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Archive for the ‘accidents’ Category

BOE has received unconfirmed reports that BP’s internal investigation into the causes of the Macondo blowout will be released on Wednesday (8 September) in Washington, DC.  The investigation team of more than 70 engineers and other staff has been headed by Mark Bly, BP’s Group VP for Safety and Operations.  Stay tuned!

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if

Deepwater Horizon BOP Stack

Oh, what might have been …..

If this BOP had prevented the explosion, fire, and blowout, 11 offshore workers would still be alive, a mega-spill would have been prevented, tens of billions of dollars would have been saved, the Gulf region would have avoided a major crisis, the national economy would be stronger, and our energy future would be much brighter.

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This article is nicely done, but like most commentary on the factors contributing to the Macondo blowout, it assumes that the well flowed in the annulus outside the production casing.  Steps 1-3 would be irrelevant if the well flowed up through the shoe track and inside the production casing (ala Montara).

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While this accident has almost nothing in common with the Macondo disaster and would have received little attention if it occurred before April 20th, the Mariner fire deserves close scrutiny.  Thirteen workers had to jump into the Gulf and the platform was badly damaged (destroyed?).  This was a major accident that could have been much worse.

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Under the direction of the federal science team and U.S. government engineers, BP used the Development Driller II to successfully install a fully functioning and tested Blow Out Preventer (BOP) on the cemented Macondo 252 well. Earlier today, BP lifted the damaged BOP, which will now be lifted to the surface and recovered. During the period of time between the removal of the damaged BOP and installation of the replacement BOP, there was no observable release of hydrocarbons from the well head. This procedure was undertaken in accordance with specific conditions I set forth last week in a directive authorizing this procedure. This is an important milestone as we move toward completing the relief well and permanently killing the Macondo 252 well. I will continue to provide updates as necessary.” Admiral Allen

You have to love the wording of these Unified Command announcements.  I trust (hope) that the language in bold is added by the public relations staff, and that the Admiral and the science team are secure enough in their leadership roles that they don’t need to continuously remind people about their importance.

Have the Admiral and the science team also directed the operations that have not gone so well, or only the successes?  In particular, we would be interested in learning about the decision making process that led to the early cessation of the dynamic top-kill, the Unified Command’s insistence that pressure be vented after the well had been capped (fortunately, this decision was reversed), and the rationale for finishing the relief well intercept.

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BP has issued a report on the response capabilities and innovative new technology and procedures demonstrated following the Macondo blowout. While the report is somewhat promotional (understandably), the information is summarized and compiled in a useful manner and underscores the magnitude of the response.  Although most close observers probably have issues with certain actions taken by BP or the Unified Command, one cannot deny the unprecedented size and complexity of the response.  We can only imagine how chaotic this response could have been if the operator did not have the resources and the will to mount such an enormous effort.

I hope BP will be similarly forthcoming with the results of their internal review of the blowout’s causes.  When will that very important report be released?

At some point, BP’s candid observations on the functioning and effectiveness of the Unified Command system would also be helpful. The more we can learn about the differences of opinion and problems that arose during the response, the better we can prepare for future incidents.  Will any of the official investigations be looking into these aspects of the response?  At BOE, we are particularly interested in the well intervention, capping, containment, and relief well decisions.

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Fire on Mariner Platform, Vermilion 380 from CultureMap.com

Summary of what we know:

-Mariner Energy production platform in Vermilion Block 380 in the Gulf of Mexico

-13 workers rescued; no reported casualties

– light sheen one mile long by 100′ wide was reported (the Coast Guard subsequently said there was no spill)

-fire was extinguished Thursday afternoon

-recent production rate reported to be 9.2 million cubic feet of gas per day and 1400 barrels of oil per day

-water depth of approximately 340,’ about 100 miles offshore

-fire reported to have started on a platform deck away from the wellheads at 0930 CDT

-crew reported to have been painting and sandblasting at the time.

-fire reported to have been from flammable material in storage on the platform

-wells have been shut-in (presumably ESD actuated subsurface safety valves)

-The Coast Guard and BOEMRE will investigate

Representatives Henry A. Waxman, Bart Stupak, and Edward J. Markey from the House Energy and Commerce Committee sent a letter to Mariner requesting a briefing by Sept. 10.

picture from NationalGeographic.com

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While BP has established a $20 billion damage fund that is being administered by the Federal government, PTTEP, the party responsible for the Montara blowout in the Timor Sea, is taking a different approach.  PTTEP has denied all claims from the Indonesian government arguing that oil spill damages were limited to the immediate vicinity of the Montara field.  However, information presented at the Montara hearings indicates that the slick extended into Indonesian waters.

PTTEP Australia (PTTEP AA), a subsidiary of the Thai-listed PTT Exploration and Production Public Company Limited today (2 September 2010) confirmed the Government of Indonesia that it has not accepted any claims for compensation relating to the claimed impacts of oil released from the company’s Montara field in the Timor Sea last year.

What if PTTEP was the operator at Macondo?

PTTEP news release

Upstream report on the claim

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Click for an excellent summary of what may have gone wrong at Macondo and what can be done to prevent future incidents.

While there are no new details on the causes of the blowout, available information on the possible contributing factors is nicely summarized.  The presentation also includes a very good summary of risk management considerations.

Barriers against accidents are not only technical and operational and “physical” but are also non-physical built around strategic and organizational measures and decisions

During the Montara hearings and later in Macondo discussions, we raised concerns about the timing of the production casing pressure test. This issue has not received enough attention in our view, possibly because most of the Macondo focus has been on annulus flow and barriers.  It was good to see this comment in the presentation:

Pressure tested well far too early – could have blown out cement of shoe track

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Besides cutting through thicker steel, the new blade design – which features a wicked-looking spear in the center – requires less ram force to do the job, allowing use of lighter support equipment, such as smaller accumulator bottles that use compressed gas to slam the valves shut.

link

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