidance was woefully inadequate.
Bob Kaluza was a temporary replacement for the regular well site leader, had worked primarily onshore, and had never conducted or witnessed a negative pressure test.
Kaluza and Vidrine were themselves victims and were fortunate to have survived the incident.
Despite all of this, DOJ still chose to prosecute the two well site leaders. However, the weaknesses in the DOJ case became more obvious over time, and DOJ dropped all but a misdemeanor water pollution charge. Vidrine, who had health issues that were exacerbated by the case, accepted a plea deal. Kaluza was confident of his innocence and chose to make his case in court. His defense team was very strong, and the trial was essentially a walkover. After less than 2 hours of deliberation, the jury fully acquitted Bob Kaluza (2/25/2016). Sadly, Don Vidrine passed away the following year.
Contrary to national and regional planning documents and the associated response exercises, Energy Secretary Chu, whose department had no jurisdiction over offshore oil and gas operations or the emergency response, assumed the leadership role on the well control aspects of the blowout. Secretary Chu is a Nobel prize winning physicist and had the President’s support to get involved with the response. Although he was not a drilling engineer or geologist, he soon became the dominant figure on well control decisions.
BP’s top kill operation (see diagram above) was intended to overcome and halt the flow of oil by pumping heavy mud into the well bore. Per an excellent paper by Dr. Mayank Tyagi and colleagues at LSU (Analysis of Well Containment and Control Attempts in the Aftermath of the Deepwater Blowout in MC252), the operation was not successful because the pumping rate and mud weight did not generate sufficient pressure.
Consistent with Dr. Tyagi’s analysis, the well would likely have been killed on 5/28/2010, shortening the blowout by 48 days, had Secretary Chu not stopped the top kill operation over the objections of BP engineers. While it was reasonable for the Secretary and his team to be concerned about possible casing leaks and the fracturing of subsurface formations, the subsequent (7/15/2010) closure of the capping stack demonstrated that the well had sufficient integrity to support the top kill operation. Questions about the aborted top kill effort and how that decision was made are therefore important and merit careful review. Did the Macondo well flow unnecessarily into the Gulf for an additional 48 days (5/28-7/15)? Did the National Incident Command facilitate or delay source control?
Keep in mind that the National Incident Command almost made a similar mistake in July. Even after the capping stack successfully shut-in the well on 7/15, Incident Commander Thad Allen (USCG) continued to call the closure of the capping stack a temporary test and threatened to require BP to resume flow from the well. We thus had a bizarre situation where the Federal Incident Commander was threatening to require the resumption of a blowout. Fortunately, informed input from experienced engineers prevailed. The well remained shut-in and the static well-kill operation was successful.
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 
This Well Control Rule comment, endorsed by 7 trade associations, hit a nerve. Here’s why.
Posted in drilling, Offshore Energy - General, Regulation, well control incidents, tagged BSEE, NTTAA, standards, standards vs. regulations, trade association comments, Well Control Rule on November 30, 2022| Leave a Comment »
The comment (pasted below) by the trade associations asserts that BSEE ignored the requirements of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTAA).
Reaction:
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