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Archive for the ‘accidents’ Category

While BP has established a $20 billion damage fund that is being administered by the Federal government, PTTEP, the party responsible for the Montara blowout in the Timor Sea, is taking a different approach.  PTTEP has denied all claims from the Indonesian government arguing that oil spill damages were limited to the immediate vicinity of the Montara field.  However, information presented at the Montara hearings indicates that the slick extended into Indonesian waters.

PTTEP Australia (PTTEP AA), a subsidiary of the Thai-listed PTT Exploration and Production Public Company Limited today (2 September 2010) confirmed the Government of Indonesia that it has not accepted any claims for compensation relating to the claimed impacts of oil released from the company’s Montara field in the Timor Sea last year.

What if PTTEP was the operator at Macondo?

PTTEP news release

Upstream report on the claim

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Click for an excellent summary of what may have gone wrong at Macondo and what can be done to prevent future incidents.

While there are no new details on the causes of the blowout, available information on the possible contributing factors is nicely summarized.  The presentation also includes a very good summary of risk management considerations.

Barriers against accidents are not only technical and operational and “physical” but are also non-physical built around strategic and organizational measures and decisions

During the Montara hearings and later in Macondo discussions, we raised concerns about the timing of the production casing pressure test. This issue has not received enough attention in our view, possibly because most of the Macondo focus has been on annulus flow and barriers.  It was good to see this comment in the presentation:

Pressure tested well far too early – could have blown out cement of shoe track

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Besides cutting through thicker steel, the new blade design – which features a wicked-looking spear in the center – requires less ram force to do the job, allowing use of lighter support equipment, such as smaller accumulator bottles that use compressed gas to slam the valves shut.

link

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This powerpoint presntation describes industry’s deepwater drilling safety initiatives.  Click to view.

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  1. They spent the week fishing (for drill pipe) at Macondo, without much success.
  2. More negative pressure tests have confirmed that the well is dead.
  3. The objectives of the relief well intercept are still a bit of a mystery.  As we have previously discussed, there are other (better?)  means of ensuring that the production casing annulus is plugged.  Is the intercept  just a risky and expensive ceremony?  Not according to BP CEO Bob Dudley who offered the following explanation: “there are several reasons for the relief well to be completed, including demonstrating that the difficult procedure can be done, providing more scientific data about the leak and giving closure to an oil-weary public.” The first and third reasons confirm the “ceremony” theory.  We don’t need to prove that you can complete a relief well, and the public needs solutions, not symbolic gestures. With regard to the “scientific data” argument, the intercept may provide some limited information on the condition of the annulus that will help to better understand the cause of the blowout. Whether that information is sufficiently important to justify the delays and added risks remains to be seen.
  4. The hurricane season continued to be kind.  Will the good luck hold?  While time has been less critical since the well was capped on 15 July and the endgame should not be rushed, we are surprised by the absence of urgency.
  5. We continue to wonder what the response would have been like if the responsible party was not a supermajor.
  6. BP and the Unified Command have still not given us their latest thinking on the Macondo flow path, even though some legislative and regulatory actions are being driven by flow path assumptions and speculation.
  7. Another garbage article about MMS’s “flawed culture” appeared in a major newspaper.  These articles are great theater; too bad their major premise isn’t true.
  8. A few former government officials, who showed little or no interest in offshore safety during their careers, have emerged to criticize the OCS oil and gas program.  Where was the criticism during the 40-year period when all was going well?  Why are the officials who have publicly voiced strong support for MMS personnel not being quoted?  These supportive comments have received almost no coverage.  Also, why are the Inspector General quotes limited to those that paint the worst possible picture of the offshore program and MMS?  These same Inspectors General have praised the overwhelming majority of MMS personnel.  Finally, those calling for more inspectors and other regulatory personnel might want to start by showing some respect and support for the staff that is already onboard.
  9. More silly comments about the evils of “industry standards” have appeared in the press.  BOE will address this nonsense later in the week.

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Since it’s already Monday morning in Oz, our Australian bureau has returned to work and is eager to pass on some news:

  • The sense in Australia seems to be that sensitive regulatory issues delayed the release of the Montara report until after the election (and perhaps much longer if another election is needed to resolve the stalemate).

We received this comment from an oil industry manager in Australia:

The Montara report damns the regulatory agency and there are many that think that is not appropriate.  That is the reason for the holdup.

Comment: I assume the report’s criticism is primarily directed at the Northern Territory regulator.  In defense of the regulators, the current division of responsibilities between the Federal government and the States is unworkable. You can’t have one agency responsible for well integrity and another responsible for rig and facility safety.  The US has similar issues with the division of safety authority among the Departments of Interior and Transportation (pipelines), and the Coast Guard.  If the regulatory responsibilities of the former MMS are not retained in a single bureau, but divided between the two new Interior bureaus, these problems could be exacerbated.  Most of the recommendations in my 11 May testimony before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources have received at least some attention.  One very important recommendation (no. 1) calling for a streamlined OCS regulatory regime, has not been addressed.

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The above photo, which was sent to BOE in an email message, illustrates that BOP tests are not risk free.  Apparently a pipe ram was blown out of the BOP during a stump (pressure) test prior to running the stack.  Fortunately, no injuries were reported.

Also (below), the 36″ conductor casing was flattened when the casing was run without ensuring that it was filled with sea water.

According to RigZone, the West Polaris is working for Petrobras offshore Brazil.

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BOE does not officially resume posting until 30 August, but we wanted to make sure you were aware of Magne Ognedal’s recent remarks to Upstream

“It is very frustrating,” Ognedal said. “We do not have the information we need to finish the job. We know from the transcripts of the inquiry that the Macondo and Montara blowouts appear to have very similar causes.  However we cannot draw any conclusions until we have access to the report.”

I also suggest that you read the text of Magne’s excellent speech during the Safety Luncheon at ONS in Stavanger.

Magne Ognedal Addresses ONS Safety Luncheon

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Colin Leach brought this paper to my attention: Subsea Accumulators – Are They a False Reliance? As BOP actuation and shearing power issues take center stage, this paper warrants further review.  Unfortunately, we were only able to link the abstract at this time.  We will post the full paper if permission is granted.

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Aug. 19, 2010 letter, click to enlarge

With the new BOP in place, and the capability to enter the well from the top, squeeze cement into the annulus, and set and test plugs, the relief well intercept appears to add nothing but risk.  Is the relief well being finished because of the repeated “read my lips” statements about its necessity or is there a valid reason that we are missing?

Also, with the well killed, should the Incident Commander be directing and approving operations that seem to fall under the plugging and abandonment category?  Those operations are under the purview of the Bureau of Offshore Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE) in the Department of the Interior.  (Actually, according to the applicable MOU, (see section 10), BOEMRE should have had the lead on well control and flow abatement since the well blew out on April 20.)

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